THE USE OF *OIKONOMIA* AND RELATED TERMS IN GREEK SOURCES TO ABOUT A.D. 100, AS A BACKGROUND FOR PATRISTIC APPLICATIONS

John Henry Paul Reumann

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Morton S. Enslin

Supervisor of Dissertation

William C. McDermott

Chairman of Group Committee

INDEX

References are to page numbers of the dissertation; "n." denotes that the term occurs in a footnote on that page. References to biblical passages are given in a separate index.

Acta Apostolorum Apocrypha, 542ff., n. 14; 557, n. 36

Acts of Andrew and Matthew, 558, n. 38.

Acts of Paul, 558, n. 38.

Acts of Peter, 543, n. 14.

Acts of Philip, 543, n. 14; 557, n. 36; 558, n. 38.

Acts of Thomas, 542, n. 14.

Acts of Xanthippe and Polyxena, 586, n. 124.

"Administration of God," 537-48; in the church fathers, 539-48; in Philo, 538; in Stoicism, 411ff., 537; relation to "Kingdom of God," 548, n. 18 See also "Economy of God" and *oikonomia*.

Administration of the Universe, in Stoic thought, 411ff.

Administrative organization: in Ptolemaic Egypt, 254-269; in Roman times, 269ff.

Administrative titles, in: Asia Minor, 232-44; Greece, 244-46; Hellenistic world, 232-248; Palestine, 246; Ptolemaic Egypt, 249ff.; societies, 234.

Adversus Praxean, 32, 71ff., 78, 550.

Aelius Aristides, 380.

Aeschines, 222, n. 38.

Aeschylus, 156, 328.

Aëtius, 400, n. 18; 434.

Agriculture, 166, 179.

aion, 98f.

Alexander of Aphrodisias, 149, 412-14, 428, n. 60.

Alexander Polyhistor, 533, n. 3.

Alexis, 154.

Alivisatos, H.S., 82-84, 94, 96, 546, n. 17.

Allegory, 444f.

Altaner, B., 14, n. 1.

Anaxagoras, 401.

Anaximenes, 349.

Andronicus Rhodius, 170, n. 45; 172, n. 49; 203, n. 119.
"Angel Christology," 45-47, especially n. 104; 563, n. 41.
Angelic hierarchies, 52ff., 559f.
Apocalyptic writings, 531, n. 1.
Apocryphal acts of the apostles, 13, 87, 94.
apoikonomein, *apoikonomia*, 149.
Apollonius of Tyana, 270.
Apologists, 34, 77, 80, 87.
Apophthegmata patrum, 64, 586.
Apostles as *oikonomoi*, 76, 104-107, 304f., 541, n. 14; 554f., 565f.
Apostolic Fathers, 34, 77, 540, n. 13; 610.
Application of findings to patristic usage, 537ff.
Aratus, 446f.
archōn, 289, 304, 568.
Aretaeus of Cappadocia, 322.
aretē, 178, n. 63; 334, n. 66.
Aristeas, Letter of, 533, n. 3; 609.
Aristophanes, 221.
Aristotle, 148, 156, 161, n. 17; n. 18; 162, 170-80, 184, 187, 206f., 214, 220, 223, 248, n. 106; 286, n. 208; 287, n. 209; 328, 349, 351, 394, 396, 433, 448, 551, 588f.
Arian controversy, 16-20, 42,
Arius, 543, n. 14.
Arius Didymus, 329, 441f.
Armenian version of Philo, 91, 142, 538, n. 11.
Arrian, *Epict. Diss.*, see Epictetus.
Artapanus, 533, n. 3; 609.
Asia Minor Theology, 30-33, 39, 57, 87f.; cf. 606f.
Astrology, 200, n. 116.
Athanasius, 17, n. 8; 28; 53, n. 108; 55, n. 116; 543, n. 14; 584; 587, n. 128.
Athenaeus, 328, n. 61; 340f.
Athenagoras, 540, n. 13.
Augustine, 113.

Bainton, R., 104, n. 20; 121, n. 80.
Barbel, J., 50, n. 104.
Bardy, G., 411, n. 41; 536, n. 7.
Barth, K., 99, n. 7.
Basil the Great, 223, n. 39; 544, n. 14; 557, n. 36.

Bauer, W., 5; 546, n. 17; 553, n. 26; 574, n. 89.

Bethune-Baker, J.F., 20-22, 31, n. 42.

Bigg, C., 16, n. 3.

Bishops as *oikonomoi*, 541, n. 14; 556, especially n. 36.

Boethus of Sidon, 435.

Bonhöffer, A., 392, n. 2; 476, n. 136.

Bousset, W., 46, 576, n. 93.

Bréhier, E., 404, n. 26; 405ff., 419ff.

Bultmann, R., 109, n. 33; 117, 535, 536.

Business, 210f., 219f.

Busolt, G., 231, n. 56; 287, n. 209.

Cadbury, H.J., 271, n. 165.

Caecilius, 359, 363f., 590.

Cappadocian fathers, 28.

Cassius Longinus, 381.

Chafer, L.S., 126f.

Charles, R.H., 575f.

Chenoboskion documents, 611.

Christ, 12, 39, 45, 76, 97ff., 109, 552, n. 26; 553, 575; as "Apostle," 555; as mystagogue, 565, n. 44.

"Christ-event," 484, 579, 583f., 610.

Chronological limits of study, 142f.

Chrysippus, 201, n. 117; 202f., 207, 217, 324, 405f., 408f., 411-414, 416-31, 493, 579, n. 100.

Chrysostom, 3, 11, 65, 530, 584, 601.

Church, 105ff., 115f.

Church administration, 556f.

Cicero, 162, 189, 204, 338f., 351, 354, 393, n. 4; 438; 527, n. 81.

Cleanthes, 202; 396, n. 12; 405, 408.

Clement of Alexandria, 80, 87f., 90, n. 98; 393, n. 6; 400, n. 20; 549, n. 18; 560; 561, n. 40; 564, n. 42; 572; 574, n. 90; 584, 601, 607, 613;
    use of *oikonomia*, 540f., n. 13.

Clement of Rome, First Epistle, 536, n. 7; 540, n. 13.

Clementine Homilies, 539, n. 13.

Cocceius (Johannes Koch), 10, n. 1.

Coelln, von, on *oikonomia*, 9.

College of *oikonomoi*, 233, 239-41.

Colophon, 238.

Colson, F.H., 610f.

Columella, 163.
Conclusions, on prepatristic use of *oikonomia*, 529-32.
Conrad, A.D., 130f.
Coptic, literature in, 611, n. 1; loan words in, 141.
Cornutus, 443ff.
Covenant theology, 125, n. 5; 552, n. 26; 569-77, 610; in post-Reformation period, 10, n. 1; relation to eschatology, 577; relation to history, 578-87.
Creator, God as, 481f.
Critias, 155.
Critobulus, 163; 195, n. 105.
Cullmann, O., 24, n. 20; 97-108; 112, 118, 130, 134, 304, 555, n. 34; 566, n. 45; 569, n. 59, 60; 578f.
Cyril of Alexandria, 65, 572, 585.
Cyril of Jerusalem, 586.
Cyril Lucar, 12.

D'Alès, A., 59-62; 78, n. 64; 95, n. 111; 96, 136; 561, n. 41; 570, n. 68.
Daniel, H.A., 10f., 391, n. 1
Dead Sea Scrolls, 189; 611, n. 1.
"De-eschatologization," 44f.; 102, n. 17; 115.
Demosthenes, 221, n. 36; 366, 379, 382.
De Mundo, 448-55.
Diaspora Judaism, 532, 534f.; as a link between biblical and Graeco-Roman worlds, 535-37.
diathēkē, 317, 572.
diathesis, 326, 373.
Dinarchus, 214; 221, n. 36.
Dinkler, E., 108-22, 134, 304, 531, n. 1; 555, n. 34; 566, n. 45; 569, n. 59; 579, 582.
Dio Chrysostom, 435, 458-61, 493, 547, 551, 553, 566, n. 45.
Diodorus Siculus, 204, 335-37, 581.
Diogenes Laertius, 181, n. 74; 323, n. 47, 399, n. 17; 409f., 437.
Diogenianus, 418, n. 50; 426, n. 57.
Diognetus, 540, n. 13.
dioikein, 53, n. 1-9; 509; financial connotation, 221f.; in the divine administration, 398ff.; related words, 150; rhetorical usage, 369f.
dioikēsis, usage in:
  administration of universe, 395ff.;
  church administration, 539, n. 13;
  Dio Chrysostom, 461f.;
  Epictetus, 462ff.;

dioikēsis (continued), in:
  fathers, 539, especially n. 13;
  financial use, 221ff., 276, 566;
  governmental titles, 231ff., 250, 276f.
  Philo, 75f., 81, 92, n. 101; 533, n. 4; 538.
  "rearrangement of the universe," 443, n. 85;
  rhetoric, 369ff.,
  Stoicism, 415ff., 535,
dioikētēs, 140, 230ff., 251ff., 266f., 276f., 282ff., 308, 499f; used of God, 415, n. 46.
dioikonomein, *dioikonomia*, 150f.
Dionysiac guild, 281.
Dionsius Exiguus, 98, n. 3.
Dionysius of Alexandria, 540, n. 13; 585.
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 222, n. 37; 373, n. 153; on history, 337f., 349, 440; on rhetoric, 359-63, 380, 590.
Dionysius of Syracuse, 186.
Dionysius Petavius, 14.
Dionysus, 407.
disciplina arcana, 19, 21.
dispensatio, 61, n. 5; 73; 140; 545, n. 16; 570.
Dispensation, in canon law, 8, 82f.
"Dispensation," as title for God, 454.
Dispensationalism, 123-28; 573.
dispositio, 30, 42, 60f., 73, 74, n. 49; 140, 356f., 373, 376, 545, n. 16; 571.
Dittenberger, W., 216, n. 26; 224, 274, n. 171; 281f.
Divine economy of administration, 391ff., 534, 537-48, 554f., 594, 612; in history, 579ff; in Stoicism, 404ff.
Dodd, C.H., 19; 116, n. 63.
Dogma, Christian, development of, 22ff., 38, 44ff.
Donatus, 341.
doxa, 88.

Eastern Orthodox Church, 8, n. 5; 12, 82f., 94.
"Economic conduct," 420, 587-608.
Economic Trinity, 31ff., 41, 67-70; 563, n. 41.

Economy of God, 391, 404ff., 555, 560, n. 40.

Egypt, 554; Ptolemaic, 224, 233, 249-69; Roman, 269f., 276ff.

Elert, W., 56, n. 117.

Empedocles, 400f.

Ennius, 527, n. 81.

Enslin, M.S., 578, n. 96; 592, n. 141.

ephapax, 103, 109f.

Ephesus, 232, n. 57; 237f., 275, 284, 567.

Epictetus, 92, 325, 385f., 397, n. 14; 435; 462-76, 494; 547, n. 14; 594; and Christianity, 473ff.

Epicureans, 160, 187, 189, 192ff., 219, n. 30; 404, 432, 521f., 540, n. 13; Jewish attitude toward, 404, n. 27.

Epicurus, 159f., 188, 395, 433.

epimelētēs, 257.

Epiphanius, 51, n. 106; 94, n. 108.

episkopē, *episkopos*, 147.

epoikonomein, *epoikonomia*, 149.

Eschatology, 43ff.; 100, n. 11; 109ff.

Estate management, 162ff.

Etymology, 144.

eu (adv.), 193ff.

Euphro, 324.

Euripides, 328.

Eusebius of Caesarea, 11, 53f., 205, n. 126; 393, n. 5; 401, n. 22; 443, n. 85; 533, n. 3; 540, n. 13; 563, n. 41; 578, n. 96; 585; 591, n. 141, 612.

Evil in the divine administration,
in Stoic thought, 419ff.;
in Christian thought, 430, n. 61.

Excerpta ex Theodoto, 561, n. 40.

"Existentialized eschatology," 116.

Expediency, 226, 589; in Epicureanism, 197-200; in rhetoric, 357ff.

Fowler, W.W., 331, n. 66; 581.

Frick, R., 548, n. 18.

Fridrichsen, A., 113, n. 47; 304; 555, n. 34.

Galen, 321; 406, n. 32; 434, n. 66.

"Galileans," 474.

Gass, W., 11-13; 85, n. 84; 96; 134; 391, n. 1.

Gataker, T., 7, n. 2.
Gärtner, B., 466, n. 121; 479, n. 140, 141.
Gilg, A., 49, n. 104.
Gnosticism: ecclesiastical organization in, 558, 559, n. 38;
  literature, 78, 611;
  pre-Christian existence of, 118f., 121;
  theology of, 23, 25, 39f., 54, 87, 94f., 100, 430, n. 61; 559; 561ff., n. 41;
  use of *oikonomia*, 61f., 78f.
Goodenough, E.R., 149.
Gottesbild, in Judaism, 479; in
  patristic thought, 63, 69, 479;
  Stoic, 407ff., 479ff.
Grant, F.C., 229, n. 48; 287, n. 209; 408, n. 36; 466, n. 121.
Gregory of Nazianzus, 28.
Gregory of Nyssa, 572.

Halicarnassus, 227.
Harnack, A. von, 13, n. 10; 22-29; 85, 95, 100, 128; 559, n. 38; 563, n. 41; 569, n. 59, 60; 606f.
Hatch, E., 348, n. 94; 391, n. 1; 429, n. 61; 480ff.
Hebrew loan words, 141.
Heikkinen, J., 129.
Heilsgeschichte, 24f., 27, 31-36, 68, 72, 88, 98-104, 107, 114f., 550, 552, n. 26; 569-77, 582;
  includes Greek learning, 560, n. 40; related to eschatology, 576;
  related to legalism, 577, n. 96.
Heracleon, 561, n. 41.
Heraclitus, 400, 422, n. 54.
Hermagoras of Temnos, 350-55.
Hermes Trismegisthus, 301ff., 568.
Hermetic literature, 92, 611.
Hermogenes, 372f.
Herodian, 144, n. 7; 149, n. 16; 217, n. 29.
Herodotus, 403.
Hesiod, 146f., 161, 503.
Hesychius, 145, 181, n. 73.
Hierarchial administration, 448ff.; in the church, 554-59; in policical world, 554; in heavenly realms, 559-64.
Hippocrates, 320.
Hippolytus, 26, 36, 52, n. 106; 61, 65, 67, 69, 87, 135; 399, n. 16; 401, n. 21; 563, n. 41.

Historians, Hellenistic, 329ff.; related to Luke, 583f., 586f.

Histories of Doctrine, 14ff. See also individual authors.

History, as a divine economy, 88, n. 92; 105, 334, 439f., 578-87; in the New Testament, 108ff.

hola, ta, the universe, 425, n. 56.

Homer, 144, 346f., 367-71, 402.

Homeric Questions of Heraclitus, 445f.

"Household of God," 546, n. 17, 552, n. 26; 557; 560, n. 40.

Hunter, A.M., 24.

Hypereides, 223, n. 38.

Idios Logos, 261ff.

Ignatius, 30-32, 38f., 87; 286, n. 207; 555, n. 33; 556, n. 36; 570.

Incarnation, 18, 34, 54f., 61, 63, 65, 67, 69, 79, 94, 610; gnostic influence, 562, n. 41.

Inscriptions, 133, 216, 218, 224ff. 235ff., 256ff. See also names of sites.

Irenaeus, 2f., 15, 25-27, 37, 39f., 54f., 59-62, 78-80, 87, 89, 95, 99f., 111; 482, n. 147; 530; 541. n. 14; 561f., n. 41; 571; 574, n. 90; 577; 604-07, 612.

Ischomachus, 165f., 178, 211.

Isidor of Pelusium, 145.

Isocrates, 323f.

Jacob, 90, n. 98; 596-602.

James, M.R., 543f., n. 14.

Jeremias, J., 530, n. 1.

Jesus, 109ff.; 475f.; 549, n. 18; 562, n. 41.

Jeuckens, R., 350, n. 101.

Jewish apocalypticism, 112, 118, 121, 534.

Jewish sources, use of, 56, 75f., 81, 609.

Jewish usage of *oikonomia* and related terms, 215, n. 22; 530, n. 1, 532-37.

Jones, A.H.M., 223ff., 231, n. 56; 252, n. 117.

Joseph, 207, 533, n. 3.

Josephus, 86; 404, n. 27; 440; 532; 582, n. 109; 609.

Justin Martyr, 2, 30, 77; 404, n. 27; 540. n. 13; 607.

kairos, 98ff., 109ff.

Kantonen, T.A., 129, n. 9; 131f.,

Kantonen, T.A., (continued), in: 144, n. 7.

katoikonomein, 149.

Kerygma, 18, n. 10; 23, n. 17; 47, 109f.

Kingdom of God, 45, 75, 109f.; 548, n. 18.

Kleist, J.A., 592, n. 141.

Koehler, W., 14, n. 2; 37-42; 51, n. 106; 57, 85; 563, n. 41; 569, n. 60.

kosmos, 396, n. 13; 481.

Kümmel, W.G., 43, n. 91; 45; 48, n. 104.

kyrios, 473; 548, n. 18.

Lake, K., 592, n. 141.

Lampe, G.W.H., 63, n. 11; 549, n. 18.

Landvogt, P., 150, n. 20; 225, n. 42; 230ff., 242ff., 269ff., 280ff.

leitourgia, 247f., 555, n. 34.

Lesbos, 245f.

Lexicons, 5.

Liechtenhan, R., 420, n. 53; 427, n. 59.

Lightfoot, J.B., 147, n. 13; 473, n. 131; 557, n. 36.

Lillge, O., 23, n. 19; 55, n. 114; 78, n. 63; 84-96; 134; 388, n. 174; 391, n. 1; 532, n. 3; 557, n. 36; 558, n. 38; 560, n. 40; 561, n. 41; 570f.; 606, n. 160; 612f.;

  criticisms of dissertation, 89-96.

Liturgy, Egyptian, 544, n. 14.

Loan words, 140-42.

Logos, 26, 52ff.; 69, 71; 76, n. 53; 400, 417, 437, 444, 581;

  in Alexandrian fathers, 560, n. 40;

  in Philo, 534, n. 4; 538, n. 11; 545, n. 16; 553; 563, n. 41.

Lohmeyer, E., 576, n. 93.

Longinus, 149, 326, 339f.

Loofs, F., 30-33, 85, 88; 569, n. 60.

Lot, 3, 602-06.

Lucian, 270, 286, n. 208; 477f., 494.

Luke, 531, n. 1; view of eschatology, 114f.; concept of history, 114f., 582-84.

Luther, M., 131.

Lycurgus, 221, n. 36.

Lysias, 153.

McGiffert, A.C., 15.
Magic papyri, 388, n. 174.
Magie, D., 234, n. 66; 238, n. 77; 242, n. 85; 248, n. 106; 273, n. 169; 274, n. 170.
Magnesia, 228f., 238f., 241, 285; 303, n. 246; 567.
Manilius, 438, 447f.
Marcellus of Ancyra, 31-33, 37, 42, 57, 135, 612.
Marcion, 430, n. 61; 481, n. 146; 571, 606.
Marcus Aurelius, 6, 92; 151, n. 24; 372, 387f.; 400, n. 20; 594, 611.
Marcus, pupil of Valentinus, 562, n. 41.
Marcus, R., 91, n. 99; 208, n. 6; 538, n. 11; 597-605.
Martyrdom of Matthew, 558, n. 38.
Martyrdom of Polycarp, 322, n. 44.
Martyrdoms, 585f.
Mary, 42, 79, 562.
Maximus of Tyre, 153.
Medical terminology, 320-23.
Melito, 578, n. 96.
Menander, 324, 517.
Memphis, Egypt, 290ff., 568.
Method of procedure, 143.
Metrodorus, 160, 188, 192.
metron, 196.
Metrophanes Kritopulos, 11.
Michaelis,,W., 48, n. 104.
Miletus, 224, 227, 273f.
Missionary task of apostles, 555.
Modalistic Monarchianism, 26, 41; 88, n. 92.
Moffatt, J., 576.
Mogilas, Peter, 12.
monarchia, 26; 63, n. 13; 70ff., 80f., 174, 182; 533, n. 4; 538; 545, n. 16; 550-54.
Monasteries, 149; 290, n. 217; 564, 568.
Monophysites, 28.
Montanists, 25, n. 22; 559, n. 38.
Moral Governor, God as, 482f.
Moses, 552, n. 26.
Moss, R.V., 570, n. 66; 572; 577, n. 96.
Münscher, W., 14.
Mylasa, Caria, 242f.
"Mystery" (*mystērion*), 206.

Mystery religions, 107, n. 25; 285ff., 303, 565f., 568.

"Natural theology," 536.
Nature, 184, 395-98, 405f., 409, 479.
Neoplatonism, 52; 563, n. 41.
Newman, J.H., 16-20, 27.
New Testament, eschatology, 110ff.; use of *oikonomia*, 76f.; 83, n. 79; 97-122; view of history, 120.
Novatian, 15, n. 2; 26, 30, 32; 49, n. 104; 61.
Numenius, 205.

Oakesmith, J., 519ff.
Offenbarungsgeschichte, 24, n. 20
oikia, 147; 552f., n. 26.
oikodespotēs, 473; 546, n. 17.
oikonomein, 65, 93, 140, 307, 311, 344; "administer a sacred office," 286; financial use, 226f., 282; "make legal arrangements," 312, 574.
oikonomeion, 149; *oikonomēma*, 218.
oikonomia, confused with *oikodomia*, 385, n. 170; illustration of uses from Plutarch, 494-528; range of uses in fathers, 65; summary on prepatristic uses, 487-494;
uses and meanings in or for:
  accommodation (in ethics), 2, 12, 18, 21, 27-29, 37, 57, 88, 306, 383-90, 492, 587-608;
    in fathers, 587f.; in Philo, 592-607; roots in pre-Christian usage, 588-92;
"administration of the Eucharist," 66, 94, 612;
administration of grain supplies, 257f., 279, 507;
"alms," 94;
architecture, 326f.;
arrangement generally, 2; 86, n. 86; 306-390; 491f.; 517f.;
  in history, 329-38;
  in letters, 338;
  in literature, 328ff.;
  in scholia, 341-47;
basileia, 549, n. 18; "contract," 318f.;
diathēkē, 312-17, 569-77;
divine administration, 2, 74, 391-485, especially 430ff.,

493, 518f., 594; summarized, 478-85;
encumbrance, 311;
"fair," market, 227;
financial usage, 206, 219-229, 319f., 511;
Heilsgeschichte, 24f., 569;
household management, 2; 86, n. 86; 153-205, 490, 495-501, 588;
"incarnation," 29, 61; 562, n. 41;
legal document, 318f., 573;
legal step, arrangement, 306-320, 573; for a census, 311;
for land registration, 311;
management in government, 2, 185f., 206-305, 490f., 501-17;
medical arrangement, 320-23;
military use, 74, 206, 209-13, 264;
music, 327;
of human life, 323-35;
political usage, 213-19;
"principle of divine government," 217f., 427;
rhetoric, 348ff., 492;
special divine interposition, 586f.;
"state revenue," 227;
wills, 312-17, 569-77.

oikonomikos (adj. and adv.), 65, 93, 140.

oikonomos, office of:
as a leitourgia, 555, n. 34;
as a term for deity, avoided by Christians, 77, 539-48; by Stoics, 416; exceptions, 542-44, n. 14; explanation, 545-48; Verhoeven's opinion, 541, n. 14;
cultic duties of, 241, 283ff.;
duties generally, 259ff., 265ff.;
ecclesiastic usage, 556, n. 35;
religious use, 564ff.; in New Testament, 288, n. 211; 285f., n. 207; in pagan world, 241, 283ff., 566-69;
used as title, in or as,
city-states, 232-46;
"city treasurer," 270ff.;
"for moneys" or "for supplies," 257f.;
guilds, societies, 280-83;
in Egypt, 250ff.;
of Caesar, 277f.;
religious cults, 283-305;
royal, 261f., 275.;
satrapies, 247;
village, 246.

Old Testament, 121, n. 80; 430, n. 61; 582, n. 109; 586, n. 126; 595-606.

Organization, administrative, in Egypt, 249ff.; influence on concept of heavenly hierarchies, 559-64; and ecclesiastical hierarchies, 554-59.

Oribasius, 323.

Origen, 15, 33, 40f., 87, 93f.; 415, n. 46; 431, n. 61; 444, 530; 543; n. 14; 560; 561, n. 40, n. 41; 570, 584, 607; use of *oikonomia*, 541, n. 13.

Otto, W, 286, n. 208.

Ovid, 456.

P, source in Old Testament, 577f., n. 96; 610;

Palatine Anthology, 189.

Papias, 591ff., n. 141.

Papyri, 5, n.1; 13, 86, 89, 133, 205, 218, 249ff., 256ff., 307ff., 321.

Parallel terms, ending in *-nomos*, *-nomia*, 148.

Parousia, 44ff., 101, 111ff., 582; cf. 267.

Paul, 3, 39, 46, 60, 62, 102, 104f., 109f., 494; 531, n. 1; 548, n. 18; 558, n. 38; 565; as mystagogue, 565, n. 44.

Pedagogy, divine, 27-29, 37, 40, 111, 115, 457ff., 595, 613.

Pergamum, 216, 225f., 285.

Peter, 3; 591, n. 141.

Peter of Alexandria, 547, n. 17.

Phaedrus, 204.

philargyria, 191f.

Philo, 63, n. 13; 75f., 86f., 90f., 93, 207f.; 374, n. 155; 419; 435, n. 67; 484; 532f., 535, 538, 545, 547, n. 17; 553; 589, n. 136; 590, n. 140; 609; "rule of God" in, 538; use of *oikonomein*, 538, n. 11; use of *oikonomia* as "accommodation," 596-604, 606.

Philodemus of Gadara, 153, 160, 163; 179, n. 67; 180, n. 71; 187; 188-200, 216; 416, n. 48; 589.

Phocylides, 145f.

phronēsis, 171.

Pittacus of Lesbos, 157.

Pistis Sophia, 78.

Plato, 156, 162, 165, 167-70, 173, 206; 222, n. 37; 394, 402; 429, n. 61.

Pleroma, 561, especially n. 41.
Plutarch, 68, n. 26; 143, 164f., 181, n. 74; 205, n. 125; 222, n. 37; 230, n. 54; 255, n. 120; 263, n. 143; 322; 334, n. 66; 350, n. 101; 373, n. 153; 393, n. 5; 411; 421, n. 54; 422ff., 433, 440, 456; 494-528, 594; religious views, 518ff.
Plymouth Brethren, 124.
Poland, F., 147, n. 12; 281, n. 191.
polis, 173f., 185ff., 213; related to *oikos*, 207ff., 501f.; related to *kosmos*, 392ff.
politikos, 169, 207ff.
Polybius, 87, n. 88; 211f., 214f., 220; 254, n. 120; 383-85, 395-398; view of history, 329-335, 580f., 587.
Posidonius, 436-41, 581.
Prayer, 543, n. 14.
Preisigke, F., 249, n. 107; 298ff.
"Presbyter-preacher source," in Irenaeus, 30, 606f.
Prestige, G.L., 5; 62-71; 94, 96, 134; 339, n. 75; 403, n. 25; 562, n. 41; 569, 572, 584f.; 606, n. 160.
Priene, 232, n. 57; 235f., 247ff., 285; 555, n. 34.
Prinz-Joachim Ostraka, 250, n. 107; 255, n. 123; 298-303.
Problem, statement of, 135-38.
Procopius, 599, n. 151; 603, n. 157, 158.
proekthesis, 583.
prooikonomein, *prooikonomia*, 149, 151; 341f.; cf. 140.
Providence, 64-7; 106; n. 24; 107, 184, 404ff., 429, 521.
Pseudo-Aristotle, 161, n. 17; 168, n. 39; 180-87, 220, 394, 551, 589; see also *De Mundo*.
Pseudo-Dionysius, 359, 365-71, 590.
publicani, 274.
Pythagoreans, 392; 397, n. 13; 398ff.

Quasten, J., 15, n. 3.
Quintilian, 339, 352, 355, 356-59.

Rabbinical literature, 609.
Rahner, H., 69, n. 33; 137; 613, n. 5.
recapitulatio, 40; 88, n. 92.
Reign of God, 533, n. 4; 609; see also Kingdom of God.
Reitzenstein, R., 485, n. 153; 539, n. 11; 565.

"Reserve" (of truth), 17-20, 57.
Revelation, 66.
Rhetoric, 348ff., 590; Attacist movement in, 359; development of, 348ff.; divisions of, 373; parts in, 349f.; Second Sophistic era, 372f.; Stoic theories of, 373.
Rhetorica ad Herennium, 355f.
Robinson, J.A., 7, n. 2.
Roman empire, role in history, 330f., 440, 547, 580.
Rose, H.J., 331, n. 66.
Rule of Faith, 13, 36f., 39, 80, 88, n. 92; 96; 482, n. 147.
"Rule of God," 537-48; see also "Administration of God."

Sabellius, 51.
Saintsbury, G., 193, n. 104; 348, n. 94; 372.
Samos, 224.
Sanders, L., 392, n. 3; 396, n. 12.
Sarapis cult, 240f., 303ff.; 403, n. 24; *oikonomoi* in, 290-297, 568.
Scheidweiler, F., 49, n. 104.
Schlatter, A., 404, n. 27; 582, n. 109.
Schmidt, K.L., 548, n. 18.
Scholiasts, 341-47.
Schweitzer, A., 44, 46, 103, n. 17.
Scofield Reference Bible, 125.
Scott, W., 190, n. 97.
Seeberg, R., 34-37, 56, 85, 96; 569, n. 59, n. 60.
Seleucid empire, 224, 232.
Semonides of Amorgoas, 146, n. 11.
Seneca, 203; 419, n. 52; 456.
Septuagint, 74, n. 49; 87; 533, n. 4; 574, 585, 609.
Seven seals on Roman will, 316f., 575-77.
Servius, 149, n. 16; 341f.
Sextus Empiricus, 396, n. 13; 400, n. 19.
Sharp, D.S., 397, n. 14; 474, n. 132.
Shorey, P., 332, n. 66.
Siegfried, C., 607, n. 162.
Simplicius, 401, n. 22.
Slaves, 175, 183.
Socrates, 159, 162-66; 169, n. 44; 178, n. 63; 210f., 424.
Sokolowski, F., 229, n. 48; 239, n. 78; 240, n. 80; 242.

Sophocles, 155, 342-46.

Stauffer, E., 47, n. 104; 119, n. 74.

Stewards, 179, 555, 564.

Stewardship, 106, 128-132.

Stobaeus, 406, n. 31; 408, n. 36; 418.

Stoic philosophy, 70, 392ff.; 534, n. 4; 551; and history, 579-82; criticized, 521f.; divine administration in, 404ff., 411ff.; ethics of, 409f.; evil as a problem in, 419ff.; Semitic origins of, 408.

Stoics, 201, 383f.; and rhetoric 350, 372-83, 590; concept of Stoic "wise man," 201f.

Strabo, 188, n. 93; 222, n. 37; 229, n. 49; 278.

stratēgos, 316f.

Suidas, 150, 155, n. 5.

Sulpicius Victor, 375f.

synodos, 280f., 567.

synoikonomein, 149.

Synoptic gospels, 113f.

Syriac loan words, 141.

Tacitus, 351.

Tamar, 603, n. 158.

tamias, 223, n. 39; 234, 242.

Tatian, 10f., 77f.; 322, n. 44; 391, n. 1.

Taubenschlag, R., 255, 318.

taxis, 105, n. 23; 166, 211, 326, 339, 349ff., 373ff., 446, 591.

Tax collecting, 259, 310.

technē, 162, 169f., 197, 210.

Tertullian, 15, 26f., 30, 32, 37, 52, n. 107; 57, 65-68, 72ff., 88, 95, 136, 174; 417, n. 49; 461; 545, n. 16; 549-54; 562f., n. 41; 571; 574, n. 90; 578, n. 96; 612; Trinitarian usage of *oikonomia*, 549-54; theories on, 550; influence of contemporary usage upon, 550-54.

Testament of Abraham, 533, n. 3; 609.

Theophilus of Antioch, 403, n. 25.

Theophrastus, 179; 180, n. 71; 191; 422, n. 54.

theos, ancient etymologies, 403.

Thucydides, 362.

Time, biblical concept of, 97ff., 108ff.

Tollinton, R.B., 572.

Trajan, 282, n. 191; 457f., 551.

Trinitarian use of *oikonomia*, 26f., 35f., 62f., 65, 549-54, 612.

Turner, H.E.W., 43, n. 91; 49, n. 104.

Tychē, in Polybius, 334, n. 66; 580f.

Valentinian Christology, 87f.

Varro, 204.

Verhoeven, T.H., 63, n. 13; 70-82; 134, 136; 210, n. 8; 391, n. 1; 461, n. 113; 533, n. 3, n. 4; 538, n. 11; 545, n. 16; 550f., 553; 561, n. 41; 566, n. 45; on use of *oikonomos* for Christ, 541, n. 14.

vilicus, 140, 273f.

Virgil, 149, n. 16; 163, 189, 341f.

Vitruvius, 326f.

Volkmann, R., 349, n. 96; 350ff.

Wealth, money-making, 170, 175f., 193ff.

Welles, C.B., 225, n. 42; 282, n. 193.

Werner, M., 43-56, 85; 100, n. 11; 115; 562f., n. 41; 569, n. 60.

Wilcken, U., 249, n. 107; 250ff., 290ff.

Williams, Isaac, 20, n. 12.

Windisch, H., 565.

Wisdom (in Old Testament), 535.

Wolfson, H.A., 404, n. 27; 608, n. 164.

Xenophanes of Colophon, 399f.

Xenophon, 6, 158f; 161, n. 18; 173, 176, n. 61; 177, 179f., 188, 191, 194ff., 209, 213, 230, 338; 386, n. 170; 402, 495; 538, n. 10; 588f.; *Oeconomicus*, 162-66.

Yahweh, reign or rule of, 534; 549, n. 18.

Zahn, T., 33, 87f., 576, 606, n. 161.

Zeno of Sidon, 189f., 201, 405, 408, 410, 416f.

Zenon Papyri, 249, n. 107; 252, n. 117; 257, n. 129; 268f., 309.

Zeus, 239, 304, 410-12, 415, 417, 426f., 432, 443f., 459ff., 477ff., 566, n. 45.

INDEX OF BIBLICAL REFERENCES

Genesis
19...602-06; 20: 10-11...600, n. 152; 27...596-602; 27: 16, 23...90, n. 98; 27: 18-19...598f.; 38...603, n. 158.

Isaiah
5: 1-7...547, n. 17.

Matthew
10: 25...546, n. 17; 13: 27 (cf. v. 37)...546, n. 17; 13: 52...547, n. 17; 19: 13-15...561, n. 40; 20: 11...547, n. 17; 21: 23...547, n. 17; 24: 43...547, n. 17.

Mark 591, n. 141.
1: 14-15...548, n. 18; 13: 35...552, n. 26.

Luke
1: 1-4...583, n. 112; 12: 42...543, n. 14; 13: 25...546, n. 17; 14: 21...547, n. 17; 16: 1ff....83f.; 128; 530, n. 1. See also main index.

John 116f.
14: 2...553, n. 26; 17: 3,8,18...555, n. 32; 20: 21...555, n. 32.

Acts 583.
1: 1-11...583, n. 112; 17...447, n. 92; 479, n. 140; 536; 18: 16ff....18, n. 10; 24: 25...18, n. 10; 20: 18-35...18, n. 10.

Romans
1-2...536; 9-11...105, 111; 11: 33...102; 16: 23...271; 16: 25f....102.

I Corinthians
1: 18-2: 13...19, n. 10; 4: 1...106, 285, n. 207; 541, n. 14; 555, n. 33; 559, n. 38; 565; 7: 20...422, n. 54; 9: 7...123; 9: 16...105; 12: 12...508.

II Corinthians
5: 17...111, 118; 6: 4...542, n. 14.

Galatians
2...3; 2: 11ff....571, n. 68; 3: 19...46; 4: 4...46.

Ephesians 7; 531, n. 1; 610.
1: 10...123; 2: 19...552, n. 26; 3: 2...123, 128, 397, n. 14; 541,

n. 14; 3: 9...102.

Philippians

2: 6-10...46; 4: 12...565, n. 44.

Colossians 531, n. 1.

1: 22-29...105; 1: 25...123, 397, n. 14; 1: 26...102.

I Timothy 531, n. 1

1: 4...128.

Titus

1: 2f....102; 1: 7...555, n. 33; 556, n. 36.

Hebrews

3: 1-6...552, n. 26; 555, n. 32.

I Peter 531, n. 1.

1: 20...102; 4: 10...286, n. 207; 555, n. 33.

Revelation

5: 1...575; 5:9...576.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Lists of Abbreviations xxv

Bibliography xxvi

Preface xxxiii

PART I PREVIOUS STUDIES:

EARLIER LITERATURE AND THE PROBLEM OF THE USE OF OIKONOMIA AND RELATED TERMS

Introduction 2

1. Lexicons, Dictionaries, and Encyclopedias 5
2. Early Attempts to Analyze Classical and Christian Usage 9
3. References to oikonomia in Histories of Doctrine 14
    - A. In English 15
        - 1) John Henry Newman on the Arians 16
        - 2) J.F. Bethune-Baker, Christian Doctrine 20
    - B. In German 22
        - 1) Adolf von Harnack 22
        - 2) Friedrich Loofs 30
        - 3) Reinhold Seeberg 34
        - 4) Walter Koehler 37
        - 5) Martin Werner 43
    - C. Summary on the References to oikonomia in Histories of Doctrine 56
4. More Recent Specialized Articles, Monographs, and Dissertations 59
    - 1) D'Alès: oikonomia in Irenaeus 59
    - 2) G.L. Prestige: oikonomia in Patristic Thought 62
    - 3) T.L. Verhoeven: oikonomia, in Tertullian especially 70

    4) H.S. Alivisatos: oikonomia in Greek Orthodox usage 82
    5) Otto Lillge: "Das patristische Wort οἰκονομία" 84
5. The Concept of oikonomia in Current Studies on New Testament Christianity 97
    1) Oscar Cullmann: Christ and Time 97
    2) Erich Dinkler: "Earliest Christianty" 108
6. Reflections of the oikonomia Concept in Popular Literature 123
    1) "Dispensationalism" 123
    2) "Stewardship" 128
7. Summary in the Light of the Earlier Literature on the Topic and Statement of the Problem 133
    The Problem Stated 135

PART II THE EVIDENCE:

THE USE OF OIKONOMIA AND RELATED TERMS IN GREEK SOURCES TO ABOUT A.D. 100

Introduction 140
    The Terms under Study 140
    Chronological Limits 142
    Method of Procedure 143
    Etymology 144
    Derivatives, Parallels, and Compounds 147
1. Oikonomia and its Related Terms in the Sense of Household Management 153
    Xenophon's Oeconomicus 162
    Plato on Household Management 167
    Aristotle's Comments on House Management 170
    Pseudo-Aristotle: the Oeconomica 180
    Philodemus: Peri oikonomias 188

2. Oikonomia and its Related Terms Applied to a Larger Household, in the State 206
Military Usage 209
Political Application 213
The Financial Emphasis 219
Specific Titles in Government Administration 230
Administrative Titles in the Hellenistic World 232
Administrative Titles in Ptolemaic Egypt 249
Continued Use for Administrative Titles in Roman Times and Beyond 269
The Terminology in Guilds, Social Organizations, and Religious Activities 280
3. Oikonomia and its Related Terms Applied to Arrangement Generally 306
Oikonomia Applied to a Legal Arrangement 306
In Medical Terminology 320
Managing One's Life 323
Arrangement in the Arts 326
Literary Arrangement 328
Applications in Rhetoric 348
Ethical "Arrangement" of Conduct 383
4. Oikonomia and its Related Terms Applied to the Largest "Household," the Universe 391
Order in Nature 395
Early Examples 398
The Stoics and the Divine Administration 404
The Administration of the Universe and its Administrator 411
The Problem of Evil in the Divine Administration 419

The Divine Administration in Later Philosophers 432

Dio Chrysostom and the Divine Administration 457

Epictetus and the Divine Administration 462

The Divine Administration, Summarized 478

PART III RESULTS:

SUMMARY ON THE USE OF OIKONOMIA AND RELATED TERMS IN GREEK SOURCES TO ABOUT A.D. 100, CONCLUSIONS AND TENTATIVE APPLICATION TO PATRISTIC USAGE, AND THE SIGNIFICANCE FOR FURTHER STUDY

1. Summary on the Use of oikonomia and Related Terms in Greek Sources to about A.D. 100 487
    - A. An Outline of the Uses 490
    - B. The Uses of oikonomia and Related Terms about A.D. 100 Illustrated in Plutarch 494
2. Some Conclusions and Their Tentative Application to Patristic Usage 529
    - The Significance of Jewish Usage of the Terms 532
    - A. The "Rule of God" or "Administration of God" theme 537
    - B. Trinitarian Usage of the Terms in Tertullian 549
    - C. Graduated, Step-by-Step Arrangement within an Administrative Organization 554
    - D. Religious Connotations to the Office of oikonomos 564
    - E. The Use of oikonomia in a Legal Sense for a Will or Testament as a Link to Patristic Application in "Covenant Theology" 569
    - F. History as a "Divine Economy" 578
    - G. Pre-Christian Background for the "Shady" Use of oikonomia as an "Accommodation" in Ethical Matters 587
3. Significance of the Findings for Future Work 609

LISTS OF ABBREVIATIONS

A. Classical and Patristic Sources

The abbreviations for texts cited from classical and patristic sources conform to those in *The Oxford Classical Dictionary* and other standard reference works.

B. Other Abbreviations,

Including Reference Works and Periodicals

AJA	*American Journal of Archeology*
B.T.	Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana (1849-)
Budé	Collection des Universitiés de France, publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé
CAH	The *Cambridge Ancient History* (1923-39)
GCS	*Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte* (edited by the Kirchenväter-Commission der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Leipzig, 1897-)
JBL	*Journal of Biblical Literature*
JHS	*Journal of Hellenic Studies*
Loeb	Loeb Classical Library
MS, MSS	Manuscript, manuscripts
OCD	*The Oxford Classical Dictionary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949)
O.C.T.	Oxford Classical Texts
PG	J.P. Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus completus, series Graeca* (1857-66)
PL	J.P. Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus completus, series Latina* (1844-64)
RE	A. Pauly, G. Wissowa, and W. Kroll, *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* (Stuttgart, 1894-)
RSV	Revised Standard Version of the Bible (1946, 1952)
TU	*Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristliche Literature* (Leipzig, 1883-)

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This Bibliography includes only those significant items cited a number of times in the body of the dissertation. In the case of items cited only two or three times, full bibliographical data is given in each instance in the footnote or a reference is supplied to the previous note where the information was given. In the case of items cited several times, full bibliographical data is found in the note the first time the work occurs, and a short title is assigned by which the work is referred to thereafter; these short titles are also listed here in the Bibliography, together with the facts about author, place, and date of publication.

Bibliographical listings for the texts of individual classical and patristic authors are not included here. These writers are cited in the dissertation from the standard texts in B.T., O.C.T., or Budé, and, for the fathers, in GCS or PG and PL. However, when the author is a minor figure or one who is little known, the bibliographical data is included in the footnote, even though a standard text has been used (e.g., for Maximus Tyrius in B.T.). When some other edition has been preferred for one reason or the other (usually accuracy or accessibility), the facts on the publication are presented in the note.

The short titles of lexicons and secondary works cited in the dissertation generally consist of the last name of the author or editor; in this Bibliography, these items are listed alphabetically according to the author's last name. In the case of collections of texts, epigraphical materials, papyri, and ostraca, the short title usually comes from the initials or an abbreviated form of the complete title to the work, rather than from the author's or editor's name; accordingly, to facilitate reference to these items, the arrangement here is alphabetical, according to the short titles in the left-hand margin, by which the works will be cited in the dissertation.

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B. Collections of Texts, Including Epigraphy

CAF	*Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta.* Ed. Theodore Kock. 3 vols. Leipzig, 1880-88.
CIG	*Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum.* Ed. A. Böckh and others. Berlin, 1825-77.
CIL	*Corpus Inscriptionum Latinorum.* Consilio et auctoritate Academiae Litterarum Borussicae editum. Berlin, 1862- .
Diels, *Dox. Graec.*	*Doxographi Graeci.* Ed. H. Diels. Berlin, 1879.
Diels, *Vorsokr.*	*Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker.* Ed. H. Diels. 3 vols. Berlin, 1934-38.
FCG	*Fragmenta Comicorum Graecorum.* Ed. A. Meineke. 5 vols. Berlin, 1839-57.

FPG	*Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum*. Ed. F.W.A. Mullach. 3 vols. Paris, 1860-81.
IG	*Inscriptiones Graecae*. Editae consilio auctoritate Academiae Regiae Borussicae. Berlin, 1873- .
IG Rom.	*Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes*. Ed. R. Cagnat, J. Toutain, P. Jouguet, and G. Lafaye. Paris, 1906.
Lipsius-Bonnet	*Acta Apostolorum Apocrypha*. Ed. R.A. Lipsius and M. Bonnet. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1891-1903.
OGIS	*Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae. Supplementum Sylloges Inscriptionum Graecarum*. Ed. W. Dittenberger. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1903-05.
Prinz-Joachim *Ostraka*	*Die Prinz-Joachim Ostraka, griechische und demotische Beisetzungsurkunden für Ibis- und Falkenmumien aus Ombos*. Ed. F. Preisigke and W. Spiegelberg. Schriften der Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft in Strassburg, Heft 19. Strassburg, 1914.
Rh. Gr. (Walz)	*Rhetores Graeci*. Ed. C. Walz. 9 vols. in 10. Tübingen, Stuttgart, and London, 1834.
Scott	*Fragmenta Herculanensia*. Ed. Walter Scott. Oxford, 1885.
SIG^2 or *SIG*^{3}	*Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*. Ed. W. Dittenberger. 3 vols., 2nd ed. Leipzig, 1898-1901. 4 vols., 3rd ed. Leipzig, 1915-24.
SVF	*Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*. Ed. J. von Arnim. 4 vols. Leipzig, 1905-24.
Wilcken, *Ostraka*	*Griechische Ostraka aus Aegypten und Nubien*. Ed. Ulrich Wilcken. Berlin, 1899.

C. Papyrology

BGU	*Ägyptische Urkunden aus den königlichen Museen zu Berlin: Griechische Urkunden*. 9 vols. Berlin, 1892- .
Edgar, *Zenon Papyri*	*Zenon Papyri in the University of Michigan Collection*. Ed. C.C. Edgar. Ann Arbor, 1931.
Mitteis, *Grundzüge and Chrestomathie*, Wilcken, *Grundzüge*	*Grundzüge und Chrestomathie der Papyruskunde*. Ed. L. Mitteis and U. Wilcken. Leipzig and Berlin, 1912. Erster Band: Historischer Teil, consisting of Erste Hälfte: *Grundzüge*, and Zweite Hälfte: *Chrestomathie*, edited by U. Wilcken. Cited as "Wilcken, *Grundzüge*," and "Wilcken, *Chrestomathie*." Zweiter Teil: Juristische Teil,

and *Chrestomathie*	consisting of Erste Hälfte: *Grundzüge*, and Zweite Hälfte: *Chrestomathie*, edited by L. Mitteis. Cited as "Mitteis, *Grundzüge*," and "Mitteis, *Chrestomathie*."
PAmh.	*The Amherst Papyri.* Ed. B.P. Grenfell and A.S. Hunt. 2 vols. London, 1900-01.
PCairo	*Greek Papyri, Catalogue général des Antiquités égyptiennes de Musée du Cairo.* Ed. B.P. Grenfell and A.S. Hunt. Vol. 10. Oxford, 1903.
PEleph.	*Elephentine Papyri.* Ed. O. Rubensohn. Berlin, 1907.
PGrenf.	Vol. I. *An Alexandrian Erotic Fragment and other Greek Papyri, chiefly Ptolemaic.* Ed. B.P. Grenfell. Oxford, 1896. Vol. II. *New Classical Fragments, and other Greek and Latin Papyri.* Ed. B.P. Grenfell and A.S. Hunt. Oxford, 1897.
PHib.	*The Hibeh Papyri.* Part I. Ptolemaic Papyri. Ed. B.P. Grenfell and A.S. Hunt. London, 1906. Part II. Ed. E.G. Turner. London, 1955.
PLondon	*Greek Papyri in the British Museum.* Ed. F.G. Kenyon and H.I. Bell. 5 vols. London, 1893-1917.
PMich. 2	*Papyri from Tebtunis, Part 1.* Ed. A.E.R. Boak. Michigan Papyri, Vol. 2. Ann Arbor, 1933.
3	*Papyri in the University of Michigan Collection: Miscellaneous Papyri.* Ed. J.G. Winter, Michigan Papyri, Vol. 3. Ann Arbor, 1936.
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POxy.	*The Oxyrynchus Papyri.* Ed. B.P. Grenfell, A.S. Hunt and H.I. Bell. 17 vols. London, 1898-1927.
PParis	*Notices et extraits des Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque impériale et autres Bibliothèques. Notices et extraits des Papyrus grecs du Musée du Louvre et de la Bibliothèque impériale*, publication préparée par feu M. Letronne. Extrait d'un rapport lu à l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres en 1850 par M.W. Brunet de Presle. Paris, 1865.
PPetrie	*The Flinders Petrie Papyri.* Ed. J.P. Mahaffy. 3 vols. Dublin, 1891-1905.
PRainer	*Corpus Papyrorum Raineri. Griechische Texte.* Ed. O. Wessely. Vienna, 1895.
PSI	*Pubblicazioni della Società Italiana per la ricerca dei Papiri greci e latini in Egitto: Papiri Greci e Latini.*

11 vols. Florence, 1912-35.

PTeb.	*The Tebtunis Papyri.* Vol. I, ed. B.P. Grenfell, A.S. Hunt, and J.G. Smyly, Vol. II, ed. B.P. Grenfell, A.S. Hunt, and E.J. Goodspeed. Vol. III, parts 1 and 2, ed. A.S. Hunt, J.G. Smyly, C.C. Edgar. London, 1902-1938.
PTurin	*Papyri graeci regii Taurinensis musei Aegyptii.* Ed. V.A. Peyron. 2 vols. Turin, 1826-27.
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PREFACE

The Greek word oikonomia is a term with a multitude of meanings, out of which it is often difficult for the reader or translator to choose the exact one in a given passage, just as is the case with such notoriously hard-to-translate words as the Greek logos and the Latin res. My own interest in the meanings of oikonomia and its related forms was aroused several years ago in reading Origen's apologetic treatise Against Celsus; here the word occurs again and again with a surprising variety of meanings, and I was not always sure how to render it.

Accordingly, when seeking a thesis topic in 1953, I suggested to my dissertation supervisor, Dr. Morton S. Enslin, an investigation into the meanings and course of development for this term in classical, biblical, and patristic literature. Any doubts about the possibilities latent in this topic were dispelled by a preliminary sampling of the primary and secondary sources. The word, beginning really with Xenophon, has rather wide usage in classical literature, branching out from its literal sense of "household management" into a number of applications in political life, history, literature, rhetoric, and especially philosophy. Though its actual occurrence in biblical literature is somewhat limited, the term oikonomia experiences a great and far-reaching development in the early Christian writers, so that almost every church father employs it in one sense or another — usually several.[1] The question therefore presented itself: how does a term so infrequent in the Septuagint

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[1] Oikonomia occurs in the Septuagint only twice, in the New Testament but nine times, and in the Apostolic Fathers (Ignatius, Diognetus, and the Martyrdom of Polycarp) on just six occasions. However, the word is found in the Apologists twenty times; it seems to appear in the extant parts of Irenaeus 120 times or more, and is found in Clement of Alexandria on 62 occasions. The Greek writings of Origen have it at least 125 times, and, if his Latin fragments are included, where the equivalent term dispensatio stands, there are 73 more examples for Origen. In spite of the disparity in size among these bodies of literature, the comparisons are striking, especially since the reader feels a growth in the shades of meaning as well as in the number of occurrences.

In the Septuagint, oikonomia occurs at Isa. 22: 19 and 21 (where the Revised Standard Version renders the term as "office" and "authority" respectively); in the New Testament, at Luke 16: 2,3, and 4 (once each; RSV, "stewardship"); I Cor. 9: 17 (RSV, "commission"); Eph. 3: 2 (RSV, "stewardship"); Col. 1: 25 (RSV, "divine office"); Eph. 1: 10 and 3: 9 (RSV, "plan"); and I Tim. 1: 4 (RSV, "divine training," or, in a note, "stewardship" or "order").

Of the related terms, oikonomos appears some 16 times in the Septuagint, regularly in the sense of "steward" or "official," and in the New Testament ten times, meaning "steward" (RSV) at Luke 12: 42, 16: 1,3, and 8, I Cor. 4: 1 and 2, Titus 1:7, and I Pet. 4: 10, "city treasurer" (RSV) at Rom. 16: 23, and "trustees" (RSV) at Gal. 4: 2; the and New Testament come to have such repeated and diverse usage in patristic literature?

Preliminary investigation also showed that, while the term *oikonomia* and the ideas associated with it have long been familiar, surprising gaps appear in the study of these words and concepts. Although collections of lexicographical evidence and brief discussions about *oikonomia* appeared as long as a century ago, subsequent inves-

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verb *oikonomein* is found only at Luke 16: 2 (RSV, "be steward"), and words from the verb *diokein* not at all in the New Testament, though all these terms are more common in the Septuagint.

On the above figures and for full citations, see, in the case of the Septuagint, E. Hatch and H.A. Redpath, *A Concordance to the Septuagint* (Oxford, 1897), 336 and 973; for the New Testament, Walter Bauer, *Griechisch-deutsches Wörterbuch*^{4} (Berlin, 1952), columns 1015f.; for the Apostolic Fathers, E.J. Goodspeed, *Index Patristicus* (Leipzig, 1907), 165f.; for the Apologists, E.J. Goodspeed, *Index Apologeticus* (Leipzig, 1912), 188; for Irenaeus, A. d'Alès, "Le Mot οἰκονομία dans la langue théologique de Saint Irénée," *Revue des Études Grecques*, 32 (1919), 1-9, summarized *infra*, 59ff.; for Clement, the listings in *Die griechische christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte*, 39 (Clemens Alexandrinus, 4) (Leipzig, 1936), 591f.; and for Origen, the listings in the same series, *GCS* 3 (Origenes, 2) (Leipzig, 1889), 504; 6 (Origenes, 3) (Leipzig, 1901), 338; 10 (Origenes, 4) (Leipzig, 1903), 644; 22 (Origenes, 5) (Leipzig, 1913), 387; 30 (Origenes, 7) (Leipzig, 1921), 574; 33 (Origenes, 8) (Leipzig, 1925), 481; 35 (Origenes, 9) (Leipzig, 1930), 307 and 321; 41,2 (Origenes, 12,3) (Leipzig, 1955), 250 and 387.

tigators have sometimes been seemingly unaware of these earlier studies,[2] or have relied on secondary collections of material as a basis for their specialized studies, without themselves examining certain primary sources, especially in regard to the pre-Christian backgrounds.[3] This situation is unfortunate not only because these early accumulations of data were merely selective and made no pretense at being even reasonably complete, but also because so many new sources, inscriptions and the papyri, for example, and texts, more accurately collated, have become available in the last century. Patristic study on the subject was thus in part vitiated because background knowledge of non-Christian Greek use was not all it could have been.

Preliminary investigation further demonstrated that, while most histories of Christian doctrine frequently note the term *oikonomia*, none of them really gives a comprehensive survey of the background, rise, and development of the concept, and, what is worse, some of the suggestions they make about the subject disagree with one another or are in outright contradiction. That there have been a number of articles and monographs on oikonomia, especially in the last two decades, was also made clear as the investigation continued, but sometimes these studies have remained unknown and unutilized by subsequent investigators for one reason or another. Moreover, these specialized treatments sometimes reach conflicting conclusions too, and none of them has tackled the total problem on the basis of a fresh survey of the pre-Christian backgrounds. Finally there is the fact that much of this secondary literature is in German, French, Dutch, modern Greek, and other languages, and there is a definite gap in treatments in English on the subject of oikonomia and its related terms.

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[2] For example, the old but basic survey by Wilhelm Gass, "Das patristische Wort οἰκονομία," in the *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 17 (1874), 465-504, where classical, biblical, and patristic data are assembled and discussed, is not noted in the article on *oikonomia* by O. Michel in the usually thorough *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament* (Stuttgart, 1949), Band V, Lieferung 3, 154f. All items of bibliography referred to in this Preface will be discussed more thoroughly in Part I.

[3] For example, both G. L. Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought* (London, 1936), and O. Lillge, "Das patristische Wort οἰκονομία, seine Geschichte und seine Bedeutung bis auf Origenes" (dissertation, Erlangen, 1955), assume a knowledge from the standard lexicons of prepatristic use.

In view of these findings, the dissertation subject proposed, on the meanings and course of development of oikonomia in classical, biblical, and patristic literature, seemed to merit full-scale research, and a method of procedure was outlined. In addition to examining all the pertinent secondary literature and the references suggested there, a firsthand analysis of the evidence was to be made in the primary sources — first, the non-Christian, prepatristic Greek writings, literary and otherwise; then the Jewish sources, including the Septuagint, Philo, and Josephus; next the earliest Christian documents, in the New Testament and the Apostolic Fathers; and then the pagan, heretical, and semi-Christian data from the second century A.D. on, including the Hermetic corpus, gnostic fragments, and apocryphal literature, followed, last of all, by an examination of the patristic writers, in groups (like the Apologists) or individually (for example, Irenaeus), in generally chronological order. It was agreed to carry on the investigation from the earliest classical Greek examples to roughly A.D. 400, terminating with such writers as Athanasius, Basil, Chrysostom, Cyril of Alexandria, and Epiphanius, all of whom were found to exhibit significant uses of *oikonomia.* It was also decided to broaden the project to include such naturally related words as the verb οἰκονομεῖν, the noun ὁ οἰκονόμος, and the adjectival and adverbial forms, as well as διοικεῖν, ἡ διοίκησις, and their derived forms.

During the next two years, therefore, in spite of a heavy teaching schedule at the Philadelphia Seminary, a large file was assembled of examples of these terms as used in classical, biblical, and patristic sources, with especial concern for the epigraphical and papyrological data, not fully examined before. Out of all this evidence began to emerge some of the conclusions embodied in this thesis, conclusions which had been tentatively reached and discussed with Professor Enslin and on a few of which I also lectured at the Seminary in the winter and spring of 1955.

At this point, word came, quite by accident, of a thesis presented in the spring of 1955 to the Theological Faculty of the University of Erlangen, Germany, by Otto Lillge, entitled, "Das patristische Wort οἰκονομία, seine Geschichte und seine Bedeutung bis auf Origenes." An immediate examination of it on microfilm showed that here was a simultaneous approach to the same general subject, but as an essay in *Dogmengeschichte* along theological and philosophical lines, rather than as an investigation from the philological and historical standpoint with stress on the classical backgrounds, which my study had assumed.

and in the light of a logical and chronological arrangement, the course of development for these words and concepts was described. In the process, a fairly orderly scheme of development emerged and with it a number of conclusions, surprising even to the author, which shed a good deal of light on later patristic usage and hinted at explanations for facets of patristic application which no investigator had apparently recorded previously.

When the length of this summary on previous literature and the discussion on non-Christian backgrounds in Greek began to reach three hundred pages in manuscript, and as the importance of these findings began to dawn more fully, Professor Enslin suggested a sharper delimitation for the dissertation from the _magnum opus_ originally outlined on the grand scale. Because of the emerging significance of what had originally been planned as an initial section on Greek backgrounds and in line with the more normal University standards on the length of dissertations, it was agreed at a conference on April 2, 1956, by Dr. Enslin, the departmental advisors, and the writer, that the actual thesis to be presented should deal with "The Use of _Oikonomia_ and Related Terms in Greek Sources to about A.D. 100, as a Background for Patristic Application," an appropriate subject in the Department of Classical Studies, yet in harmony with the interests of author and advisor, and reflecting the original startingpoint, in the church fathers. It was also agreed, however, that this dissertation is but the beginning for a larger investigation, for which the author has already gathered much of the data and which he hopes to continue in the future, and that the over-all interests and scope of the problem should be indicated in this presentation, especially in the introductory and concluding sections.

Furthermore, a critical reading suggested certain obvious shortcomings in method and limitations in scope in this German dissertation, as well as the possibility of alternate conclusions on certain evidence there analyzed. Such comments are in no sense a disparagement of the task Lillge has accomplished, for on many findings I find myself in agreement. However, the more thorough accumulation of evidence in certain areas through my own investigation and the tentative conclusions derived from this evidence helped explain along different lines certain problems he had encountered and provided some insights at which his treatment could not have arrived because of a more limited method of approach. After this careful examination into Lillge's thesis, Dr. Enslin and the departmental advisors at the University of Pennsylvania approved continuing with the research project.

During the fall and winter of 1955-56 the task of writing up the findings from the research data previously unearthed was begun. First a thorough treatment of previous literature on oikonomia, especially in its patristic usages, was assembled, presumably the most detailed discussion by far of the bibliographical data which has been attempted on the topic to date; some of the items, for example, were apparently not known to Lillge in his research. This bibliographical discussion attempts to summarize the current status of investigation, indicating agreements as well as disagreements, and is meant to serve as an introduction to the literature especially for nonspecialists in patristic study.

Next the hundreds of references gathered on non-Christian, prepatristic usages of oikonomia and its related terms were classified, Accordingly, Part I of the thesis will set forth a thorough survey of earlier literature on oikonomia and its related terms, especially in the church fathers, and in the light of this literature the problem will be stated generally and with regard to the many questions that emerge out of the secondary literature; and then particularly and in connection with the non-Christian, prepatristic usage which the dissertation will discuss.

Part II will then present the evidence in detail, including the texts and discussion of them, of these applications prior to the earliest Christian documents in the New Testament and the Apostolic Fathers.

Part III, last of all, will summarize the findings from this evidence on the chief pre-Christian uses of oikonomia and its related terms, illustrating how most of these nuances occur in a single writer, Plutarch (A.D. 46-120), at precisely the period when the earliest Christian literature was being written. Conclusions will be drawn from this evidence, including some examples of how these findings help clarify or explain difficulties in patristic applications observed by previous writers on the subject and never fully solved by them. Finally some indication will be suggested of the significance of this research for future work and the necessary tasks to be undertaken in the future.

The dissertation was approved on December 18, 1956, by the members of the Department of Classical Studies, Dr. Morton S. Enslin, supervisor; Dr. William C. McDermott, Chairman of the Group Committee; Dr. Lloyd W. Daly, first reader; and Drs. Edward H. Heffner, Henry M.F. Hoenigswald, and Michael H. Jameson. The defense of the thesis was accomplished on January 28, 1957.

Minor stylistic corrections having been made, the lengthy task of typing the final draft was begun late in December by a professional agency in Germantown, which soon, however, found the chore too great. Mrs. John D. Newpher then undertook the assignment, and to her I am indebted for an extremely painstaking and accurate performance of this exacting job. For her care, especially in the page layout, involving many footnotes and much Greek, in preparing the manuscript for microfilming, I here express my sincere thanks. I also want to express appreciation to a number of friends who helped in typing the second draft from my longhand, Mrs. Robert L. Binder, Mrs. Fred Walters, Miss Martha Brobst, Miss Hope Treichler, and Miss Betty Noll; to the librarians at the University of Pennsylvania and the Krauth Memorial Library of the Seminary for their willing assistance; and to Dr. T.G. Tappert, of the Seminary faculty, and Dr. Martin Schmidt, of the Kirchliche Hochschule, Berlin, who read portions of Part I.

To my professors at the University I wish to acknowledge an especial debt of gratitude, in particular to Dr. Daly and Dr. McDermott for their suggestions and counsel on a number of points. Above all, I should like to record my deepest thanks to Dr. Enslin for his able guidance in this project over the past years, his patience in helping me work through a mass of evidence and theories, his insistent advice to "prove all things," and his constant example at the tasks of scholarship; and also to Mrs. Enslin for her hospitality after Dr. Enslin became Professor of New

Testament at the Theological School of St. Lawrence University, Canton, New York— her graciousness made the crowded weekends of work there the past two years a memorable pleasure. While all these persons have been of inestimable help in producing this work, the views and all errors remain my own responsibility.

Finally I offer this work in dedication to my parents, from whom I have received a goodly heritage, not the least of which is encouragement and enthusiasm towards learning and truth.

John Reumann

The Lutheran Theological Seminary
at Philadelphia
Ascension Day, May 30, 1957

PART I

PREVIOUS STUDIES:
EARLIER LITERATURE
AND THE PROBLEM OF THE USE
OF *OIKONOMIA* AND RELATED TERMS

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Introduction

The word *oikonomia* and its related terms are well-known in both classical and patristic literature, occurring with some frequency, especially in certain writers.

Likewise well-known are the general lines along which this word and the complex of ideas associated with it develop. From the etymological and apparently original sense of "household management," *oikonomia* moves on to express the idea of "management" more generally, as of a city or financial affairs, and "arrangement," as of a composition or a speech or business matters, and then, raised to the highest exponent possible, to the sense of a divine "management" or "arrangement" of the affairs of the world — particularly the "economy of salvation" about which patristic writers delight to speak, often with reference to the career of Jesus Christ. Finally, there is a curious, but widely recognized, "shady" ethical sense, the "arrangement" of a matter "by economy," a device found both in later Stoicism and the Christian fathers, through which something otherwise offensive or questionable is seen in a new and more favorable light. There are numerous patristic examples of this shady sense — for instance, the attempts by Justin Martyr to show that Jacob's polygamy and David's sin with the wife of Uriah do not stem from fornication but proclaim instead "economies of some sort" with mysterious significance;[1] or the effort in Irenaeus to explain away the sordid story about the incest of Lot's daughters as an "economy" with spiritual meaning for the New Israel;[2] or, to take an application from the New Testament, the statement by Chrysostom that the quarrel between Peter and Paul at Antioch, reported in Galatians 2, was merely a sham fight, cooked up by the two of them as an "economy" to win over the Jewish brethren to Paul's plans![3]

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[1] Just. Mart. *Dial.* 134. 2 and 141. 4.

Our concern is to trace, in more detail than ever before, at least the beginnings of the complex and devious lines along which this development took place, noting especially the early, pre-Christian applications which determined in part and help explain the later trends and which serve as background for the variety of nuances in the church fathers.

Since, however, both the terms and the general lines of usage are so well-known and there has already been a great deal written on the topic, it is consequently necessary to note here some of the earlier literature, to which reference will be made at times later on.

Accordingly, in Part I a broad survey will be provided of the important literature which has appeared on oikonomia and related terms, classified under the following chapters:

1. Lexicons, Dictionaries, and Encyclopedias;
2. Early Attempts to Analyze Classical and Christian Usage;
3. References to oikonomia in Histories of Doctrine;
4. More Recent Specialized Articles, Monographs, and Dissertations;
5. The Concept of oikonomia in Current Studies on New Testament Christianity;

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[2] Iren. Adv. Haer. 4. 31. 1-2.

[3] Chrysos. Expos. in Gal. 2. 4.

6. Reflections of the oikonomia Concept in Popular Literature. Under each heading relevant items will be briefly characterized, and their significant contributions and suggestions for procedure noted.

Then in the light of this prior literature the problem will be sketched in general, along with still unresolved questions posed by this secondary literature, and last of all the specific problem with which the body of this dissertation is to deal will be stated concretely.

1. Lexicons, Dictionaries, and Encyclopedias

Almost all the standard lexicons, both classical and those concerned with biblical and patristic writers, provide a sampling of passages to illustrate the different meanings of the terms with which we are concerned.[1]

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[1] Among the standard lexicons which have been consulted are the following: H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon*, revised by H. Stuart Jones and R. McKenzie (9th ed.; Oxford, 1925-40), cited hereafter as "LSJ"; W. Bauer, *Griechisch-deutsches Wörterbuch zu den Schriften des Neuen Testaments und den übrigen urchristlichen Literatur* (4th ed.; Berlin, 1952) (an English translation by W.F. Arndt and F.W. Gingrich, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature* is announced for publication in 1957 by the University of Chicago Press), cited hereafter as "Bauer"; E.A. Sophocles, *Greek Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine Periods* (3rd ed.; New York, 1887). The long-promised *Oxford Dictionary of Patristic Greek* is scheduled to begin appearing in fascicles, probably in 1957, but a preview of its contents with regard to our terms is apparently available in G.L. Presige's *God in Patristic Thought* (London, 1936); see discussion *infra*, 62ff., regarding this important source.

For the papyri, especially valuable are J.H. Moulton and G. Milligan, *The Vocabulary of the Greek New Testament Illustrated from the Papyri and Other Non-Literary Sources* (London, 1914-29), cited hereafter as "Moulton-Milligan"; F. Preisigke, *Fachwörter des öffentlichen Verwaltungsdienstes Ägyptens in den griechischen Papyrusurkuden der ptolemäisch-römischen Zeit* (Göttingen, 1915), cited hereafter as "Preisigke *Fachwörter*";

In addition, in many cases, the texts and translations of certain authors who use the term *oikonomia* may be examined profitably for notes of varying lengths which editors have inserted on the specific use and meaning of the term in that author. Noteworthy examples in the classics include almost any edition of Xenophon's little treatise on household management, the *Oeconomicus*, and the reference in the Stoic meditations of Marcus Aurelius to things done "by economy" (κατ' οἰκονομίαν); the note written long ago by Gataker on this latter passage is cited, for instance, by almost every subsequent

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and F. Preisigke, *Wörterbuch der griechischen Papyrusurkuden* (3 vols.; Berlin, 1925-31), cited hereafter as "Preisigke, *Wörterbuch*."

Among the older lexicons, still invaluable for their rich citations, which have been consulted are H. Stephanus, *Thesaurus Graecae Linguae*, (3rd ed., edited by C.B. Hase and L. Dindorf; Paris, 1831-65), cited hereafter as "Stephanus, *Thesaurus*"; J.J. Wetstein, *Novum Testamentum Graecum* (2 vols; Amsterdam, 1752); Du Cange, *Glossarium ad Scriptores Mediae et Infimae Graecitatis* (Lyons, 1688 and 1890f.); and J.C. Suicer, *Thesaurus Ecclesiasticus e patribus graecis* (Amsterdam, 1728), cited as "Suicer."

For Latin usage, the most thorough listing is given, where the project has been completed, in the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*, under preparation from 1900 to date by five German universities; otherwise, see A. Forcellini, *Totius latinitatis Lexicon* (Padua, 1858-79), and, for later materials, Du Cange-Henschel-Favre, *Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis* (reprinted, Paris, 1840-46 and 1883-87). For certain individual authors, both Greek and Latin, the *index verborum* writer.[2] Likewise in the New Testament, most commentaries on Ephesians, for example, where the word oikonomia occurs three times, supply some sort of note on its puzzling meanings there.[3]

The wordbooks devoted to the theological terminology of the New Testament group together all the biblical references—and in the case of the Kittel Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament some examples from the earlier fathers—and discuss the concept of oikonomia.[4]

Finally, the various dictionaries and encyclopedias which are con-

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to their works has been checked, where such exists; in a few significant cases where there is no index verborum as yet, the text has been scanned.

[2] M. Aur. Ant. Med. 9. 18. The note by Thomas Gataker is originally in his edition Marci Antonini imperatoris de rebus suis (London, 1697), 400.

[3] The discussion by J. Armitage Robinson on Ephesians 1: 10 in his commentary St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians (London, 1907), 144f., is cited by many subsequent writers, for example.

[4] E.g., Hermann Cremer, Biblico-Theological Lexicon of New Testament Greek (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1888), 449f.; Gerhard Kittel, Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament (Stuttgart, 1933-), where the articles on oikonomia and oikonomos in 5, 151-55, are done by Otto Michel; and W.E. Vine, An Expository Dictionary of New Testament Words, A Comprehensive Dictionary of the Original Greek Words with their Precise Meanings for English Readers (London, 1939), 1, 320f., and 4, 74.

cerned with church history and doctrine also provide some insight into the development of the terms "economy" and "dispensation," but usually such articles deal only with later developments, particularly in regard to canon law.[5]

Thus these basic reference works provide a starting place in the sources and a general orientation.

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[5] John Henry Blunt, *Dictionary of Doctrinal and Historical Theology* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott and Company, 1870), 229f., gives a good picture of the early significance of the term "economy," particularly in its gnostic applications. The article on "Dispensation" in the *Cyclopaedia of Biblical, Theological, and Ecclesiastical Literature,* edited by John M'Clintock and James Strong (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1894), 2, 820f., is also of some interest, though dealing mostly with usage in ecclesiastical law. *A Dictionary of the Eastern Orthodox Church,* by R.L. Langford-Jones (London: Faith Press, n.d.), 47-50, is disappointingly sketchy in its article on "Economy," the main interest lying beyond the New Testament and patristic periods. A longer article is to be found in the *Dictionnaire d'archéologie chrétienne and de liturgie,* edited by F. Cabrol and H. Leclercq (Paris, 1903-). "Économe" is treated by Leclercq himself in Tome IV, part 2, 1884-86, and becomes really a discussion of the work of stewards (*oikonomoi*) in the administration of church affairs, citing most of its materials from later periods. The important *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum,* ed. T. Klauser and others (Leipzig, 1941-), has not reached *oikonomia* as yet. Brief articles, naturally, will be found in James Hastings, *A Dictionary of the Bible*

2. Early Attempts to Analyze Classical and Christian Usage

For over a century there have been attempts to classify and analyze patristic usage of *oikonomia* in the light of non-Christian meanings. Three of these early attempts are worthy of note even today for the lists of references they bring together, and the pioneer effort of the three is the brief discussion entitled "Oeconomia" contributed by von Coelln to the *Allgemeine Encyclopädie der Wissenschaften und Künste* in 1832.[1]

(New York, 1898), "Disposition," 1, 611, and "Steward," "Stewardship," 4, 615; and T.K. Cheyne and J.S. Black, *Encyclopaedia Biblica* (London, 1889-1903), "Steward," 4, 4797f. The following reference works deal with the subject only in the aspect of ecclesiastical law: *Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge* (New York, 1908), "Dispensation," 3, 448ff. (nothing is added in the two recent supplementary volumes to Schaff-Herzog, published as the *Twentieth Century Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge*, Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 1955); *The Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York, 1907-14), "Dispensation," 5, 41-46; Michael Buchberger, *Lexicon für Theologie und Kirche* (Freiburg: Herder and Co., 1935), "Dispensation," 3, 347; and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (Chicago, 1954), "Dispensation," 7, 423, cf. 935, and 13, 760B.

[1] *Allgemeine Encyclopädie der Wissenschaften und Künste*, ed. by J.S. Ersch and J.G. Gruber; Section III, O-Z, ed. by M.H.E. Meier and L.F. Kantz, second part (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1832), 14-16. Von Coelln's five divisions are 1) Ordering of the divine world government; 2) Divine ordering of an institution of salvation for men through the establishment of the Kingdom of Christ; 3) the Incarnation of the Logos; 4) the human nature taken on by the Logos; 5) in Tertullian, the distinction of a

Von Coelln's article provides a careful breakdown of a series of citations for the term, through only from patristic writers and later theologians, organized into five general categories. It offers a beginning and provides some helpful references to patristic examples — the discussion is far superior to many later encyclopedias — but no real attempt is made to sketch the historical connection and development between the various meanings.

This brief listing is supplemented and corrected in an eight-page discussion in H.A. Daniel's book, Tatianus der Apologet, published five years later in 1837.[2] Here, in order to clarify Tatian's use of the word

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Trinity of Persons in the Unity of Divine Being. As can be seen, the treatment omits the earlier classical usages and proceeeds logically, not historically. There are, however, a number of references to the later "Covenantal-theology" (Foederal-Theologie) in seventeenth-century German Protestant theologians, a post-Reformation reflection of the concept of economy, especially in the works of Johannes Koch (Cocceius) (1603-1699), on which, cf. further Gottlob Schrenk, Gottesreich und Bund im älteren Protestantismus, vornehmlich bei Johannes Cocceius (Gütersloh, 1923); for nineteenth-century representations of this theology, see Gustav Weth, Die Heilsgeschichte, Ihr universeller und ihr individueller Sinn in der offenbarungsgeschichtlichen Theologie des 19. Jahrhunderts (Munich, 1931). These late reflections are beyond the bounds of this thesis.

[2] Hermann Adalbert Daniel, Tatianus der Apologet: Ein Beitrag zur Dogmengeschichte (Halle, 1837), 159-164. Daniel's ten categories are arranged in a generally historical order: 1) management of household affairs; 2) management of the state; 3) management, ordering, arrangement in

oikonomia at Apology 8, Daniel gathers a larger number of passages from classical and biblical, as well as patristic, literature, and arranges them along the general lines of development which the term has taken historically. It is a performance which, for its general outline and specific references, no subsequent treatment can ignore.

A far more thorough treatment, however, is to be found in the 40-page monograph, "Das patristiche Wort οἰκονομία," published by Professor Wilhelm Gass, of Heidelberg, in the Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie for 1874.[3] While Gass makes no attempt to be exhaustive in his references, he does begin with the classical and biblical uses of the word oikonomia, and then, leaning heavily on Suicer's Thesaurus, traces the historical development of the many shades of meaning for the term. Most of his citations are from church fathers prior to Origen, but some attention is also given to subsequent development in writers like Eusebius and Chrysostom, and, in particular, to the usage of the word in seventeenth-century Orthodox writers like Metrophanes Kritopulos, the so-called "Lu-

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general; 4) as a technical expression in various branches of science and art; 5) in Stoic ethics; 6) God's management of the universe; 7) the work of redemption; 8) the Incarnation of the Logos; 9) the human nature of Christ; 10) Tertullian's use for the Trinity. The procedure, which begins with classical usages and then proceeds to patristic categories, is a sound one, and connections between Christian and non-Christian use are pointed out, as with the ethical application in Marcus Aurelius and the church fathers.

[3] Wilhelm Gass, "Das patristische Wort οἰκονομία," Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie, 17 (1874), 465-504. Cited hereafter as "Gass."

theran apostate," who later became patriarch of Alexandria, and Peter Mogilas, the metropolitan of Kiev.[4]

Gass also lays a stress on the ethical side of economy, as it developed in Orthodox practice, bringing his examples down, through numerous cases of exegetical legerdemain in the fathers (where something offensive is explained as "by economy" or as an "expedient arrangement"), to the incident in 1632 where Cyril Lucar's confession of faith was condemned by the Orthodox Synod, although his enemies, acting economically, "in order to save the honor of the Patriarch before the eyes of the world, sought to prove from inner reasons that Cyril himself could not possibly have been the author, while they nonetheless considered him to be!"[5] This tendency toward "economical behavior", dominated by "teleological pragmatism", Gass calls "a religious strength and . . . a moral weakness" in Greek Orthodoxy, and he sees a parallel development in the Western Church with the Jesuit principle, "The end justifies the means."[6]

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[4] Ibid., 491ff. Kritopulos visited Germany in 1624-25 and was much influenced by Reformation thought; Mogilas' Confession of the Orthodox Faith was written in 1643. On the subject in general, see W. Gass, Symbolik der griechischen Kirche (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1872), a discussion of the theology of the Orthodox confessions from 1453 to 1700, especially pp. 169-176 on "Die ökonomische Theologie." Gass' later article on oikonomia in ZWTh is really meant to be a supplementary verification of some points made in his book as he points out (p. 465).

[5] Gass, 499. Further on Cyril Lucar, especially in relation to Reformation theology, cf. E. Benz, Wittenberg and Byzanz (Marburg, 1949), and G.E. Zachariadis, Tübingen und Konstantinopel (Göttingen, 1941).

[6] Ibid., 501f.

Gass' article is, of course, by no means complete---its classical citations are rather scanty, there being only a half a dozen or so---and it is intended instead to be illustrative. There is a serious omission in the complete absence of any reference to the use of oikonomia in gnostic materials---the apocryphal acts of the apostles, for example. The whole performance antedates modern papyrus discoveries and so could not make use of the rich materials which have come to light in the last eighty years. However, the general trends are clearly analyzed, and Gass makes a number of stimulating suggestions, particularly his insistence that the doctrine of economy was influential in coining the Second Article in the Rule of Faith.[7] Every subsequent investigator is in his debt.

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[7] Ibid., 484.

3. References to oikonomia in Histories of Doctrine

Inevitably the various histories of Christian doctrine should include some notice and discussion of how the concept of oikonomia was applied and developed by early theologians. Indeed, there is mention of economy even in the first histories of Christian doctrine ever written. On the Roman Catholic side, for example, the De theologicis dogmatibus of Dionysius Petavius, sometimes called the "Father of Dogmengeschichte," who died in 1652, deals with it;[1] on the Protestant side, there are the works of Wilhelm Münscher, whose Handbuch der christlichen Dogmengeschichte, in four volumes, 1797-1809, presents a ten-page discussion of "Oekonomie," particularly in regard to its later exegetical and ethical applications by the church fathers, and whose Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmengeschichte, 1838, discusses the same doctrine both with reference to some of the fathers and the much later theory of accommodation advocated by J.J. Semler in 1760.[2]

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[1] The phrase, "Vater der Dogmengeschichte" is used of Petavius by B. Altaner, Patrologie (3rd ed.; Freiburg, 1951), 12. On Petavius' discussion of oikonomia, cf. Gass, 466.

[2] Wilhelm Münscher, Handbuch der christlichen Dogmengeschichte (Marburg, 1804), Band 3, section 39, pp. 157-167; Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmengeschichte (Cassel, 1838), Zweiter Hälfte, Zweite Abteilung, "Accommodation," pp. 135-140. Münscher is usually recognized as the first Protestant author of a history of doctrine, but Walter Koehler claims the honor should go to Samuel Gottlieb Lange, of Jena, for his Ausführliche Geschichte der Dogma a few years earlier; see W. Koehler, Dogmengeschichte als Geschichte des christlichen Selbstbe-

A. In English

The histories of doctrine which have been written in English, however, almost completely ignore the term and concept of oikonomia. A.C. McGiffert's two-volume History of Christian Thought, for example, does not even list "economy" or "dispensation" in its index, and I fail to find any mention of the idea even in its discussions of theologians who used the term frequently, such as Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Origen.[3] There are, though, some exceptions to this general paucity of discussion about oikonomia in English writings on the history of doctrine, and two of them may be mentioned here.

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wusstseins (2nd ed.; Zürich and Leipzig, Max Niehans Verlag, 1943), 1.

[3] Arthur C. McGiffert, A History of Christian Thought (2 vols.; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932-38). Even when a passage from Ign. Eph. 18, is quoted where the phrase "according to the economy of God" occurs, the quotation (1, 38) stops in the middle of the sentence, just before these words! At 1, 153, the phrase "plan of our salvation" is used in a citation from Iren., Adv. Haer. 3. 1, but with no indication of Irenaeus' extensive usage of the term oikonomia. The situation is no better in the other, briefer histories of doctrine written in English which I have examined.

One exception, along slightly different lines, is the Patrology by Johannes Quasten now appearing (Westminster, Maryland: Newman Press, Vol. 1, 1951; Vol. 2, 1953): I notice there references to economy in the discussions of Ignatius (1, 65), Novatian (2, 233), and

1) John Henry Newman on the Arians

The first of these is the study by John Henry Newman, Arians of the Fourth Century, their Doctrines, Temper, and Conduct, published in 1833.[4] Cardinal Newman's genius for words at times cloaks hasty scholarship behind the work, and few readers today will agree with all his findings; nonetheless the book is still stimulating reading and has a good deal of material on "economy," especially in its later sense of arrangement or "reserve" of truth.

Newman recognized the patristic application of oikonomia to the work of creation and the general system of providence as God's "arrangement" or management; further, to the dealings of providence with men; accordingly, the term "economy" or "dispensation" may be applied to "that series of divine appointments viewed as a whole, by which the Gospel is introduced and realized among mankind."[5] Since,

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Tertullian (2, 285,322). In some of the older English works on individual fathers, of course, proper mention is also given to the doctrine of economy; e.g., C. Bigg, The Christian Platonists of Alexandria (2nd ed.; Oxford, 1913). Perhaps a partial explanation is the fact that Dogmengeschichte has always been a German science which never wholly caught on in the English-speaking world.

[4] John Henry Newman, Arians of the Fourth Century, their Doctrines, Temper, and Conduct (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1833). Cited hereafter as "Newman, Arians."

[5] Ibid., 74f.

however, these economies or dispensations, which display "God's character in action," are marked by condescensions on God's part "to the infirmity and peculiarity of our minds," Newman argues that economic words or acts are particularly characterized by the qualities of condescension and tenderness---to use his favorite term, "reserve"---as, for example, Christ's conduct on earth.[6]

Similar condescension or reserve, Newman goes on, was practiced by early Christians, particularly the teachers of the church at Alexandria, in presenting the gospel to the world; it was the type of tenderness or reserve "with which we are accustomed to address those who do not sympathize with us, or whom we fear to mislead or to prejudice against the truth, by precipitate disclosures of its details."[7] There was thus "economical language," as Newman calls it elsewhere, "relating to matters beyond the direct apprehension of those to whom it is addressed, and which, in order to have a chance of conveying to them any idea, however faint, of the fact, must be more or less of an analogous or figurative character, as viewed relatively to the truths which it professes to report, instead of a direct and literal statement of the things which have to be conveyed";[8] and an "economical method of presentation," "of accommodation to the feelings and prejudices of the hearer, in leading him to the reception of a novel or unacceptable doctrine."[9]

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[6] Ibid., 75ff.

[7] Ibid., 42.

[8] John Henry Newman, Select Treatises of St. Athanasius (5th ed.; London, 1890), Vol. 2, 91. The comment comes from a short essay on "Economical Language" in the "Index of Annotations on Theological Subjects" written by Newman for Vol. 2 of his "free translation" of

This reserve or economy of truth Newman connects with the exoteric or external presentation of the gospel to the world by early Christians, as distinguished from the esoteric or internal instruction for believers in the higher mysteries of the faith, and he holds that the New Testament itself shows Paul often accommodating himself to the limits of his hearers, by presenting in the beginning only the first elements of truth which men could understand, as in the case of his address at the Areopagus, with the deeper doctrines, like the Incarnation or the Trinity, reserved for later esoteric instruction.[10]

Athanasius in 1881. It does not appear in the earlier, literal translation he made, while still a member of the Church of England, for the "Library of the Fathers" series, Select Treatises of S. Athanasius, Vols. 8 and 19 (Oxford, 1842 and 1844).

[9] Newman, Arians, 71f.

[10] Ibid., 42ff. Newman's chief examples are Paul's sermon at the Areopagus (Acts 18: 16ff.), where Paul begins with the conceptions of natural religion his Greek hearers would already possess and builds up to Jesus and the Resurrection on this basis, and the address of Paul to Felix (Acts 24: 25). Newman points up his contrast between exoteric preaching and esoteric instruction thus: "The first principles of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come, are urged upon Felix; while the elders of Ephesus are reminded of the divinity and vicarious sacrifice of Christ and the presence and power of the Holy Spirit in the Church [Acts 20: 18-35]" (p.47).

This whole approach of economical teaching in the early Church is further associated by Newman with the *disciplina arcana*, the notion of secret, oral tradition and instruction reserved for those who penetrate more deeply into the faith, an idea of which he makes much; "the one [reserve of truth] may be considered as withholding the truth, and the other [*disciplina arcana*] as setting it forth to advantage."[11] Finally, from this concept of economic teaching (κατ' οἰκονομίαν) or reserve of the truth in instruction, it is but a step to the practice of an actual economic *concealment* of the truth or even to economic *relinquishment* of a

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It seems impossible, however, to reconcile this concept with the picture of the public preaching of the apostles, as analyzed by Harnack, for example, in his *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte* (3rd ed.; Freiburg and Leipzig, 1894), 1, 73ff., (Eng. tr. by Neil Buchanan, *History of Dogma* (Boston, 1905 ff.), 1, 76ff.) or, more recently, C.H. Dodd, *The Apostolic Preaching and its Development* (Chicago, 1937). Both of these see the Cross and the Resurrection as the heart of this public preaching, and not as esoteric doctrines to be revealed only later to the convert who gradually builds himself up to such a teaching; the Cross and Christ crucified, a suffering Messiah, comprise precisely the offense Paul resolved to preach consistently after the unfortunate and comparatively unsuccessful experience at Athens, if we can trust I Cor. 1: 18-2: 13. However, Newman's point is a helpful warning not to simplify the apostolic kerygma too much; it had a richness, and an ability to adapt itself to situations, that transcend the partial knowledge of it which our sources supply.

[11] Newman, *Arians*, 65.

doctrine at times in argument or dispute, and Newman cites examples of each sort of conduct among the fathers, conduct, one might add, that often becomes submoral by normal standards.

While Newman's book provides no complete history of the doctrine of economy even in its later stages, it does offer a number of citations from the sources on the concept and sets forth in a most emphatic way the idea of economy as a method of instruction, language, and conduct, a "reserve of truth," an idea which was dear to Newman's own heart.[12] No real insight is provided into the classical background of the word, however, nor are any parallels offered for economical language and actions in pagan writers.

2) J.F. Bethune-Baker, Christian Doctrine

Reflections of Newman's emphasis on economy as "reserve of truth" are to be found also in subsequent literature in English on the history of doctrine. An example is J.F. Bethune-Baker's often reprinted work, An Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine to the Time of the Council of Chalcedon, perhaps the most convenient and complete book of its kind written in English.[13]

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[12] That economy played an important part in Newman's own thought and practice is suggested by the number of references to it in his writings; cf. Joseph Rickaby, Index to the Works of John Henry Cardinal Newman (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1914), 54. "The principle of economy is familiarly acted on among us every day," Newman wrote in A Grammar of Assent, p. 47, and in his Via Media, 1, lxi, he advocates "the great principle of Economy" as being as helpful to Catholics today as to the Old Testament and the School of Alexandria. Cf. further, Issac Williams, On Reserve in Communicating Religious Knowledge, in the series "Tracts for the Times," Vol. 4, no. 80, and Vol. 5, no. 87 (London, 1842).

Here, too, oikonomia is related to the "secret tradition" entrusted to the church, the disciplina arcana, handed down orally, according to this author, from Christ and the Spirit through the bishops and published only later. As part of the scheme, a "reserve" is assumed, practiced by experienced teachers in dealing with the "babes in Christ, the carnal hearers."[14] Bethune-Baker hastens to add, however, there is little evidence that such an economy of truth existed among Christians in their associations with one another, and this "stream of knowledge" seems not to have been of a different content from what the humblest believer in Alexandria knew. But Bethune-Baker also follows Newman in holding, in a long, detached note, that "such an 'economy' or 'accommodation' of the truth . . . is evidently legitimate and educationally necessary," though he admits the principle was sometimes extended in "questionable ways," examples of which are given.[15] All the examples are patristic, however, and there is no association offered with non-Christian usage.

It may be concluded that those histories of doctrine which have been written in English either ignore the concept of oikonomia in the early church or stress primarily its later sense of "economy of truth," especially under the influence of Newman's emphasis on that term.

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[13] J.F. Bethune-Baker, An Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine to the Time of the Council of Chalcedon (London: Methuen and Company, 1903). The work has been reprinted a number of times, and I quote from the most recent edition, the 8th, 1949. Cited hereafter as "Bethune-Baker, Christian Doctrine."

[14] Ibid., 34.

[15] Ibid., 39f.

B. In German

Hence it is necessary, in order to discover a more complete picture of the use of the concept, to turn to the more thorough works on the history of doctrine by German authors. The first effort we shall consider here, and in some ways, still, the most important, is the monumental work of Adolf von Harnack.

1) Adolf von Harnack

Harnack's Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, first published in three volumes in 1885, and translated into English from the third German edition by Neil Buchanan as History of Dogma,[16] is a classic effort to survey the literary remains of Christianity in their historical setting, and then, making use of whatever other evidence is available, to describe and account for the growth of doctrines through the centuries. In this process Harnack's thesis comes to the fore, that "dogma in its conception and development is a work of the Greek spirit on the soil of the Gospel,"[17] and his more famous description of the attempts of the first theologians to create a Christian dogmatic as "an acute secularizing or hellenising of Christianity."[18]

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[16] Adolf von Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte (3 vols., 3rd ed.; Freiburg and Leipzig: Akademische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J.C.B. Mohr, 1894-97). The references given in the Register of Vol. 3 are to the second edition, but the pagination of both these editions is given at the top of each page in the third edition. The English translation is by Neil Buchanan, History of Dogma (7 vols.; Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1903-07). Cited hereafter as "Harnack, DG^3," with the pages given first for the third German edition, followed in parentheses by the pages in the English translation by Buchanan.

The Index at the end of Vol. 3 in Harnack's third German edition lists only four references to "Oekonomie" or related terms, but a careful reading of his pages---and notes, which often pack more information and suggestions than the *text* of subsequent authors---reveals a number of other references to patristic writers who use the term *oikonomia* and, more important, references as to how they employ the concept, in this development of the gospel, in the Greek spirit.[19] Accordingly, though one finds no account in Harnack of how oikonomia first came to be used in early Christian writers and no real explanation of why the term came to have such a wide vogue, the volumes do note its chief nuances in patristic literature.

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[17] Harnack, *DG*^{3}, 1, 18 (Eng. tr., 1, 17). The latter part of the definition is often ignored, and Harnack himself found it necessary to emphasize the words "on the soil of the Gospel" in the face of contemporary misunderstandings at this point (pp. 22f.; Eng. tr., 21f.). Quite clearly, however, he does attempt to summarize the earliest gospel, as Jesus preached it (pp. 56-73; Eng. tr., 58-76), and in the "Common Preaching concerning Jesus in the first generation of believers" (pp. 73ff.; Eng. tr., 76ff.). There is therefore, according to Harnack, a kerygma, which forms one of the presuppositions for dogma (p. 75; Eng. tr., 78).

[18] *Ibid.*, 1, 215 (Eng. tr., 1, 227). Harnack regards the Gnostics as the first real theologians (p. 216; Eng. tr. 228).

[19] The German thesis by Otto Lillge, "Das patristische Wort οἰκονομία, seine Geschichte und seine Bedeutung bis auf Origenes" (Erlangen, 1955), discussed in detail on pp. 84ff., does not note, in its discussion of Harnack on pp. 1f., much more than the few

For one thing, Harnack often records use of oikonomia in the sense of a history of salvation which unfolds itself gradually in the biblical events (Heilsgeschichte).[20] Thus in the work of Irenaeus and his contemporaries, Harnack sees the orthodox Christian thinkers forging a doctrine of the economy of God in opposition to gnostic

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passages in the Index. However, in working through Harnack, I have found several dozen references and suggestions on the topic not noted in this Index.

[20] "History of Salvation" is the translation for Heilsgeschichte which Buchanan employs in rendering Harnack. F.V. Filson uses "redemptive history" for Heilsgeschichte in his translation of O. Cullmann's Christ and Time (Philadelphia, 1950), though Cullman himself seems at times to prefer an even more comprehensive term, Offenbarungsgeschichte ("revelational history") in order to avoid the connotations attached to the former term in use by the "Erlangen School" in nineteenth-century German theology, 27, note 10. Either "history of salvation" or "redemptive history" is far more satisfactory than "holy history" and like phrases. Heilsgeschichte has, however, by now entered English theological literature as an acceptable technical term——cf. A.M. Hunter, The Message of the New Testament (Philadelphia, 1944), 11, for example——and provides a far more convenient adjectival form, heilsgeschichtlich, than any English phrase. Accordingly, I have not hesitated to use the German words throughout the dissertation.

heresies, although not without influence from the Gnostics, who apparently made use of the terminology first. Irenaeus, who is "the first to whom Jesus Christ, God and man, is the center of human history," although "following the method of Valentinus, . . . succeeded in sketching a history of salvation, the gradual realising of the οἰκονομία θεοῦ culminating in the deification of believing humanity, but . . . always . . . within the limits of the Biblical [language]."[21] This concept of a history of salvation, unfolding itself by degrees (οἰκονομία θεοῦ) and corresponding to the several covenants, Harnack claims, owed "a great deal to the controversy with Gnosticism, or to the example of the Gnostics."[22] But Irenaeus himself, with his stress on redemption in Christ, and his constant wonder at the Incarnation, draws this step-by-step scheme of salvation together, preserving much of the early Christian tradition amid pronounced hellenizing of the gospel. Although admitting and adopting some gnostic formulae,[23] he makes the Incarnation "the final and supreme means of the divine economy by which God gradually brought the original creation . . . to completion,"[24] and frequently emphasizes his idea "that the whole economy of God refers to mankind."[25]

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[21] Harnack, DG^{3}, 1, 520 (Eng. tr., 2, 243f.).

[22] *Ibid.*, 1, 520, note 3 (Eng. tr., 2, 244, note 1); cf. 1, 517 (Eng. tr., 2, 240). On the place of *oikonomoi* in Montanistic church organization, another possible case of gnostic-heretical usage of a related term, see 1, 392, note 1 (Eng. tr., 2, 97, note 1).

[23] *Ibid.*, 1, 520, note 3 (Eng. tr., 2, 244, note 1).

[24] *Ibid.*, 2, 169 (Eng. tr., 3, 303).

[25] *Ibid.*, 1, 541, note 1 (Eng. tr., 2, 266, note 1).

Another application of the term oikonomia in the church fathers, which Harnack points out frequently, is to the Trinity, in the relation of Christ to the Father. Already in the Apologists, for example, the Logos is viewed not as "cut off and separated from God, nor is he a mere modality in him; he is rather the independent product of the self-unfolding of God (οἰκονομία)."[26] This concept of "administration of the divine sovereignty" or monarchy by the Logos as a sort of legal fiction becomes clearer in later writers, where μοναρχία κατ' οἰκονομίαν is a technical expression which preserves the Monarchy of God, or monotheism, yet at the same time allows the Logos an essential role in the activities of God, a "monarchy in accordance with the economy."[27] Such a notion of an "economic Trinity" is found in Tertullian, Hippolytus, and Novatian, and was particularly employed to oppose the strong trend between A.D. 180 and A.D. 300 toward "Modalistic Monarchianism," the notion that there was just one God who appeared in various modes, "the deity itself incarnate in Christ, . . . the Father become flesh."[28] Here again Harnack sees gnostic influence at work; just as with Irenaeus' use of oikonomia for describing redemptive history, here also Tertullian and Hippolytus seem to reflect gnostic notions; "the only difference is that Tertullian and Hippolytus limit the 'economy of God' (οἰκονομία τοῦ θεοῦ) to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, while the Gnostics exceed this number" with their host of aeons which share the administration of the divine sovereignty.[29] Harnack is also aware, it might be added, of the later decline of this "economic" concept of the Trinity, before newer dogmatic ideas.[30]

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[26] Ibid., 1, 491 (Eng. tr., 2, 211).

[27] Ibid., 1, 532 (Eng. tr., 2, 257); cf. 1, 654 (Eng. tr., 3, 7).

[28] Ibid., 1, 692ff. (Eng. tr., 3, 51ff.).

Still another patristic usage of oikonomia which Harnack observes has to do with divine accommodation and pedagogy, the belief that God, in granting his economy of salvation and economic unfolding of the Trinity to the human race, did so while accommodating himself to forms appropriate to the times and the comprehension of men. This involves, of course, a training or pedagogy of the human race, as well as divine accommodation, and Harnack notes it as early as Irenaeus; so he writes, that "the economy of salvation and Heilsgeschichte, which contained the conception of a divine accommodation and pedagogy, and which accordingly distinguished between constituent parts of different degrees of value (in the Old Testament also) is the great result presented in the main work [Against Heresies] of Irenaeus and accepted by Tertullian."[31]

This belief that God adapted himself economically to situations, however, soon spilled over to another application of oikonomia in the fathers, viz., to ethics, and the practice of doing something κατ' οἰκονομίαν, i.e., with a different real intention than seems apparent or with an adaptation of one's ultimate purpose to the immediate situation. This usage—the practice of "reserve" or "economical language," noted in Newman—Harnack also perceives. It causes problems in dealing with the sources, he points out, as when Athanasius claims that his predecessor Dionysius, in making some unsound Christological statements, was really speaking κατ' οἰκονομίαν.[32] Further, the Cappadocians often permitted themselves oikonomia, "pedagogic or political reticence," in connection with the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, reserving the doctrine that the Spirit is "God" until hearers were ready for it, and even concealing their real beliefs when expedient.[33] This tendency that "the truth be arranged" (οἰκονομηθῆναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν) through the "politic and prudent disguise and gradual communication" of it makes sources difficult to evaluate.[34] Worse yet, doctrinally, this type of conduct was attributed to God at times; Gregory of Nazianzus said God revealed the truth only οἰκονομικῶς, "only at the suitable times," and even that God did not demand the sacrifice of Christ but received it merely δι' οἰκονομίαν.[35] Harnack comments that this amounts to regarding God as a politician or pedagogue, and that if Athanasius had acted this way in the ὁμοούσιος controversy, "the Homoeans would have been the victors!"[36] Even the late usage of the phrase κατ' οἰκονομίαν, "by arrangement or accommodation," on the part of the Monophysites, and by the orthodox Christian, church fathers in explaining the apparent lack of omniscence in the earthly Jesus, does not elude Harnack.[37]

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[29] Ibid., 1, 534 (Eng. tr., 2, 258).

[30] Ibid., 2, 276 and cf. 282 (Eng. tr., 4, 111 and cf. 119).

[31] Ibid., 1, 577ff. (Eng. tr., 2, 304ff.).

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[32] Ibid., 2, 61f. (Eng. tr., 3, 183f.). Cf. Athanas. De decretis synod. Nic. 27.

[33] Ibid., 2, 280, note 2 (Eng. tr., 4, 116, note 1). Greg. Naz., Orat. 41.6, cf. Ep. 26.

[34] Ibid., 2, 61f. (Eng. tr., 3, 184).

[35] Ibid., 2, 62 (Eng. tr., 3, 184) and 2, 174f. (Eng. tr., 3, 309).

[36] Ibid., 2, 280, note 2 (Eng. tr., 4, 116, note 1).

Finally the principal, later Orthodox use of the word oikonomia as a specific reference to the Incarnation, is also pointed out several times in this comprehensive History of Dogma.[38] Indeed, even the Orthodox conception of the church which has come down to the present, as "the lawful steward of the mysteries" (ὁ γνήσιος τῶν μυστηρίων οἰκονόμος), is duly noted in the volumes.[39]

Harnack may be criticized for ignoring or assuming familiarity with classical and non-Christian uses of these terms, and for failing to show precisely how the doctrine of the divine economy he alludes to so often, arose and how it developed step by step to have so many different applications. His references, even when gathered together, as here, seem somewhat piecemeal. But he is not composing a monograph on this particular doctrine. Moreover, as so often, there is much in what he does have to say which not all future writers have observed.

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[37] Ibid., 2, 386, note 1 (Eng., tr., 4, 238, note 1) and 388, note 1 (Eng. tr., 239, note 2).

[38] Ibid., 2, 51 (Eng. tr., 3, 171), for example.

[39] Ibid., 2, 111, note 3 (Eng. tr., 3, 236, note 3) and 2, 421 (Eng. tr., 4, 279).

2) Friedrich Loofs

The briefer primer or guide to the history of doctrines by Friedrich Loofs, Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte, first published in 1889, but since revised several times, presents thirteen notices of "oikonomia (dispositiones)" in its Index, and offers further, stimulating insight into the use of the concept in the fathers, beyond what Harnack has to say.[40] This is because Loofs makes oikonomia one characteristic of what he is fond of calling the "Asia Minor theology" in the ancient church.

By "Asia Minor theology" ("kleinasiatische Theologie") Loofs means a distinctive understanding of the gospel, which arose——ultimately with New Testament roots, of course——in Asia Minor, that important center of Christian activity and thinking, in the first and early second centuries. It is a concept of the gospel which is reflected in the writings of Ignatius of Antioch; Justin Martyr occasionally; the "Presbyter source" on whom Irenaeus sometimes depends; Irenaeus himself, who presents a "Catholic formulation of the

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[40] Friedrich Loofs, Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte (4th ed., completely revised; Halle: Verlag von Max Niemeyer, 1906). The 5th edition, edited by Kurt Aland, was published in 1950 (Halle: Verlag von Max Niemeyer) with considerable revision; in some cases material in the older editions has been omitted, in others rewritten. There is no English translation. Cited hereafter as "Loofs, $\underline{\text{DG}}^4$" with references from the fourth edition, and those of the fifth edition added in parentheses. The Index listing is found in the fourth edition on p. 982.

Asia Minor theology"; Tertullian; perhaps Novatian; and particularly, at a much later date, Marcellus of Ancyra.[41]

This Asia Minor theology which Loofs sees in these writers——and it might be noted the whole notion of such a "school" of theology has been disputed by other investigators[42]——is characterized by at least two points of interest to us here. The one is a general *heilsgeschichtlich* framework, a view of things from the standpoint of redemptive history, at the center of which stands Christ as the revealer of God and the beginner of a new humanity——to use Ignatius' phrase, the οἰκονομία εἰς τὸν καινὸν ἄνθρωπον (*Eph*. 20: 1), a redemptive happening which results in the new humanity.[43] Inextricably intertwined with this is a second feature: an "economical trinitarian monotheism," which regards the divine monarchy of the one God as unfolding in three steps or stages in the course of *Heilsgeschichte*. Thus there is a triad involved, but this economical trinity has to do, not with later philosophical concepts of ousia and hypostases, but with the threefold way and manner the one God has revealed himself in the course of the history of redemption, a movement which may best be characterized as "economical."[44]

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[41] On Ignatius, see Loofs, *DG*^{4}, 98-104 (5th ed., 73-77); Justin Martyr, 127f. (5th ed., 96); the "Presbyter source," 103f. (5th ed., 77); Irenaeus, 139-151 (5th ed., 106-116); Tertullian, 158-161 (5th ed., 116ff.); Novatian, 189 (5th ed., 148); and Marcellus of Ancyra, 243-251 (5th ed., 190-196).

[42] There are varying views on the Asia Minor theology; for a brief summary on it in English, see Bethune-Baker, *Christian Doctrine*, 130, note 2. For a dissenting voice, cf. Harnack, *DG*^{4}, 1, 168f.

[43] Loofs, *DG*^{4}, 99 (5th ed., 73f.); for the same concept in Irenaeus, see 140 (5th ed., 107).

Ignatius, according to Loofs, shows the basic elements of such a theology, though in a fragmentary fashion only.[45] Justin and the Asia Minor Presbyter reflect it at times and lead on to Irenaeus, perhaps the chief representative of the movement. Irenaeus shows the "catholic shaping" of this older theological tradition, and it is in part by an examination of Irenaeus" works that it is possible to characterize the "pre-Irenaeus Asia Minor theology."[46] Tertullian, perhaps through his Montanist (Asia Minor) connections came under the influence of this Asia Minor theology, Loofs goes on, and in his Adversus Praxean "the concept of oikonomia became for him of decisive significance."[47] Novatian's doctrine of the Trinity is also labeled as "economical."[48] But most significantly, Marcellus of Ancyra, whose biblical theology seems almost an anachronism in the disputes of the fourth century, represents this same Asia Minor theology, according to Loofs---"more reactionary than revolutionary" by now, he calls it.[49] Marcellus views Heilsgeschichte as a series of oikonomiai wrought by God, precisely as in the old Asia Minor theologians---Loofs skillfully reconstructs much of Marcellus' thought from the very fragmentary quotations of him still preserved---and he also reflects the old economical-trinitarian monotheism, which is the reason why he opposed the philosophical terms and concepts being introduced into theology in his day, especially under Origen's influence.

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[44] Ibid., 101f. and 143f. (5th ed., 75f. and 109f.).

[45] Ibid., 98f. (5th ed., 73).

[46] Ibid., 139f. (5th ed., 106f.).

[47] Ibid., 158 (5th ed., 121).

[48] Ibid., 189 (5th ed., 148).

[49] The phrase is found in F. Loofs, "Die Trinitätslehre Marcell's von Ancyra und ihr Verhälthiss zur älteren Traditionen," Sitzungs-

Loofs provides us with further theory for thought---and a good many citations of the sources to back it up. He properly shows that any heilsgeschichtlich method of thinking (i.e., one which sees God working in history for the redemption of men) must have consequences for one's concept of God (i.e., leading ultimately to some sort of Binity or Trinity). Loofs shows how the two notions of Heilsgeschichte and an economical Trinity are intertwined in the theme of oikonomia, though not always too clearly; yet at the same time the two notions may be separated and often are in a given writer. There are excellent suggestions here, though not all problems are solved, nor have all scholars accepted the basic lines of solution Loofs proposes in every case. Again there is no attempt to survey non-Christian, prepatristic uses of oikonomia to provide insight into this elusive word.

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berichte der königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (1902), 764, cf. T. Zahn, Marcellus von Ancyra (Gotha, 1867), 217. In English cf. also Loofs' article in the Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 1953), "Marcellus of Ancyra," 7, 170f.

3) Reinhold Seeberg

A third, standard history of doctrine in German is Reinhold Seeberg's very competent Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, first published in four volumes in 1895, subsequently revised and expanded several times by the author, and translated into English in 1905, though greatly compressed, in a single bulky volume, as Textbook of the History of Doctrines.[50]

Seeberg is the only one of the German scholars who produced a Dogmengeschichte to include much of a discussion on the emerging development of Christian meanings for the term oikonomia, an obvious advantage for the average student who cannot be assumed to have a knowledge of the material in the larger lexicons or in a monograph such as Gass'. Although he includes no pre-Christian material, Seeberg does provide, in his first extensive discussion about oikonomia, a brief survey on the usage of the word in the New Testament and a rundown of its chief applications in the Apostolic Fathers, Apologists, and later writers, including citation of representative passages from them.[51] He notes that "from olden times men availed themselves of this expression in many sorts of application," and points out that the basic thought in it for patristic usage is "that God carries through a connected activity in the world, whether one thinks of the order and guiding of the world, or of the Incarnation of Christ, or of his or the apostles' working of redemption (Heilswirken)."[52] Thus there is a brief account of its course of growth, at least from the New Testament to Tertullian.

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[50] Reinhold Seeberg, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte (4 vols.; Leipzig: A. Deichert'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1st ed., 1895; 2nd ed., greatly expanded, 1908-10; 3rd edition, 1922-23). The English translation is by Charles E. Hay, from Seeberg's "revised German edition of 1904," but greatly compressed, with some parts completely omitted, originally published in two volumes, (Philadelphia: Lutheran Publication Society, 1905), but now reprinted with the two volumes bound as one (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 1954). Cited as "Seeberg, DG^3," with references from the third German edition and the pages of the English translation as reprinted in 1954 given in parentheses where the English includes the passage.

Specifically, Seeberg refers to two principal lines of application for the term in what he calls the antignostic fathers; first, in the sense of Heilsgeschichte or God's plan of redemption (Heilsplan), an application found particularly in Irenaeus;[53] and second, to the triune God, in the sense of an economical Trinity, a usage especially frequent in Tertullian.[54] The discussion of Tertullian's Christology and doctrine of the Trinity, incidentally, is particularly rich in notices of oikonomia and its related terms, and Seeberg sketches in some detail the development of that father's trinitarian views.[55]

Basic to the whole concept of economy, Seeberg says, is "the idea of the resolution of salvation (Heilsratschluss) and the sending of the Son which is thereby postulated, and then of the Holy Spirit."[56] The divine economy becomes therefore "God's administration of the world, effective in this sequence of stages":[57] the Father; the Father and the Son, or the Father in the Son; then, the Spirit, who "takes up his economy first at Pentecost."[58] It is accordingly possible to speak of "the revelational and working forms of three persons,"[59] and even of "the economical relationship of the three persons with one another"[60] in this economical Trinity. The same divine substance characterizes Father and Son, for example, and there is a unity and identity of the divine existence and nature, but there is also a separateness and difference, an oikonomia or dispositio, in the heilsgeschichtlich function of these persons.[61] Seeberg, as can be seen from these remarks, has a number of helpful comments on the redemptive activity of God and the relationship of this to the economical idea of the Trinity, in these antignostic fathers.

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[51] Seeberg, DG^3, 1, 421f., especially note 1 in the discussion of "Tertullian's Doctrine of the Trinity and Christology," omitted in the English.

[52] Ibid., 1, 421.

[53] Ibid., 1, 395 and 421 (omitted in English), and 1, 399f. (Eng. tr., 123f.).

[54] Ibid., 1, 419-425 (omitted in English).

[55] See, on this latter point, ibid., 1, 424.

Further, Seeberg provides the insights that this economical method of thinking "roots in the Rule of Faith" of the early church;[62] and that "the heilsgeschichtlich-economical principle also determines the reproduction of the Rule of Faith in Tertullian";[63] and that the eschatology of Hippolytus, "together with the idea of the 'economy' and the four covenants, . . .

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[56] Ibid., 1, 421.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid., 1, 420.

[59] Ibid., 1, 414, summarized briefly but misleadingly in Eng. tr., 125.

[60] Ibid., 1, 420.

[61] Ibid., 1, 414f. (Eng. tr., 125f.).

[62] Ibid., 1, 421, note 2.

[63] Ibid., 1, 400, note 2.

form the groundwork for a Christian philosophy of history."[64] Finally when Seeberg writes that in Irenaeus "the spiritual process of development of men" is comprehended as a divine economy,[65] and that human weakness is the reason which accounts for a gradual revelation on God's part of himself,[66] he is hinting at what Harnack called the pedagogic sense of economy, the notion of divine accommodation to man's understanding.

Actually, however, Seeberg never develops this last sense very much. The later usage of oikonomia in the Stoic sense of accommodation and for the notion of a divine pedagogy is generally passed over in silence, as is any real attention to the term oikonomia in Marcellus of Ancyra.[67] The same is true of its very common later sense of Incarnation. What Seeberg does have to say, however, is clear, well-organized, and quite correct in its lines of development, from the New Testament on, especially in regard to Tertullian.

4) Walter Koehler

A whole generation elapses before the next important attempts are made to cover the entire field of history of doctrine in a single work. At least two scholars in recent times, however, have undertaken, writing in German, to resurvey the development of doctrine, and the first of these is Walter Koehler, whose Dogmengeschichte als Geschichte des christlichen Selbstbewusstseins, a much thinner work than any of the three preceeding "classical" ones, first was printed in 1938;[68]

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[64] Ibid., 1, 471 (Eng. tr., 134ff., omits the paragraph).

[65] Ibid., 1, 435 (Eng. tr., 123f., omits the paragraph).

[66] Ibid., 1, 421, note 2.

[67] On Marcellus, cf. ibid., 2, 87-90 (omitted in English).

[68] Walter Koehler, Dogmengeschichte als Geschichte des christlichen Selbstbewusstseins (Zürich and Leipzig: Max Niehans Verlag, 1st ed., 1938;

As the title suggests, Koehler approaches the subject in a different way. *Dogmengeschichte* to him is not merely a history of officially promulgated dogmas, not "a working of the Greek spirit on the ground of the Gospel" as Harnack had said, not a "history of those statements of faith, the acknowledgement of which an ecclesiastical fellowship expressly demands of its members," as Loofs and Seeberg had implied, but it is, more broadly, a "history of Christian consciousness which comes to an awareness of itself."[69] It thus deals with Christian *thought*, not cultus, piety, or pronouncements, and while one might approach the subject historically or systematically or in the manner of the history-of-religions school, Koehler chooses to consider his subject a history of the thinking Christian self-consciousness, and thus of *ideas*——which may explain why there is comparatively little in the way of citation of source material. The term "economy" is mentioned, however, from time to time in his discussion.

In the letters of Ignatius of Antioch, for example, he says "a *heilsgeschichtlich* framework, an οἰκονομία εἰς τὸν καινὸν ἄνθρωπον, (*Eph.* 20: 1) is spun."[70] Thereby "Ignatius introduces the important concept of the οἰκονομία into the history of doctrine. The οἰκονομία εἰς τὸν καινὸν ἄνθρωπον. . . is the plan of redemption (*Heilsplan*) which refers to the new kind of man, i.e., Christ as the Beginner of a new humanity. Such an arrangement for redemption (*Heilsökonomie*) is a Christian concept of history and does not disappear as long as this makes itself felt; in fact

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2nd ed., 1943). Cited as "Koehler, *DG*^{2}" with references from the 2nd edition, which has made some few additions and corrections to the 1st edition; there is no English translation.

[69] Koehler, *DG*^{2}, 3.

[70] *Ibid.*, 139.

Paul already recognizes it (Gal. 4: 1f., Rom. 9-11, I Cor. 15: 47)."[71] Ignatius stands therefore at the beginning of emerging christological development; his paradoxical expressions about Christ are proof "we stand for the first time at the beginning of theology."[72] But this is not an Asia Minor theology, as Loofs proposed, which is "construction, not reality."[73] Koehler connects Ignatius with Gnosticism---by which he means not "acute Hellenization of Christianity" (Harnack), but "syncretism, the entrance of Christianity into the general syncretistic stream."[74] Such a Weltanschauungssystem, a theology in the full sense of the word, "spawned" him; "Ignatius of Antioch stands in the swell of Gnosis."[75]

Later on, after the rise of the early Catholic church, with its threefold emphasis, against Gnosticism, on canon, regula fidei, and the apostolic-monarchian episcopate,[76] Irenaeus emerges as an outspoken church theologian with a strongly monistic system in opposition to the Gnostics. In Irenaeus "the idea of the economy of salvation (Heilsökonomie) and Logos-speculation are combined with one another," and the "divine humanity

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[71] Ibid., 37.

[72] Ibid., 140.

[73] Ibid., 37.

[74] Ibid., 38.

[75] Ibid., 37. On Ignatius as a gnostic, cf. further H. Schlier, Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zu den Ignatiusbriefen (Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft, 8; Giessen, 1929).

[76] Koehler, DG^2, 67, characterizes this threefold authority very compactly as "Offenbarungsbuch, Offenbarungsglaube, und das Amt als Trager des Offenbarungsgeistes."

(*Gottmenschheit*) of Christ is the central point of the economy of salvation (*Heilsökonomie*) and of faith."[77] According to this system, "the Creator-God is the Redeemer-God and carries through a definite plan; he has an 'economy.' But his economy is different from the gnostic one. In Gnosis, at the peak stands a metaphysical dualism; this was to have continued to remain, but was destroyed through a mixing of material and spirit in a manner contrary to the divine; redemption was consequently a separation of that connected contrary to nature. In Irenaeus, at the peak stands unity; it was broken through Adam's fall into sin; consequently redemption is a reuniting of that separated contrary to nature: *recapitulatio*, ἀνακεφαλαίωσις. The economy is constructed step by step; it is divine pedagogy, and Irenaeus has the idea of an education of the human race."[78] Moreover since Irenaeus has enumerated, as part of this economy or scheme of redemption, two covenants, Old and New, he "has thereby become the founder of covenantal theology; where this emerges, there always lies the thought at bottom of an historical *oeconomia salutis*."[79] To put it another way, redemption, immortality, incorruptibility, restoration of the image of God—"Irenaeus has brought together these ideas in an economy of salvation, under the central point of recapitulation (ἀνακεφαλαίωσις)."[80] Certainly, as these quotations show, Koehler is not unaware of the importance of *oikonomia* in the writings of Irenaeus.

Further, Koehler notes the presence of *oikonomia* in the thought of Origen. It is different here from the essentially biblical economy of salvation found in Irenaeus, however. Origen's Heilsökonomie or economy of salvation is, as Koehler puts it succinctly, not Heilsgeschichte, which is vividly real in the framework of the two covenants, but Heilstheorie, a theory of salvation, which was similar in some ways to gnostic world descriptions, a sort of "catholicized Gnosis" (verkirchlichte Gnosis).[81]

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[77] *Ibid.*, 143.

[78] *Ibid.*, 42.

[79] *Ibid.*

[80] *Ibid.*, 172.

Koehler also observes from time to time the use of the concept of an economical Trinity, as in the struggle with the Monarchians.[82] In the face of Monarchian opposition and the danger of bitheism, Tertullian argues for an "economical monarchy," and thus "there is the concept of the Trinity here for the first time, but it is quite clearly an economical Trinity,"[83] different from the later Trinity of being, the difference between "a redemptive-economical (heilsökonomisch) and a static Trinity."[84] Koehler even suggests that this conception of "first Father, then Son, then Holy Spirit, as first source, then river, then brook . . . connects with the fact that Tertullian proceeds from Gnosis and catholicizes its speculation about God!"[85] Thus he throws out hints as to origins, but later developments are not ignored; for example, "the idea of an economy of salvation (Heilsökonomie) is alive in Sabellius in the one-after-another succession of the forms of appearance, but only through one and the same person. This redemptive-economical thought became valuable for further construction of Christology"[86] later on, Koehler contends, and only with the Arians was the notion of "the divine Monarch who reigns but does not govern," as Tertullian had suggested, finally discredited, and the economical Trinity, as well as Monarchianism, went into decline.[87]

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[81] Ibid., 44.

[82] On Monarchianism, cf. ibid., 45, 84f., 147ff.

[83] Ibid., 269, cf. 147.

[84] Ibid., 266.

[85] Ibid., 270.

[86] Ibid., 151.

In connection with the Arian Controversy, the anachronistic theology of Marcellus of Ancyra is also duly sketched by Koehler, and the discussion brings out Marcellus' basically *heilsgeschichtlich* thought in a series of divine economies, the πρώτη οἰκονομία beginning at creation, for example, and the economy of the Spirit, beginning after that of the Son; and in the view that Father and Son are separate, but only economically, i.e., as the Logos appears separately in the course of *Heilsgeschichte*.[88]

Finally Koehler has a bit to say about the subject in its relation to providence, at least with regard to the Latin *dispositio*,[89] and he includes a striking section on the place of "The Virgin Mary within the Economy of Salvation (*Heilsökonomie*)."[90] Koehler, it may be said, does not present any precise summary of the meaning and development of *oikonomia*, but, as these references suggest, he has noted some of its different applications in the course of his "history of Christian self-consciousness," and made some stimulating suggestions, although the later senses of accommodation and incarnation are not stressed. Moreover, question may be raised whether the connection between *oikonomia* and gnostic thought which his remarks often suggest has been clearly shown as yet. There is nothing on classical backgrounds of the term at any point.

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[87] *Ibid.*, 85, cf. 151.

[88] *Ibid.*, 155-157 and 272.

[89] *Ibid.*, 90f.

[90] *Ibid.*, 227-230.

5) Martin Werner

The second, and perhaps most controversial, attempt in recent years to deal with the rise of Christian doctrine is the massive volume by Martin Werner, professor at Bern, Die Entstehung des christlichen Dogmas, a stimulating work, the importance of which has probably been obscured because it appeared during the war in 1941.[91]

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[91] Martin Werner, Die Entstehung des christlichen Dogmas problemgeschichtlich dargestellt (Bern and Leipzig: Verlag Paul Haupt, 1941; 2nd ed., with preface rewritten in view of critics' comments, and indices added, 1953). Cited hereafter as "Werner, Entstehung"; pages in both editions are the same, unless otherwise indicated. No major review has appeared as yet in English to the best of my knowledge, and files in this country for European theological journals for the period 1941-45 are very incomplete because of the wartime conditions. A short summary and brief criticism, however, is found in H.E.W. Turner, The Pattern of Christian Truth (London: A.R. Mowbray and Co., Limited, 1954), 20-23, who calls Werner's book "brilliant, learned, and perverse" (20), a characterization which repeats his earlier opinion of the volume ("brilliant, exhaustive, well-documented, and perverse") in Turner's lectures, The Patristic Doctrine of Redemption (London: A.R. Mowbray and Co., Limited, 1952), 13. The most thorough discussion of the entire book which I have found is by Werner Georg Kümmel, "Das Urchristentum, IV, Die Entwicklung der urchristlichen Gedankenwelt," Theologische Rundschau, Neue Folge, 17 (1948/49), 108-112. On one widely discussed phase of Werner's views, "angel Christology," see the items listed infra, note 104.

Werner not only recognizes that new sources are available in some cases since the "classical" historians of dogma wrote a generation ago, but he also holds the view that Dogmengeschichte has been at fault in dealing only with the first half of Harnack's famous dictum that "dogma in its conception and development is a work of the Greek spirit on the soil of the Gospel."[92] Earlier writers have stressed "the conception and development of the Greek spirit," but Werner proposes to pay more attention to "the soil of the Gospel" from which all later development stems.

At this point Werner reflects the trends in New Testament scholarship which have emerged since 1900, particularly the emphasis of Albert Schweitzer on eschatology, a "konsequent-eschatologische" concept of the essence of primitive Christianity.[93] Werner sees this eschatological emphasis as the basic element in the soil from which primitive Christianity arose, and the nonfulfillment of the Parousia——Enteschatologisierung, "de-eschatologization," as he calls it——as a most important element in the life of the early church. Accordingly, for him, the theme of Dogmengeschichte in this early church is "the construction of the fundamental primitive Christian doctrines as a consequence of the delay of the Parousia."[94] The Old Catholic dogma arises because the Second Coming did not take place!

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[92] Werner, Entstehung, vii ff. (2nd ed., 1ff., especially 28-36. For Harnack's statement, see his DG^3, 18 (Eng. tr., 1, 17) and cf. supra, 23, note 17.

[93] Werner, Entstehung, viii (2nd ed., v) and 36ff., especially 37, note 3, where the Schweitzer bibliography is given. Two of these important items have now appeared in English: The Quest for the Historical Jesus (tr. W. Montgomery; London: A. and C. Black, 1910, and often reprinted since), and The Mystery of the Kingdom of God: the Secret of Jesus' Messiahship and Passion (tr. Walter Lowrie; New York: the Macmillan Company, 1950).

Coupled with this thesis are a number of other debatable theories which Werner puts forth, particularly the claim that "angel Christology" was "the primitive Christian doctrine of the Person of Christ."[95] Briefly his argument may be summarized thus.[96] Jesus originally expected that during his earthly life the intervention of the Kingdom would occur and his own elevation as heavenly Son of Man; this failing to materialize, however, he then assumed these things would happen through his Passion. Thus far, Schweitzer's famous views are being followed.

After the death of Jesus, the disciples continued to live in the same sort of eschatological expectation and awaited the Parousia momentarily. Soon, however, it became apparent that the death and resurrection of Jesus had to be more adequately interpreted, or, more precisely reinterpreted. At this crucial moment, enter Paul. Instead of the simple emphasis of the apostolic kerygma, that by his death and resurrection the man Jesus has been elevated as Messiah and Lord, Paul emphasizes that Jesus had actually been a higher angelic being, no mere man, and that with Jesus' death and resurrection the turning point of the ages has really begun. Thus appears "angel Christology." As Werner expresses his theme, the apocalyptic Messiah of primitive Christianity is now conceived of as the high angelic being chosen by God for the ruling of the new aeon.

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[94] This is the title of Werner's first Main Section, Entstehung, 81-388.

[95] Ibid., 302ff. deals with this concept particularly.

[96] I follow here particularly the summary given by W.G. Kümmel, op. cit. (supra, note 91), 109f.

This sort of Christology, Werner holds, was not new with Paul, but had roots in late Jewish apocalyptic: thus the Son of Man is said to appear, from Enoch on, as "a being of the higher angel world (46: 1, 61: 10)," a view for which he claims the support of Bousset, Schweitzer, Otto, and others.[97]

Further, he sees this type of Christology reflected in many details in the Synoptics and Paul; they presuppose the "connection of Christology with the presentation of a strongly hierarchical, graduated ordering of the heavenly angel kingdom with many layers."[98] For example, Werner argues such notions underlie any presentation of the creation of the world by angels and any presentation of the heavenly Messiah as mediator of creation;[99] or again, Paul's strange comment at Gal. 3: 19, that the Law was given through angels, has behind it the idea that the world is ruled and administered by angels; but since according to Paul the death of Jesus is a victory over these spiritual and angelic powers (Phil. 2: 6-10, Gal. 4: 4, I Cor. 2: 8), the Law is now abrogated——angel Christology offers a key to Paul's attitude toward the Law.[100]

Paul thus, according to Werner's analysis, differs from other strands of primitive Christianity in his attitude toward the Law (and in the process of de-eschatologization this emphasis is severed from the Pauline concept of the death of Jesus as a victory over the spiritual and angelic powers).[101] But what Werner stresses as more important is the place of this angel Christology as the common early Christian view of the Person of Christ——

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[97] Werner, Entstehung, 304.

[98] Ibid., 305.

[99] Ibid., 305f.

[100] Ibid., 306, cf. 238ff.

[101] Ibid., 239.

that he is "a being of the higher angel world, created by God and chosen for the task of introducing at the end of the times the new aeon of the Kingdom of God in the battle with the spiritual powers of the existing world."[102] It is a view which Werner claims can be traced in later dogmatic controversy until newer christological speculations crowded it out, as the early kerygma was de-eschatologized, and an inner development of Christianity took place as a natural result of the delay and nonfulfillment of the Parousia---a development to the exclusion of Pauline ideas, for the most part.[103] It is a view, however, which, along with other of Werner's theories, has met with scholarly skepticism and rejection by important scholars, it must be added.[104]

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[102] Ibid., 311.

[103] On angel Christology and Gnosticism, cf. ibid., 332ff.; angel Christology and the Trinity, 338ff.; angel Christology and the Arian controversy, 371ff.

[104] Werner's notion of angel Christology has stirred up some discussion in European theological circles, but almost no reflections have been observed in the English-speaking world as yet. The idea of such a Christology is, of course, not new; E. Stauffer, for example, Die Theologie des Neuen Testaments (4th edition; Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1948), 85ff. (Eng. tr., by John Marsh, New Testament Theology (London: SCM Press, 1955), 105ff.) notes the idea, but with full awareness of the wide range of ideas, Jewish and Hellenistic, on which the early church drew, in constructing its Christology. What is new is Werner's extreme emphasis on it, and his attempt to trace its presence out in later patristic literature.

Most reactions to Werner's thesis have been extremely critical. Shortly

Now all these details of Werner's approach are worth sketching, not merely because they are novel (and have received very little

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after the appearance of his book in 1941, a colleague at Bern, Wilhelm Michaelis, answered the theory with a thoroughly documented, 240-page discussion, *Zur Engelchristologie im Urchristentum: Abbau der Konstruktion Martin Werners* ("Gegenwartsfragen Biblischer Theologie, I"; Basle: Verlag von Heinrich Majer, 1942). Michaelis agrees with Werner on the eschatological character of the proclamation of Jesus and of primitive Christianity, but not on the so-called angel Christology. Werner's evidence, which for the New Testament is rather thin to begin with, is examined minutely, and "examples" which Werner claimed are again and again denied by Michaelis——e.g., the contention that Eusebius has an angel Christology is thoroughly repudiated (p. 177). The conclusion to his demolition of Werner's thesis is that "das Urchristentum keine Engelchristologie gekannt hat" (p. 187).

W.G. Kümmel, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 91), voices a similar conclusion in his review, dismissing angel Christology as untenable ("unhaltbar"), because the notion is not demonstrable either in later Judaism, whence Werner claims it came, or in primitive Christianity (p. 110). Further he questions other assumptions by Werner: that Jesus, for example, proclaimed the *near* Parousia (according to Kümmel, Jesus regarded it as *already* present); or that Paul stressed an intermediate Messianic Kingdom. "Because all these premises are false," Kümmel concludes, "the main thesis cannot be regarded as proven either, that postapostolic development must be explained as de-eschatologization of the apostolic kerygma, as a consequence of the attention in literature in English), but also because they are reflected in some of the few references his book makes to the concept

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delay of the Parousia" (p. 111); Werner's thesis therefore cannot be regarded as proven, that the inner development of primitive Christianity was carried out under the force of the delay of the Parousia and de-eschatologization (p. 112).

A. Gilg, in *Theologische Zeitschrift*, 1954, 113ff. holds the same opinion about Werner's effort: "a tradition which reaches from late Judaism through Jesus and the Apostles into the early church is not to be found" for angel Christology. Cf. also A. Debrunner, *Der Kirchenfreund*, 1942, 274ff. H.E.W. Turner, *Pattern of Christian Truth*, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 91), dismisses Werner's angel Christology as displaying "more learning than judgment, more ingenuity than conviction" (p. 143).

For a more sympathetic view, however, cf. Felix Scheidweiler, "Novatian und die Engelchristologie," *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, Vierte Folge IV, LXVI Band (1954/55), Heft I and II, 126-139, where Scheidweiler argues for such a Christology in the writings of Novatian. Werner's book, he admits, "sought to prove this to be the oldest form of Christology, but scarcely found examples." Michaelis' monograph he is aware of, but it may be dismissed as "only negative" in regard to the subject, and Kümmel's analysis is said to amount only to the question, "Is the view untenable because angel Christology does not happen to be demonstrable either in Judaism or primitive Christianity?" Then Scheidweiler adds a bit of evidence to support the presence of angel Christology in the New Testament: the opening chapters of Hebrews are a polemic *against* it, he claims! Thus in of *oikonomia* and its related terms. Werner does not have much discussion of the concept, but he writes at times as if he assumed the conception as understood and self-evident.

For example, in examining the viewpoints of the earlier histories of doctrine, he notes Loofs' use of economy in describing the Asia Minor theology. Both Loofs and Seeberg, he points out, follow Harnack in stressing primarily the Hellenization of Christianity, rather than the *soil* from which the Gospel sprung, but these writers do diverge on individual matters in that Hellenizing process, and among the questions that still remain "undecided" is "the thesis presented by Loofs of the 'Asia Minor' theology, which

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Scheidweiler's approach, angel Christology "*is* to be seen and need only be taken hold of"!

Another ally for Werner's views is the work of a Roman Catholic scholar, Joseph Barbel, *Christos Angelos: Die Anschauung von Christus als Bote und Engel* (Bonn, 1941), a study which argues that the representation of Christ as an angel appears not only in heretics but also in orthodox writers in the postapostolic period, that this angel Christology is essentially the continuation of a pre-Nicene subordinationalistic concept of Christ, and that the concept led finally to Arianism; Werner was unaware of the study when he first propounded his views, but reports it in the new preface to his second edition, *Entstehung*², vi f.

For summary and further discussion of some elements involved in the question, cf. my note "Martin Werner and 'Angel Christology,'" *The Lutheran Quarterly*, 8, Number 4 (November, 1956), 349-358. To the literature there mentioned should be added F. Flückiger, *Der Ursprung des christlichen Dogmas: Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Albert Schweitzer und Martin Werner* (Zürich, 1955).

he sees characterized through the 'heilsgeschichtlich-stamped' and widespread concept of the 'economy' and which he therefore evaluates as a 'total view of Christianity very rich in influence' for the later developments."[105]

Again, Werner assumes the application of oikonomia to the divine plan of creation and redemption, particularly in regard to the self-unfolding of God in carrying out this plan, a usage already sketched from previous writers on Dogmengeschichte. Werner here, like Koehler, brings the concept into relation with Sabellius, who represents Modalistic Monarchianism: "Sabellius even coins for the one God the double name 'Hyiopator' (Son-Father), but then nonetheless holds fast to the three names 'Father,' 'Son,' and 'Spirit,' as separate designations for the three forms of appearance (prosopa) of God which follow one after the other, which are distinguished according to the various acts of the divine plan of creation and redemption (the 'economy' of the ecclesiastical doctrine)."[106]

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[105] Werner, Entstehung, 34. The references to Loofs are to his DG^4, 96; cf. supra, 31f., for a fuller summary. For other instances when Werner speaks of oikonomia in the sense of Erlösungswerk, cf. Entstehung, 367, note 92, and 564, note 13.

[106] Werner, Entstehung, 568, citing Epiph. Adv. Haeres. 70. 1. 8. On Koehler, cf. his DG^2, 151 and supra, 41. Cf. further these additional comments of Werner, on Sabellius: "The theory which was dominant in the pre-Nicene church has one thing in common with the Sabellian doctrine: the orientation towards the concept of the divine plan of the world and of salvation (economy)" (p. 579); thus the Son and the Spirit are said to go forth as part of a divine

At times, however, Werner is also able to relate the use of oikonomia in regard to the threefold revelation of God to the angel Christology of which he makes so much. He claims that since angel Christology posits the subordination of Christ to the Father, it is "absolutely incompatible" with any Nicene Trinitarian dogma. Angel Christology is original; the Nicene Trinity, with its three hypostases in one ousia, is later; between the two in Christian thought are many views on the relation of Christ to the Father, especially the economical Trinity. As Werner puts it: "new interpretations which are presented in the wake of de-eschatologization may arrange the apocalyptic-eschatological Angel-Christ of the teaching of Jesus and the apostles in a gnostic series of aeons or in a system corresponding to the Neoplatonic graduated system, above all also in an 'economical Trinity,' or may give him a new interpretation with less effort simply in the Logos, but always must he appear and amount to a subordinate to the Father God who is thought of as absolute and transcendent."[107]

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economy, a successive unfolding of the one God, as in Hippolytus, c. Noet. 14 (580, note 5); and "this subordinationalistic construction expressed through the concept of the heilsgeschichtlich economy of the pre-Nicene church theology, Sabellius has fitted into his doctrine of Father, Son, and Spirit as the three forms of appearance of the one Godhead which likewise proceed in temporal succession" (p.580).

[107] Ibid., 338. Cf. also 602, where Werner sees a gnostic feature in Tertullian in the successive unfolding of the Urmonas into Dyad and Triad in a manner corresponding to the economy.

Thus behind much of the early Christian discussion over the relation of Christ to God, Werner sees lurking his favorite angel Christology, the primitive christological concept which he claims was not finally conquered and suppressed by Catholic Christianity until the Arian controversy.[108] Often then he makes reference to "angelic hierarchies" which appear in patristic writings, and particularly to "administrative angels" who rule over nations, according to God's original arrangement—a group mentioned both in gnostic and orthodox writers in connection with the creation and government of the world.[109]

The especial father, however, in whom Werner ties together the matters of administrative angels, Christology, and Trinity, is Eusebius of Caesarea. In his Demonstratio Evangelica, Werner says, monotheism is stressed, but there is also recognition of a heavenly Kingdom of divine powers, angels, and spirits. The Logos-Christ is the oldest of these beings, installed by God as supreme "administrator" (Verwalter) of the whole creation, but there are also other subordinate administrative angels. In the theological thought of his day, Eusebius' tendency, "to put Christ in a place under the category of the administrative angels (Verwaltungsengel, oikonomoi), comes to the fore as something special"; it is angel Christology accommodating itself to the cosmological Logos doctrine.[110] Admittedly Werner's views here are none too substantially documented, but there is the interesting suggestion to pay heed to the way in which Eusebius treats oikonomia and its related terms, and there is also posed for examination the question of whether use of these terms in political administration and organization of the times provides any background for the concept.

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[108] Ibid., 371ff. Thus, for example, Werner holds (374f.) that Athanasius' First Epistle to Serapion is directed against the Arian comparison of Christ and the Holy Spirit with "Engelwesen."

[109] On these "Verwaltungs- und Völkerengel," cf. ibid., 241f., especially 241, note 1, where a list of passages concerning these administrative angels is cited; these passages sometimes employ the verb dioikein as well as oikonomein.

[110] Ibid., 375.

Finally something must be said about one passage where Werner speaks of an "economy of salvation" in connection with a gnostic view of the Incarnation. Here, "with speculation over the significance for redemption of the Incarnation," Werner writes, "Hellenistic Christianity leaves the ground of the original apostolic faith completely. The divine Logos who appears in the human body of flesh is no more the apocalyptic Son of Man of primitive Christian faith."[111] The emphasis on death and resurrection has shifted to Incarnation under the impact of "the great crisis of de-eschatologization" and subsequent Hellenization. But more, Werner sees a specific influence from Gnosticism---e.g., "the new ecclesiastical speculation over the Incarnation first comes to the fore with rich elaboration in the work of Irenaeus directed against Gnosis," the Adversus Haereses---and apparently the gnostic theologians had spoken of some sort of Incarnation, or entry of the Logos-Redeemer into the material, as necessary to free the spirit imprisoned in the flesh.[112] An unusual example of such speculation occurs in the fragments of the Valentinian Marcus; according to him, "the Incarnation of the Logos ensues, not through begetting and birth from the Virgin, but in the descent and entrance of the Spirit into Jesus at the Baptism. It is important for redemption in view of the fact that, along with the Logos-spirit which enters into him, at the same time the seed of all those is united in Jesus who are of the same origin with him and who descend and rise with him. There is also in this connection mention of an economy (order of salvation)."[113] The exact meaning of the passage here referred to is debatable,[114] but Werner does alert us again to the importance of looking for references to oikonomia in gnostic remains, and we may well note his main emphasis here: "The purpose of the Incarnation is here expressed through the dominant chief thought of the gnostic doctrine of redemption: freeing the spiritual from the material";[115] and what Catholic theology does, according to Werner, in taking over the gnostic emphasis, is to make the Incarnation of the Logos a binding of the Logos to a human body of flesh, in order to redeem it by the power of this connection from the fate of death---in its classic form, "He became human, that we might become divine."[116]

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[111] Ibid., 470.

[112] Ibid.

Martin Werner's performance, it may be said, is lacking in any real discussion of oikonomia and provides relatively few references to the concept. But his novel insights and occasional comments do suggest lines of investigation to be considered seriously in any treatment.

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[113] Ibid., 471. The phrase quoted is in Hippol. Haer. 6. 51. 1f.

[114] O. Lillge, "Das patristische Wort οἰκονομία" (Erlangen, 1955), 3, for example, interprets the passage under consideration against Werner's claim.

[115] Werner, Entstehung, 471.

[116] E.g., Iren. Adv. Haer. 5. Praef. (Harvey, ii, 314), "Qui propter immensam suam dilectionem factus est quod sumus uti nos perficeret esse quod est ipse"; and Athanas. De Inc. 54 (PG 25, 192), αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐνηνθρώπησεν, ἵνα ἡμεῖς θεοποιηθῶμεν· and Epist. ad Adelph. 4 (PG 26, 1077), γέγονε γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἵνα ἡμᾶς ἐν ἑαυτῷ θεοποιήσῃ.

Once more, however, we have a case of allusion to the term oikonomia without a real investigation into its prepatristic, non-Christian applications being indicated or even an orderly account of how it develops in the writings of the fathers.

C. Summary on the References to oikonomia in Histories of Doctrine

This examination of the various important histories of Christian doctrine,[117] unduly prolix perhaps but necessary to bring together a host of insights scattered throughout the thousands of pages written on the subject in the last seventy years, makes clear at least three things.

First, the concept of oikonomia is important in the history of Christian doctrine. Every major writer on the subject in German and some in English recognize or assume the concept again and again in their discussions.

Secondly, however, none of these histories of doctrine provides a complete picture or thorough treatment of the background in Greek and Jewish usage or even of the total development of the concept in the early church fathers. Seeberg begins to sketch the meaning of the term from the New Testament to Tertullian but does not carry his little discussion far enough in either direction. Harnack had previously recognized several more shades of meaning for the word but nowhere systematically brought them together. Loofs ties the concept in with the important Asia Minor school of theology he proposes, and Koehler and Werner both supply passing references that suggest further avenues of investigation. From all these authors, the general lines of consideration begin to become clear, and the sources for investigation which are especially significant are enumerated----fathers like Ignatius, Irenaeus, Tertullian, the Alexandrians, Eusebius, and Marcellus of Ancyra. But none of the histories of doctrine makes a thorough analysis or Zusammenfassung of the materials.

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[117] One other major history of Christian doctrine has been reported under way in our day: a definitive effort by Werner Elert, of Erlangen, based on extensive research in the fathers, to which he turned in the late years of his life. His death in 1954 precludes completion of such a work, and the first major publication of his researches, Abendmahl und Kirchengemeinschaft in der alten Kirche (Berlin, 1954), has nothing to say on our subject. Cf. the notes in The Lutheran Quarterly, 7, Number 2 (May, 1955), 171ff., and Number 4 (November, 1955), 361f.

Thirdly, it is also apparent that these writers on Dogmengeschichte are not in agreement on some points, and vital questions still remain undecided. Thus, for example, there is room for investigation into the status of Asia Minor theology; into the relationship of patristic use of oikonomia to Gnosticism---writers again and again have hinted at this relationship, but no one makes it overly clear; into the background, in pagan, Stoic usage of the patristic application as "accommodation" or "reserve." Such questions call for careful investigation but only on the basis of a thorough examination of the non-Christian, prepatristic materials----an examination which these histories of doctrine assume on the basis of lexicons current in their day and earlier attempts noted above,[118] but which none of these Dogmengeschichten actually provides.

All in all, this review of the histories of doctrine indicates the importance, the richness, and the need for further study of the concept of oikonomia. Before making a thorough investigation, however, it is next necessary to note some recent articles, monographs, and dissertations, in some cases very little known, which deal with oikonomia and which offer suggestions for procedure, as well as conclusions that, in some cases, may be reexamined in light of our survey into Greek uses prior to A.D. 100. In some cases, too, these studies will be helpful in examining the pre-Christian usages.

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[118] Supra, Chapter 2, pp. 9ff.

4. More Recent Specialized Articles, Monographs, and Dissertations

Investigations into the usage of the term *oikonomia* and the varied concepts related to it have not been lacking in the past half century from a variety of approaches, lexicographical, historical, and dogmatic-ethical, though the results of these findings are widely scattered in periodical literature and, at times, unpublished material, in at least five different languages. Important items will be discussed here in their chronological order of appearance, since sometimes a man's work reflects or reacts against the findings of earlier scholarship.

1) D'Alès: *oikonomia* in Irenaeus

Abbé Adhémar d'Alès, professor at the French Institut Catholique, has written widely on the church fathers, particularly Tertullian, Irenaeus, and Hippolytus, and in 1919 he published in the *Revue des Études Grecques* an article entitled, "Le Mot οἰκονομία dans la langue théologique de Saint Irénée."[1] Although no classical materials are included at all, the background is sketched of the use of the word in the New Testament— because "from Paul's concept all further developments will follow; not without some *peripeteia*," he maintains[2]— and in the Apostolic Fathers and Apologists. But Irenaeus' usage merits special attention: he is "a theologian who writes with discernment" and who makes "extremely frequent use of the word."[3]

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[1] Adhémar d'Alès, "Le Mot οἰκονομία dans la langue théologique de Saint Irénée," *Revue des Études Grecques*, 32 (1919), 1-9. Cited hereafter as "D'Alès, 'Irénée,'" Other writings include *La Théologie de Tertullian* (Paris, 1905); *La Théologie de saint Hippolyte* (Paris, 1906); *L'édit de Calliste* (Paris, 1914); "*Tertullianea*," *Recherches de science religieuse* (Paris) 1935, 593ff., and 1936, 99ff.; "Tertullien Helléniste," *Revue des Études Grecques*, 50 (1937), 329ff.; and "Vocabulaire exotique de Tertullien," *ibid.*, (1937), 352ff.

The text of Irenaeus' major work, the *Adversus Haereses*, is the problem; much of the Greek is lost, though reflected in an early and extremely literal Latin translation. D'Alès proceeds to show how the Latin can be used to examine Irenaeus' concept of *oikonomia*. Οἰκονομία occurs in the extant Greek 30 times; in 27 cases the Latin renders it by *dispositio*. Counterchecking, we find the word *dispositio* crops up 31 times in portions where the Greek original is preserved, and, of course, in 27 of these instances, the Greek reads οἰκονομία. It can be concluded that "where we possess only the Latin, an example of *dispositio* has about 7 chances against 1 of representing the original οἰκονομία."[4] Now altogether, in the sections extant in Latin only, there are at least 85 examples of *dispositio*; by our 7:1 ratio it may be assumed that about 75 of these cases employed οἰκονομία in the original. Add to this the 30 examples actually found in the Greek fragments, and there are over 100— D'Alès assumes some 120— examples of οἰκονομία or its Latin equivalent to work with in Irenaeus' major work. A chart sums up all the passages then in which these terms occur.[5]

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[2] D'Alès, "Irénée," 1.

[3] *Ibid.*, 3.

[4] *Ibid.*, 4.

[5] *Ibid.*, 5f. The chart includes, as an added convenience, the terms other than οἰκονομία and *dispositio* where they occur in parallel passages

On the basis of this analysis, D'Alès next classifies Irenaeus' usage of οἰκονομία-dispositio into two sharply antithetical groups. On the one hand are 33 cases where the writer quotes the term in a properly gnostic doctrine, referring to "the internal economy of the Pleroma, and more particularly to the fusion of divine aeons from which results the person of the Saviour."[6] In the other category are the far more numerous examples where Irenaeus expresses a Catholic doctrine, concerning the Incarnation or redemption. A few examples of each are quoted, and all gnostic usages are so labeled in the chart.

Finally Abbé d'Alès expresses his conclusions: Irenaeus always distinguished very carefully between these two senses, the one having to do with "nebulous theosophy" and the other "issuing immediately from Gospel history."[7] He deliberately avoided applying oikonomia to an internal economy of the Trinity or to an interior economy of the person of Christ, though earlier nongnostics, like Ignatius and Tatian, had allowed such uses; Irenaeus wanted to guard against any possible confusion and reserved "the name of economy for the designation of exterior effects of the Incarnation and of redemption."[8] Such reserve, D'Alès admits, was not followed by later writers, like Hippolytus, Tertullian, and Novatian, and examples are cited of how they apply oikonomia to the exposition of

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to the term cited; further, dispensatio is included in three cases where the Latin only is extant, with a reasonable certainty that behind it was an οἰκονομία in the Greek original, because in one case the extant Greek is rendered by dispensatio in the Latin (4. 31. 1.).

[6] Ibid., 6.

[7] Ibid., 8.

[8] Ibid.

trinitarian dogma. But eventually, he concludes, "before the end of the third century, theological language had reentered the lines traced by St. Paul. The use of the word οἰκονομία was renounced for the exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity...[and] οἰκονομία became a usage employed to denote the Incarnation and the consequences of the Incarnation."[9]

Certainly this little study provides clear lines of analysis for Irenaeus' employment of the term. The question is overlooked, however, of whether the gnostic usage Irenaeus quotes, borders on the sense of "Incarnation" and "redemption," and the larger question of how much the orthodox father himself may have been influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by his heretical opponents. And it may also be pointed out that D'Alès tends to minimize the few cases which do not fit into his scheme. But for the assembly of passages and suggested theories, D'Alès' article is certainly worth noting, even though it omits all prepatristic evidence and begins only with Paul.

2) G.L. Prestige: *oikonomia* in Patristic Thought

An exceedingly thorough and fruitful investigation of the concept of God in the church fathers, conducted along primarily lexicographical lines, is G. L. Prestige's book, *God in Patristic Thought*, first published in 1936.[10] Originally, back in 1921, Prestige was assigned the task of gathering materials on the important words in the Greek fathers concerning the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation for the projected Oxford Lexicon of Patristic Greek.[11] Out of the mass of information assembled, and because of the many unavoidable delays in getting the Lexicon itself ready for the press, Prestige decided to write up his findings in more complete form than a lexicon would allow, and the result of his research is this significant volume, an attempt to determine what the fathers taught, not on the basis of a "speculative reconstruction of their supposed intellectual systems," but "from the facts of linguistic usage," on a scale never attempted before.[12] The undertaking has all the advantages of modern critical editions of the texts, their thorough indexing, and the tremendous resources of the still unpublished Lexicon, plus Prestige's firsthand knowledge of the sources.

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[9] *Ibid.*, 9.

[10] G. L. Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought* (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1936; 2nd ed., London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1952). Quotations are from the slightly revised second edition, cited hereafter as "Prestige^2."

The book is thus a discussion, along linguistic lines, of representative passages, from a number of patristic writers, which attempts to summarize their Gottesbild. The product is no mere catena of quotations, however; it shows very real historical insight. And if the chapters may sometimes be criticized as lacking in depth of investigation into the backgrounds behind the fathers[13]— there is very little citation of non-Christian, prepatristic material, though it must be remembered assembly of such information was not the author's purpose — nevertheless the book must be commended for its amazing scope and spread of sources cited, which range from Clement of Rome to Thomas Aquinas, the Testament of Adam to the Apothegmata Patrum, and include such sources as canons, martyrdoms, and creeds, in addition to a wide range of fathers, important and obscure. It must also be commended for its clear readability, in that usually it is interestingly constructed and does not sound like the "lining out" of dictionary citations. Some Latin fathers, incidentally, are cited to parallel Greek illustrations, and efficient indices of passages and subjects treated, as well as information on the date and where the text of each may be found, add to the usefulness of the book.

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[11] Prestige^2, ix f. Oxford announces that this Lexicon of Patristic Greek, now under the editorship of G.W.H. Lampe, should soon begin appearing, with the first fascicle "before the end of 1957."

[12] Ibid., x. Is there a reference to the various long histories of doctrine with their reconstructions of systems here?

[13] In addition to the paucity of data offered from classical Greek writers, T. Verhoeven also finds fault with Prestige for not examining the usage of certain terms in Philo; see "Monarchia dans Tertullien,

Two chapters in Prestige's reconstruction of the patristic concept of God contain extensive information about oikonomia and its related terms, the verb, adjective, and adverb from the stem also being included: Chapter III, on Divine Providence, and Chapter V about Organic Monotheism.[14]

In the third chapter a lengthy account is devoted to God's providential ordering of things, or, as the fathers called it, his "economy," because, as Prestige says, "the concept of 'economy' has a most important bearing

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Adversus Praxean," Vigiliae Christianae, 5 (1951), 44. Cf. further the remark (Prestige "makes no real endeavor to explain the usage in Tertullian in its historical context") in Verhoeven's dissertation Studiën over Tertullianus' Adversus Praxean (Amsterdam: N.V. Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1948), 108.

[14] Prestige^2, Chap. III, 55-67, and Chap. V, 97-111.

on the doctrine of the Trinity, and a still more fundamental connection with the doctrine of the Incarnation."[15] To put it another way, the chapter has to do with God in action, discerned through his providential activities by man. "The knowledge of God . . . depends," Prestige argues in his own summary of Chapter III, "on recognition of his 'economy' or dispensations; the word economy covers both general and special providence, divine government, divine revelation, and divine grace, the whole culminating in the Incarnation."[16]

This vast range of meanings is traced out in considerable detail, with the citation of representative examples for each sense. First the verb οἰκονομεῖν is treated in a four-page discussion, then the adjective οἰκονομικός and the adverb οἰκονομικῶς more briefly; finally the noun itself is analyzed most thoroughly of all. Rather than labor the categories set up in detail here, a summary of the thoroughness with which οἰκονομία is handled will suffice. At the outset, a paragraph describes its vast range of usage:

> The noun "economy" bears in different connections the sense of charge or ministration, and (rarely) good management or thrift; business, occupation, or function, and hence, though apparently only in apocryphal literature, life's work or career or earthly course; arrangement, procedure, system; administration of alms, and so the alms themselves. A further sense, which becomes of notable importance in Tertullian's and Hippolytus's exposition of the Trinity, is that of the disposition of the parts in relation to one another, organization, constitution . . . .

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[15] Ibid., 57.

[16] Ibid., xxi.

> In connection with the adaptation of means to ends, as practised in prudent administration, comes a whole class of passages in which the general sense is discretion, consideration, or concession, and sometimes reserve; in Chrysostom, with whom the word is a constant favorite, the sense of manoeuvre can be illustrated by a number of instances; in Cyril seldom, if indeed ever, does the word bear this sense; but it sometimes recurs in later authors meaning policy, compromise, or even connivance in sharp practices.[17]

Then particularly important meanings are discussed and amply illustrated with a host of passages from the fathers: first, *oikonomia* in the sense of God's management of mundane affairs, a divine economy manifested in God's providential rule either in natural or spiritual law; then, especially, with reference to the covenanted dispensation of grace, arranged by God; finally, in particularization of God's merciful arrangements, the term is applied either to particular instances of a dispensation of God's mercy in men's lives— "a special divine interposition," Prestige calls it[18]— or to some particular sacramental operation, as the Eucharist, or to a "description of prophecy and revelation."[19] Prestige then concludes:

> Enough has been said to indicate the extent to which the Greek Fathers recognized, in principle and detail, the providential activity of God in nature, human history, and the sphere of grace. It need only be added that the supreme instance of the divine economy, whether

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[17] *Ibid.*, 62f.

[18] *Ibid.*, 65.

[19] *Ibid.*, 67.

in the sense of dispensation, condescension, or special providence, was exhibited in the Incarnation, for which the word 'oekonomia,' without any verbal qualification, is the regular patristic term from the third century onwards.[20]

Chapter V takes up cases where oikonomia is applied in the sense of the so-called economical Trinity presented by certain fathers, in what Prestige describes as "an interesting and neglected effort, made by Tertullian and Hippolytus, to produce a theological statement which would reconcile monotheism with the acceptance of the divine triad."[21] "If this effort to enunciate an 'organic monotheism' had succeeded," he remarks significantly, "the term 'economy,' which Tertullian employed for the purpose, would have become the technical description of the Trinity instead of the Incarnation."[22]

Prestige's presentation of the economic Trinity is therefore particularly stimulating because it strikes out independently from the views of some other writers on the subject. The term "economy," for example, he says, "is Tertullian's unexpected and somewhat startling name . . . for what modern theologians really understand as the doctrine of the Trinity."[23] Further, Tertullian's conception of the divine unity is said to rest "on his doctrine of 'economy,' that the unity constitutes the triad out of its own inherent nature."[24] Thus "economy" expresses the nature of the divine unity, and— here Prestige differs from other writers— "the reference which lies behind this usage is mainly to the sense of interior organisation."[25] Prestige notes the use of economy in a few contemporary secular writers, [26] but refuses to conclude that Tertullian borrowed the usage either from pagan literature or from the gnostic theologians.

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[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid., xxv.

[22] Ibid., cf. 111 also.

[23] Ibid., 98.

[24] Ibid., 99.

Although at times Prestige allows the unity of the Godhead was "functionally constituted,"[27] he does not view the Trinity in the *heilsgeschichtlich* manner observed by many previous writers on dogma but insists the economy "implies at least in some sense, that the substance of the godhead is relayed in turn to each Person of the triad,"[28] thus making the economical Trinity turn on the point of substance primarily, rather than redemptive function or *Heilsgeschichte*. As he plainly puts it at one point, "the divine economy is not an economy of redemption, nor an economy of revelation, but an economy of divine being"— certainly an interpretation of economic Trinity more in harmony with Nicene terminology than many other investigators have found.[29]

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[25] *Ibid*.

[26] *Ibid*., 99f. Quint. *Inst*. 1. 8. 9, 7. 10. 11, and 3. 3. 9 are cited as well as Plut. *Mor*. 2.142A, but Prestige decides there is "no reason to conjecture that Tertullian derived the term from Quintilian or any other Latin author. . . . Nor is it likely that he took it direct from the vocabulary of literary criticism" (p. 100). Earlier, though, he admits that Tertullian's analogy is drawn from Roman political life (p. 98).

[27] *Ibid*., 102, 105.

[28] *Ibid*., 102.

[29] *Ibid*., 106. Compare Harnack's remarks, for example, cited *supra*, 26f.

Hippolytus' important trinitarian writings are similarly discussed. While Prestige acknowledges that in Hippolytus the economy of the one God is sometimes applied to his threefold manifestation,[30] he again concludes that "the primary sense of economy is obviously that of coordinate distinction in the being of the godhead,"[31] or, to put it another way, a reference to "the internal relationships and systematized co-ordination of the whole godhead."[32] Even in a passage which seems to refer distinctly to the Incarnation (*c. Noet.* 4), Prestige holds the phrase, "the mystery of the economy," here "means, as elsewhere, the eternal relationship of the Father and the Logos within the godhead."[33]

The acumen with which Prestige marshals his evidence throughout and the clarity with which it is presented— some of the translations suggested and comments added are particularly valuable — show the importance of his work for any consideration of *oikonomia* in patristic thought. Here data assembled with a scope found almost nowhere else is also evaluated as part of a total portrayal of the *Gottesbild* in the church fathers, and in this well-grounded study are often reflected the strikingly independent views of a careful scholar.

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[30] *Ibid.*, 106f.

[31] *Ibid.*, 107, italics mine.

[32] *Ibid.*, 108.

[33] *Ibid.*, 108f. Not all scholars have accepted Prestige's emphasis on being and internal relationships within the godhead as the meaning of economy in these passages; cf. in particular the review by Hugo Rahner, S.J., in *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie*, (1937), 298f., who argues that *oikonomia* here has more of a *heilsgeschichtlich* sense than Prestige gives it.

It is therefore the more regrettable that this study is built on an insecure foundation: the assumption that the non-Christian, prepatristic usages of a word like oikonomia have already been fully traced out and that the reader is aware of these. The fact that a few pagan citations are occasionally offered, as with Tertullian's use of oeconomia in Latin, makes this the more unfortunate, because the reader may assume that here the total nonpatristic evidence has been exhausted, and this is the only possible conclusion— when, as we shall see,[34] other investigators have come to a different conclusion on the basis of more exhaustive evidence applied to this very issue. It may well be asked, what precisely was the background in Greek and Jewish sources for many of the uses of oikonomia Prestige has so thoroughly outlined in the fathers? What did the Stoics and Philo, for example, have to do with patristic application of oikonomia to the divine Unity or to ethical maneuvers and "connivance in sharp practices"?

In short, much of the concept of God in patristic thought and its terminology rests on the idea of God in earlier Hellenistic thought and the vocabulary used to express this. Again, an investigation into the non-Christian, prepatristic terms and sources would seem called for regarding oikonomia.

3) T.L. Verhoeven: oikonomia, in Tertullian especially

An extremely important study, along more limited lines, is the doctoral dissertation presented by Theodorus L. Verhoeven at the University of Utrecht in 1948 and subsequently published that same year in Dutch, Studiën over Tertullianus' Adversus Praxean.[35] The subject is quite specific, being centered on this one treatise by Tertullian and in particular on the terms monarchia, oikonomia, and probola in their relation to the Trinity there, and the treatment is quite detailed, including a careful examination of manuscript evidence and problems of text.[36]

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[34] Infra, section 3), 70ff.

[35] Theodorus L. Verhoeven, Studiën over Tertullianus' Adversus Praxean voornamelijk betrekking hebbend op Monarchia, Oikonomia, Probola in

However, the investigation is especially important for our purposes because it is carried on against a broad historical background of pre-Christian usage; over twenty pages, for example, are devoted to the applications of oikonomia by classical authors, Jewish sources, and Christian literature prior to Tertullian. And partly on the basis of this sort of investigation, Verhoeven several times reaches conclusions opposed to the findings of G.L. Prestige, whose work he knows and examines. Specifically, where both try to explain Tertullian's terminology for the Trinity against classical backgrounds, they choose different backgrounds for their explanations.

Verhoeven begins with a consideration of the monarchia of God, his oneness and absolute rule and control in the universe, a central theme in the Adversus Praxean. This emphasis, carried over from Judaism and directed particularly against Greek polytheism, led to the early Christian movement known as Monarchianism, an essentially antignostic system according to Verhoeven.[37] With the rise of the Logos doctrine, however, Christianity was compelled to reexamine its cherished emphasis on God's monarchia so as to make place in it for the Logos Christ, to "consider monarchia

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verband met de Triniteit (Amsterdam: N.V. Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1948). Cited hereafter as "Verhoeven."

[36] On the discussion of Tertullian's text, see ibid., 176-203.

[37] Ibid., 30ff. Verhoeven's initial thesis reads: "Monarchianism is in origin . . . an antignostic system."

and Christology," as Verhoeven puts it, especially in the face of gnostic theologizing.[38] Thus in Tertullian and contemporaries we have an initial phase of that controversy on relationships within the godhead which was to concern Christianity for several centuries, and we have in Tertullian's wrestlings over the subject "raw materials" for Athanasius and Augustine.[39]

Oikonomia is, of course, the term Tertullian uses to describe the inner unfolding of the divine unity into a trinity of persons, though this unfolding must always be seen against the background of the monarchia of God. Verhoeven sets himself to the task of discovering how oikonomia comes to have this meaning in Tertullian. One view, earlier advanced, had been that such a meaning emerged out of the original Christian sense of oikonomia as "God's arrangement of salvation," after the doctrine of the economy was loosed completely from its original heilsgeschichtlich framework, and under the influence of the rising Logos Christology, no allowance being made here for influence from secular usage or Gnosticism.[40] A second view, presented by Prestige, sees oikonomia in Tertullian as referring "mainly to the sense of interior organization," with secular or gnostic influence doubtful or denied.[41] Verhoeven himself, seeing the close connection oikonomia has with monarchia in Tertullian, advances an additional hypothesis: "since *monarchia* in its original sense recalls the example of oriental despotism, one thinks in regard to *oikonomia* in this connection . . . of the office of administrator, which in the court was performed by one of several οἰκονόμοι. One is inclined to carry over this parallel to the Logos (Christ) and to see him as οἰκονόμος in the *monarchia* of the Father."[42]

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[38] Ibid., 148.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid., 107. The view is that of E. Kroymann in Tertullian Adversus Praxean, Sammlung Ausgewählter Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichtlicher Quellenschriften, II. 8 (Tübingen, 1907), Introduction, Chap. 3. After summarizing Kroymann's view, however, Verhoeven remarks: "There is actually no mention of an historical investigation by him."

[41] Ibid., 107f. Prestige^2, 99ff.; cf. supra, 68f.

To test these three hypotheses, Verhoeven goes on first to trace the precise meanings the terms involved have in Tertullian's treatise.[43] Here he considers not only *oikonomia*, but also *dispositio* and *dispensatio*, and their related verbal forms, and he considers them especially in their connection with *monarchia* throughout. One merit of Verhoeven's detailed examination is that he is able to point out how both *monarchia* and *oikonomia* take on different shades of meaning in different chapters of Tertullian's treatise,[44] and thus at the end he is able to summarize in chart form four chief nuances of meaning for *oikonomia* in *Adversus Praxean*— in addition to common secular uses— and all four in connection with distinct shades of meaning for *monarchia*.[45]

Then to complete his examination of the three hypotheses, Verhoeven surveys the earlier usage of *oikonomia* in its historical connections.[46] Classical usage, drawn apparently from standard lexicons, like Stephanus and Forcellini, and even from Prestige's few citations,[47] is summed up under four main headings, a few examples being listed under each: *oikonomia* as household management; as military or political arrangement or management; as arrangement in general, in rhetoric, for instance; and as the task or office of an *oikonomos*.[48] Here, surprisingly, the notion of God's management of the universe is omitted, though elsewhere at times Verhoeven seems somewhat aware of this important concept.[49] In spite of this deficiency, and the general brevity that any such summary entails, the survey properly lays a groundwork from which later patristic use of the word *oikonomia* can be often be explained— indeed, Verhoeven frequently traces Christian use of the word back specifically to one or more of these four classical Greek meanings.[50]

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[42] *Ibid.*, 108.

[43] *Ibid.*, 108-115.

[44] Thus, for example, Verhoeven concludes, *ibid.*, 109, that in *Adv. Prax.* 2b-3a *monarchia* means "the substantial unity of God" and *oikonomia* indicates "the inner unfolding of this one substance," but in 3b-4 *monarchia* refers to "unity of power and will" while *dispositio* now means "the direction of the world administration established through God's free choice."

[45] *Ibid.*, 114f.

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[46] *Ibid*., 116-136. This curious order is followed throughout by Verhoeven, to examine a term first in Tertullian, then in its historical connections in earlier literature. Would there by any significant difference in results if the order of procedure were reversed? Or does he treat Tertullian already knowing the results of this survey of earlier uses?

[47] On Stephanus and Forcellini, see *supra*, Chap. 1, 5, note 1. Prestige's occasional nontheological references are noted by Verhoeven, 117.

[48] Verhoeven, 116-118.

[49] *Ibid*., 118, for example, where Verhoeven comments on the Septuagint use of *dioikēsis* that "Zeno and Chrysippus also use διοίκησις for the world administration of God. This word was translated by the Romans here with *dispositio* (*SVF*, von Arnim, I, 548)." Again, 123 and 136, the sense of "the ordering of the world in the creation and the administration of the world" for *oikonomia* is described as "thus already in the Stoa, in the Septuagint." Verhoeven does not cite, however, the extensive evidence for the application of *dioikēsis* and *oikonomia* in classical Greek

Use of the term *oikonomia* and of the equally important synonym *dioikēsis* in the Old Testament and Philo is next taken up.[51] Verhoeven advances the theory that *dioikēsis* is "used in the Septuagint whenever the talk is of God, who orders his kingdom," and that "Philo also shows in this case the [same] preference for *dioikēsis*, while *oikonomia* is used by him only in the profane sense" of classical Greek usage.[52] These

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secular writers to God's world administration; inclusion of it would strengthen the presentation and perhaps cause him to develop it along different lines at some points.

[50] E.g., *ibid.*, 123, Verhoeven suggests that the Jewish-Christian usage of *oikonomia* to refer to "the direction of the cosmos and the world administration of God" comes out of the second and third classical Greek uses, i.e., military or political arrangement or management, and arrangement in general. While this is true, it is also possible to show, as we shall attempt to demonstrate, that "profane" writers already used *oikonomia* in much this same sense. But Verhoeven presents a correct method, it seems, for explaining Christian usage: in so far as possible, on the basis of parallel earlier usage in classical writers, Jewish sources, or the papyri, and this same procedure will be followed, even more thoroughly, in the Part II of this dissertation.

[51] *Ibid.*, 118f.

[52] *Ibid.*, 118.

suggestions merit further consideration, and, if it is correct that Philo uses *oikonomia* only with the regular meanings of normal classical application, then it would seem that any influence from Philo on the church fathers regarding the use of *oikonomia* in theology is dubious. Thus it is with proper caution that Verhoeven, although observing that in Philo God's rule over the world (or *monarchia*) does include a place for the Logos in the execution of that *monarchia*, refuses to conclude that Tertullian's use of *monarchia* and the tasks he assigns the Logos are developed out of Philo's concept.[53] Interesting conjecture and proper historical balance both manifest themselves in Verhoeven's pages.

The New Testament passages employing *oikonomia* are discussed with a similar precision and freshness.[54] This dissertation sees the designation of the apostles as *oikonomoi* of God as a new, specifically Christian, sense for the word, though arising out of classical, secular Greek usage. Likewise the sense of *oikonomia* as *Heilsplan*, the divine plan of salvation with Christ as its focal point, is viewed as a significant New Testament application, "which becomes the occasion for the church fathers to bring the term into connection with the person of Jesus Christ so strikingly often"— though again influence from classical secular usage is allowed.[55] Verhoeven then neatly summarizes the uses of *oikonomia* in the Jewish-Christian application of the term to God and his arrangements: first, for the direction and administration of the universe, in which the Logos has a part, according already to Philo; then for the mediating task of stewards which is thrust upon the apostles; and finally for the *Heilsplan* of God in Jesus Christ, which includes God's free resolution of will, the plan of redemption outlined in his mind, and the actual execution of the plan in Jesus' incarnation and death.[56] However, Verhoeven adds emphatically, even though Jesus' life thus forms the *contents* of this plan, "the meaning: 'subordinate service, entrusted to an οἰκονόμος,' is not thereby applied to Jesus, but only to the apostles and the bishops appointed through them."[57] With only one exception, Jesus is not called *oikonomos* anywhere in the New Testament or in other early Christian literature, he claims, though this point seems to undercut his own hypothesis about Tertullian's use of *oikonomia* for the Trinity, viz., that Christ is *oikonomos* in the *monarchia* of the Father.[58] This claim about the application of the word *oikonomos* is to be noted for reexamination in the light of the non-Christian, prepatristic evidence.

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[53] *Ibid.*, 119. His reason is this: "Precisely the lack of application of οἰκονόμος to the Logos in this function— this not only in Philo, but also in almost the whole Christian literature— leads us to this degree of caution." Further light will be shed on this situation in our conclusions, Part III.

[54] *Ibid.*, 119-123.

[55] *Ibid.*, 121.

The Apostolic Fathers and Justin Martyr and the Apologists are then examined for their uses of *oikonomia*, always against the background of classical and Jewish-Christian usage already sketched.[59] Tatian is cited as especially significant because he seems to bring the term *oikonomia* into connection with the birth of the Logos and with creation, at least according to Verhoeven's discussion of a much disputed passage.[60]

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[56] *Ibid.*, 123.

[57] *Ibid.*

[58] *Ibid.*, 121. The one exception Verhoeven cites (note 42) is the phrase "dispensator paternae gratiae," applied to Christ at Iren. *Adv. Haer.* 4. 20. 7. For his hypothesis, *supra*, 72f.

[59] "The Apostolic Fathers," *ibid.*, 123-125; "Oikonomia in Justin and the Other Apologists." 125-128.

Then an extremely significant section follows on the use of *oikonomia* in Gnosticism and in Irenaeus.[61] Verhoeven, contrary to Prestige, takes the position that this usage in Gnosticism is of the utmost importance in understanding Tertullian's concepts in *Adversus Praxean*, though he is also conscious that much which is said here must be of a hypothetical character, since gnostic sources are fragmentary and not completely studied yet.[62] What he does do, however, is examine the gnostic document *Pistis Sophia*[63] and then the gnostic passages preserved in Irenaeus.[64]

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[60] *Ibid.*, 126-128. The passage under discussion is Tat. *Orat.* 5. 1.

[61] *Ibid.*, 128-135.

[62] *Ibid.*, 107, especially note 1 (where the contrary opinion of Prestige^2, 101, is quoted), and 137.

[63] Carl Schmidt, *Koptisch-Gnostische Schriften* I (Leipzig, 1905), 1ff. Verhoeven bases his work here on the sixteen examples of *oikonomia* cited in Schmidt's Index, 378. O. Lillge, "Das patristische Wort οἰκονομία" (Erlangen, 1955), 104, mentions fourteen examples and deals with only some of these as important. However Lillge also brings forth other gnostic documents, though by no means all that are available. Plainly the subject needs more thorough examination, though Verhoeven is on the right track in recognizing the importance of gnostic influence on "orthodox" writers in his limited sampling of materials.

[64] Verhoeven, 129-132. The breakdown of examples in Irenaeus which D'Alès had worked out, *supra*, 61, is followed by Verhoeven, but he corrects it from 33 to 29 examples, removing some and adding one additional one (note 58).

From these sources Verhoeven concludes the Gnostics used oikonomia in three additional and important senses different from anything previously found: first, for the mysteries of God, his arrangements revealed in Jesus Christ, which for the Gnostics go much further than the usual details of the Heilsplan; secondly, for the wondrous birth of the man Jesus from Mary; and thirdly, for the gnostic pleroma, the disposition, ordering, and emanation of the constellation of aeons in the upper world above, according to the speculative gnostic systems.[65] In all these applications by the gnostic theologians, Verhoeven is able to point to distinct parallels and also distinct differences from usage in earlier "orthodox" Christian writers.[66]

He then considers the uses of oikonomia by Irenaeus himself, here following, but also supplementing and correcting, the earlier study made by D'Alès.[67] Irenaeus, who employs the term in a variety of senses, seeks to restore it as orthodox property in the face of gnostic perversion, and even takes oikonomia into the regula fidei. He is not a link, Verhoeven thinks, to Tertullian's usage of the term as an "unfolding of the unity into a trinity"; the Apologists and the gnostics, rather, seem to be the significant influence here.[68]

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[65] Ibid., 128-132, and 135.

[66] Ibid., passim. Cf. especially 130 where Verhoeven sees in the gnostic use of oikonomia for "the wondrous birth of Jesus from Mary" a parallel to "orthodox" usage: "The Gnostics have their own view about this birth as such, but that does not remove the fact that the term is used apart from that in a traditional sense, however gnostically tainted. . . . Here this word still stands clearly in connection with the wonderful birth, which is indicated through the Christian tradition as oikonomia." From this it would seem that Gnosticism is the place to look for important influences in the use of oikonomia, especially in its dominant later sense of Incarnation.

[67] Ibid., 132-135. Verhoeven (p. 133) is even able to offer an explanation for the one passage (Adv. Haer. 5. 20. 1) which D'Alès believed

More is said about the use of oikonomia by Clement of Alexandria[69] and Hippolytus,[70] about the relation of the word to the term probola (or "projection" of the Word from the Father) in Tertullian,[71] and in convenient summary form about all the uses of oikonomia prior to Tertullian as a background for the Adversus Praxean.[72] Without spelling out all these points here, we may conclude with Verhoeven's answer to his initial problem: how did the internal unfolding of God get the name oikonomia in Tertullian? The point of departure had to be, Verhoeven insists, in line with the first hypothesis sketched above, the idea of oikonomia as the Heilsplan of God; this Heilsplan-motif, however, was broadened through the Logos concept in the Apologists and Irenaeus and also, he holds, by the gnostic doctrine of the aeons.[73] Further, Tertullian's whole concept must be seen with the monarchia as its background, but there is no clear evidence that the Logos Christ was referred to as

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deviated from the general rule that Irenaeus does not speak of any "internal economy of Christ."

[68] Ibid., 134.

[69] Ibid., 135.

[70] Ibid., 147-150.

[71] Ibid., 137-147.

[72] Ibid., 136f.

[73] Ibid., 137.

an inferior *oikonomos* in the *monarchia* of the Father. While Verhoeven does think Tertullian included in his concept of *monarchia* the notion of unity in substance (*substantia*),[74] he does not agree with Prestige's finding that the divine economy was one of being, rather than redemption or revelation. For Verhoeven, "the unfolding of God means . . . at the same time the birth of the Logos and the coming into existence of the world";[75] the economy, as unfolding of the divine unity, is, in other words, related to the *probola* of the Logos, to creation, and ultimately to the whole *Heilsplan* — it is not just a matter of internal organization of being.[76] And when Prestige excludes influence from the "profane," classical Greek meanings and from the *Heilsplan* concept of earlier Christianity, he is guilty, Verhoeven concludes, of "an apriori, fixed opinion, which is refuted through an historical investigation."[77]

Even this lengthy summary does not do full justice to all facets of Verhoeven's competent study, and we shall have occasion later to refer to him on several points. He makes two significant contributions for our study, however, in addition to dealing with specific passages and problems in Tertullian and presenting suggestions for consideration about other writers. One is the indication of the general lines of investigation that ought to be followed — namely, from classical Greek use, through the Old Testament and Philo, then to the New Testament and fathers, with inclusion of synonyms like *dioikēsis* — although Verhoeven's own investigations are not always as complete as they might be, and his case might have been even stronger at points if he had analyzed pre-Christian usage more thoroughly. The second is the reexamination of questions which D'Alès and Prestige ignored or answered in the negative — like the matter of gnostic influence on patristic usage. Both these elements suggest the need for an even more thorough treatment of non-Christian, prepatristic applications.

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[74] *Ibid.*, 150ff.

[75] *Ibid.*, 137.

[76] *Ibid.*

[77] *Ibid.*

4) H.S. Alivisatos: oikonomia in Greek Orthodox usage

A recent discussion, important for its great number of patristic citations, particularly in the later writers from the fifth century on, which are quite obscure to most Western students, is the work in modern Greek, entitled Η ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑ ("Economy, according to the Canonical Law of the Orthodox Church") by Hamilcar S. Alivisatos, Professor of Canon Law at the University of Athens, published in Athens, 1949.[78] Actually the work is a 112-page monograph on dispensations (or economy) under Orthodox ecclesiastical law. However, in dealing with this area of Orthodox life and practice, which incidentally is still undefined dogmatically, the author presents a historical treatment of this subject as it has developed in the Christian church, and in so doing provides, through this broad base on which he builds, a discussion of the biblical and patristic passages which are pertinent.

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[78] ΑΜΙΛΚΑ Σ. ΑΛΙΒΙΖΑΤΟΥ Η ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟ ΚΑΝΟΝΙΚΟΝ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ ΤΗΣ ΟΡΘΟΔΟΞΟΥ ΕΚΚΛΗΣΙΑΣ (Athens: Aster Publishing House, 1949). Cited hereafter as "Alivisatos." A one-page English translation of the conclusions is provided. A summary of "Economy, from the Orthodox point of view," has also appeared in Dispensation in Practice and Theory with special reference to the Anglican Churches (London, 1944). On this latter item, however, cf. the remarks in a review by Dom Gregory Dix, Journal of Theological Studies 46, No. 183-4 (July-October, 1945), 251-56.

Of the two parts into which the book is divided, the first is of concern to us. Here the definition and meaning of oikonomia is examined, with one paragraph devoted to classical usage, three pages to scriptural citations, and some thirteen pages to the fathers, down to the Middle Ages.[79] Alivisatos sees an orderly development of the term from classical, through biblical, to ecclesiastical usage, though, admittedly, the fathers seem to give new twists to the meanings. Since most of the patristic citations are given from Migne's Patrologia, the references are helpful even to the reader with little knowledge of modern Greek.

Some of Professor Alivisatos' suggestions are striking. For example, there is his emphasis on the elements of condescension and mercy (sugkatabasis, epieikeia) in explaining the doctrine of economy in its ethical sense as "a way out of the anomaly created by and proceeding from the imposition of extreme severity and precision in the observance of canonical law."[80] Less convincing perhaps is his feeling that the Parable of the Unjust Steward at Luke 16: 1-8 could be interpreted as containing the beginning of this thought of condescension and mercy in Christian usage.[81]

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[79] One brief paragraph in Alivisatos, 22, summarizes three chief classical meanings for oikonomia, based on Stephanus, Thesaurus (note 4): management and supervision of a household; management and governing of a city; and the proper ordering of any matter towards definite purposes. No examples are offered. On New Testament usage, see ibid., 23-26; on the fathers, 26-39.

[80] Ibid., 112; cf. Eng. tr. on 8.

The second portion of the book, briefly, is devoted to special cases of the application of economy (to the seven sacraments, for example) and an interesting distinguishing of the Orthodox doctrine of economy from the Roman Catholic device of dispensations. The final page of summary observations on the practice of economy in the Greek Church today is also provided in an English translation.

Invaluable for its often obscure patristic citations, Professor Alivisatos' work is also helpful for seeing the whole sweep of the doctrine from the present-day Orthodox viewpoint. It is little help, however, in grasping more deeply the non-Christian influences on the word in patristic thought.

5) Otto Lillge: "Das patristische Wort οἰκονομία"

The most extensive discussion on oikonomia yet to appear is the dissertation presented in 1955 to the Theological Faculty of the University of Erlangen by Otto Lillge, entitled "Das patristische Wort οἰκονομία, seine Geschichte und seine Bedeutung bis auf Origenes."[82] It represents a research project carried on at about the same time that material for my own thesis was being gathered, although the two undertakings approach the subject in a somewhat different manner.[83] This Erlangen dissertation brings together a good quantity of material on the topic in the earlier church fathers and, within the limits imposed by its methodology, offers some sound and helpful observations on the usage of the term, especially by the orthodox fathers, from the first century to about A.D. 250.

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[81] Ibid., 25; cf. 24, note 2.

[82] Otto Lillge, "Das patristische Wort οἰκονομία, seine Geschichte und seine Bedeutung bis auf Origines" (Erlangen, 1955). Cited hereafter as "Lillge." The dissertation has appeared only in typewritten form but is available on microfilm. The filmed copy I have used is now deposited in the Krauth Memorial Library of the Lutheran Theological Seminary at Philadelphia. For a brief summary of this dissertation without any discussion, see Theologische Literaturzeitung, 80, N. 4 (April, 1955), 239, "Referate über theologische Dissertationen in Machinenschrift."

Lillge's work is, briefly characterized, a competent, 125-page survey of the single term oikonomia in the various Christian writers down to Origen. It is carried out from a philosophical and theological point of view, though without neglecting details of lower criticism at times, drawing its reference material by and large only from German works on any given topic.

The dissertation begins by sketching in four pages what the standard German writers on Dogmengeschichte in the last seventy years have had to say about oikonomia. The views of Harnack, Loofs, Seeberg, Koehler, and Werner, which are presented in order to bring "the question into the sharpest possible focus," are by no means cited with the completeness of the survey we have provided above.[84]

After this introduction, the author, in the main section of the dissertation, operating on the assumption that "the word is itself fundamentally capable of a many-sided application,"[85] goes on to examine how the various Christian writers or groups of them understood the word oikonomia and what connotations the term carried along with itself.

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[83] See supra, Preface, xxxviii f.

[84] Lillge, 1, with the survey on the histories of doctrine plus the article by Gass, 1-4. Cf. supra, Chap. 3, 14-58. Because Lillge limits himself mainly to the references indicated in the indices of these various works, he overlooks in Harnack, for example, the frequent suggestion of gnostic connections.

At the outset the usages of the word in secular Greek are outlined in five pages, a brief, illustrative survey which cites most of the passages found in the Liddell-Scott-Jones Lexicon but which does not go much further than repeating the listings found in such secondary sources.[86] Philo and Josephus are dealt with in a single page. Then two pages are allotted to a rundown of examples in the papyri, again dependent on the lexicons. In each of these sections there is an outline under which a few examples are given, the categories usually being related logically or historically. Only a few examples are cited "because of the fulness of the material,"[87] and while a satisfactory outline is generally provided for each section (though far from complete because of the dependence on secondary sources), the significance even of some of the references that are cited may be overlooked in this very cursory treatment of foundations.[88]

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[85] Lillge, 1.

[86] Ibid., 5-9, with the sources consulted listed in an appendix on 9. The outline for classical Greek usage is as follows:

I. Oikonomia in the basic sense of household management, then direction of a household, household administration, especially the art and method or capability of managing a household.

II. Arrangement: 1) oikonomia in the sense of diathesis, taxis, kataskeuē; 2) in addition, the meaning of unified connection, natural ordering; 3) a technical term for the disposition(arrangement) of an orator or writer; 4) in ethics, accommodation, i.e., adaptation, calculation or consideration of utility, as, e.g., a later technical term in politics.

[87] Ibid., 5.

Then, after a brief observation on usage of the word oikonomia by the Septuagint in half a page and the New Testament examples in three more pages,[89] a series of sections, forming the body of the work, takes up the term in Ignatius, the Apologists, Irenaeus, Tertullian, Hippolytus, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen.[90] Only at this point is attention given in a sort of appendix to the occurrence of the word in Gnosticism and the apocryphal acts of the apostles.[91] Interspersed in these sections are a number of excursuses, on such subjects as "The Beginnings of the Asia Minor Theology," "Oikonomia in the Confessions of Faith in the Early Church," "Valentinian Christology," and "Theodor Zahn on oikonomia in the

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[88] For example, the phrase at Polyb. 1. 4. 3. where oikonomia occurs is cited (ibid., 7), but no indication is given either of Polybius' other uses of the term or of the importance which he attaches to the concept, nor is this connected with patristic usage as a possible influence or parallel; cf. infra, 330. None of the material presented below in Part II, Chap. 4, apparently of direct importance to patristic thought, is cited at all— because the secondary sources do not present much on it.

[89] Oikonomia in the Septuagint, ibid., 13; in the New Testament, 13-15.

[90] Oikonomia in Ignatius, ibid., 15-18; in the Age of the Apologists, 21-33; in Irenaeus, 33-51; in Tertullian, 59-69; in Hippolytus, 70-77; in Clement of Alexandria, 79-91; in Origen, 91-102.

[91] Oikonomia in Gnosticism, ibid., 103-115; in the semignostic apocryphal acts of the apostles, 117-120.

Acts of John."[92] Usually such an excursus provides an opportunity to dig more deeply into what some later writer, Zahn, Loofs, Gass, for example, has had to say on oikonomia or a related topic which might be under dispute.

The conclusions may be summed up briefly.[93] Lillge finds that oikonomia, like a number of other Greek words and concepts, takes on new meanings and contents under (Jewish and) Christian usage, as was the case, for example, with doxa.[94] These varied, new meanings of oikonomia, he thinks, can be summed up under three main headings, each one particularly exemplified by an important church father: 1) the redemptive history (heilsgeschichtlich) sense, stressed by Irenaeus; 2) the structural sense, presented by Tertullian; and 3) the ethical application, implying training and a method of action which allows itself to be led by the principle of accommodation, prevalent in Clement of Alexandria. Of the three, it is

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[92] The Beginnings of the Asia Minor Theology, ibid. 18-21; Oikonomia in the Confessions of Faith of the Early Church, 51-52; Irenaeus' Source in Asia Minor, 52-53; The Relationship of oikonomia and recapitulatio in Irenaeus, 54-56; The Understanding of History in Irenaeus, 56-58; The Modalistic-Monarchian Controversy, 78-79; On the Valentinian Christology, 110-111; On the Understanding of the Old Testament Law in Ptolemaeus, 115-116; Theodor Zahn on oikonomia in the Acts of John, 121-122.

[93] Ibid., 122-125.

[94] Ibid., 122. On this term, cf. the unpublished dissertation by Everett F. Harrison, "The Use of Doxa in Greek Literature with Special Reference to the New Testament" (Philadelphia: the University of Pennsylvania, 1950, on microfilm).

Irenaeus' usage, he feels, which made the most lasting contribution, and the closing half of the conclusions are spent in explaining how this *heilsgeschichtlich* view is rooted in the biblical categories of time and history, rather than in Greek notions, an emphasis currently popularized by Oscar Cullmann, among others.[95] The thesis concludes, "it is legitimate . . . to render the term as divine redemptive economy [göttliche Heilsökonomie]."[96]

Lillge's study, as previously indicated, has helped verify my belief that a dissertation on *oikonomia* is of genuine importance and has also established concretely some of the points my own research had tentatively indicated. Moreover, the philosophical and theological orientation, coming from a scholar in another land, provides a valuable supplement to my own basically historical approach, which is also more concerned with the classical and non-Christian roots of the problem. However, there are a number of impressions which occur, some very evident, others debatable, about shortcomings in Lillge's dissertation.

(1) In view of his undoubtedly correct assumptions that *oikonomia* is from the very beginning "capable of a many-sided application," and that it takes on a host of new meanings already in the papyri, as well as exhibiting this many-sided application in the classical authors, more attention should be paid to these roots and foundations. I propose therefore to show, by a more complete examination of pre-Christian examples of the term, how many of its patristic usages are paralleled here or are predictable from these earlier occurrences. Although the term may be one of

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[95] Lillge, 123f.; cf. 14, note 19a, and 56-58. On Cullmann, see *infra*, 97-108.

[96] Lillge, 125.

a class of words which take on new meanings under (Jewish and) Christian usage, one must nonetheless ask what the previous meanings were and whether they influenced the new applications in any way. This examination will be the major concern of Parts II and III of this dissertation.

(2) In the examination of the use of the term by Christian writers, certain significant sources have not been employed fully or in some cases at all in attempting to assess patristic meanings. A case in point is Philo. Five examples of Philo's use of oikonomia are cited by Lillge,[97] and there is not much more, it is true, that is listed in the index verborum to the Cohn-Wendland edition of his works.[98] But the Questions on

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[97] Ibid., 10.

[98] L. Cohn and P. Wendland, Philonis Alexandrini Opera Quae Supersunt (Berlin, 1896-1930), vol. 7, part 2. Lillge passes over their reference to oikonomikos at 4, 73, 11 (where it means skill at oikonomia or household management), all their citations of the verb and adjective forms, and even the important but questionable passage at 5, 330, 14, where oikonomia appears to be once used by Philo in the sense of a divine arrangement. The reference in this latter passage is to the detail in the Jacob and Esau story at Gen. 27: 16 and 23, where Jacob disguises his hands with goatskins. The phrase is bracketed in Cohn-Wendland as an interpolation, but Philo himself seems to use the word oikonomia in connection with the Jacob-Esau story at Quaest. in Gen. 4. 206, and Clement of Alexandria reflects the same idea (Strom. 2. 19). F. H. Colson, in his Loeb Classical Library translation of Philo (London, 1929ff.), 8, 449f., presents more of a defense for the phrase, though he inclines to the view that it is spurious in Philo. For a tentative suggestion along different lines, see infra, 600ff.

Genesis and *Questions on Exodus* by Philo are not included in that *index verborum*. Excellent translations of the two treatises are now available, however, made from the Armenian version (where the entire treatises are extant) and from the available Greek fragments, and this recent edition indicates a far greater number of occurrences of *oikonomia* in these treatises than in all other extant portions of Philo.[99] Some of the evidence appears extremely important and ought not to be overlooked.

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[99] Ralph Marcus, *Questions and Answers on Genesis* and *Questions and Answers on Exodus*, both translated from the ancient Armenian Version of the original Greek (Loeb Classical Library; London, 1953). Both treatises had been available for more than a century, since J.B. Aucher's Latin translation of the Armenian, *Philonis Judaei Paralipomena Armena* (Venice, 1826). The work by Marcus brings to the subject a number of small Greek fragments recognized since that time, printing all of these Greek fragments, and in addition provides a clear, well-annotated translation. What is more, Marcus conjectures in his notes where an original *oikonomia* stood in the Greek text, claiming such words can confidently be restored because of the nature of the Armenian language, the literalness of the translation, and the check provided at some points by the extant Greek fragments (*Questions and Answers on Genesis*, v f.; "with the help of this material I have ventured to reconstruct many of the philosophical and religious terms used by Philo in passages which are no longer extant in Greek; these reconstructions are not all to be regarded as certain, but most of them, I think, are correct"). There is no index of such terms provided by Marcus, but on the basis of my own scanning there seem to be about a dozen more possible examples of *oikonomia* in these writings of Philo, some of them with significance not previously noted; cf. *infra*, 600ff.

To take another example, the Hermetic literature, of a debatable and vexing quality at best, but important because it stems from the same milieu and period in which Clement and Origen were writing and reflects current religious usage of that time, ought not be ignored. And oikonomia does occur in the Hermetica.[100] A final illustration of the point: the application of oikonomia, by Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, to mean an accommodation or adaptation, very much parallel to patristic usage, is noted by Lillge.[101] No real examination is provided, however, into Stoic philosophy, which this usage would seem to reflect, nor is there any attempt to relate the meager evidence from pagan sources that is presented to patristic meaning. Did one influence the other? If so, how? It would seem that there ought to be a further consideration of some of these patristic meanings Lillge and others have recognized, on the basis of the fullest evidence from the non-Christian sources, with an attempt made to investigate the relationships between the two in certain cases.

(3) Another factor which limits the value of Lillge's work is the fact that he confines himself for the most part only to the one word oikonomia.

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[100] Cf. Walter Scott, Hermetica (4 vols.; Oxford, 1924-36), with the index verborum in vol. 4.

[101] Lillge, 7-9; cf., on the general question of Stoic influence, 83, where Lillge remarks that "in this sense oikonomia is in Clement almost identical with dioikēsis," though he has not previously said much about the term dioikēsis and does not indicate whether he is aware of any Stoic background here, and more particularly 86f., where he begins to note a relationship between Clement and the Stoa (Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, at least), though he does not say much about the real problem of dependence here in the specific ethical practice.

His treatise is a classification of the meanings of its occurrences in given authors; only occasionally are adverbial, adjectival, or verbal forms cited, though, as Lillge himself shows, these forms often shed light on a writer's thought.[102] I can well appreciate the advantages of limiting oneself to a given word, but to come to a more thorough understanding of the concept of oikonomia in the fathers, it is necessary also to examine such related words as οἰκονομεῖν, οἰκονομικός, οἰκονομικῶς, and even the related διοικεῖν and διοίκησις, as other studies have shown.[103] To cite an example in Philo again, there are some passages where oikonomein the verb is used of God "governing" or "administering" the universe, precisely as in the fathers, as a glance at the index of Cohn-Wendland will show.[104] To limit oneself to the noun alone passes over such evidence, but all this evidence is a part of the writer's concept of the divine economy. I propose therefore, wherever in point, to broaden the investigation to include these other terms and forms which help express the general idea of oikonomia.

(4) It may also be questioned whether it is sufficient to carry the examination down only to Origen. His works are a convenient stopping point, and there is undoubtedly some truth in Lillge's contention "that in that period already all the later possibilities of meaning for

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[102] Lillge himself brings in the related terms occasionally; e.g., oikonomos, ibid., 4 and 16; the adverb oikonomikōs, 76f., 86, 88, 118, 121; oikonomein, 100; and even dioikēsis, 83.

[103] E.g., Prestige and Verhoeven; cf. supra, 65 and 73ff.

[104] Op. cit. (supra, note 98). At least half a dozen examples occur; e.g., 1, 3, 13. There are also a few more instances in the Quaest. in Gen. and Quaest. in Exod., op. cit. (supra, note 99).

oikonomia are in essence present"[105] and that the later use of the Eastern Church is predominantly in the sense of Incarnation.[106] Yet to stop at this point does not take into account all later developments, particularly the further application to ethical affairs, which Professor Alivisatos' monograph finds so extremely important.[107] Moreover, Prestige's survey certainly indicates an astonishing wealth of later applications which are overlooked if the curtain is drawn on the survey at Origen's death.[108] Ideally, therefore, examination should eventually be carried on beyond Origen.

(5) A question of procedure in historical research may also be raised concerning Lillge's arrangement which first takes up all the orthodox church fathers down to Origen and then examines the use of oikonomia in Gnosticism and the semignostic apocryphal acts. From the standpoint of clarity and ease of presentation this method has much to recommend it, for the gnostic documents present so many problems of text, date, and interpretation that it is certainly easier to examine them after looking at the "catholic" view of the matter.

However we have already noted the opinion, going back at least to

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[105] Lillge, 4.

[106] Ibid., 101; cf. 51a-52.

[107] Supra, 83f.

[108] Prestige^2, 55-67 and 97-111; supra, 66f. Note also the further meanings which oikonomia takes on in the late fourth-century writings of Epiphanius: the Lord's Supper ("the Administration," PG 41, 2, 828C) and "charity" or "alms" (PG 41, 2, 829C and 508A), noted in Sophocles' Lexicon, op. cit. (supra, 5, note 1).

Harnack,[109] that there was borrowing or influence of some sort from Gnosticism at precisely this point. The catholic doctrine of oikonomia was not formed in a vacuum but hammered out with Gnosticism as the forge, and Verhoeven argues for definite indebtedness to the Gnostics.[110] Moreover, there is the obvious fact that some references to oikonomia occur in gnostic documents which must be dated prior to Irenaeus and Tertullian and to which these catholic fathers are replying, as Lillge himself shows several times.[111]

Therefore, in spite of all the difficulties involved, it seems necessary to attempt to deal with the gnostic usage of the term before turning to later catholic fathers, not afterwards. Consideration must be given to the possibility that there was gnostic and even totally non-Christian influence on the patristic use of the term. This important question Lillge's work leaves unanswered: did contemporary second- and third-century usage influence Christian thought here? There is in his method a case of hysteron proteron, and what is called for is an examination in the light of fuller knowledge about non-Christian usage, especially in Gnosticism.

(6) There is some question as to whether Lillge has made full use of all the suggestions already advanced by earlier investigators, a point suggested before by the briefness of his survey on previous study. Certainly Harnack's emphasis on gnostic influence, and probably the insistence

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[109] Harnack, DG^3, 2, 276 (Eng. tr., 4, 111); cf. supra, 24ff.

[110] Supra, 78f.

[111] E.g., Lillge, 33f. Cf. D'Alès' conclusion on the careful way in which Irenaeus guards against the evidently common gnostic use of oikonomia and tries to establish an orthodox meaning for the term, supra, 61f.

by Gass and Seeberg that the doctrine of economy had influence on the Rule of Faith and the creeds[112] could be explored more fully with some profit.

(7) Finally, Lillge's investigation has been carried out without any apparent knowledge of the findings of D'Alès, Prestige, Verhoeven, and Alivisatos, all noted above, on the subject; at least they are never mentioned in the entire dissertation. Though the postwar conditions are probably to blame, knowledge of the findings of these scholars might have resulted in slightly different conclusions on some matters.

All in all— and these comments do not diminish the esteem I feel for Lillge's generally fine job— there seems nonetheless good reason for a more thorough investigation along the lines proposed, dealing primarily in this dissertation with what Lillge has assumed or taken at secondhand, the pre-Christian, pagan usages of oikonomia and related terms, with the hope to provide at some later time a complete study of patristic use in the light of these findings.

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[112] Gass, 484; supra, 13. Seeberg, DG^3, 1, 421, note 2; supra, 37.

5. The Concept of oikonomia in Current Studies on New Testament Christianity

The term oikonomia and the plethora of ideas associated with it have in recent years come into renewed discussion in patrology, as we have seen. New Testament scholars have also made increasing use of the term in their analysis of the theology of the primitive church and its attitude towards time and history. Two studies can be especially singled out here, and the first of them, as just indicated, had some influence on Lillge's investigation.[1]

1) Oscar Cullmann: Christ and Time

Christ and Time, subtitled The Primitive Christian Conception of Time and History, the significant work of Oscar Cullmann, professor of New Testament and Early Christianity at Basel and lecturer on the origins of Christianity at the Sorbonne as well, was written in 1945 and appeared in English only five years later.[2] The book makes oikonomia one of its two basic terms in assessing this primitive Christian philosophy about time and history.

Cullmann, in his introduction, notes that our usual Western system of reckoning time assumes as a center the birth of Christ, from which, as a temporal mid-point, events are counted backwards (in years B.C.) and forward (in years A.D.).[3] Such a system, he argues, is correct, biblically speaking, but must be seen primarily in regard to a special process of redemption or *Heilsgeschichte*, and only secondarily as a measuring standard for general or "secular" history.[4] As he presents the biblical understanding of time and history which characterizes this *Heilsgeschichte* and in the light of which "secular" events are to be seen, two aspects are stressed.

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[1] Supra, 89, especially note 95.

[2] Oscar Cullmann, Christus und die Zeit (second edition; Zürich, 1948). Cited throughout from the English translation by Floyd V. Filson, Christ and Time; the Primitive Christian Conception of Time and History (Philadelphia, 1950), as "Cullmann."

The first of these, our particular concern here, is what Cullmann calls "the continuous redemptive line," i.e., the divine plan of salvation bound to a continuous time process in an ascending line embracing past, present, and future, viewed in its entirety as a dispensation or *oikonomia*.[5] Study of the New Testament terminology for time, like *kairos* ("a definite point of time that has a special place in the execution of God's plan of salvation"[6]) and *aion* (a longer duration of time, defined or undefined in extent), suggests that this divine plan is bound up in a series of *kairoi*, selected by God's sovereignty, in the past, present, and future; by joining them the redemptive line results.

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[3] *Ibid.*, 17f. The method of designating the years following Christ's birth as "years of the Lord" was begun by Dionysius Exiguus, abbot at Rome, about A.D. 525 in his chronological writings; that of counting backwards from Christ's birth stems only from the late seventeenth century, Cullmann asserts.

[4] *Ibid.*, 20f.

[5] *Ibid.*, 33ff. Cullmann titles Part I "The Continuous Redemptive Line, οἰκονομία."

[6] *Ibid.*, 39.

These New Testament expressions always have a temporal character, casting the kairoi, or redemptive events, in terms of "Formerly" and "Now" and "Then," never in contrast to an "eternity" which in the Platonic sense stands for "endless time," and never in spatial terms of contrast between a "Here" and a "Beyond."[7] Thus the linear view of the Bible with its continuous redemptive line stands in sharp contrast to all Greek cyclical views, where man is enslaved to a circle of time and finds redemption only by removal from time and space to an eternal beyond.[8]

The biblical concept, Cullmann would contend, is marked first by a scheme of Heilsgeschichte proceeding along a time line as a series of kairoi, the decisive event in which is, we note secondly, the incarnation of Christ, and to which there is attached, in the third place, eschatological expectation about the kairoi of the future.[9] Irenaeus, he holds, emerges as the champion of these three positions against the

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[7] Ibid., 37ff. Thus in the biblical view it is not, Cullmann insists, "time and eternity that stand opposed, but limited time and unlimited, endless time" (46); the word aion, which carries a time meaning, also expresses, he adds, however, "eternity," "the endless succession of the ages" (62). In spite of his censure of Karl Barth at this point for succumbing to philosophical influence, Cullmann himself in the last analysis must allow aion to mean on occasion "time in its entire unending extension . . . unlimited in both the backward and forward direction" (48), an expression that sounds like the "naive" concept of eternity he so often opposes.

[8] Ibid., 51ff.

[9] Ibid., 55f.

Gnostics, clearly recognizing that "the Christian proclamation stands or falls with the redemptive history, that the historical work of Jesus Christ as Redeemer forms the mid-point of the line which leads from the Old Testament to the return of Christ."[10] Here he sees the biblical view of time (and history) standing in radical opposition to the Greek thought embodied in Gnosticism and suggests that the Hellenizing of Christianity, which Harnack sensed, took place most readily at this point, namely in regard to the biblical view of time.[11]

For the biblical view, therefore, God's redemptive action always takes place within time (over which God is lord), and time is not to be contrasted with any timeless eternity. Accordingly, the "present age" and the "future age" of which the Bible speaks are not to be equated with "time" and "eternity," for the future age, as in the book of Revelation, takes place in time, also.[12] The biblical view assumes, Cullmann goes on, a scheme within time of three ages:

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[10] Ibid., 57.

[11] Ibid., 58f. Here Cullmann is in agreement with Werner on the importance of the collapse of primitive Christian eschatological expectation. However, he denies that the nonoccurrence of the Parousia is responsible for the Hellenization (Werner), for the process of Hellenization "affected not only Christianity but all ancient religions" (59); further it affected not only the concept of future time (eschatology) but rather of time in general. Cullmann concludes that the problem is not merely one concerning the Hellenization of eschatology, but the Hellenization of "the entire biblical scheme of redemptive history" (58); the issue is not a "consistently eschatological" way of looking at things (Werner), but the "consistently historical method of revelation" which Christianity claims (60).

1. The age before the Creation, in which the revelatory process is already being prepared in the divine predestination and in the Logos, who is already with God.
2. The "present" age, which lies between the Creation and the end.
3. The "coming" age, in which the eschatological drama falls.[13]

Now this general scheme is shared by both Old Testament and New, and both Judaism and Christianity emphasize a decisive event, a divine inbreaking into history. But the difference is that for Judaism this event still lies in the future, at the end of this present age when the coming age is to be inaugurated, while for Christianity this event has already happened in the coming of Christ.[14] Christ is the mid-point of history therefore, coming between Creation and Parousia, and God reveals through the Spirit to the believer that this decisive event has taken place and enables him to survey the entire redemptive line in its light. Thus, the important thing is that, though God does not reveal to believers the schedule of future events and does not take them out of their present temporal situation, he does allow them to grasp the redemptive process in its larger stages and direction, to grasp the progression toward fulfillment in successive stages of the oikonomia of God. To put this in Cullmann's own words, the believers thus see

> . . . the division of time on the basis of the fixed point at which Christ appeared in history. This is what it means when in various

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[12] *Ibid.*, 65f.

[13] *Ibid.*, 67.

[14] *Ibid.*, 81ff.

places in the New Testament it is explained that "the redemptive plan (οἰκονομία) of the mystery which before times eternal was hidden in God" "is *now revealed* to his saints, to whom he willed to make it known" (Eph. 3: 9; Col. 1: 26; Rom. 16: 25f.; Titus 1: 2f.; I Peter 1: 20).

When Paul speaks of the "mystery," he thereby means the stages of the redemptive history. This expression, which is connected with the "redemptive plan," indicates that a special revelation was needed in order to gain this insight into God's plan.

This knowledge of the divine economy fills the apostle with wonder and causes him to cry, "O the depth of the riches, the wisdom, and the knowledge of God!" The "incomprehensibility of his judgments" and the "unsearchable character of his ways" for human understanding come to his mind precisely through his insight into the divine economy, an insight granted him by the Holy Spirit (Rom. 11: 33).[15]

Such divinely given insight into the *oikonomia* of God enables a believer like Paul, Cullmann continues, to look backwards over the events of the Old Testament christologically, to look forward in the same way, and to view his present situation in the light of this "Christ-event."[16] In his present situation the Christian lives with the mid-point past, but the coming age not yet here; in terms of the Synoptic Gospels, the Kingdom is present and still to come; in Cullmann's now famous analogy, the decisive battle has already occurred, but the war still drags on.[17]

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[15] *Ibid.*, 77f.

[16] *Ibid.*, 90 ff. Cf. also Part II, Chaps. 2, 3, and 4, 131ff.

[17] *Ibid.*, 84. The analogy also helps Cullman to explain the mistaken eschatological views of parts of the New Testament: the writers rightly

Thus, according to Cullmann, the Christ-event— his coming and life, but especially his death and resurrection— gives a new center to time, a unique vantage point from which to view all of history, and the decisive key to the continuous redemptive line or *oikonomia* that forms the backbone of the primitive Christian view of time and history. *Oikonomia* means, to put it a slightly different way, what some nowadays call *Heilsgeschichte*, the whole pattern of God's redemptive acts, stretched out as a series of *kairoi* on a continuous line.

The other term Cullmann underscores as basic to the primitive Christian notion of time and history is *ephapax* (ἐφάπαξ), literally, "once-and-for-all-ness," uniqueness, *Einmaligkeit*.[18] Its meaning has already been suggested: in the total *oikonomia* the Christ-event stands out as *ephapax*, i.e., it is to be viewed as decisively unique, not only as historical

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knew that the decisive battle had taken place, but wrongly some expected the Parousia in their own day; in terms of the analogy, this "error is explained on a psychological basis in the same way that we explain the hasty determinations of the date of the end of the war when once the conviction is present that the decisive battle has already taken place" (87f.). Werner and Schweitzer are criticized in this connection for making the coming of the future age the mid-point, when in reality it is the historical work of Jesus himself; they wrongly make, Cullmann observes, the coming Parousia the center of thought instead of the past event which was Paul's theme, Christ crucified and risen. Hence the vigorous comment (86): "He who does not see that the radically new thing in the New Testament is the Primitive Christian shifting of the center of time can understand Christianity only as a Jewish sect."

[18] *Ibid.*, 119ff.

happening, but also for the salvation of all men. It is the climax of Heilsgeschichte which shapes the whole redemptive line, the determinative in the light of which past, present, and future are to be viewed. While oikonomia thus signifies the idea of continuity and general progress in a divine plan administered for the world and men, ephapax makes clear what is decisive and uniquely climactic in this continuing redemptive line.

Cullmann's discussion of the present age in connection with this whole view of time and history seeks to tie up the church and the individual believer with this over-all divine plan or oikonomia. The church's missionary preaching that Christ is lord, is said to provide the significance of this present period between Christ's Resurrection and Parousia for redemptive history.[19] Here is reflected the idea found in Mark already, that, before the end comes, "the gospel must first be preached to all nations," a theme often amplified in the church fathers, "that the denouement was being deliberately held back by God to provide time for the world mission of the church."[20] And since the believer, Paul, for example, has a part in this preaching and the world mission, he becomes, ipso facto, a cog in the divine economy. He is, as Paul says of himself, an oikonomos in this oikonomia.[21] To quote Cullmann on Paul's apostolic office:

> With reference to God's eschatological plan of salvation, Paul repeatedly emphasizes that he is called to preach particularly to the

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[19] Ibid., 157.

[20] R. Bainton, "Patristic Christianity," in The Idea of History in the Ancient Near East (New Haven, 1955), 220. The reference in Mark is 13: 10.

[21] Cf. I Cor. 4: 1, 9: 17.

> Gentiles. Even in Rom., ch. 11, where he speaks of the mystery of that divine plan, he mentions his own office, which he honors as an apostle to the Gentiles (v. 13). In Col. 1: 22-29 he underlines the narrow bond between his personal office and the divine economy which has to do with the "mystery among the Gentiles." When we remember that Paul knows himself to be given a place in a plan on whose execution God makes the coming of his Kingdom dependent, then we also understand better the "compulsion" (I Cor. 9: 16) to which he understands he is subjected.[22]

Apostolic vocation is definitely coupled with an underlying concept of the oikonomia of God.

Later sections in Cullmann's book— and this summary treats mainly references to oikonomia, adding only enough of his other views to make these references intelligible— seek to relate this view of Heilsgeschichte to the general course of world events (including universal history, the world outside the church, and the state)[23] and to the individual. It is in this latter connection that he relates the individual's election to the divine oikonomia:

> This relation of the redemptive history to me finds its concrete expression in faith in my own election. Indeed, this faith signifies that we as individual men belong from the beginning in the divine

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[22] Cullmann, 163f.

[23] Ibid., 175 - 213. Great emphasis is placed by Cullmann on the divine order and the place of the state therein, but the term employed for "order" is taxis, under the influence of Rom. 13, Paul's important chapter on the state, where a number of words from this root occur.

providential administration (οἰκονομία).[24]

He also relates the individual's role in the present age to this divine *oikonomia*, for an individual's significance comes from his being placed somewhere in the over-all redemptive process. Cullmann here explains Paul's "apostolic consciousness" with more detail than previously in terms of his "unique role in redemptive history," his task in God's *oikonomia* of "laying once for all the church's unique foundation, which it will have until the end":

> The apostle knows that his office carries forward the divine redemptive process in a special way, that it belongs in the divine "stewardship" of the "mystery." In this sense Paul, making use of the characteristic expressions, designates himself as "steward of the mysteries of God" (I Cor. 4: 1), in which connection we must think not only of an administration of the divine teaching about salvation but also of the active realization of the redemptive history.[25] We know, indeed, that in this connection "stewardship" (οἰκονομία) and "mystery" (μυστήριον) are the New Testament designation for that

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[24] *Ibid.*, 220. The definition here, "divine providential administration," seems a good basic one for *oikonomia*, but differs slightly, it may be observed, from any phraseology Cullmann employed before. He does not indicate, moreover, whether or not such a definition, if it is the New Testament sense of the term, owes anything to current Stoic use, on the possibility of which cf. *supra*, 64ff. and 74, note 49. The scanty evidence here suggests the need to look for possible backgrounds in Greek Stoicism to the concept.

[25] Does Cullmann mean to imply here that Paul's use of the self-designation *oikonomos* proceeds out of his concept of the divine *oikonomia* and his

which we call redemptive history or revelational history.[26]

And what is said of Paul can be said of other men, in a lesser degree, as to their place in redemptive history, so that "even the most modest service in the Church of Christ belongs in redemptive history."[27] The individual believer's acts become a part, however modest, of the overwhelming plan of God for the ages, his *oikonomia*, the continuing line of *Heilsgeschichte*.

Thus in Cullmann's book there are propounded the following theories significant to our investigation.

(1) The concept of *oikonomia*, together with the idea that the Christ-event is *ephapax*, provides the key for the early Christian view of time and history.

(2) *Oikonomia* here represents the continuous redemptive line of God's dispensations in the past, present, and future, the mid-point being the Christ-event from which the whole series of *kairoi* is to be viewed. This concept may be defined more briefly as a New Testament term for what is now called *Heilsgeschichte* (redemptive or revelational history), or as the "divine providential administration," not merely of the world but of man's salvation.

(3) The work of the church and of the individual fits into this *oikonomia*,

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understanding of his own role in it, rather than out of current usage of the term in daily life or, perhaps, as the phrase suggests, the mystery religions? Sources for this Pauline application of the word ought to be sought in the pre-Christian usages, in order to test this suggestion.

[26] *Ibid.*, 223f.

[27] *Ibid.*, 224.

and the individual, as an oikonomos, derives his real significance in God's scheme of things from it; perhaps Paul's self-designation by this term stems from this whole way of thinking.

2) Erich Dinkler: "Earliest Christianity"

A second study which, like Christ and Time, lays great emphasis on the cruciality of the oikonomia motif in primitive Christian conceptions of time and history, and yet which offers contrast and correction to some of Cullmann's views on the topic, is the essay by Erich Dinkler, then of Yale, entitled "Earliest Christianity" in the symposium volume, The Idea of History in the Ancient Near East.[28] Dinkler was assigned the task, as part of this panoramic series of survey articles in 1952-53, of presenting the concept of history found in apostolic Christianity, roughly from A.D. 50 to 150.

In approaching the New Testament's concept of history, we must first inquire, Dinkler says, about the New Testament's concept of time,[29] and this brings him face to face with Cullmann's conclusions on that topic. But Dinkler, in contrast, it may be said at the outset, sees in the New Testament "not a theological unity but . . . varied theological conceptions"; not all is on one level, nor can all be harmonized, as he holds

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[28] Erich Dinkler, "Earliest Christianity," in Robert C. Dentan (ed.), The Idea of History in the Ancient Near East (American Oriental Series, 38; New Haven, 1955), 169-214. Cited hereafter as "Dinkler."

[29] Ibid., 172. This procedure is followed not only because the word "history" never occurs in the New Testament but also because "our modern word history . . . is freighted with philosophy" (171f.).

Cullmann tends to do.[30] Accordingly Dinkler objects to the thesis "that the real scope of the New Testament is given by 'Christ as the center of History.'"[31] The issues are more complex, he argues. To put the issue that interests us as clearly as possible, there is another view of time in the New Testament besides the oikonomia motif described by Cullmann; and this other view of time in the New Testament, according to Dinkler, is the distinctly Christian one, rather than any oikonomia philosophy! The essay therefore really becomes a constant dialogue with Cullmann, mainly on this point.

In his argument, Dinkler begins with the message of Jesus. This message can be reconstructed, he feels, "with a high degree of probability," and its theme is the nearness of the Reign of God, in the face of which man is challenged to decide.[32] "'The time is fulfilled.' It is a present lifted out as a καιρός with reference to the imminence of the coming. An either-or is set before man."[33] This Reign of God that Jesus preached, however, Dinkler goes on, is no "development" or "process" or "product of this world," but "its coming is synonymous with the end of the world."[34] It is "strictly eschatological," a supernatural event, not in the framework of history, but rather "a new epoch of salvation which breaks in with the termination of history."[35] Jesus' preaching therefore offered "no theology of history but a soteriology of the eschatological man"; the only "idea of history" presented is that "the end of history proclaims the redemption of man from history."[36]

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[30] Ibid., 173.

[31] Ibid., 173, note 4.

[32] Ibid., 174f.

[33] Ibid., 179. The indebtedness to Rudolf Bultmann here and throughout the essay in exegesis and existential interpretation is plain and is openly acknowledged at times.

[34] Ibid., 176.

But soon there arose "out of Jesus the messenger . . . the message about Jesus Christ" as preached by the apostles.[37] The carrier became "the object and content of the message." His cross and resurrection were viewed as "the turning point in the world epochs." The concept of the eschatological reign of God was now interpreted so that the Christian community itself became the "breaking in and the start of the new aeon, the realization of the Reign of God." The decisive event, it was felt, had already happened, and "what for Jesus was future [became] for the early Christian congregation already present."[38]

Such an understanding of what had happened through Christ is implicit in a number of New Testament books, but especially, Dinkler maintains, in the letters of Paul. Paul sees, on the one hand, the uniqueness of the act of God in Christ; it is "the turning point, the caesura," ephapax, once for all, within the frame of history, understood as eschatological event, not, however, as the "fixing of a date on a calendar, but rather and primarily a message which affects man" in his existence.[39] This message applies to believers only— unbelievers simply go on in the old aeon—— and it says to the believer, "If any one is in Christ, he is a new creature" (II Cor. 5: 17), or, put another way, "the turning of the aeons is to be understood . . . existentially"—— it gives _me_ freedom from _my_ past for _my_ future.[40]

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[35] Ibid., 180.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid., 181.

[38] Ibid. All the quotations in this paragraph are from this single, terse page in Dinkler.

[39] Ibid., 182.

But alongside this existential view of the eschatological Christ-event Dinkler also sees in Paul a second stress, on the Parousia. Paul looks for the Second Coming, soon. And if, in the first view, one could say, "Christ is the end of the world and its history," then, according to the second view, one must say, "Christ is the _prelude_ to the end of the world and its history."[41] And within this latter (Parousia) concept of time there may be noted sometimes an attempt "to delineate a plan of God for mankind, a sort of history of salvation. Perhaps," Dinkler restates it, "we would do better to avoid using the concept of history in connection with salvation and to speak rather of a sketch of an economy (οἰκονομία), a plan of salvation."[42] In such a sketch or plan, at any rate, "the attempt is made to interpret the past, the present, and the future up to the time of the parousia as a period planned by God Himself and predestined from eternity," what Irenaeus "would call . . . a 'divine pedagogy' of mankind."[43] Like Cullmann, it may be added, Dinkler also views Romans 9-11, on the problem of Israel, as "a wrestling with the problem of the οἰκονομία of God."[44]

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[40] _Ibid_., 183.

[41] _Ibid_., 184.

[42] _Ibid_.

[43] _Ibid_.

[44] _Ibid_., 185.

Thus there are these two concepts in Paul, seemingly in tension. The one is the theme that Christ is the end of history, an existentialized conception of eschatology and time in which past and future are drawn together in the present, in the *kairos*, with a message for man that "now is the time of salvation— decide." This might be called the existential view, or, as Dinkler himself phrases it, "the καιρός conception." The other embodies the claim that Christ is the *prelude* to the end, a conception of eschatology and time drawn from Jewish apocalyptic, Dinkler says, in which there must be a divine plan of salvation, an *oikonomia* stretching through past, present, and future; there is here an emphasis upon the nearness of the final drama of the Parousia, judgment, and general resurrection, but also upon the salvation plan that must be completed before Christ returns to judge. In contrast to the first, existentialist or *kairos* conception, with fulfillment now in the *kairos*, this latter view is termed an apocalyptic, or the *oikonomia* conception.[45] And Paul has both, not really in tension, Dinkler believes, but they correlate, they balance and support each other— not by chance, for this balance and tension is ultimately a reflection of being "in between" Christ-event and Parousia.[46]

Dinkler must allow, however, that it is the *oikonomia* theme which underlies the apostolic activity of Paul. In tones similar to Cullmann he describes the "*oikonomia* idea" as "the frame and basis of his missionary task."[47] He also states that it is in the light of this oikonomia idea that Paul interpreted the Old Testament typologically, with "the vertical relationship of God's plan of salvation," rather than any horizontal chain of cause and effect, seen as "the cause of the unity of the aeons."[48] Finally, he admits, "the οἰκονομία conception, the idea of a plan of God" is the dominant motif taken up and developed by the early church and medieval theology with the exception of Augustine.[49] This, however, Dinkler cautions, was but one side of Paul, and Cullmann, he charges, "unfortunately delineates only this idea and asserts that it is the biblical one."[50]

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[45] *Ibid.*, 186ff., especially 190. On Dinkler's designations for the two concepts, see notes 21 and 23. On the relation of the *oikonomia* conception to Jewish apocalyptic, see further 206f.

[46] *Ibid.*, 186 and also note 23.

Jesus and Paul are thus both said to stress the nearness of God's lordship, and Paul to present a kairos as well as an oikonomia concept of time and history. The situation is a bit different in the rest of the New Testament, however. The Synoptic Gospels, each the work of redactors with their own theological viewpoints a few years later on, are all aware of the problem of the delay of the Parousia. There are apologetic reflections and attempts of several sorts to explain the postponement. "Time and history have become a speculative problem," speculation arising about "the coming history which must unroll before the parousia."[51] Hence the

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[47] Ibid., 186. Cf. further A. Fridrichsen, The Apostle and his Message (Inbjudning till Teologie Doktorspromotionen, Uppsala, 1947), 3-23, and J. Munck, Paulus und die Heilsgeschichte (Acta Jutlandica, Aarsskrift for Aarhus Universitet 24 (1954), 1 (Teologisk Serie 6), Kopenhagen, 1954).

[48] Ibid., 188.

[49] Ibid., note 21, cf. 214.

[50] Ibid., note 21.

[51] Ibid., 194.

"Synoptic apocalypse" (Mark 13 and parallels) and the parables about watchful waiting during this lengthening time, like that of the Ten Virgins (Matt. 25: 1-13).[52]

It is Luke, however, who makes the most significant contribution of the three to the problem. He stresses the idea that the announcement of the Christian message must go into all the world before the Parousia, and thus the Parousia loses its theological import, as the gospel advances "in an apparently unthreatened continuity of time."[53] "The inferences of this conception . . . are twofold: 1) For Luke the early Christian 'in between' becomes a time for the unfolding of an economy of world history. The event of Christ Jesus at the beginning of the Christian Church and the expected parousia at the end are the frame, the borderlines of history. In the midst of this frame world history as an economy-plan progresses. 2) Luke explains historical events on the line of cause and effect. He recognizes immanent contingencies and thus inaugurates a 'history of salvation.' The secularization of history in Christian theology begins with Luke. And secularization means also universalism."[54] So Luke, Hellenistic historian that he is, fixes the Christ-event in a chronology of secular occurrences and ties past, present, and future in a nexus of events. In his Gospel and Acts, expectation of the immediate end no longer looms so large; the end of the world is projected indefinitely into the future and the notion of a divine economy begins to include secular history as well as the events of Heilsgeschichte.

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[52] Ibid., 192-195, 199.

[53] Ibid., 200; cf. 195f., 199.

[54] Ibid., 196f., italics Dinkler's.

Thereafter the old eschatological idea definitely waned. Hebrews is an attempt to show its reality to a group for whom the "last things" were more theoretical than existential.[55] In the Deutero-Pauline literature, Colossians, Ephesians, the Pastorals, neither immediate expectation nor delay of the Parousia plays a prominent part, while II Peter represents a last-ditch attempt at explanation of the delay.[56] By now, "the eschatological community . . . has become an historical Church," demanding acceptance of a churchly doctrine,[57] and here, one can add, is where the oikonomia idea triumphed. Disallusionment over the delayed Parousia led to a theology of history, "a theology of the history of salvation which operates with the concept of a world mission, of a 'pedagogy of mankind,' or with the idea of a thousand year interval," so often found in the fathers.[58] History "became a conscious problem," Dinkler writes (somewhat in the spirit of Werner), "only after the expectation of the imminent end of the parousia had gone through a crisis," though he adds that Werner's presentation is one-sided and this "de-eschatologization" was a gradual transition, not a uniform development.[59] One result, however, of this "demotion" of eschatology from "the very basis of the early Christian faith" to merely "one chapter among others," was that "the καιρός idea, which was well balanced with the οικονομία conception in Paul, is replaced by the doctrine of the Holy Spirit and then by an early

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[55] *Ibid.*, 197-199.

[56] *Ibid.*, 200.

[57] *Ibid.*

[58] *Ibid.*

[59] *Ibid.*, 201, especially note 34 on Werner's thesis.

Catholic sacramentalism"[60] — i.e., by the notion of an historical church with a growing theology, playing a key part under the Spirit in the divine economy.

There is just one New Testament writer, however, Dinkler insists, where there is an implicit solution to all these problems which preserves the kairos view of Jesus and Paul: at the end of the first century there appears in John "an eschatology made present by the way of conceiving time."[61] In the Fourth Gospel, so Dinkler's interpretation runs, the theme is the "historical significance of that which happened in Christ and its implications for the man in faith, apart from any naïve chronological interest. . . . Past and future are brought together in Christ . . . a unity in the believing man."[62] Thus the Parousia is said, not to be future, but to have already happened in Christ. Judgment is not eschatological in a future sense but is already present in confrontation by the word of Jesus, and so is life. The eschatological crisis is accomplished now, in the present moment. Accent is on the Now, for the future brings nothing decisively new — this is "existentialized eschatology."[63]

Now if this kairos, existentialist concept is so prominent in John, what of the oikonomia motif there? It is absent, Dinkler says; in John there is "no concept of an eschatological future in the sense of the temporal," there is in John no "idea of the οἰκονομία, . . . no waiting for any *telos*, . . . nor is there any reflection about time."[64] But such a conclusion, Dinkler concedes, depends upon Bultmann's critical analysis of the Fourth Gospel, an analysis assuming that there was a later churchly revision which "adds passages with a temporal eschatology, thus including the οἰκονομία line," so that the Fourth Gospel as we have it includes both views.[65] Yet remarkably in this revision, it is pointed out, the *kairos* line was not eliminated, but rather complemented, and the net result is that the two ideas are presented, as in Paul— but with this difference: "with Paul the two conceptions are balanced and correlated; in John they are obviously in tension and somewhat contradicting."[66] John, one therefore infers, though reflecting in its present form the two conceptions, was originally a representative of the *kairos* school.

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[60] Ibid., 202.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Ibid.

[63] The term is my own to describe Dinkler's analysis of the Fourth Gospel, ibid., 202-205. Though apparently rejecting C.H. Dodd's "realized eschatology" (cf. 180, note 9), Dinkler does employ the phrase "contemporizing of eschatology" for his own view (204f.).

In summary, Dinkler's essay argues that there were within the New Testament these two concepts of time and eschatology. "In the one, the Parousia is expected as coming either immediately or remotely in the future and, correspondingly, the present time is conceived as a progress toward the cosmic conclusion of the drama. . . . Here there is reflection about the economy, about God's design; and the more time goes on, the more acute the problem is."[67] As to source, this view would appear "plainly derived from the tradition of Jewish apocalyptic," and "the only specific Christian element in this eschatology is that Jesus Christ constitutes the turning point of the aeons."[68] However, it is important to note that a bit later Dinkler modifies this theory about Jewish apocalypticism to include the possibility of gnostic influence, especially in Ephesians and Colossians, where the history of salvation motif is combined with cosmology, and the oikonomia concept there is called syncretistic.[69] Such a system, Dinkler argues nonetheless, is "not genuinely Christian," and "our modern chronological scheme with its division of time into the two aeons, before and after Christ, is a secularized survival of this Jewish apocalyptic reckoning . . . Christianized only because it is brought into relationship with the birth of Christ."[70] Cullmann to the contrary, "it would be false to see in this the New Testament theology of history."[71]

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[64] *Ibid.*, 204.

[65] *Ibid.*, note 37, where literature and other opinions are briefly cited.

[66] *Ibid.* One may ask here, since some of the chief passages in Paul showing an *oikonomia* conception seem to be in the so-called Deutero-Pauline literature, whether Paul himself is responsible for this balance and correlation, or was the Paulinist redactor simply more skillful than the "churchly reviser" of John?

The other New Testament line of approach "contemporizes eschatology"; it does not refer to "any decisive act of God in the future," but holds the Event has already happened, and "the new has come" (II Cor. 5: 17).[72] As to source for this sort of eschatology, Dinkler suggests the "decisive impulse is derived from pre-Christian Gnosticism," though even the existence of such a movement is still be no means proved;[73] regardless of any such impulses, however, the opinion is offered that "one must recognize in the contemporizing of eschatology a genuine Christian conception."[74] Though suggesting that "the basis for both conceptions may already be present in the preaching of Jesus,"[75] Dinkler's verdict, it is plain, leans to the *kairos* over the *oikonomia* approach as the more genuinely Christian of the two New Testament views. It is therefore something of a misfortune, the essay seems to suggest, that "the οἰκονομία conception, the idea of God's design with and within history and world history, became the predominant churchly interest," and that "the dialectic statement of Paul and also the Johannine conception of the historical Now were forgotten" until our present century rediscovered them.[76] Or, is this, too, a Cullmannite might ask, merely one of the stranger blessings of God's economy?

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[67] Ibid., 205.

[68] Ibid., 206, italics Dinkler's.

[69] Ibid., 207.

[70] Ibid., 206.

[71] Ibid., especially note 40.

[72] Ibid., 205.

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[73] Ibid., 207; Dinkler is aware of the debate over such pre-Christian Gnosticism, as note 43 shows, where extensive literature is cited.

[74] Ibid., 209. While differences between Christian and gnostic thought are indicated on this point (208f.), it is nowhere made overly clear on what basis the approach to eschatology based upon pre-Christian gnostic impulses is judged "a genuine Christian conception," while the approach to eschatology based on Jewish apocalypticism with traits derived from gnostic cosmology must be judged "not genuinely Christian." The reason for such a judgment would appear based on any of three possibilities:

1) the belief that historically pre-Christian Gnosticism stands closer to the preaching of Jesus and the thought of the early church than does Jewish apocalypticism (here may be reflected the difference in emphasis of Bultmann and E. Stauffer in their New Testament theologies, as to whether the New Testament is to be understood primarily in the light of the Graeco-Roman world or against the backdrop of Jewish apocalypticism; cf. Dinkler's comment, 207, however, "the preaching of Jesus assumes the structure of the apocalyptic view of the world but does not share the apocalyptic speculation");

2) the assumption that the spirit of the original gospel is more akin to Gnosticism than to apocalyptic speculation at many points;

3) one's own preference for the existentialist outlook.

After all this discussion, the essay finally tries to answer the question it originally addressed. The conclusion is that "one cannot derive a philosophy of history from the New Testament. One cannot extract a Christian methodology of history or . . . a Christian periodization of history."[77] The New Testament provides "no key to unlock the secret of world history," and for the early Christians "*the history of our human world remains a riddle*."[78] But the New Testament did make one positive contribution to the history of the idea of history: it "first discovered the historicity of man," and demonstrated that history is to be thought of "not . . . in cosmological or metaphysical terms, but in terms of the historicity of man."[79]

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[75] *Ibid.*

[76] *Ibid.*, 214.

[77] *Ibid.*, 210.

[78] *Ibid.*, italics Dinkler's.

[79] *Ibid.*, 214.

Dinkler's essay, using Christ and Time as its foil, makes the following important contributions to our study.

(1) The importance of the concept of oikonomia in the thought of the early church is stressed again emphatically.

(2) There is correction and criticism from the existentialist viewpoint of Cullmann's analysis of oikonomia; dangers in a too-unified, heilsgeschichtlich method of approach are hinted at, and a very different type of thinking within the New Testament is set forth.

(3) A source for the oikonomia concept of a divine plan of salvation is suggested in the Jewish apocalyptic doctrine of the two aeons, though other sources, notably in Gnosticism, may be involved.

Both of these studies by Cullmann and Dinkler demonstrate how the oikonomia concept was fundamental in the attitude towards eschatology and the philosophy of time and history in primitive Christianity and how it continued to be important in patristic Christianity.[80] They further underscore the need to examine in detail the sources for this concept and the terminology involved in the pre-Christian world, Jewish and Greek, for possible influences. Again the importance of the topic is demonstrated, but its background and course of development far from settled.

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[80] Both writers make use of the early fathers, including the Apostolic Fathers and, in Cullmann's case especially, Irenaeus. The essay following Dinkler's in The Idea of History in the Ancient Near East, 215-236, on "Patristic Christianity," by Roland Bainton, is brief and somewhat disappointing on the topic of oikonomia. Bainton does note (225), however, that the device of dispensations was one means the fathers employed to relate the Old Testament to Christ. The device implies that "God dealt with his chosen people by stages." On the side of man's behavior, there might be deterioration as well as progress in these stages; but God's side is marked by progressive self-disclosure. "The dispensations were linked together by certain anticipations cast according to a similarity of pattern." Thus the Old Testament was viewed in terms of typology, though

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this did not involve "a cyclical view of history, because the new covenant did not repeat precisely the old; the point was rather that a certain identity of meaning, a similarity of structure linked each dispensation with that which was to come" (226). Following later patristic thought, Bainton also writes that, as the events of Augustine's day show, "empires rise and fall according to the great economy of God. . . . Ultimately, the only history is the history of God's great plan" (232). He himself seems to agree with this heilsgeschichtlich sentiment, for he concludes the essay, "there is in events a sequence arising solely from the purpose of God to culminate the drama of redemption; this [divine economy] . . . explains the rise and fall of empires, and this enables man to survive the rise and the fall of empires because hope is fixed on Him who sitteth above the circle of the earth" (233). Surely there is a far different point of emphasis here than in Dinkler's article.

6. Reflections of the oikonomia Concept in Popular Literature

There remains now to indicate in our survey of earlier literature on the subject two areas in more popular treatment where the word oikonomia and the concept of the economy of God are in some sense reflected. This can be done quite briefly, since neither area really has much to contribute to a scholarly investigation of the concept in classical Greek literature or in the church fathers.

1) "Dispensationalism"

The first of these areas has to do with what may conveniently be called "dispensationalism." As has been noted, the Greek word oikonomia is sometimes rendered in Latin by the term dispensatio, and from this Latin root the English word "dispensation" is available as a possible translation. Thus "dispensation" may appear in English translations of the New Testament where oikonomia stands in the original, as in the renderings of I Cor. 9: 17, Eph. 1: 10 and 3: 2, and Col. 1: 25 in the King James Version of 1611, "dispensation" referring to a commission or plan of God.

However, the word "dispensation" has been avoided in those passages by the Revised Standard Version and other modern translations, and for a good reason. In recent times certain denominational groups have especially stressed the term and have developed a "dispensational" type of theology—an extremely conservative, biblicistic approach, which usually conceives of these dispensations of God not merely in terms of redemptive arrangements, but also in terms of a time span; thus all history, following the particular group's analysis of the biblical material, is divided into a series of dispensations, in each one of which there is a revelation of God and a test of man's obedience.[1]

Such an approach has particularly characterized the movement in the early nineteenth century known as the Plymouth Brethren, in England, on the continent of Europe, and in the United States. For this group — and the scheme recurs in a number of fundamentalist groups in the United States especially, though often with an amazing number of variations — history is divided into seven distinct dispensations, namely, those of Innocency, Conscience, Human Government, Promise, Law, Grace, and the Fulness of the Times, which is yet to come.[2] Such radical but confident analysis is based primarily on an extremely literalistic and often completely erroneous interpretation of a comparatively few key verses.[3] The unconscious rationalism which dominates the approach, under the protective cover of the theory of verbal inspiration of the scriptures, often expresses itself in odd distinctions, as that between a "Kingdom of the Gospel," which is for Jews only and requires merely repentance, and a "Kingdom of Grace," which is for Gentiles and requires faith only!

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[1] For a brief treatment with up-to-date bibliography, see W.D. Chamberlain's article "Dispensationalism" in the _20th Century Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge_ (extension of _Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge_; Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1955), 1, 341f., and John Wick Bowman, "The Bible and Modern Religions: II. "Dispensationalism," _Interpretation_, 10 (1956), 170-187.

[2] The biblical basis alleged for each of these seven dispensations is as follows: Innocency, Gen. 1: 28 - 3: 13; Conscience, Gen. 3: 22 - 7: 23; Human Government, Gen, 8: 20 - 11: 9; Promise, Gen. 12: 1 - Exod. 19: 8; Law, Exod. 19: 8 - Matt. 27: 35; Grace, Rom. 3: 24 - II Tim. 3: 1; and the Fulness of the Times or the Kingdom Reign, Eph. 1: 10; cf. J.W. Bowman, _op. cit._ (_supra_, note 1), 173f., and L.S. Chafer, _Systematic Theology_ (Dallas, Texas, 1947), 1, 40f. Connected with these seven dispensations is usually a series of eight covenants, though as many as twelve may be listed; cf. Bowman, _op. cit._, 179, and Chafer, _op. cit._, 1, 42f.

The best known representative of this type of thinking is the Scofield Reference Bible, packed with notes reflecting dispensationalism.[4] There are also a large number of tracts, pamphlets, and books disseminating these notions.[5] As a magnum opus of dispensationalism, the eight-volume

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[3] Thus, for instance, the dispensationalistic Scofield Reference Bible ignores Eph. 3: 2, one of the rare places where the King James Version does employ the word "dispensation," and Eph. 3: 9, where the Greek text reads oikonomia, because these verses do not readily fit into the scheme of seven dispensations! Furthermore, oikonomia scarcely refers to a period or span of time; cf. Bowman, op. cit., 174f.

[4] Cyrus Ingerson Scofield, an American lawyer and clergyman of Congregationalist background (1843-1921), wrote, with the aid of others, a series of notes and comments reflecting an extremely conservative and dispensational interpretation of the Bible, published as the Scofield Reference Bible (New York, 1917, reprinted and copyrighted 1945), which continues to have wide popularity in some quarters; further literature given in Bowman, op. cit., 170ff., especially notes 1, 4, and 5.

[5] Examples, particularly if the whole range of "covenantal" or "economic" thinking in theology is included here, are almost without number. A sampling, though not all are of equal merit by any means, includes such

Systematic Theology of Lewis Sperry Chafer, at Dallas Theological Seminary, in Texas, may be mentioned.[6]

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titles, often quite pretentious, as H. Bomelius, *Oeconomica Christiana: Summa der godliker Schrifturen* (1523); Johannes Cocceius, *Summa doctrina de foedere et testamento Dei* (Leiden, 1648), cf. *supra*, 9, note 1; Herman Witsius, *The Oeconomy of the Covenants between God and Man* (1693; translated by William Crookshank, 2 vols., London, 1837); Charles Bulkley, *The Oeconomy of the Gospel*, (1764); G.S. Faber, *Treatise on the Genius and Object of the Patriarchal, the Levitical, and the Christian Dispensations* (London, 1823); E.A. Litton, *The Mosaic Dispensation* (London, 1863); Patrick Fairbairn, *The Revelation of Law in Scripture* (New York, 1869); Henry G. Guinness, *The Divine Programme of the World's History* (London, 1889); W.A. Parlane, *Elements of Dispensational Truth* (Collingwood, Canada, 1894); Samuel James Andrews, *God's Revelation of Himself to Men as Successively Made in the Patriarchal, Jewish, and Christian Dispensations* (New York, 1901); Clarence Larkin, *Dispensational Truth or God's Plan and Purpose in the Ages* (Philadelphia, 1918); E.R. Marvin, *Dispensational Sketch of Redemption*, n.d., n.p.; and the various publications of C.I. Scofield.

These examples, it may be noted, beginning with the post-Reformation interest in "covenantal" theology, and increasing from the early eighteen hundreds down to the present, usually reflect a Calvinistic background and tend to divide all history into three distinct dispensations. In none of them is there much material on *oikonomia* drawn from outside the scriptures themselves.

[6] Lewis Sperry Chafer, *Systematic Theology* (8 vols.; Dallas: Dallas Seminary Press, 1947-48). An intimate of C.I. Scofield, Chafer presents

Since, however, all these representations of dispensational theology are interested only in the reconstruction of the biblical materials into

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his massive work as "Calvinistic, pre-millennial, and dispensational" (7, 6). Although the Index volume (8, 126) provides a host of references to "divine dispensations" throughout the work, the reader will find, if interested, the most convenient sampling of views in the "Doctrinal Summarization" at 7, 121-23; here under "Dispensations" a distinction is made between "age (αἰών)," which Chafer equates with "a block or period of time," and "dispensation (οἰκονομία), meaning primarily stewardship," which, he adds, implies "a specific divine economy, a commitment from God to man of a responsibility to discharge that which God has appointed him" (122).

Throughout, Chafer depreciates the Covenant theologians, who see only one, same divine purpose, though administered in different ways, throughout the ages, and he himself stresses the pattern of "an age past, a present age, and a future age" (7, 123). These three economies or divine governments (cf. Cullmann's views, supra, 101) are reflected in the Mosaic Law of the past, the requirements for admission into the future Messianic Kingdom of a thousand years, both of these economies being for Israel, and the present economy for Christians (4, 16ff.) Each economy, he holds, exhibits different revealed purposes of God, and each has its own type of right conduct. Thus it becomes possible to distinguish between "the teachings of grace," on the one hand, and "the teachings of the future kingdom," like Sermon on the Mount, on the other (4, 154ff.).

Chafer's Systematic Theology occasionally offers citations from beyond the New Testament in the church fathers, as at 4, 120ff., but there is nothing provided on either classical background or patristic opinion some sort of scheme, generally along arbitrary lines devoid of any really critical or historical approach, and since they all tend to skip pretty much from the Bible to their own times, ignoring the intervening centuries — the church fathers are not only an "unknown land" to dispensationalists, but also a "land to be avoided" as a Hellenistic corrupting of the biblical spirit (how they would welcome Harnack's famous remark — if they knew of it!) — the flood of dispensational literature is not of the slightest help in discovering the meaning of the term oikonomia in classical, patristic, or even biblical sources.

2) "Stewardship"

The second area where there is some popular reflection today of the Greek concept of oikonomia, is the current interest in "Stewardship" among both clergy and laity, especially in America. The word oikonomos, of course, means steward, and oikonomia, stewardship. This term "stewardship" in fact occurs as a translation for oikonomia at Luke 16: 2-4 in the King James Version, and at Ephesians 3: 2 and I Timothy 1: 4 (in the note) in the Revised Standard Version of 1946.

Now application of this biblical word to modern Christian life stems from a practical theological interest which runs something like this: man has been entrusted with God's various gifts — he is a steward; man's job is to use these gifts to God's glory, in the service of his church, for his fellowmen — he must exercise his stewardship or trust. Though often the emphasis has been primarily on money and fund-raising, there has also been a frequent interest in the larger "stewardship of time and

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about the dispensations and economies — merely biblical passages fitted into the general framework outlined above.

talents, as well as treasure."[7]

The movement, which has been primarily— and perhaps typically— American, but which has had repercussions elsewhere in the world,[8] has not been entirely void of theological interest, however, and it is increasingly popular to speak of a "theology of stewardship."[9] Under the auspices of the interdenominational United Stewardship Council, a condensed translation of the articles on οἰκονόμος and οἰκονομία in the *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament* has appeared in English, by Jacob Heikkinen, entitled "New Testament Basis of Stewardship," in the Council's annual booklet *Stewardship Facts*.[10]

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[7] This alliterative outline has been especially stressed by the Lutheran Layman's Movement for Stewardship, of the United Lutheran Church in America, which has done much pioneer work in the area.

[8] The American quality of the movement is indicated in the fact that, during the 1952 meeting of the Lutheran World Federation at Hannover, Germany, Europeans finally gave up any attempt at using the German word "die Haushalterschaft," which is the traditional rendering but has acquired the notion of menial service, and coined a new term: "die Stewardschiffe"!

[9] Cf., for example, T.A. Kantonen, "The Scriptural and Theological Basis of Evangelism and Stewardship," *The Lutheran Quarterly*, 3, Number 3 (August, 1951), 271-77; and *A Theology For Christian Stewardship* (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1956).

[10] Jacob Heikkinen, "New Testament Basis of Stewardship," *Stewardship Facts*, *1954-55*, edited by T.K. Thompson, annual publication of the United Stewardship Council, n.p., n.d.), 14-16. Professor Heikkinen, of Gettysburg Seminary, informs me in a note that this translation was undertaken

An even more detailed study growing out of this movement is a thesis presented by A.C. Conrad to the Central Baptist Theological Seminary at Kansas City, Kansas, for the Th. D. degree, and subsequently published in book form in 1954 under the title, *The Divine Economy: A Study in Stewardship*.[11] Actually the study is rather homiletical at times, often biblicistic,[12] and dependent for much of its theology on long reproductions of Cullmann's *Christ and Time*. The New Testament background, which is sketched in two pages, leans mostly on Hermann Cremer's old (1872) *Lexicon of the New Testament Greek*. But the author manages to develop a rather practical definition of stewardship, as "partnership with Christ, through the Holy Spirit, in fulfilling the purpose of God in the world,"[13] which is related to conservative evangelical theology and a multitude of other interests, including economics, evangelism, and modern-day social problems.[14] The outline follows the trinitarian progression hinted at in the

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on request of the Stewardship Council, and no further work or study is planned from it.

[11] Alphin Carl Conrad, *The Divine Economy: A Study in Stewardship* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1954).

[12] The exegetical tone of the work is suggested by the following example (*ibid.*, 33): "God himself is the true starting-point of all Christian thought and action. . . . The opening statement of the Scriptures is, 'In the beginning God' (Gen. 1: 1)" — a method of proof that holds truer in the English translation than in the Hebrew text!

[13] *Ibid.*, 27.

[14] Interestingly, when the author comes to discuss the Kingdom of God as "the fulfillment of Stewardship" and the social-economic application of the Gospel to twentieth-century problems, he quotes almost entirely

definition of stewardship above, and accordingly the stewardship of the Father, then of the Son, and then of the Holy Spirit are taken up as the basis for the stewardship of the believer.

The book has a number of good points; its extensive bibliography and many quotations culled from a variety of sources should provide a lot of ammunition for the "stewardshipologists" of twentieth-century church life. However, this extensive study has nothing to say on the "economy of God" in Christian writers between the New Testament and the present day; not a single church father is noted — these lie beyond the author's scope and interests — and the only figure quoted very much between the first and nineteenth centuries is Luther! There is, of course, even less said about pre-Christian backgrounds.

A final, most recent effort is a book by T.A. Kantonen, of Hamma Divinity School at Springfield, Ohio, entitled A Theology for Christian Stewardship.[15] Stemming originally from a series of lectures given at the annual meeting of the Joint Department of Stewardship and Benevolence of the National Council of Churches in 1954, and reflecting generally the author's conservative and biblical Lutheran position,[16] the book approaches its

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from such nonfundamentalist writers as Henry Sloan Coffin, H.H. Rowley, John Bennett, and Otto Piper (ibid., 152ff.).

[15] Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1956, distributed in a special edition by the Lutheran Laymen's Movement for Stewardship.

[16] Thus the basic outline not only follows the threefold division of the Apostles' Creed, but specifically the treatment of it in Luther's Catechism (pp. 9f.). Again, Gen. 1: 1 ("In the beginning God") is cited to show that God's action must come before man's response (p. 28).

subject along theological lines, dealing, for example, with such topics as the relation of stewardship with theology in general, with the Word of God (where a more dynamic concept emerges than in Conrad's treatment), and with such cardinal Reformation doctrines as Justification by Faith and the Priesthood of All Believers. A final, more practical chapter takes up the steward's reward. Perhaps the most significant contribution, in addition to offering a doctrinal undergirding for this new offspring of American church life, is the effort to launch the word oikonomia and a practical oikonomia theology into the life of laymen as a prime expression of the Christian faith. While considerable exposition of specific New Testament texts is offered, the matter of pre-Christian backgrounds is beyond the author's scope, as is much concern over nuances in the church fathers.

The stewardship movement, like the dispensationalist interest, it must be said, then, is, in some sense, a reflection of the ancient economy-of-God theme, but in neither case is there any real understanding or investigation of what patristic writers meant by it or of the non-Christian backgrounds.

7. Summary in the Light of the Earlier Literature on the Topic and Statement of the Problem

This detailed bibliographical survey of previous literature on the use of oikonomia by the church fathers and in other sources indicates clearly that the importance of this topic for patristic thought has again and again been recognized.

For a long time, lexicons, dictionaries, and encyclopedias have assembled information on the subject, data from classical and patristic sources, with some insight in a few cases into the wealth of material available in the papyri and the inscriptions; usually, however, these latter materials were confined to places accessible only to the specialist and were not fully utilized by investigators of patristic theology.

About a century ago scholars began to try to put this information together and to trace out the course of development of the concept in early Christianity, sometimes, however, without seeing it against its classical backdrop, and more often without being able to take advantage of the wealth of paprological and inscriptional evidence then coming to light.

Some knowledge of these studies on the part of the reader is assumed by all important histories of Christian doctrine, for all these histories note the concept of oikonomia — more properly, concepts — and refer to the topic frequently. However, no Dogmengeschichte provides a systematic treatment of the evolution of the concept and the manifold applications of the term, though, as we have seen, each has its particular (and not always mutually reconcilable) suggestions to make. Further, none of these histories of doctrine discusses the pre-Christian backgrounds of the term with any thoroughness.

Subsequent monographs and articles, it is true, are not lacking on how the concept was employed by individual fathers and, in the case of some areas of thought, like the Trinity, by several fathers, especially for the period from Ignatius to Origen. However, the older summaries of this type, by Gass, for instance, are by no means complete, were compiled in the days prior to the papyrus discoveries, and have subsequently been ignored by some later discussions on the topic. The more recent treatments often omit pagan usages and possible non-Christian influences (Prestige), rely on secondary sources without real investigation of essential background (Lillge), or, where there is a consciousness of the importance of the pre-Christian background, overlook significant aspects of pagan usage which may have colored Christian application (Verhoeven). In short, none of these special studies affords a comprehensive consideration of non-Christian, prepatristic usages of the terms involved, in an effort to understand the Christian usages of these same words.

Yet these terms, and the ideas connected with them, we have also seen, are in the forefront of some scholarly discussion about the theology of the early church and the primitive Christian view of history (Cullmann, Dinkler, for example) and also are important enough to be reflected today in at least two areas of contemporary Christian life, "dispensationalism" and "stewardship." Conclusions are never more secure than their premises, however, and the results of theological analysis are not any more accurate than the painstaking linguistic investigations and historical studies which lie behind them. We are confronted, therefore, in this case with a series of terms and concepts recognized as important in early Christian thought and currently under discussion in an effort to grasp primitive Christian ways of thinking; yet for all this interest, there has been no fresh, firsthand, detailed investigation of the non-Christian, prepatristic usages of the terminology and ideas involved, as a basis for assaying the meanings in the Christian fathers. Such a thorough examination of the rich material now at our disposal seems to be a desideratum of the utmost importance in order to comprehend both the indebtedness and novelty of patristic thought at this point.

The Problem Stated

In broadest terms, we are, of course, concerned with tracing the background and development of the frequent and varied applications of _oikonomia_ and its related terms in patristic literature. Why did the fathers employ these words so much? Can any orderly and logical course of development be sketched that accounts for these varied meanings?

We have already seen in our bibliographical survey some of the wide ramifications these concepts take on, and the contiguous areas of thought and life the terms involve. Specific problems in the course of Christian application of the words have already been suggested by the comments and disagreements of writers on the topic. Why, for one thing, does a term so infrequent in the New Testament documents become by comparison so exceedingly common in later Christian writers? How was this concept present and what connotations did the words take on in that highly important, but little known, period of church history, the second century, particularly between A.D. 120 and 180? Was there considerable gnostic influence, as some feel? Whence comes the _heilsgeschichtlich_ application of the term, which so many investigators have felt? How did the word become associated with the idea of the Trinity and what background is involved here? With what special emphases and shades of meaning do certain fathers employ the term — Irenaeus, Tertullian, Hippolytus, Clement, Origen, Eusebius, and Marcellus of Ancyra, for example? And is it true that the term oikonomia has run its full course of development by A.D. 250, or did it continue taking on new meanings even after that date?

Varying answers to these and a number of other questions have already been indicated in the opinions of previous scholars on the topic. But underlying all these questions and basic to finding a satisfactory answer for many of them, it would seem, is a more important matter: what are the roots, the classical roots, the roots in the everyday pagan idiom of the period, for these Christian applications? The prior consideration for any understanding of the Christian usages is how did earlier thinkers and writers, how did non-Christian men and women of the first century, apply these words? In these backgrounds, it would seem, lies much that is significant for explaining the seemingly strange course of later development.

D'Alès has written, in regard to patristic use of the word oikonomia, that it is "from Paul's concept all further developments will follow," though, he adds, "not without some peripeteia."[1] But what backgrounds influence Paul? What connotations did the word already possess from half a dozen centuries of use?

Verhoeven has shown in his dissertation on Tertullian the absolute necessity of peering into this pre-Christian background in order to comprehend Tertullian's tortured prose and theological wrestlings with the Latin language, and Prestige has rightly argued that any conclusions about patristic thought must rest on the "facts of linguistic usage."[2] Yet nowhere has there been a recent and reasonably complete treatment of the "facts of linguistic usage" in non-Christian, prepatristic sources for oikonomia and its kindred terms. It is therefore with absolute correctness that Hugo Rahner, S.J., in reviewing Prestige's book urges that there must be a "still more exact presentation of the history of the term οἰκονομία,"[3] a presentation that rests on a solid linguistic and historical investigation of the pre-Christian backgrounds and then builds from there. An effort is made to provide the beginnings, at least, of this presentation in the following pages.

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[1] D'Alès, "Irénée," 1; supra, 60.

[2] Prestige^2, x; supra, 63.

To sum up, the previous literature on the topic indicates the general nature of, and specific problems relating to, the patristic concept of an "economy of God." It indicates also the need for a thorough examination of the backgrounds to the Christian usage, and then, ultimately, in the light of these findings a resurvey of the patristic applications, modifying or correcting earlier views where necessary, explaining questions unresolved by earlier investigations where possible. This previous literature suggests also the necessity of dealing in the investigation with more than merely the noun oikonomia — related terms must be included — and the necessity of providing more than a mere statistical compendium — the historical method must be employed to see setting and significance of word occurrences.

Our purpose then is this: to examine how oikonomia and its kindred terms were employed in writings of all sorts in Greek down to the time when the earliest Christian literature was beginning to appear, viz., about A.D. 100, as a background for patristic usages. The question to be asked throughout must be, what were the usages of these terms in Greek literature and life prior to the Christian applications? The ultimate, implied question behind all this investigation will be: how can these earlier usages help us understand patristic meanings?

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[3] Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, 61 (1937), 299.

Because of the complexity and significance of these pre-Christian applications, only this Greek background is being here presented in this study. It amounts to a prolegomenon— important, however, even beyond the original surmise of the author— to a larger, future study, the scope of which has already been indicated. Accordingly, in the conclusions which follow the detailed survey of non-Christian, prepatristic evidence, some attempt will be made, in addition to summarizing these findings, to suggest preliminary applications of the evidence to some of the larger questions raised above, and also to outline the significance of these findings for further steps of study.

PART II

THE EVIDENCE:

THE USE OF OIKONOMIA AND RELATED TERMS IN GREEK SOURCES TO ABOUT A.D. 100

Introduction

Our task is to examine the background for the patristic usages of *oikonomia* and related terms by sketching carefully the meanings which the words involved took on in Greek writings of all sorts, down to the time of the appearance of the earliest Christian literature, documenting our study as accurately as possible.

The Terms Under Study

Primarily, of course, the term with which we are concerned is the noun οἰκονομία, but the other words from the same stem οἰκονόμος, οἰκονομεῖν, οἰκονομικός, and the adverbial οἰκονομικῶς, as well as the related terms διοικεῖν, διοίκησις, and διοικητής, which are frequently associated with them, must be noted. Since some of the classical authors and the church fathers write in Latin, the Latin loan words from Greek, *oeconomia*, *oeconomicus*, *oeconomus*, and *prooeconomia* also have to be considered from time to time, as well as the other Latin words employed to render the Greek, *vilicus*, *dispositio*, *dispensatio*, *dispensare*, and their derivatives.[1] It may also be observed that the Greek οἰκονομία and/or οἰκονόμος appear as loan words in other languages where important ancient Christian literature is preserved or where there are sources important for our study;

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[1] For the lexicons employed here, see *supra*, 5, note 1. For more detailed information on Latin uses than will be provided here, cf. A. Forcellini, *Totius latinitatis Lexicon*, 2, 747 and 4, 391, and, more briefly, C.T. Lewis and C. Short, *A New Latin Dictionary* (New York, 1907), 591f., 1257, and 1990.

namely, Hebrew, with the form אִיקוֹנוֹמוֹס, oikonomos;[2] Syriac, with the forms ܗܘܩܘܢܘܡܝܩܘܢ, hokonomikon, ܗܘܩܘܢܡܐ, hokonama, "house steward";[3] Coptic, showing the terms ⲟⲓⲕⲟⲛⲟⲙⲓⲁ and ⲟⲓⲕⲟⲛⲟⲙⲟⲥ;[4] and apparently

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[2] See O. Michel, article οἰκονόμος in G. Kittel, Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament (Stuttgart, 1933-), 5, 152, and M. Jastrow, A Dictionary to the Targumin, the Talmud Babli and Yershalmi and the Midrashic Literature (New York, 1903), 60, where examples are cited. The usual meaning is "steward" or "town official" of some sort. I have not found any evidence that oikonomia ever appeared in Hebrew or Aramaic as a loan word, though it may well have.

[3] See R. Payne Smith, Thesaurus Syricus (Oxford, 1879), 1, 999; and C. Brockelmann, Lexicon Syriacum (2nd ed.; Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1928), 174a. Much more common to express the concept, however, are forms from the root ܪܒ ܒܝܬܐ = oeconomus (706 a-b), and ܦܪܢܣ = distribute, administer (599a-b), and ܡܕܒܪܢܘܬ ܒܝܬܐ = οἰκονομία (140b).

[4] W.E. Crum, A Coptic Dictionary (Oxford, 1939) does not cite the term because of his policy of omitting all Greek loan words (p. viii). A very complete survey of material should be available, however, in Alexander Böhlig, Ein Lexicon der griechischen Wörter im Koptischen: Die griechisch-lateinischen Lehnwörter in den koptischen manichäischer Texten (Munich: Verlag Robert Lerche, 1953-), although I have not seen more than what is apparently the first fascicle. I have observed the presence of ⲟⲓⲕⲟⲛⲟⲙⲓⲁ in Forbes Robinson, Coptic Apocryphal Gospels (Texts and Studies 4, 2; Cambridge, 1896), p. 30, line 17; p. 70, line 2; p. 76, line 3; and p. 90, line 5. A brief listing for all three loan words, ⲟⲓⲕⲟⲛⲟⲙⲓⲁ, ⲟⲓⲕⲟⲛⲟⲙⲓⲛ, and ⲟⲓⲕⲟⲛⲟⲙⲟⲥ, is also to be found in Alexis Mallon, Grammaire Copte (Beyrouth: Imprimerie Catholique, 1907), p. 162. For the

Armenian.[5] Citations from these languages are occasionally included, but properly they lie beyond the scope of this study. The extensive material in Syriac would appear to repay a more intensive examination, it may be noted.

Chronological Lines

The terminus post quem for this study, roughly the end of the first century A.D., is chosen so as to include all materials down to the time when the earliest Christian writings are appearing, both New Testament documents and noncanonical materials. Then the use of oikonomia in authors in these earliest Christian materials may be viewed in the light of Greek usage prior to and contemporary with the period. While occasional examples will be included from centuries beyond this point to make clear a point or, where there is meager evidence only, in order to present all

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related Egyptian dialects of Sahidic and Bohairic, see most conveniently A. Böhlig, Die griechischen Lehnwörter im sahidischen und bohairischen Neuen Testament (Studien zur Erforschung des christlichen Aegyptens, 2; Munich: Verlag Robert Lerche, 1954), 1, 345; oikonomos, meaning, "administrator," representing "for every one . . . a well-known personage," occurs in both literary and nonliterary texts in Sahidic, and in the New Testament translation of both dialects; oikonomia appears in both Sahidic and Bohairic, not only in the New Testament, but elsewhere; and the verb oikonomein appears in the literary and nonliterary texts of both dialects, as well as the Old and New Testament translations, in simple and compound forms; cf. pp. 132, 150 for details on the borrowing process.

[5] See supra, 91, note 99.

the data found, this terminus seemed most convenient in providing a background for primitive Christian use. It is recognized that oikonomia and its related terms undoubtedly continued to take on new meanings in the ensuing centuries in pagan as well as in Christian authors, but examination of this material may well be included in the proposed study, noted previously, on non-Christian, gnostic and semignostic sources in the second and third centuries A.D.[6]

Method of Procedure

We begin with the etymology of the term oikonomia and a brief survey of the many forms derived from it. Then the four main senses which the word took on in pre-Christian Greek sources will be discussed, each with several subheadings and with the related terms worked in at the appropriate points. The order in which these chief senses are taken up will be partly logical — from the primary meaning, going on to derived senses — and partly historical — with the earliest meanings cited first, then the later ones. Illustrations from the papyri and inscriptions are included throughout, rather than in a separate analysis, since, even though these sources sometimes present different meanings, they are part and parcel of the total pre-Christian development of the terminology in Greek. Finally, in Part III, the findings will be summarized, and, both as an illustration of the main senses our survey will note and as an example of how many nuances the terms might take on in a single writer in precisely the period when the earliest Christian literature was being written, the examples of our terms in Plutarch (A.D. 46-120) will be presented.

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[6] See supra, xxxvii and xxxix.

Etymology

The word *oikonomia* is derived from *oikonomos*. This latter term is a compound of the noun **οἶκος**, meaning "house, household," and the verb **νέμειν**, meaning "to deal out, distribute, or dispense," therefore "to rule" or "to manage."[7] Both elements in the compound appear in Greek from early times, *oikos* going back to a hypothetical Indo-European root **wōíkos*, and *nemein* being found from Homer on, often in the sense of dealing out or dispensing meat and drink within a household, later becoming common for all distribution, especially by the gods. Masculine substantives ending in -os, derived from verbs, are common enough in Greek to denote the agent or doer of an action, as are feminine nouns in -ia to denote the action itself, and the compound form with the second element coming from a verb is amply attested.[8]

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[7] On etymology, cf. especially Émile Boisacq, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque* (Paris and Heidelberg, 1916), and J.B. Hofmann, *Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Griechischen* (Munich, 1949), with additional bibliography in Boisacq. Neither treats *oikonomos* or *oikonomia* specifically, but each offers extensive material on **οἶκος** and **νέμω** (Boisacq, 662f., and Hofmann, 214). Connection of the second element in the word with *nomos*, "law," must be repudiated; cf. the remark in Aelius Herodianus, second cent. A.D., *Epitome of Herodian's General Prosody* (ed. M. Schmidt; Jena, 1860), p. 98, lines 14f. (cf. p. 104, lines 13-16): "The terms 'bone-collector' (**ὀστολόγος**) and 'house manager' (**οἰκονόμος**) do not come from **λόγος** and **νόμος**, but from the verbs **λέγω** ("collect") and **νέμω** ("manage")." This very error in derivation is repeated, however, by T.A. Kantonen, *A Theology for Christian Stewardship* (Philadelphia, 1956), 2: "The Greek word is a compound of *oikos*, meaning house, and *nomos*, meaning law"!

Etymologically, then, the fundamental meaning for *oikonomos* is "one who manages a household and dispenses goods within it," and for *oikonomia* the basic idea is "dispensing supplies within a household" or "household management."

This meaning suggested by etymology is well borne out by the definitions in the later dictionaries and writers. Thus Hesychius (fifth century A.D.?) defines οἰκονόμος as ὁ τὸν οἶκον νεμόμενος, "the one who manages the household,"[9] and Isidor of Pelusium (*ob*. *c*. 435), after making a bad etymological guess, reaches a similar conclusion when he writes, "he is called an *oikonomos* because of the fact that he distributes to each one what is his own, or because he distributes to each one in the house what is in accord with his worth."[10]

More important, however, this same meaning is also supported by what is apparently the oldest use of any term from the root which is preserved to us today, a poem from the lyricist Phocylides (sixth century B.C.) about women:

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[8] On substantives in *-os* and *-ia*, cf. P. Chantraine, *La formation des noms en grec ancien* (Paris, 1933), 8ff. and 78ff. On such compounds, cf. A. Debrunner, *Griechische Wortbildungslehre* (Heidelberg, 1917), 74.

[9] *Hesychii Alexandrini Lexicon* (ed. M. Schmidt; ed. min., Jena, 1863), 1112: οἰκονομία· βράβευσις, διοίκησις.
οἰκονόμος· ὁ τὸν οἶκον νεμόμενος φύλαξ.

[10] *Epistolarum Lib*. 5, *Ep*. 301 (PG 78, 1512): οἰκονόμος εἴρηται παρὰ τὸ ἑκάστῳ τὸ οἰκεῖον νέμειν, ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ τὸ πρὸς ἀξίαν νέμειν. Isidor also speaks more specifically of the tasks of the ecclesiastical *oikonomos* or steward, as at *Lib*. 1, *Ep*. 269 (PG 78, 341).

And this from Phocylides: from these four types have come
The tribes of women: first, from the dog; then, from the bee;
Next, from the bristly pig; and finally, from the long-mained horse.
This latter type is well-born, fast, encompassing, and best in shapeliness;
That from the bristly pig is neither bad nor good;
That from the dog is difficult and wild; but the busy bee
Is a good household manager (oikonomos) and knows how to work—
Her, dear friend, pray that you get for a lovely wife.[11]

Thus the original application was apparently to the housewife (fem.) as housekeeper or manager of the household, but it must be remembered that the concept is ages old and reflects more than the modern notion of "domestic science" or "homemaking" might imply. Hesiod included many details in his manual Works and Days on how to run a successful household. In later usage οἶκος meant one's whole property in its widest sense, not merely the οἰκία or house.[12] Therefore, as we shall see from the early treatises on oikonomia, the subject included household management in broadest terms — the house, the family, the slaves, the animals, the possessions, and the finances.

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[11] E. Diehl, Anthologia Lyrica Graeca (Leipzig, 1936), Vol. 1, p. 58, fr. 2. LSJ, sub **οἰκονόμος**, suggests the translation "housekeeper" or "housewife" for the passage. The entire poem may reflect not only Phocylides's preferences in female accomplishments, but also his dislike of noble birth, a theme found elsewhere in his fragments. The idea of comparing the various types of women with animals is worked out in more detail by Semonides of Amorgos, frag. 7, especially lines 83-93. Phocylides' text reads:

καὶ τόδε Φωκυλίδεω· τετόρων ἀπὸ τῶνδε γένοντο
φῦλα γυναικείων· ἡ μὲν κυνός, ἡ δὲ μελίσσης,
ἡ δὲ συὸς βλοσυρῆς, ἡ δ' ἵππου χαιτηέσσης.
εὔφορος ἥδε, ταχεῖα, περίδρομος, εἶδος ἀρίστη·
ἡ δὲ συὸς βλοσυρῆς, οὔτ' ἂν κακὴ οὐδὲ μὲν ἐσθλή·
ἡ δὲ κυνός, χαλεπή τε καὶ ἄγριος· ἡ δὲ μελίσσης
οἰκονόμος τ' ἀγαθὴ καὶ ἐπίσταται ἐργάζεσθαι·
ἧς εὔχου, φίλ' ἑταῖρε, λαχεῖν γάμου ἱμερόεντος.

Derivatives, Parallels, and Compounds

The word first used from the root, then, was apparently οἰκονόμος in the feminine, if our example may be trusted; οἰκονομία, as the task or job of the οἰκονόμος, soon must have come into use, however. A rough analogy is provided by the later case of ἐπίσκοπος, used in Attic Greek as a title (= the Spartan "harmost"), and ἐπισκοπή, not a classical term, but one which crops up in the Septuagint and in Christian use for the office of an ἐπίσκοπος.[13] And from the original οἰκονόμος came in time the verb, adjective, and adverbial forms.

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[12] Cf. A. Boeckh, The Public Economy of Athens (London, 1892), 110, 142, 354. The same distinction holds true in the religious area; see F. Poland, Geschichte der griechischen Vereinswesen (Leipzig, 1909), 459ff.: οἰκία, "the actual dwelling-place"; οἶκος, "the general concept." Thus οἰκία can refer to the dwelling-place of priests or priestesses, οἶκος the place of assembly for a cult, or a chapel, or even a treasury. Poland (p. 462) especially draws attention to use of the term for cult-houses in the mystery religions with their many rites and cultic apparatus, and even suggests the usage of the terms οἶκος and οἰκία for a sort of "Pfarrhaus" by such groups as a background for the Christian ἐκκλησία κατ' οἶκον (p. 463); cf. G. Heinrici, "Die Anfänge paulinischer Gemeinden," Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie, 20 (1877), 103.

[13] So J.B. Lightfoot, Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians (London, 1894), 95f.

Numerous parallels to the noun οἰκονόμος offer themselves, which end in the same verbal component and have the same basic idea: thus ἀγορανόμος, a clerk of the market, who regulated buying and selling in the agora; βοηνόμος, for the herdsman who tended the oxen (Theocritus 20. 41); αἰγινόμος, similarly for one who herds goats (Palatine Anthology 6. 221); οἰονόμος, one who herds sheep (Palatine Anthology 7. 213, 4. 291); παιδονόμος, applied to a supervisor of education, literally one who manages children, in Sparta, Ephesus, and elsewhere; ἱερονόμοι, temple wardens; and even γυναικονόμος, a supervisor of women in Athens (Arist. Pol. 1299a 22; SIG², 653. 30). Later, in Philo (2, 269, "On the Sacrifice of Cain and Abel" 33, cf. Lobeck's edition of Phrynichus, the second-century A.D. rhetorican, 667) the word κακοικονόμος even occurs.[14]

Likewise, the verbal component -νομία is common, suggesting the idea management, supervision, care of something, as in the words ἀγορανομία, management of the market place, or γυναικονομία, supervision of women, or παιδονομία (Arist. Pol. 7. 14 1322b 39), supervision of education. Further: ἀστυνομία (Arist. Pol. 1321b 23), the office of the ἀστυνόμος, the magistrate who had care of police, streets, and public buildings at Athens; ἀστρονομία, the study of the arrangement of the stars; and γαστρονομία, "the tending of the stomach," in the Almanac des Gourmands or "Gastronomical Baedeker" by Archestratus of Sicily in the 4th century B.C.[15]

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[14] For most of these examples, I am indebted to C.D. Buck and W. Petersen, A Reverse List of Greek Nouns and Adjectives arranged by Terminations with Brief Historical Introductions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 142.

[15] Ibid.

Later, nouns compounded with οἰκονομία itself may be observed too: προοικονομία, for example, in Herodian (second century A.D.) in the sense of "prefatory summary," which became a fairly frequent loan word in Latin scholiasts;[16] ἀπ-οικονομία, used by Alexander of Aphrodisias, a philosopher of the third century A.D., to mean "rejection"; and ἐπ-οικονομία, a compound which is apparently to be read at Longinus 11. 2, meaning "apportionment or rhetorical arrangement." From the verb οἰκονομεῖν such strengthened compounds as ἀπ-οικονομεῖν, ἐπ-οικονομεῖν, κατ-οικονομεῖν, προ-οικονομεῖν, and συν-οικονομεῖν can be cited.[17]

In addition to the forms already noted in the family of words related to οἰκονόμος, and in addition to these late compound forms, there are also a few other unusual words which come from the same stem. In classical Greek there exists a noun, τὸ οἰκονόμημα, derived from the verb oikonomein; it occurs especially in inscriptions and means "an act of management or administration," usually by a government.[18] And in patristic sources there are the extremely late terms τὸ οἰκονομεῖον, meaning the office in which the manager or steward of a monastery does his work and keeps his stores,[19] and the word οἰκονόμεισσα, from Asia Minor in the

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[16] Herodian, De Figuris, ed. L. Spengel, Rhetores Graeci (Leipzig, 1854-56), 3, 183. Prooeconomia, e.g., at Serv. on Aen. 5. 858 (G. Thilo and H. Hagen, Servii Grammatici qui feruntur in Vergili carmina commentarii (Leipzig, 1923), 1, 654); cf. infra, 341ff.

[17] For exact citations of the occurrence of these words, cf. Stephanus, Thesaurus, under the appropriate words, or LSJ.

[18] Examples of this term will be cited infra.

[19] Examples are given in Sophocles, Lexicon, op. cit. (supra, 5, note 1), p. 796.

6th century A.D., meaning either the wife of an οἰκονόμος or a female church official, a stewardess.[20]

The related Greek family of words, διοικεῖν, διοίκησις, etc., comes, of course, from the same root οἶκος, ultimately, strengthened with the prepositional prefix διά; the basic meaning is "to keep house." Hence ἡ διοίκησις has the sense of "housekeeping," particularly the management or administration of a city; a διοικητής is an administrator or manager. Later, uncommon forms derived hence include the adjective διοικητικός, "pertaining to management or administration," "controlling"; ἡ διοικητρία, "housekeeper" or "stewardess"; and once ὁ διοικήτωρ = διοικητής, "manager."[21]

Linking together the two Greek forms οἰκονομία and διοίκησις are the second-century compounds ἡ διοικονομία, a strengthened form for οἰκονομία, as in Vettius Valens, a philosopher, and the compounded verb διοικονομεῖν found in several writers, Pollux and Vettius Valens, among others, of the second Christian century.[22] Suidas likewise relates the words in his definition of οἰκονομέω: τὰ ἐν οἴκῳ διοικῶ, to "arrange the things in a household."[23] There is even a compound προ-διοικονομεῖν, "prepare, set in order beforehand."[24]

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[20] Cf. A.M. Ramsay, "The Early Christian Art of Isaura Nova," *JHS*, 24 (1904), who writes of the inscription at Dorla, near Iconium: "Δόξα οἰκονόμεισσα ἡ σεμνή. Doxa may be assigned to the fifth century. Her name is of the Christian type. . . . The word οἰκονόμεισσα is not given by Stephanus, and it is difficult to say whether it should be taken as the title of a female official in the church, or as meaning simply the wife of an οἰκονόμος." The latter view is followed by P. Landvogt, *Epigraphische Untersuchung über den ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΟΣ* (Strassburg, 1908), 48. With this form οἰκονόμ(ε)ισσα, compare such words as ἱέρισσα, διακόνισσα, and πρεσβυτέρισσα.

[21] Examples of these terms will be included in subsequent discussions, where pertinent; otherwise see LSJ.

The original word οἰκονόμος, meaning house manager, thus gave birth to a large number of derived and related words, as can be seen from this survey. It is now our task to observe how this word οἰκονόμος and more particularly οἰκονομία, with the other derived forms not overlooked, were actually employed in Greek literature and daily conversation down through the first century. The first important sense, however, which we may observe is the same etymological meaning, the sense already found in the oldest example, having to do with house management, which continued to be retained amid all subsequent development of words from the οἰκονομος family. We turn first then to a detailed examination of how this basic meaning was kept and applied.

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[22] διοικονομία in W. Kroll's edition, *Vettii Valentis Anthologiarum Libri* (Berlin: Weidemann, 1908), at IV, xxiv (p. 199, line 20; p. 200, lines 10 and (?) 25); διοικονομεῖν in Vettius Valens, *ibid*., I, xxii (p. 42, line 3), Pollux 5. 156, and Pseudo-Aristotle, *De Mundo*, 6. 37.

[23] A. Adler, *Suidae Lexicon* (Leipzig, 1928-), 4, 619. Suidas cites the passage from Soph. *El*. 185-90 and also has entries on *oikonomia* and *oikonomōn*.

[24] I. Bekker, *Anecdota Graeca* (3 vols.; Berlin, 1814-21), 2, 743, a scholium on the Grammar of Dionysius Thrax. Cf. also the form προδιοικητικός, "regulating or arranging beforehand," vouched for as early as M. Aur. Ant. *Med*. 1. 16. 2, where he speaks of the qualities exhibited by his father M. Antoninus Pius, including his habit of "arranging ahead of time the slightest details, without any last minute dramatics" (τῶν ἐλαχίστων προδιοικητικὸν ἀτραγῴδως).

1. *Oikonomia* and its Related Terms
in the Sense of Household Management

We deal in Chapter 1 with *oikonomia* and its related terms in the sense of *Household Management* — *the ordering, administration, and care of domestic affairs within a household; husbandry which implies thrift, orderly arrangement, and frugality, and is, in a word, "economical."* Hence, also the *duty of an oikonomos* in such a type of household management.

Here, in the primary sense of the root, οἰκονόμος means house manager, housekeeper, or house steward; οἰκονομεῖν means "to manage a household" or "do household duties," and οἰκονομία refers to the task or art or science of household management. The basic idiom, to manage a household, is one which continues in Greek speech down through the entire period, so that writers in the first and second centuries of the Christian era, like Philodemus or Maximus of Tyre, can quite naturally employ the phrase οἰκονομεῖν τὸν οἶκον.[1]

This idea of house management is common enough that it can be referred to again and again in a variety of ways in Greek literature. Lysias, for example, the orator of the later fifth century B.C., can praise the wife of one of his clients for having been at the start of their marriage a model housewife: "At first, O men of Athens, she was best of all women; for she was both a clever household manager (οἰκονόμος) and a [good], thrifty woman, arranging (διοικοῦσα) all things precisely."[2] That such qualities were moreover expected of a wife is suggested in the fragmentary dialogue of an unknown comic poet; one character remarks that it is the man who is careful and adept at managing (οἰκονομεῖν) things that ought to marry, but the other speaker rejoins, no, "rather the man who is careless but who desires leisure, in order that, by having a wife as household manager (οἰκονόμον), he may live securely"— she will capably take charge of his affairs.[3]

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[1] The phrase is used for example in Phld. *Peri oik.* (C. Jensen, *Philodemi* περὶ οἰκονομίας *qui dicitur libellus*, Leipzig, 1906), VI. 17, and in Maximus of Tyre (edited by H. Holbein; Leipzig, 1910), p. 443, lines 1f.

[2] Lys. *Or.* 92. 22 (*Or.* I, "On the Murder of Erotosthenes," 7): καὶ γὰρ οἰκονόμος δείνη καὶ φειδωλὸς [ἀγαθὴ] καὶ ἀκριβῶς πάντα διοικοῦσα.

Occasionally literary passages give some insight into the daily life and tasks of household managers— wives, or slaves employed in such a capacity— though not with the depth of detail the later papyri do. One fragment from Alexis, a poet of Middle Comedy at Athens, depicts an oikonomos (slave?) saying, "I shall arrange (οἰκονομήσω) these things [meats] so wisely and neatly and artfully— for I will make the main course myself— that I'll make those who dine sink their teeth into the plates sometimes from pleasure!"[4]

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[3] Text in T. Kock, Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta (3 vols.; Leipzig, 1880-1888) (cited hereafter as "CAF"), 3, 430, or in A. Meineke, Fragmenta Comicorum Graecorum (5 vols.; Berlin, 1839-57) (cited hereafter as "FCG"), 4, 602, as quoted from Stob. Flor. 67. 25: "the more a man himself is repelled from household management (οἰκονομία), the more he ought to receive the woman who takes charge of such management; as the comic poet sums it up not badly:

> Α. Σχολαστής ἐστι. δεῖ δ' οἶμαι γαμεῖν
> τὸν ἐπιμελῆ καὶ δυνατὸν οἰκονομεῖν ἄλλον
> πλείω. Β. τὸν ἀμελῆ μᾶλλον, ἐπιθυμοῦντα δὲ
> σχολῆς, ἵν' ἔχων οἰκονόμον ἀδεῶς περιπατῇ."

[4] Alexis Κρατεύας ἢ Φαρμακοπώλης ("Crateuas or the Medicine Man") l. 20, in FCG, 2, 701, or in CAF, 2, 335:

That, however, the lot of an oikonomos was not always a happy one, and that foreigners and slaves were often given the menial tasks of household management, is suggested in one of the choral passages of Sophocles (496-406 B.C.); Electra, pining away under her hard lot in the house of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus, laments to the chorus:

> Just like some unworthy alien,
> I care for (οἰκονομῶ) the chambers of my father, thus
> In unseemly garb,
> And stand around at empty tables.

— i.e., poorly fed, ill-clad, and overworked, apparently like many an oikonomos of the day.[5]

The terms and ideas involved were also common enough to be treated metaphorically. For example, Critias (fifth century B.C.), in a poetic fragment about the place of origin for the different items in a household,

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...ἀλλ' ἐγὼ σοφῶς
ταῦτ' οἰκονομήσω καὶ γλαφυρῶς καὶ ποικίλως
οὕτω, ποιῶ γὰρ τοὔψον αὐτός, ὥστε τοὺς
δειπνοῦντας εἰς τὰ λοπάδι' ἐμβάλλειν ποιῶ
ἐνίοτε τοὺς ὀδόντας ὑπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς.

The term τὸ ὄψον can mean "meat" or "fish" or "sauce," and τὰ λοπάδια may mean "oysters" as well as "plates," but the context is not clear.

[5] Soph. El. 190:

ἀλλ' ἁπερεί τις ἔποικος ἀναξία
οἰκονομῶ θαλάμους πατρός, ὧδε μὲν
ἀεικεῖ σὺν στολᾷ,
κεναῖς δ' ἀμφίσταμαι τραπέζαις.

Cf. F. Ellendt, Lexicon Sophocleum (Berlin, 1872), p. 518, where the change in Suidas from οἰκονομῶ to οἰκοδομῶ (="do I build up the halls of my father?") is noted and discarded for the reading given above.

speaks of "the descendant of earth and oven, most illustrious earthenware [or tile]" as a "useful household servant" (Χρήσιμον οἰκονόμον).[6] Aeschylus, going a bit farther, vividly depicts in the opening choral passage of the Agamemnon, Wrath abiding as a "fearful, irrepressible housekeeper" (οἰκονόμος) in the halls of Agamemnon, "treacherous, ever-mindful, exacting vengeance for a child."[7] Alcidamas, a fourth-century B.C. orator and sophist, pupil of the more famous Gorgias, is said to have used the figure, "steward (or dispenser, οἰκονόμος) of the pleasure of the hearers," one of a series of epithets which Aristotle criticized him for using, "not as a seasoning but as a regular dish."[8] Finally, Plato at one point censures the affection of a nonlover, in contrast to _erōs_, as "dispensing things which are mortal and sparing (θνητά τε καὶ φειδωλὰ οἰκονομοῦσα)," again a figurative application of the task of the _oikonomos_ in managing and dispensing things in a household, perhaps with excessive frugality.[9]

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[6] Critias 32, in Hermann Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, (Berlin, 1934-38) (cited hereafter as "Diels, Vorsokr."), 2, 377, 10:

τὸν δὲ τροχὸν γαίας τε καμίνου τ' ἔκγονον εὗρεν
κλεινότατον κέραμον, Χρήσιμον οἰκονόμον,
ἡ τὸ καλὸν Μαραθῶνι καταστήσασα τρόπαιον.

The reference comes in a series where an item is noted, then its place of origin is given; as the game of kottabos comes from the land of Sicily, the Phoenicians discovered the letters as an aid to thought; then:

"The potter's wheel and the descendant of earth and the oven —
The most illustrious earthenware, useful for household management,
She invented who has appointed the noble victory-trophy at Marathon."

Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla to The Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), 154, renders it "glorious pottery, useful household ware."

[7] Aesch. Ag. 155: μίμνει γὰρ φοβερὰ παλίνορτος
οἰκονόμος δολία μνάμων μῆνις τεκνόποινος.

[8] The phrase is οἰκονόμος τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἡδονῆς, which Aristotle preserves and cites as an example of overuse of epithets in Alcidamas, who "appears frigid, because he uses epithets not as a seasoning but as a regular dish, ... so long ... are they," in his Rh. 3. 3. 3. (1406a 27).

Now not only was skill in household management well-known and widely alluded to, in various ways, among the ancient Greeks; the quality was also hailed from early times by philosophers as a characteristic virtue of the wise man. Pittacus of Lesbos (_c_. 650-570 B.C.,), traditionally one of the Seven Wise Men of Greece, is said to have advised, "Pay attention to piety, the upbringing of children, temperance, prudence. . .," and finally at the end of a catalogue of a dozen virtues, ". . . friendship, diligent care of duties, household management, art (ἑταιρείαν, ἐπιμέλειαν, οἰκονομίαν, τέχνην)."[10] Socrates, similarly, according to Xenophon, taught that knowledge of the means "through which a person would regulate (διοικήσειε) his body well and would manage his household (οἶκον καλῶς οἰκονομήσειε) successfully" is a delight of the man with self-control,[11] just as elsewhere he argues that the people of small means, "if they are thrifty [or adept at household management, οἰκονομικόι] ," must be included among the rich.[12]

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[9] Pl. _Phdr_. 256E, in the concluding paragraph of Socrates' speech in praise of _erōs_: "Such blessings, thus so great and divine, O boy, will the friendship of a lover grant to you; but the affection of a nonlover, because it is mixed with a mortal temperance, dispensing things mortal and sparing (ἡ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἐρῶντος οἰκειότης, σωφροσύνῃ θνητῇ κεκραμένη, θνητά τε καὶ φειδωλὰ οἰκονομοῦσα), begetting in the beloved soul that lack of freedom which is praised by the multitude as virtue, will cause the soul to wander about the earth and be senseless under the earth nine thousand years."

[10] Pittacus 10. 3 in Diels, _Vorsokr_. 1, 64, 19: "Pittacus, . . . of Lesbos, said: . . . Pay attention to piety, the upbringing of children, temperence, prudence, truth, trustworthiness, cleverness, friendship, diligent care [apparently, as from Aeschines on, with regard to a public

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charge or commission], household management, art." Πιττικὸς ... Λέσβιος ἔφη... θεράπευε εὐσέβειαν, παιδείαν, σωφροσύνην, φρόνησιν, ἀλήθειαν, πίστιν, ἐμπειρίαν, ἐπιδειξιότητα, ἑταιρείαν, ἐπιμέλειαν, οἰκονομίαν, τέχνην.

[11] Xen. Mem. 4. 5. 10: δι' ὧν ἄν τις καὶ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα καλῶς διοικήσειε καὶ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ οἶκον καλῶς οἰκονομήσειε. The complete passage, where Socrates is stressing self-control to Euthydemus as a virtue, runs, "The delights of learning are something good and excellent, and of studying some of the means by which a man knows how to regulate his body well and to manage his household well, to be useful to his friends and city, and to defeat his enemies— knowledge which brings not only very great benefits but also very great pleasures— these are the delights of those who have self-control; but those who are incontinent have no part in them."

[12] Ibid., 4. 2. 39, where Socrates shows Euthydemus that the latter's definition for rich and poor ("the poor are those who do not have enough to pay for what they want; the rich are those who have more than enough") is inaccurate, because some men who have very little find it enough, and other men, like rich tyrants, are driven to crime to meet their more extensive desires; "therefore," Socrates concludes, "if that is so, we shall put the tyrants on the one hand among the common people, and those of limited means, if they are thrifty, among the rich." Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη

Proficiency at household management is therefore a skill eagerly to be sought just like the art of demagoguery or leading an army, and teachers professing the ability to impart such knowledge must have appeared at an early date, as the offer of one of the speakers in Xenophon's Symposium suggests.[13] Skill at house management was further connected with business acumen, according to Xenophon's Memoirs of Socrates,[14] and the capacity for such household or business management (ἡ οἰκονομικὴ [τέχνη]) is additionally related to the qualities necessary for a good general in the army by this same Socrates.[15] Even Epicurus (342/1 - 271/70 B.C.) is

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ὁ Σωκράτης, εἴ γε ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, τοὺς μὲν τυράννους εἰς τὸν δῆμον θήσομεν, τοὺς δὲ ὀλίγα κεκτημένους, ἐὰν οἰκονομικοὶ ὦσιν, εἰς τοὺς πλουσίους.

[13] Symp. 4. 6: Niceratus offers, "Anyone of you, then, who would wish to become a household manager, or a political leader, or an army general, or like Achilles or Ajax or Nestor or Odysseus, let him seek my favor, for I understand all these things." ὅστις ἂν οὖν ὑμῶν βούληται ἢ οἰκονομικὸς ἢ δημηγορικὸς ἢ στρατηγικὸς γενέσθαι ἢ ὅμοιος Ἀχιλλεῖ ἢ Αἴαντι ἢ Νέστορι ἢ Ὀδυσσεῖ, ἐμὲ θεραπευέτω. That it was assumed the subject could be taught is also implied in the various treatises on the subject discussed below.

[14] Mem. 2. 10. 4, where Socrates says, "Good householders, moreover, say that whenever it is possible to buy that which is worth much for little, then one ought to buy." οἱ μέντοι ἀγαθοὶ οἰκονόμοι, ὅταν τὸ πολλοῦ ἄξιον μικροῦ ἐξῇ πρίασθαι, τότε φασὶ δεῖν ὠνεῖσθαι. Cf. Cyr. 2. 2. 14, where the comparative οἰκονομικώτερος is used in the sense "more fitted for the affairs of private business."

[15] Mem. 3. 4. 11 and 12. To sum up the long passage, Socrates argues that good businessmen (οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οἰκονόμοι) make good generals, and business capacity (ἡ οἰκονομικὴ [τέχνη]) is helpful to the general; since

reported as giving the tasks of house management some place in the work of the philosopher: "We must laugh and philosophize at the same time," he wrote, "and do our household duties (οἰκονομεῖν) and employ our other faculties, and never cease proclaiming the sayings of true philosophy," an attitude reflected by later Epicureans, like Metrodorus and Philodemus.[16]

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he knows nothing pays off like a victory in the field, the businessman-turned-general will be eager to provide all the aids for victory. Further, management of private business differs from that of public business only in numbers; both deal with men, and "those who take care of public affairs employ just the same men as when they care for their private affairs" (οὐ γὰρ ἄλλοις τισὶν ἀνθρώποις οἱ τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμελόμενοι χρῶνται ἢ οἷσπερ οἱ τὰ ἴδια οἰκονομοῦντες). The man who succeeds at one should succeed at the other, and vice versa.

[16] Epicurus, *Ep.*, text in P. von der Mühll, *Epicuri Epistulae Tres et Ratae Sententiae* (Leipzig, 1922), p. 64, or in Cyril Bailey, *Epicurus: the Extant Remains* (Oxford, 1926), pp. 112f., or more recently, in *Gnomologium Vaticanum Epicureum* ("Vatican Collection of Sayings of Epicurus") *Codex Vaticanus Graecus*, 1950, number 41: γελᾶν ἅμα δεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οἰκονομεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς οἰκειώμασι χρῆσθαι καὶ μηδαμῆ λήγειν τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀρθῆς φιλοσοφίας φωνὰς ἀφιέντας. Cf. the very similar sentiment attributed to Metrodorus of Lampsakos, (331/30 - 278/77 B.C.), the close friend of Epicurus, and the most important leader of the movement after Epicurus himself, *frag.* 59 (in A. Körte, "*Metrodori Epicurei Fragmenta*," *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie, Suppl.* 17 (1890), 563ff., also cited by C. Jensen, *Philodemi περὶ οἰκονομίας*, *op. cit.*, in his discussion there of XXVII, 20ff.): ἅμα δεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οἰκονομεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς οἰκειώμασι χρῆσθαι κ.τ.λ. as above.

Household management thus came to have an accepted place in Greek life, important enough even for the thinkers to consider and praise it. The concept, however, had grown in scope constantly since Hesiod spoke of "a house, a woman, and an ox for the plow,"[17] as the essential ingredients in life; house management now came to include a host of elements which are found in a household: house, property, animals, land, yes, but also wife, children, slaves, and money. The art of household management came to be referred to as a "science" (*epistēmē*) and was soon related to the running of an army or of a political household and public affairs or to the skillful conduct of business operations, as Greek households began to develop widening horizons in trade and manufacture, as well as agriculture, which was the basic interest in earlier society.[18] And nowhere is this broadening scope of household management — which widens eventually to the second main application of *oikonomia* to management of some larger unit like an army or a city-state — and this tendency to include within its scope a surprising number of subjects to be seen more clearly than in the various treatises which appeared on *oikonomia* in the ancient world.

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[17] Hes. *Op*. 405: οἶκον μὲν πρώτιστα γυναῖκά τε βοῦν τ'ἀροτῆρα. This line is quoted in connection with the subject of household management in Arist. *Pol*. 1. 2. (1258a) and in Ps.-Arist. *Oec*. 1. 2. 1 (1343a), and is reflected in Philodemus.

[18] On *oikonomia* as an "art" or "science," cf. Xen. *Mem*. 3. 4. 11, *Oec*. 1. 1; Pl. *The Lovers* 138C; Arist. *Eth. Nic*. 1. 1. 3, and the summaries below. On *oikonomia* in regard to an army, cf. *Mem*. 3. 4. 11f., e.g.; on political affairs, note how often *oikonomikos* and *politikos* are paired, and see Chap. 2; on business, cf. *Cyr*. 2. 2. 14 or *Mem*. 2. 10. 4, *infra*.

Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*

The first such treatise preserved for us, and perhaps the most influential one, is that charming little picture of Greek home life and instruction manual on domestic management by Xenophon, early in the fourth century B.C., the *Oeconomicus* (οἰκονομικός).[19] In the *Memorabilia*, Xenophon's Socrates, as we have seen, had much to say about household management, and the *Oeconomicus* begins so abruptly that it has been suggested that it is almost an appendix to the former work which grew into an independent treatise, when Xenophon found he had so much more to say.[20] Really, then, the *Oeconomicus* is a discourse on estate management, especially agriculture, with Socrates as mouthpiece, and forms a part of Xenophon's triple division of philosophy; i.e., the *Memorabilia* shows Socrates as a teacher of Moral Philosophy, the *Cyropaedia* amounts to a "political romance," and the *Oeconomicus* takes up the subject that lies between ethics and politics, household management, a threefold scheme which Plato and Aristotle later reflect.[21]

The treatise itself must have had tremendous popularity in the ancient world. In addition to Greek imitations which drew on it, Cicero praised it and translated it into Latin, fragments of which translation are preserved by Columella in Books XI and XII of his De Re Rustica.[22] Philodemus and Galen also refer to Xenophon's work, and most Roman writers on agriculture, including Virgil, must have been acquainted with it.[23]

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[19] For the text, see E.C. Marchant in O.C.T., 5, *Opuscula* (Oxford, 1919). On the date, cf. E.C. Marchant, *Xenophon: Memorabilia and Oeconomicus* (Loeb Classical Library; London, 1923), xxiv, and Hubert A. Holden, *The Oeconomicus of Xenophon* (London, 1889), xxxii.

[20] So W. von Christ - O. Stahlin - W. Schmidt, *Geschichte der griechischen Litteratur* (Munich, 1908), 1, 483, note 6, where as an ancient source for the view *Comm. in Hippocr. de artic.* 1. 1. is cited.

[21] The view is expressed in Holden, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 19), xiii ff.; the "pattern" in later writers will be noted *infra*, 169 and 171.

The Oeconomicus takes the form of a report by Xenophon on how Socrates and Critobulus once discussed oikonomia. By his usual question-and-answer method, Socrates establishes at the outset that "household management (οἰκονομία) is a name of some branch of knowledge [τέχνη or science], like medicine and metal-working and carpentry."[24] The function of a good house manager (ἀγαθὸς οἰκονόμος) is "to manage well his own household" (εὖ οἰκεῖν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ οἶκον), a phrase which was later distorted and misunderstood, and his household or estate includes not only a house

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[22] Cicero praises it at Sen. 17: "In many respects Xenophon's works are very useful. How eloquently he praises agriculture in his book entitled Oeconomicus, which deals with the care of one's property." The fragments of his translation are preserved in Columella De Re Rustica 11. 1. 5, on the duties of the bailiff or vilicus, and at 12. Praefatio 1 and 7, on the bailiff's wife and her responsibilities.

[23] Phld. Peri oik. VII. 28. speaks of τοῖς Ξενοφῶντος οἰκονομικοῖς, "the Economics [pl.] of Xenophon." On other Roman use, cf. Holden, op. cit. (supra, note 19), xxxii f.

[24] Oec. 1. 1-2: ἤκουσα δέ ποτε αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ οἰκονομίας τοιάδε διαλεγομένου. Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, ἆρά γε ἡ οἰκονομία ἐπιστήμης τινὸς ὄνομά ἐστιν, ὥσπερ ἡ ἰατρικὴ καὶ χαλκευτικὴ καὶ τεκτονική; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος. Ἦ καὶ ὥσπερ τούτων τῶν τεχνῶν ἔχοιμεν ἂν εἰπεῖν ὅ τι ἔργον ἑκάστης, οὕτω καὶ τῆς οἰκονομίας δυναίμεθα εἰπεῖν ὅ τι ἔργον αὐτῆς ἐστιν; Δοκεῖ γοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος, οἰκονόμου ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι εὖ οἰκεῖν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ οἶκον.

(οἰκία) but everything a man possesses that is good and profitable to him. Further, a good household manager can manage the estate of another man for salary, as well as his own,[25] but he must be a man of certain abilities — indeed, he must "know how to use even enemies so as to derive a profit from the enemies," a note of shrewdness which never leaves the term oikonomia and which Plutarch recalls three and a half centuries later.[26]

Socrates himself is able to indicate some of the qualities of a good household manager; it is characteristic of the functions of good household management (τῶν οἰκονομικῶν ἔργων), for example, to build small, useful houses, rather than larger, useless ones, to stress order and arrangement, so that everything lies arranged in its place, and to keep slaves willing to work but without fetters.[27] However, Socrates himself cannot claim to speak as a firsthand authority on the intricacies of household management and therefore cannot really instruct Critobulus on how to increase his estate; "for I myself," he points out, "never possessed the tool of money, so as to learn, nor did any one else ever provide the opportunity for me to administer his wealth (τὰ ἑαυτοῦ διοικεῖν). . . and if I should undertake to learn how to manage a household on your estate, possibly I would utterly spoil your estate."[28] Accordingly, the device is resorted to of having Socrates describe how an expert named Ischomachus, surely a thinly disguised Xenophon, once taught him.[29] The fiction is in line with what we know of Socrates elsewhere; Plato's Apology has him say he did not spend his life "caring about what the majority care for— money and household property (οἰκονομίας) and army generalships and public speaking and other offices."[30] But apparently many Athenians did care for just such things and sought out teachers, as Critobulus had done, to learn how to increase their estates.

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[25] Ibid., 1. 3-4: Ἦ καὶ τὸν ἄλλου δὲ οἶκον, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰ ἐπιτρέποι τις αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο, εἰ βούλοιτο, εὖ οἰκεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ; ὁ μὲν γὰρ τεκτονικὴν ἐπιστάμενος ὁμοίως ἂν καὶ ἄλλῳ δύναιτο ἐργάζεσθαι ὅτι περ καὶ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ ὁ οἰκονομικὸς γ᾽ ἂν ὡσαύτως. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ἔστιν ἄρα, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τὴν τέχνην ταύτην ἐπισταμένῳ ... τὸν ἄλλου οἶκον οἰκονομοῦντα ... μισθοφορεῖν; Νὴ Δία....

[26] Ibid., 1. 15: οἰκονόμου ἄρα ἐστὶν ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἐπίστασθαι χρῆσθαι ὥστε ὠφελεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν. Plutarch makes use of the figure at De recta ratione audiendi 6 (Mor. 40C).

[27] Ibid., 3. 1-3.

At any rate, after Socrates sums up his own conclusions on the topic—

> it seemed to us that household management (οἰκονομία) was a name for a branch of knowledge, and this branch of knowledge appeared to be the science by which men can increase estates, and an estate appeared to us to be that which comprises one's total property, and we said that property means this— whatever might be beneficial to each man and his livelihood[31]

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[28] Ibid., 2. 13: οὔτε γὰρ αὐτὸς ὄργανα χρήματα ἐκεκτήμην, ὥστε μανθάνειν, οὔτε ἄλλος πώποτέ μοι παρέσχε τὰ ἑαυτοῦ διοικεῖν... καὶ ἐγὼ δὴ εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαιμι ἐν τῷ σῷ οἴκῳ μανθάνειν οἰκονομεῖν, ἴσως ἂν καταλυμηναίμην ἄν σου τὸν οἶκον.

[29] Plutarch took Ischomachus to be an historical person, but most scholars today assume that Xenophon provides something of a self-portrait and that the unnamed wife represents Xenophon's Philesia.

[30] Ap. 36B: . . . .ἀμελήσας ὧνπερ οἱ πολλοί, χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν....

[31] Oec. 6. 4: οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐπιστήμης μέν τινος

after this, the detailed teachings of Ischomachus are then given, showing the maze of matters which oikonomia could cover. For example, the treatise includes how Ischomachus trained his fifteen-year-old wife to run his household, "to manage (διοικεῖν) the things in the house"; orderliness (τάξις) is especially stressed. It even includes how she might adorn herself to secure her husband's admiration, and how he, as a gentleman, spent his day, partly in speech and debate at the law courts, and especially how slaves might best be worked by the bailiffs (ἐπιτρόποι) and how agriculture, the "mother of all arts," yet the "easiest to learn," might be carried on most efficiently.[32] Household management is thus a many-sided science and art, but it shares in common with activities like politics and warfare the need for aptitude at command or skill in ruling (τὸ ἀρχικόν), and on this note the treatise abruptly ends.[33]

ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν ὄνομα εἶναι ἡ οἰκονομία, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη αὕτη ἐφαίνετο, ᾗ οἴκους δύναται αὔξειν ἄνθρωποι, οἶκος δ' ἡμῖν ἐφαίνετο ὅπερ κτῆσις ἡ σύμπασα, κτῆσιν δὲ τοῦτο ἔφαμεν εἶναι, ὅ τι ἑκάστῳ εἴη ὠφέλιμον εἰς τὸν βίον....

[32] Ibid., 7. 3 and, after a long section on agriculture, 21. 1ff.

[33] Ibid., 21. 2: ἀλλὰ τόδε τοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ πάσαις κοινὸν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ γεωργικῇ καὶ πολιτικῇ καὶ οἰκονομικῇ καὶ πολεμικῇ τὸ ἀρχικὸν εἶναι, τοῦτο δὴ συνομολογῶ σοὶ ἐγὼ πολὺ διαφέρειν γνώμῃ τοὺς ἑτέρους τῶν ἑτέρων. "But with regard to the fact, O Socrates, that skill in ruling (or aptitude for command) is that which is common to all activities, both farming and politics and estate management and warfare — in regard to this, I do admit to you that some men differ much from others in knowledge."

Plato on Household Management

Many of these same ideas of household management are reflected by Plato. Oikonomia means, for example, to manage a household, οἰκίαν οἰκονομεῖν, using the old terms,[34] and Cyrus of Persia is declared to have been entirely "without a right education and to have paid no attention to household management (οἰκονομίᾳ)" — i.e., he spent his life soldiering and entrusted his children to women and to a soft, undisciplined upbringing, with the result that one of them, Cambyses, slew the other, pseudo-Smerdis, for the throne and ruined the empire — for want of oikonomia, here including the proper training of children, an empire was lost![35]

Household management loomed large enough in Plato's thinking for him to make reference to it at times in sketching his laws for the ideal city-state. Excessive care for the body, for instance, which goes beyond simple gymnastics is an obstacle, interfering and proving "troublesome for household affairs (οἰκονομίας), for military service, and for 'desk-jobs' in city administration."[36] The study of numbers is commended "for household management (οἰκονομίαν), for politics, and for the arts,"[37] and pupils are to be taught arithmetic through games as an aid for their future tasks of drilling and leading armies, or "for household management (εἰς οἰκονομίας)."[38] And while it is recognized that it would be undignified for a lawgiver to mention the host of petty matters "concerned with domestic arrangements" (περὶ τῶν κατ' οἰκίαν διοικήσεων), nonetheless, Plato does urge that no citizen spend the whole of any night in sleep — the mistress must be up before her maids, and all who are awake at night must "do a large part of their business, both political and domestic (τῶν οἰκονομικῶν)" at that time.[39] But the members of the military caste in the ideal state are to be subject to a Spartanlike discipline, owning no private property; the danger is that "whenever they acquire land and houses and money of their own, they will become householders (οἰκονόμοι) and farmers, instead of guardians."[40] Otherwise, though, the oikonomos, the household manager or businessman, is reckoned a part of society, being

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[34] Lysis 209D: πότερον οἴει αὐτὸν ἐπιτρέψειν σοι τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν οἰκονομεῖν, ὅταν σε ἡγήσηται βέλτιον περὶ οἰκονομίας ἑαυτοῦ φρονεῖν, ἢ αὐτὸν ἐπιστατήσειν; "Do you think he [your neighbor] will entrust you with the management of his house, as soon as he considers you to have a better idea of its management than himself, or will he direct it himself?"

[35] Leg. 3. 694C: παιδείας δὲ ὀρθῆς οὐχ ἧφθαι τὸ παράπαν οἰκονομίᾳ τε οὐδὲν τὸν νοῦν προσεσχηκέναι.

[36] Resp. 407B: καὶ γὰρ πρὸς οἰκονομίας καὶ πρὸς στρατείας καὶ πρὸς ἑδραίους ἐν πόλει ἀρχὰς δύσκολος.

[37] Leg. 5. 747A: πρός τε γὰρ οἰκονομίαν καὶ πρὸς πολιτείαν καὶ πρὸς τὰς τέχνας πάσας....

Cf. 7. 809C, where it is said of arithmetic that there ought to be as much as each man needs to use "for war and household management and civic administration" (πρὸς πόλεμον καὶ οἰκονομίαν καὶ τὴν κατὰ πόλιν διοίκησιν).

[38] *Ibid.*, 7. 819C.

[39] *Ibid.*, 7. 808B: πράττειν τῶν τε πολιτικῶν μέρη πολλὰ καὶ τῶν οἰκονομικῶν.
Cf. the similar view expressed later in Ps.-Arist. *Oec*. 1. 6. 5 (1345a): rising before daybreak is a good habit "for health and household management and philosophical study" (πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ οἰκονομίαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν χρήσιμον).

[40] *Resp*. 417A: ὁπότε δ' αὐτοὶ γῆν τε ἰδίαν καὶ οἰκίας καὶ νομίσματα κτήσονται, οἰκονόμοι μὲν καὶ γεωργοὶ ἀντὶ φυλάκων ἔσονται....

frequently paired with the politician or statesman (πολιτικός),[41] and in the discussion about reincarnation in the *Phaedrus* the third type of soul is said to enter into the birth of a man who is a "politician, or a businessman of some sort (τινος οἰκονομικοῦ), or a financier."[42]

Having thus indicated a connection between the *oikonomos* and the *politikos*, Plato goes on elsewhere to suggest a relationship between the household manager, and statesman or politician, and even king or master: the point is that the latter two have to do with *oikonomia* on a larger scale, with a larger household.[43] There is then a common art or *technē* in kingship and statesmanship and householding, use what terms you will, and the man who would govern his house well (τὴν οἰκίαν διοικοῖ) must employ justice and temperence, just as the other, large-scale "managers" do.[44]

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[41] *Alc*. 1. 133E, *Leg*. 10. 902D, *Resp*. 498A, and examples *supra*.

[42] *Phdr*. 248D: τρίτην εἰς πολιτικοῦ ἢ τινος οἰκονομικοῦ ἢ χρηματιστικοῦ....

[43] *Politicus* 258E-259C: ἐπιστήμη μία περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα· ταύτην δὲ εἴτε βασιλικὴν εἴτε πολιτικὴν εἴτε οἰκονομικήν τις ὀνομάζει, οὐδὲν αὐτῷ διαφερώμεθα.
"It is clear that all these are the object of one science, and whether a man calls this the art of kingship or statesmanship or householding, let us not quarrel with him."

[44] *The Lovers* 138C: τί δὲ ὅταν εἷς ὦν ἀνὴρ οἰκίαν διοικῇ ὀρθῶς, τί ὄνομα τούτῳ ἐστίν; οὐκ οἰκονόμος τε καὶ δεσπότης; Ναί. Πότερον οὖν καὶ οὗτος δικαιοσύνῃ εὖ ἂν τὴν οἰκίαν διοικοῖ ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ τέχνῃ; Δικαιοσύνῃ. Ἔστιν ἄρα ταὐτόν, ὡς ἔοικα, βασιλεύς, τύραννος, πολιτικός, οἰκονόμος, δεσπότης, σώφρων, δίκαιος. καὶ μία τέχνη ἐστὶ βασιλική, τυραννική, πολιτική, δεσποτική, οἰκονομική, δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη.
Socrates asked, "And when one man governs a house rightly, what is the

Household management is thus being related more definitely to politics and ethics by Plato, but it remained for Aristotle to incorporate the age-old idea of *oikonomia* into a philosophic scheme of things.

Aristotle's Comments on House Management

There is, according to Aristotle, just as with the older writers, an "art of household management" (ἡ οἰκονομικὴ τέχνη), and, like every science, pursuit, and activity, this art, too, has an end, a good at which it aims: namely, wealth.[45] Although politics is for Aristotle the most absolute science and, most of all, a master science, there are under it several highly honored faculties (*dunameis*), and one of these is the faculty for household management which ranks with generalship and rhetoric, in determining what sciences each man should learn and to what degree he should master each in the political state.[46]

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name for this man? Is he not a household manager and a master?" "Yes." "Then would this man govern his house well by justice or by some other art?" "By justice." "Hence, they are the same, so it seems — king, tyrant, statesman, house manager, master, and the temperate man and the just man; and it is all one art — the kingly, the tyrannical, the statesman, the master's, the house manager's, and justice and temperence." A common art binds them together.

[45] *Eth. Nic.* 1. 1. 3 (1094a 9): οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος. The words are also preserved in Andronicus Rhodius' paraphrase of the *Eth. Nic.* 1. 1., in W.A. Mullach, *Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum* (Paris, 1881) (cited hereafter as "*FPG*"), 3, 303.

[46] *Ibid.*, 1. 2. 6. (1094b 2-3): ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐντιμοτάτας τῶν δυνάμεων ὑπὸ ταύτην οὔσας, οἷον στρατηγικήν, οἰκονομικήν, ῥητορικήν.

In another way, however, household management is inevitably connected with both politics and ethics. As Aristotle puts it, oikonomia is one of the three branches of phronēsis or thought— i.e., the art of practical wisdom, which comes with experience, deals with particular instances, and comes about through a kind of perception, aisthēsis or common sense— and these three branches are phronēsis about oneself, or "thought"; phronēsis about the family, or oikonomia; and phronēsis about the state, or politics.[47] Practical wisdom (φρόνησις) for Aristotle thus is not concerned just with self, but also concerns these other areas, because the welfare of the individual is inevitably bound up with that of the family and the state.[48]

"We see also that the most honored of the faculties are under this one [politics], namely the faculties of generalship, household management, and rhetoric."

[47] Ibid., 6. 8. 3 (1141b 30-33): καὶ ἔχει αὕτη τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα, φρόνησις· ἐκείνων δὲ ἡ μὲν οἰκονομία, ἡ δὲ νομοθεσία, ἡ δὲ πολιτική, καὶ ταύτης ἡ μὲν βουλευτικὴ ἡ δὲ δικαστική. "This [faculty] has the general name phronēsis, 'thought'; the branches thereof are Economy, and Legislation, and Politics, and of this latter the branches are deliberative and judicial." Cf. the chart in Alexander Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle (3rd ed.; London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1874), 2, 169:


Thought
About Oneself
"Thought"
About the Family
Economy
About the State
Politics
Universal (ἀρχιτεκτονική)
Legislation
In detail (χειροτεχνική)
"Politics"
Deliberative
Judicial

[48] Ibid., 6. 8. 4 (1142a 9-10): καίτοι ἴσως οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὑτοῦ εὖ ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ πολιτείας·

Household management, in fact, may be said to occupy a middle place between the individual and ethics on the one hand, and politics and the state on the other.

Having placed *oikonomia* in the scheme of things, Aristotle can therefore speak of a "family or household justice" (τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον) which has to do with women or children or possessions, in contrast with "political justice."[49] And he can group together, as Plato had done, "those who are inclined towards household management and those who are inclined towards state management" (τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς πολιτικούς) and say both are thoughtful men of practical wisdom (φρόνιμοι).[50] With such an understanding of *oikonomia*, it is no wonder Aristotle gave the subject a place in his *Politics*.

"The welfare of oneself is probably inseparable from the regulation of the household and from the existence of a state."

[49] *Ibid.*, 5. 6. 9 (1134b 16-17): διὸ μᾶλλον πρὸς γυναῖκά ἐστι δίκαιον ἢ πρὸς τέκνα καὶ κτήματα· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον· ἕτερον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ πολιτικοῦ. "Hence rather there is justice towards women or towards children and possessions; this is justice in a family (household), and this is different from political justice." Cf. also 5. 11. 9. Andronicus Rhodius, the Peripatetic philosopher of the first century B.C. who helped revive interest in Aristotle, heads a chapter in his paraphrase of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VIII, Chapter xvi: Περὶ ἑταιρικῆς φιλίας καὶ συγγενικῆς καὶ οἰκονομικῆς, i.e., on domestic friendship, but he does not then use the term anywhere in the chapter, nor does Aristotle's original; cf. *FPG*, 3, 510.

[50] *Ibid.*, 6. 5. 5 (1140b 10-11): διὰ τοῦτο Περικλέα καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους φρονίμους οἰόμεθα εἶναι, ὅτι τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται θεωρεῖν· εἶναι δὲ τοιούτους ἡγούμεθα τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς πολιτικούς·

In the Politics, the subject of which is properly the city-state (πόλις) and political society (ἡ πολιτικὴ κοινωνία), Aristotle must begin by saying something about the household and its management or government, because, already in Xenophon and Plato, as we have seen, a connection between household and city-state was hinted. There were some, as Aristotle notes, who "suppose political, regal, domestic (οἰκονομικόν), and despotic government are the same," and that they differ only in regard to the number of people who are ruled— that, e.g., a despotic government is concerned only with a few people, the domestic (οἰκονομικός) with more, and the political or regal with still more, with the result that a great house (οἰκία) and a small city (πόλις) really do not differ.[51] Those who hold this view, Aristotle says, "who think the natures of the statesman, the

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"Therefore we consider Pericles and such men to be thoughtful because they are able to perceive what is good for themselves and what is good for men in general; and we believe those who incline to household management and those who incline to management of a state to be of such a nature."

[51] Pol. 1. 1. 2 (1252a 8-14): ὅσοι μὲν οὖν οἴονται πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν καὶ οἰκονομικὸν καὶ δεσποτικὸν εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν, οὐ καλῶς λέγουσιν (πλήθει γὰρ καὶ ὀλιγότητι νομίζουσι διαφέρειν ἀλλ' οὐκ εἴδει τούτων ἕκαστον, οἷον ἂν μὲν ὀλίγων, δεσπότην, ἂν δὲ πλειόνων, οἰκονόμον, ἂν δ' ἔτι πλειόνων, πολιτικὸν ἢ βασιλικόν, ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέρουσαν μεγάλην οἰκίαν ἢ μικρὰν πόλιν). "Now those who suppose that the political and the regal and the domestic and the despotic government are the same do not speak well (for they think that each of these differs in size and smallness, but not in form; for example, that the ruler over a few men is a master, over more men, a head of an estate, over still more a statesman or a king, so that a large household differs in no way from a small city-state)."

royal ruler, the head of an estate (οἰκονομικός), and the master of a family (δεσποτικός) are the same are mistaken," because they do not analyze the elements in each.[52] The truth is that "the government of a household, on the one hand, is a monarchy— for every house is governed by a single ruler— but the political rule of a city-state is one of men who are free and equal."[53] Thus domestic government and political government, as far as Aristotle is concerned, are not quite the same and differ in more than size; *monarchia* (rule by a single individual) and *oikonomia* (management of a household) go together, a combination found much later in a theological sense in Tertullian, incidentally,[54] while *politeia* (management of a political state) has to do with equals.

The household, however, like the city-state, is for Aristotle a part of the very nature of things. As he puts it, male and female are drawn together, and out of their relationship comes the household (οἰκία), and that society which is established for daily support, the οἶκος, is thus created in accordance with nature. In time, a society of many households (οἰκίαι) develops, called a village (κώμη), and finally, out of the uniting of many villages, a city-state or πόλις results. "Every city-state, then, must be allowed to be the work of nature," and man is naturally a "political animal."[55] And the household and its management, it may be added, are also the work of nature in this view.

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[52] *Ibid.*, 1. 1. 2-3 (1252a 8-24). For text quoted, cf. *supra*, note 51.

[53] *Ibid.*, 1. 2. 21 (1255b 19-21): καὶ ἡ μὲν οἰκονομικὴ [sc. ἀρχή], μοναρχία· μοναρχεῖται γὰρ πᾶς οἶκος· ἡ δὲ πολιτικὴ ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἀρχή.

[54] *Adv. Prax.* 2ff., cf. *supra*, 70ff.

[55] *Pol.* 1. 1. 9 (1253a 2-4): ἐκ τούτων οὖν φανερὸν ὅτι τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστί, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον.

This being so, Aristotle finds it "necessary to speak first about household government (περὶ οἰκονομίας)" before going on to his main subject.[56] "The departments into which household government falls," he says, "correspond to the parts of which a household is composed,"[57] namely, the master and the slave, the husband and the wife, and the father and the children; accordingly he must take up these three relationships, δεσποτική, γαμική, and πατρική, authoritative, marital, and parental. Each one of these is then further explored, with the method of governing indicated which is appropriate to each relationship within the household. The wife, for example, is to be ruled πολιτικῶς, that is, as a citizen rules over his fellow citizens; the children are to be ruled βασιλικῶς, as under kingly power; and slaves, δεσποτικῶς, as by a master, slaves or "living tools" being regarded as necessary to household management by Aristotle.[58]

Oikonomia, then, has to do with these relationships in a household, and further also with property and instruments and tools (like slaves) and even the procuring of property. But this brings Aristotle to another knotty question. Does *oikonomia* include the art of making money (ἡ χρηματιστική), which some men of the day, perhaps like Critobulus and his ilk, supposed to be the *whole* of household management and others thought was merely its *most important* part? No, Aristotle concludes, "the getting of money is *not* the same thing as economy (οἰκονομία), for the business of the one is to furnish the means, the business of the other is to use them."[59] The science of the acquisition of supplies (κτητική), Aristotle must admit, is a part of oikonomia; to procure or to have on hand certain supplies is necessary for domestic and political establishments (τοῖς οἰκονομικοῖς καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς) in order to function.[60] But while money may have a part in domestic economy, Aristotle insists that mere money-making is a perversion of true oikonomia — household management is limited in concern to getting enough to live well on (τὸ εὖ ζῆν), not being concerned with mere acquisition of funds; thus is reflected the proverbial Greek spirit of "nothing too much."[61] But the very fact the question had to be dealt with so emphatically shows the popular attitude that must have existed about oikonomia, and the pragmatic lines along which the "art" must have been taking shape in some areas. "To live well" and "to manage well a household," the traditional functions of the science, were being perverted popularly, the adverb stressed to mean "richly and lavishly," with an accent on money.

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[56] *Ibid.*, 1. 2. 1 (1253b 2-3): ἀναγκαῖον πρῶτον περὶ οἰκονομίας εἰπεῖν.

[57] *Ibid.*, (1253b 3-4): οἰκονομίας δὲ μέρη ἐξ ὧν πάλιν οἰκία συνέστηκεν.

[58] *Ibid.*, 1. 2. 1ff. (1253b ff.), on slave and master; 1. 5. 1ff. (1259a 38ff.), on wife and children.

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[59] Ibid., 1. 3. 2 (1256a 12-14): ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἡ οἰκονομικὴ τῇ χρηματιστικῇ, δῆλον, τῆς μὲν γὰρ τὸ πορίσασθαι, τῆς δὲ τὸ χρήσασθαι.

[60] Ibid., 1. 3. 9 (1256b 38-40): ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἔστι τις κτητικὴ κατὰ φύσιν τοῖς οἰκονόμοις καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, καὶ δι᾽ ἣν αἰτίαν, δῆλον.

[61] The arguments which Aristotle uses in differentiating skill at money-making from oikonomia are interesting. Oikonomia is natural, he says; acquiring money is not, since it depends upon some art or skill (ἐμπειρία, τέχνη). Household management uses possessions, e.g., a shoe, for the purpose of which they were made; money-making exchanges them for something else. Money-making, naturally, is concerned with money; oikonomia, with other forms of wealth, like property. Above all, though, household management is limited in concern — enough to get along on comfortably; money-making knows no limits — everything becomes subservient to it, and bad practices like usury result. One senses here an indignation against current "materialism" in contrast to the old-time frugality, as well as a polemic against the developing system of commerce and finance in contrast to the traditional, self-sufficient household in Xenophon's ideal. The whole performance also suggests the attitude of shrewdness, high finance,

Now more is said by the Politics in detail about the practical matters of household management, the care of cattle, fields, orchards, bees, fish, and so forth, that need not detain us here.[62] What we must note, however, is that Aristotle differs from Xenophon not merely in situation — he is defending the idea that oikonomia, that ancient and honorable science, has a place in the philosopher's view of the world, as part of the very nature of things, in spite of current perversions, while Xenophon put forth a simple manual of advice on what was a growing topic of practical interest in his day — but also he differs from him in tone: Xenophon saw estate-management as aiming at the increase of estates, while Aristotle, distaining the emphasis on piling up money, views it more as the art of providing sufficient for comfortable living. In a word, especially in contrast with

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and even sharp practices, which must have come to surround the ancient art of household management. Cf. the anecdote in chap. 11 about how Thales of Miletus, through his skill in astronomy, cornered the olive market and made a fortune from his monopoly; the section's authenticity has been questioned since it does not quite square with Aristotle's dim view of money-making above, but it must also be remembered the Politics often shifts from the profoundly ideal to the more practical. Cf. W.L. Newman, The Politics of Aristotle (Oxford, 1887), 196ff.

[62] Pol. 1. 4. 1ff. (1258b 9ff.).

attitudes prevalent in his time, Aristotle's concept of *oikonomia* is a *humanitarian* one.[63] As he wrote, "the zeal or earnest concern in household management (ἡ σπουδὴ τῆς οἰκονομίας) is more concerned with men than with possession of lifeless instruments, and with the virtue of these than with the increase of possessions."[64] There is an element of noble tenderness about Aristotle's philosophical discussion of household management, which advances or at least differs from that idyllic picture of Ischomachus and his wife in Xenophon.

Aristotle speaks occasionally about *oikonomia* in other significant ways. For example, he mentions a type of kingship which is similar to household government, what he calls ἡ οἰκονομικὴ βασιλεία ; here the idea is that "just as the master's rule in the household is a sort of monarchy, so absolute monarchy is domestic mastership over a city or over a race or several races."[65] This is a concept, of the city or state as a larger "household," which will develop, of course, into the second main sense of *oikonomia*; and, once at least, Aristotle even suggests that "someone by managing funds carefully would seem to be a steward (οἰκονόμος)" or household manager of the state.[66] Only rarely, however, does Aristotle deal with the practical aspects of household management which were so essential a part of the subject in Xenophon's treatise; outside of the few remarks in the *Politics* on agriculture, for example, and some chance observations here and there,[67] Aristotle does not really present the kind of practical advice on household management which the average Greek interested in improving his estate could sink his teeth into. And so some unknown follower of Aristotle — perhaps his successor, Theophrastus, if we follow one tradition from Roman times[68] — aware of this need brought out a little handbook on house management to which the great Aristotle's name became attached, the *Oeconomica*.

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[63] *Ibid.*, 1. 5. 3ff. (1259b 18ff.). Thus, for example, Aristotle tends to put the human relationships within the household (master-slave, husband-wife, father-child) in the forefront of his discussion of *oikonomia*; thus he holds money-making is strictly no part of this art, but at best an auxiliary to it (ὑπηρετική); thus also his emphasis that *oikonomia* will not be indifferent to the goodness or badness of the property it uses (1258a 26) and will care for the excellence of the human beings with whom it has to deal; thus even the question is taken up of whether slaves have virtue (ἀρετή), with an affirmative answer being given. Newman, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 61), 212f., suggests the views here expressed may go back to Socrates himself.

[64] *Ibid.*, 1. 5. 3 (1259b 18-22): φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι πλείων ἡ σπουδὴ τῆς οἰκονομίας περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἢ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀψύχων κτῆσιν καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τούτων ἢ περὶ τὴν τῆς κτήσεως.

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[65] *Ibid.*, 3. 10. 2 (1285b 32-34): ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ οἰκονομικὴ βασιλεία τις οἰκίας ἐστίν, οὕτως ἡ ⟨παμ⟩βασιλεία πόλεως καὶ ἔθνους ἑνὸς ἢ πλειόνων οἰκονομία.

[66] *Pol*. 5. 9. 11 (1314b 7-9): οὕτω γὰρ ἄν τις διοικῶν οἰκονόμος ἀλλ' οὐ τύραννος εἶναι δόξειεν. The ruler should administer carefully the public funds and not squander them; "for someone managing funds in this fashion would seem to be a steward and not a tyrant." Note the financial connotation to *dioikein* so common in later use.

[67] E.g., *Pol*. 5. 9. 11ff. (1314b 7ff.), the beginning of which has just been quoted (*supra*, note 66), might be subtitled, "Suggestions for Successful Tyrants."

[68] Phld. *Peri oik*. VII. 37-XII. 2 consistently assigns the work to Theophrastus.

Pseudo-Aristotle: The Oeconomica

This little treatise on "Housecraft," the second one, after Xenophon's, to come down to us from the Greek world about the practical side of *oikonomia*, consists today of three short books, the third one extant only in medieval Latin translations.[69] Certainly no part was written by Aristotle himself.[70] Book I, the most important for our discussion, seems to be drawn from Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* and Aristotle's remarks about household management in the *Politics* and to have been put together by some Peripatetic admirer shortly after Aristotle's death.[71] Book II takes a very different view of *oikonomia*, applying it to the state, and then going on to show in a series of "footnotes to history" how rulers by one means or another filled their treasuries; at best late third century B.C., it originated perhaps in Asia Minor and somehow got tacked on to the Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise.[72] Book III is a "graceful homily on married life . . .

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[69] Text edited by F. Susemihl (Leipzig, 1887), reprinted in G. Cyril Armstrong, *Aristotle: Metaphysics X-XIV, Oeconomica, and Magna Moralia* (Loeb; London, 1935), 321ff. The Latin MSS for Book III are summarized in Armstrong, *op. cit.*, 324f., the chief translation being dated 1295.

[70] So most modern scholars; Armstrong, *ibid.*, e.g., or Friederich Ueberweg, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie* (Basel, 1953), 1, 372, or *RE* 2, 1052.

[71] Recall Philodemus' attribution to Theophrastus, *supra*, note 68, and cf. Susemihl's opinion, in his B.T. edition, viii, that the author does not reflect only Aristotelian teachings, but also some Peripatetic ones, though there is no strong Stoic coloring to his work, such as appears in the *Magna Moralia*.

[72] Armstrong, *op. cit.*, 323f. Niebuhr in 1813 (*Opusc. philol.* 1, 412)

almost Christian" that may possibly reflect a genuine lost work of Aristotle, but this is uncertain.[73] Some pupil, it would seem from what we can ascertain, wrote the first part, to provide a handbook on that practical subject, *oikonomia*, between Ethics and Politics, and to it other chapters were added in ancient times,[74] the whole process showing the abiding interest of writers then in the topic and the elastic limits which "house management" had come to have.

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argued that Book II was an independent work and assigned it to an author in Asia Minor after the times of Theophrastus, but L. Spengel, *Aristotelische Studien*, III. *Zur Politik und Oekonomik*, (Munich: Abhandlung der k. bayer. Akademie, philos.-philolog. Klasse, 1868), 76, concludes it is not possible to confirm the conjecture that the author lived in Asia Minor.

[73] Armstrong, *op. cit.*, 325. Hesychius of Miletus (6th cent.) attributes to Aristotle a work entitled "Rules for Married Life" (νόμοι ἀνδρὸς καὶ γαμετῆς), and V. Rose, *Fragmenta* (Leipzig, 1886), No. 184, has conjectured this is the work translated by Guillaume Durand, Bishop of Mende in Languedoc in 1295 into Latin, which we now know as Book III of the *Oeconomica*. As Book III does not use the terms *dispositio* and *dispensatio*, I omit any further discussion of it.

[74] That our Book II was attached very early to Book I is suggested by the fact that Plutarch, in his *Life of Aristotle* (= ?) expressly attributes to Aristotle *two* books on the subject of economic art; so E. Walford, *The Politics and Economics of Aristotle* (London, 1889), lxxix. However, it may also be noted that Diogenes Laertius (5. 22) knew of only *one* such book by Aristotle, and only one book is mentioned in the catalog by Hesychius (cf. V. Rose, *Fragmenta* (Leipzig, 1886), 11). Perhaps Walford

Summarizing Book I briefly, we find it draws heavily on Aristotelian theory and Xenophontic practicality, but also adds a few significant notions of its own. Housecraft (ἡ οἰκονομική) and statecraft (ἡ πολιτική) are said to differ both in extent (the πόλις is much larger than an οἰκία) and in that statecraft consists of many rulers, while housecraft is marked by individual rule (ἡ οἰκονομικὴ δὲ μοναρχία), a point Aristotle had made.[75] But household management, which is related by nature to political management (πολιτική), is older, it is argued, because the household is a portion of the state.[76] This basic art of household management is then said to concern two things, first, human beings, and second, possessions or goods and chattels (ἄνθρωπός τε καὶ κτῆσις). Thus there is provided a basic outline for the rest of the book:[77] first, the human beings in the household, especially a wife — so that as one recognized task of oikonomia "it would be necessary to set properly in order (οἰκονομήσασθαι καλῶς) the details about the relationship with the wife," and show what it ought to be[78] — and then possessions — goods,

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had in mind some late opinion like those cited in Rose, Fragmenta, 138f.

[75] [Oec.] 1. 1. 1. (1343a 1-4): ἡ οἰκονομικὴ καὶ πολιτικὴ διαφέρει οὐ μόνον τοσοῦτον ὅσον οἰκία καὶ πόλις (ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ αὐταῖς ἐστι τὰ ὑποκείμενα), ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι ἡ μὲν πολιτικὴ ἐκ πολλῶν ἀρχόντων ἐστίν, ἡ οἰκονομικὴ δὲ μοναρχία.

[76] Ibid., 1. 1. 2 (1343a 14-16): ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι πρότερον γενέσει ἡ οἰκονομικὴ πολιτικῆς ἐστι. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἔργον. μόριον γὰρ οἰκία πόλεώς ἐστιν.

[77] Ibid., 1. 2. 1 (1343a 17): μέρη δὲ οἰκίας ἄνθρωπός τε καὶ κτῆσις ἐστίν. Human relationships are taken up particularly in chap. 3 and 4, and possessions especially in chap. 5 and 6.

[78] Ibid., 1. 2. 1 (1343a 22-24): ὥστε δέοι ἂν τὰ περὶ τὴν τῆς γυναικὸς ὁμιλίαν οἰκονομήσασθαι καλῶς. τοῦτο δέ ἐστι τὸ ποίαν τινὰ δεῖ ταύτην εἶναι παρασκευάσαι.

slaves, supervision, buying, selling, and a dozen other similar matters. Hesiod's line about "house and woman and plow and ox" provides a text for the essentials of oikonomia in barest outline,[79] but the actual discussion goes on to all the host of things that had come to be recognized as part and parcel of the subject, right down to the husband-wife relationship (he is not to do her wrong, she must not be restless in his absence), the duties of an oikonomos (to be able to acquire, to keep, to improve, to use possessions), and even the type of buildings to erect ("airy in summer, sunny in winter").[80]

We pass over all the technical details and such fine distinctions as the difference between "Attic household management" and the Persian or Laconian systems,[81] to note one significant observation by our author. In discussing the human part of the household, on which, following Aristotle, he seems to lay most emphasis, he speaks of the union or community

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[79] Ibid., (1343a 20-21): ὥστε καθ' Ἡσίοδον δέοι ἂν ὑπάρχειν, οἶκον μὲν πρώτιστα γυναῖκά τε βοῦν τ' ἀροτῆρα.

[80] Ibid. On the husband-wife relationship, cf. 1. 3 and 4, especially 1. 4. 1 and 2. On the duties of the oikonomos, cf. 1. 6. 1. The fourfold outline is an expansion of the older formula at 1. 1. 1 (1343a 8-9), "household management tells us how to acquire a household and how to use it or conduct its affairs" (ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἂν εἴη καὶ κτήσασθαι οἶκον καὶ χρήσασθαι αὐτῷ). On the type of buildings, see 1. 6. 7.

[81] Ibid., 1. 6. 2. The Attic type of household management buys and sells but makes no large deposits of idle goods in a storage chamber; the other systems stock-pile materials, all carefully arranged.

(κοινωνία) between man and woman which is basic to the household.[82] This is in part necessitated by Nature, he says, for procreation, as with the lower animals, but there are also more complex reasons: this community provides for the care of children in their youth, and vice versa, for care by children of parents in their old age — in other words, a cooperative well-being in the household. Nature itself has arranged this, our author holds, and then, more important, he adds,

> At the same time, Nature, by this cycle, fulfills its purpose of perpetual existence, since perpetual existence is possible, not with regard to the individual, but with the race as species. Thus the nature of each, of both man and woman, was arranged beforehand by the divine (προῳκονόμηται ὑπὸ τοῦ θείου) for community.[83]

And so it is, by a divine arrangement — Divine Providence, one is tempted to say — man and woman are different from each other in faculties and strength and ability, in the kind of contribution each makes to the birth of a child, and also in what each contributes to the upbringing of that child. Aristotle himself had on occasion spoken of Nature as an oikonomos, arranging things,[84] but here in Pseudo-Aristotle we seem to have for the first time a view of some sort of providential arranging behind the subject of oikonomia. Here the relation of man and woman within a household, their differences, and the sex instinct itself are recognized as in some way naturally and divinely given, a part of a prearranged ordering for community. Here, apparently, for the first time, and in connection with the root meaning of the term as household management, there is indicated an oikonomia by Nature, or Providence, or the divine.

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[82] Ibid., 1. 3. 1ff. (1343b 8-9): κοινωνία γὰρ φύσει τῷ θήλει καὶ τῷ ἄρρενι μάλιστά ἐστιν.

[83] Ibid., 1. 3. 4. (1343b 23-27): ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἡ φύσις ἀναπληροῖ ταύτῃ τῇ περιόδῳ τὸ ἀεὶ εἶναι, ἐπεὶ κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν οὐ δύναται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος. οὕτω προῳκονόμηται ὑπὸ τοῦ θείου ἑκατέρου ἡ φύσις, τοῦ τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ τῆς γυναικός, πρὸς τὴν κοινωνίαν. This is the earliest example of the compound προ-οικονομεῖν I have noted in Greek literature.

[84] Arist. Gen. An. 2. 6. 42 (744b): ὥσπερ γὰρ οἰκονόμος ἀγαθός, καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν ἀποβάλλειν εἴωθεν ἐξ ὧν ἔστι ποιῆσαί τι χρηστόν.

Quite in contrast with this elevated moment in the treatise which we know as Book I is the spirit of that slightly later Hellenistic tract on administration which we know as Book II in the Oeconomica. Here oikonomia is extended to apply to the management of states. Necessary qualifications for any man who is going to administer something (τὸν οἰκονομεῖν μέλλοντά τι) are efficiently summed up,[85] and four types of administrations (οἰκονομίαι) are precisely ennumerated— that of a king, a satrap,

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"For, just like a good housekeeper, Nature also is accustomed to throw away none of the things out of which it is possible to make something useful."

[85] [Oec.] 2. 1. 1 (1345b 7-11): τὸν οἰκονομεῖν μέλλοντά τι... μὴ ἀπείρως ἔχειν, καὶ τῆ φύσει εὐφυῆ εἶναι καὶ τῆ προαιρέσει φιλόπονόν τε καὶ δίκαιον· ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν ἀπῆ τούτων τῶν μερῶν, πολλὰ διαμαρτήσεται περὶ τὴν πραγματείαν ἣν μεταχειρίζεται. "The man who is going to administer something . . . is not to be inexperienced, and is to be clever by nature and both industrious and just in purpose; insofar as he is wanting of these parts, many details will go wrong regarding the matter he handles." Throughout, however, the emphasis is on administering something larger than a household, as at 2. 2. 15 (1348b 5), τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν διοικεῖν, "administer the city-state."

a city-state, and of an individual;[86] but the financial aspect is emphasized in the one rule that is common to all kinds of administration: keep expenditures within the limits of revenue.[87] Having advocated a balanced budget, this author then feels compelled to go on and make his more practical contribution of listing ways in which famous or infamous financiers and rulers of the past have arranged matters artfully (τεχνικῶς τι διῴκησαν) or schemed to get revenue— like the Athenian who built the upper stories of his houses out over the street to gain more room, or Dionysius of Syracuse who compelled his citizens to regard coinage of tin as silver, and once had them turn in all their silver and, after coining it into drachmae stamped at double the actual value of the silver in each coin, returned it and thus paid off all his debts.[88] Such were tricks of good oikonomia according to this book.

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[86] Ibid. (1345b 12-14): οἰκονομίαι δέ εἰσι τέσσαρες, ὡς ἐν τύπω διελέσθαι (τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας εἰς τοῦτο ἐμπιπτούσας εὑρήσομεν), βασιλικὴ σατραπικὴ πολιτικὴ ἰδιωτική. "There are four types of administration, so that they may be defined in outline (for we shall find that the others fit in with this outline), that of a king, of a satrap, of a city-state, and of an individual."

[87] Ibid., 2. 1. 6 (1346a 14-16): ὃ πάσαις μὲν ἐπικοινωνεῖται ταῖς οἰκονομίαις, καὶ προσήκει σκοπεῖν αὐτὸ μὴ παρέργως, μάλιστα δὲ ταύτῃ, τὸ τ' ἀναλώματα μὴ μείζω τῶν προσόδων γίνεσθαι. "That which is shared in common by all types of administration and which it is fitting to consider, not in any incidental manner but especially in this way is the principle that the expenses be not greater than the revenues." Note how the financial emphasis is foremost in the illustrations cited. At 2. 2. 23 διοικεῖν means specifically "make financial arrangements."

[88] For the various examples, cf. ibid., 2. 2. 1-41, the bulk of the

These two little treatises— Book III omits any of our terms; even if ancient, it merely elaborates one phase of house management which we have already seen, namely, the dress, conduct, and so forth, of a good wife — from unknowns after Aristotle are important for us, not only as showing the continuing interest in *oikonomia*, its practical and more theoretical aspects, in the early Hellenistic age, but also as demonstrating the constant expansion of subject matter which the topic included— note the stress on sharp financial practice in Book II— but above all as suggesting a notion beginning to appear of *oikonomia sub specie dei*, the concept of order and arrangement, in households, in this case, under the aspect of the divine.

Such interest in the science of household management continued on into Roman times — the practical aspects attracting many men, often for mercenary reasons, the more theoretical side interesting philosophers of varied schools, Peripatetics like the anonymous imitators of Aristotle just noted, Stoics, for whom, as we shall see, *oikonomia* was an important term,[89] and Epicureans too. The best evidence for this latter interest is a third handbook, *Peri oikonomias*,[90] preserved for us in fragments from the first century B.C. by an Epicurean philosopher, Philodemus of Gadara. That there were some men who did not share this traditional interest on the part of philosophy in household management is implied in one remark

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treatise. The illustration about Hippias the Athenian is given at 2. 2. 4 (1347a 4-18), and those about Dionysius at 2. 2. 20 (1349a 14-1350a 6).

[89] *Infra*, 201ff.

[90] C. Jensen, *Philodemi* *περὶ οἰκονομίας*, *op*. *cit*. (*supra*, 153, note 1). All references will be given from this standard edition, but cf. remarks *infra* on the state of the text.

Philodemus makes, but that he felt he had ample precedent for writing a treatise on the subject is also made clear in the same remark:

> If someone finds fault as we write about oikonomia, sufficient for us is, along with Epicurus, Metrodorus, who commanded and urged and arranged (διοικῶν) [household affairs] in a more careful manner and down to the more minute details, even doing a thing himself, although the matter, as it seems, was not urgent.[91]

Epicurus and Metrodorus, as a few fragmentary quotations show,[92] and later Philodemus, all Epicureans, thus exhibit an interest in household management. To the latter's treatise we turn at this point, because it is a reaction to what Xenophon and Pseudo-Aristotle had to say, a final example of discussions on oikonomia in the ancient world.

Philodemus: Peri oikonomias

Philodemus himself, born c. 101 B.C., probably of Greek parentage, at Gadara, between modern Jaffa and Ascalon on the coast of Palestine, the same town Menippus and Meleager hailed from, lived most of his adult life in Italy, from 80 or 70 B.C. to his death about 40 B.C.[93] A pupil of the

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[91] Ibid., Col. xxvii, lines 20-29; cf. xx. 45 - xxi. 7. εἰ δὴ καταμέμψεταί τις ἡμῶν περὶ οἰκονομίας ἀναγρ[α]φ[όν]των, ἡμῖν μὲν ἱκανὸς μετ' Ἐπικούρου Μητρόδωρος ἐπιστέλλων καὶ παραινῶν καὶ διοικῶν ἐπ[ι]μελέστερον καὶ μέχρι μικροτέρων καὶ ποιῶν αὐτός, εἰ καὶ μὴ τὸ πρᾶγμ[α κ]ατήπειγεν ὡς [φα]ίνεται.

[92] Cf. supra, 160, note 16.

[93] On the biography of Philodemus, cf. RE 19, 2, 2444ff., and P.H. and E.A. De Lacy, Philodemus: On Methods of Inference: a Study in Ancient Empiricism (Monograph; Philadelphia: American Philological Association, 1941), 1-9. Among the ancient sources, cf. especially Strabo Geography 16. 2. 29.

Epicurean philosopher, Zeno of Sidon, Philodemus too became a philosopher and poet, and in Italy struck up a friendship with Caesar's father-in-law, Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, who became his patron. As "house philosopher," Philodemus soon set up a school in the Naples area, which became the center of Italian Epicureanism and "an extremely important factor in Italy of the first century B.C."[94] Praised by Cicero for his scholarship and elegance,[95] Philodemus evidently knew many of the leading figures of the day, including political leaders like Caesar and Antony — no ivory-tower philosopher, this man! — and was a teacher of Virgil, perhaps of Horace too — the latter at least refers to Philodemus' poetry.[96]

As an author, Philodemus wrote widely. Some 25 epigrams, polished and licentious, are preserved from him in the _Palatine Anthology_. But there must have been innumerable prose treatises, on all sorts of subjects, frequently polemic against the Stoic or Peripatetic philosophers, and sometimes preserving teachings of Zeno; these were lost to the world until papyri were discovered at Herculaneum in the mid-eighteenth century, containing some of them. It is now agreed that this collection, mostly works by Philodemus himself or other Epicureans, comprised the library in Piso's villa at Herculaneum and that probably the manuscripts had been gathered by Philodemus himself.[97] In other words, the library and writings of this philosopher himself were sealed up two or three generations later and thus preserved for modern study.

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[94] De Lacy, _op. cit._ (_supra_, note 93), 7.

[95] Cicero spoke of Philodemus, perhaps ironically, as _vere humanus_ (_Pis_. 28. 68ff.) and _inter optimos et doctissimos homines_ (_Fin_. 2. 35. 119), and as a man of elegance and taste and distinguished not only in philosophy but also in other studies, like literature (_Pis_. 29. 70).

[96] On Philodemus as Virgil's teacher, cf. Serv. on Virgil's _Aen_. 4. 264; Horace refers to his poems in _Sat_. 1. 2. 121. Cf. also De Lacy, _op. cit._ (_supra_, note 93), 3ff.

Now the story of the restoration and editing of these Philodemus fragments reads like a detective story with comic and tragic touches. One is reminded of the current vicissitudes of the Dead Sea Scrolls.[98] But out of the mass of materials recovered, on rhetoric, music, summaries of lectures by Zeno, and so forth, it is agreed that some of the papyrus rolls can be rearranged in connected order to form a work bearing the general title, "On Vices and the Corresponding Virtues."[99] Each book in this work apparently took up a different pair, Book VII for example, flattery (κολακεία) and frankness (παρρησία).

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[97] The view is suggested by Cic. Pis. 29. 68-72, and the inference may even be drawn that Piso had given the villa to Philodemus (so e.g., Piero Treves, "Philodemus," in OCD, 681). The view is also presented in some detail by Walter Scott, Fragmenta Herculanensia (Oxford, 1885) (cited hereafter as "Scott"), 11ff., and accepted in RE, 19, 2, 2447.

[98] On the problems of unrolling the Herculaneum scrolls, cf. Scott, 1ff. for an interesting account. As with the Dead Sea materials, problems included wartime conditions which made work next to impossible, the fact that scrolls were carried off and published in different places (Oxford and Naples especially), and the fact that some scrolls presented problems in unrolling them without destroying them — just as with the Palestinian documents.

[99] So Scott, 69ff. I refrain from tracing the complex history of the Philodemus material that has been grouped together by editors to form the other books of the larger work. Book IX, however, depends especially on papyrus 1424 from Herculaneum, found in 1752; this was first worked over by Rev. John Hayter in 1806 and the following years, and in 1824 some 22

Book IX in this sequence has to do with careful, frugal household management against the foil of covetousness as a corresponding vice, a treatise thus "on how the [Epicurean] philosopher should employ, acquire, retain and manage property."[100] As one of its editors more thoroughly analyzes it, what's left of Book IX

> might be described as περὶ οἰκονομίας. The question discussed is how the Epicurean σοφός must conduct himself with respect to the acquisition and preservation of wealth, in order to avoid disturbance of the philosophic calm. Philodemus criticizes from this point of view the Oeconomicus of Xenophon, and one of the books of the same name traditionally ascribed to Aristotle; but refers to the latter as a work of Theophrastus. . . . It is probable . . . that the particular vice treated in this book was covetousness (φιλαργυρία) so that it might be connected

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columns of it were published at Oxford (Herc. Voll. Oxon. Pars Prima, 1824, pp. 83-105). In 1827, Italian workers at Naples raised the number to 28 columns (Coll. Prior III. (1), 1827). The two editions were eventually combined in a more critical text by various scholars; that of C. Goettling (Jena, 1830) was better but often arbitrary, being criticized by Spengel a few years later (Gelehrte Anzeigen, Munich, 1838, pp. 1001-23). Further work on the text was done by Schoemann in 1839 (Observationes in Theophrasti Oecomonicum et Philodemi lib. IX de Virtutibus et Vitiis, Opusc. Academ. III, 206-243), by Hartung in 1857, and by Perron in 1895. See, of course, Jensen's Teubner edition, op. cit., for a full discussion.

[100] Holden, op. cit. (supra, 162, note 19), xxxiii, note 18.

with the four following anonymous rolls, which are shown by the frequent recurrence of the word φιλαργυρία to deal with the same subject.[101] Scott's guess about "love of money" as the foil for Philodemus' virtue of household management, that frugal art of providing enough for oneself to live comfortably but not lavishly, seems to be correct; for just such a perversion of oikonomia into an "art of money-making" and a system of sharp financial practices, which we have seen existing earlier, must have continued to be the common notion against which this writing protested. Vulgar love of money and materialism and luxurious living is opposed by the modest Epicurean virtue of providing enough for the simple wants of the wise man and his imperturbable life of withdrawal from the maddening rush of the world.

Philodemus' Peri oikonomias therefore is an Epicurean "diatribe,"[102] and according to its most recent editor "divides into three parts, the first of which sets forth the opinions of adversaries whom he calls τοὺς ευπρακτικωτέρους τῶν φιλοσόφων ("the more luxurious of the philosophers," col. xxvii. 31.); secondly, he refutes them; thirdly and last, following the tracks of Metrodorus he presents the particular precepts of his school."[103] With this much generally clear about the work, we may now try to see, not so much what its contents or course of argument are — there are too many lacunae for that — but rather where this work differs from earlier treatises in emphasis at least. All the while it must be remembered that the precarious state of the text renders conclusions tentative and difficult.[104]

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[101] Scott, 72; cf. RE 19, 2, 2471.

[102] The term is used in RE 19, 2, 2467.

[103] Jensen, op. cit. (supra, 153, note 1), xxiv f. He accordingly divided his rearrangement of the treatise thus (p. xviii):

I. On the Oeconomicus of Xenophon: Col. I - Col. VII. 37.

II. On the Oeconomicus of Theophrastus: Col. VII. 37 - Col. XII. 2.

III. The particular precepts of his own Epicurean School: Col. XII. 2 - Col. XXVIII. 10.

The basic problem for an Epicurean discussing *oikonomia* in the first century B.C. — when his philosophy still stood for an absence of pain and a neutral state of feeling as the goal, not sensual self-indulgence, as in its later perversion — was the fact that household management was *popularly* interpreted to mean money-making; but to an Epicurean the goal of this science was only to provide a comfortable living according to a mean of expediency. The crux of the issue was the adverb "well" (εὖ) in the traditional definition that household management is "to manage *well* one's own household and to cause the house of another to be *well*-ordered." This adverb "well" had been popularly taken to mean "lavishly, by making lots of money"; for the Epicurean it meant "comfortably, in accordance with a simpler standard."

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[104] The words of George Saintsbury, *A History of Criticism* (New York, 1908), 1, 63, are an appropriate warning here: "The tolerably abundant fragments of Philodemus are, even after all the pains spent on them, in such a chaos that only extremely temerarious arguers will do more than take a vague inference from them. . . . It is difficult to know whether Philodemus or his opponent is speaking" at times! Without being a temerarious arguer, however, I think it is possible to reconstruct some lines of his thought here with the help of Jensen's text and comments. The task is also eased now by the appearance of a *Lexicon Philodemeum* in two volumes, edited by C.J. Vooys (Amsterdam, 1934 and, completed by D.A. van Krevelen, 1941) which goes beyond the *index verborum* in Jensen's Teubner edition.

Thus, at the outset of his discussion of Xenophon's Oeconomicus, Philodemus sticks at the word εὖ in Xenophon's definition of the function of oikonomia, and assumes Xenophon found it necessary to bow to the vulgar will and accept this term εὖ in the customary, mercenary sense. Xenophon had to do this, he argues:

> If, on the one hand, he [Xenophon] assumed that it is not a function of what is customarily considered household management "to manage well one's own household and to cause the other man's household to be well-managed," the view being taken that "well" means "greatly and happily expedient," but that it is "to provide much money and to take care how the things which have been provided and previously acquired may continue," and that "to manage well one's own household and to cause the other household to be well-managed" is to be viewed with reference to this standard, if indeed it was customary then to put it in the way it is now— then a person [i.e., the average man] would not deny [his point] ; but, if on the other hand, he assumed the contrary to the points made before, he would not assent.[105]

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[105] Phld. Peri oik. Col. I. 3-21: ...εἰ μὲν... ὑπελάμβανεν, ὅτι τῆς συνή[θ]ως νοουμένης] οἰκον[ομ]ίας οὐ[κ] ἔ[σ]τι]ν ἔργο[ν] τὸ [ε]ὖ οἰκεῖν τὸ̣[ν] ἴδιον οἶκον καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν τὸν ἀλλότριον εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι, λαμβανομένου τὸ ε[ὖ] τοῦ μεγαλωστὶ συμφέρον̣τος καὶ μακαρίως, ἀλλὰ τὸ πορίζειν πολλὰ χρήματα καὶ φυλάττειν πῶς διαμενεῖ τὰ̣ πορισθέντα καὶ προϋπάρχοντα καὶ κατὰ̣ τοῦτο τὸ εὖ [ο]ἰκεῖν τὸν ἴδιον οἶκον καὶ π[οι]ε̣ῖν οἰκεῖσθαι τὸν ἀλλότριον, εἴ̣ γε σύνηθες ἦν τιθέναι [τ̣]ο̣τ̣ε ᾗ καὶ νῦ̣ν̣ ἐστιν, οὐκ ἂν φθονήσαι τις, εἰ δὲ κατὰ τοῦ προλε[χ]θέν[τ]ο̣ς, οὐκ ἂν συ[γ]χωρ[ή]σειεν....

Philodemus here assumes that Xenophon included "well" in his definition in the vulgar sense to secure popular agreement; whether that was in

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Such is also the interpretation of Jensen, the Teubner editor, who concludes that Philodemus is here censuring Xenophon, a possibility that had escaped all previous editors; Jensen reconstructs the argument, op. cit., xxv-xxvi: "At Oec. 1. 2ff., Xenophon introduces Critobulus saying that he thinks that man popularly is a good oeconomicus who can εὖ οἰκεῖν τὸν ἴδιον οἶκον. This definition is amplified in what follows: 'Surely,' said Socrates, 'and if someone puts him in charge of the estate of another man, wouldn't he be able, if he wished, to manage it well, just as also his own estate?' . . . 'It seems so to me, O Socrates.' Now let us hear the criticism of Philodemus, which, since the truth escaped all those learned men who worked so diligently in the arranging of the text itself, could not rightly be explained. Philodemus therefore stops [and comments] at the word 'well' (εὖ). Since this word can be explained in a variety of ways, Philodemus thinks that this is the meaning of Xenophon: namely, that he understood the word as it is accustomed to be understood popularly, since Philodemus would assume a beginning in Xenophon from a popular definition. 'If,' he says, 'Xenophon wished that phrase, "to order well one's own house and to cause the house of another to be well-ordered," to be so understood that it is characteristic of a good oeconomicus "to provide much money and to take care how the things provided and previously acquired might continue," and if this same meaning was accustomed either at that time to be understood in those words or is accustomed to be nowadays, this then we [i.e., the average man in the street] shall readily grant [i.e., the average man, who thinks "well" means to make lots of money and this is successful household management, Xenophon's mind or not is an open question, but at least, we have seen, the art of household management was ofttimes taken to mean money-making by some. And so Philodemus' main task, as posed in this torturously involved sentence is to show that such a notion, of the vulgar herd and of Xenophon as well, is wrong; the man who is truly wise according to Epicurean standards is the one who uses wealth rightly— he has a standard, and that standard is expediency.

Philodemus puts it thus in introducing the tenets of his own school:

> We shall argue that it (οἰκονομία) does *not* mean to live *well* in a household, but that it *is* necessary to understand about both the *acquisition* and *preservation* of goods about which it has turned out the art of household management and the man who is inclined to household management are particularly concerned, although we do not differ with those who choose to arrange different things under the headings, and about the acquisition which is necessary to philosophy, and not that which is necessary to anything else. There is for philosophy a mean (μέτρον) of wealth, which we have provided in accordance with the principles established in the treatise *Peri ploutou* ["On Wealth" also by Philodemus], so that the art of household management may provide for

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would agree with this]; but if he understood that word "well" in the sense of "what is greatly and happily expedient," then no one in his right mind would have approved [i.e., of those living then, no one would have accepted the Epicurean definition, that to manage "well" does not mean to make all the money one can, but only that which is expedient or beneficial for the wise man]." Thus Philodemus' task is to show that household management is not concerned with money-making, but only seeks enough to live comfortably according to the mean of expediency.

both the acquisition of this [mean of wealth] and its preservation.[106] The Epicurean sophos, in other words, aims not at living "well" in the lavish popular sense but at meeting through his household management the moderate standards which other Epicurean treatises had suggested; here he follows Metrodorus and Philodemus and the others who had written to explain "the amount of possessions we must be concerned about, and what sort and how much household management (οἰκονομίαν) we receive in reason, and how it is possible to say the wise man is a good oikonomos and how it is not, just as also he is a businessman, and what oikonomia is an art (τέχνη) and what is not," and so on.[107]

Household management and manager thus get a place in Epicurean life, but in a situation different from the usual, popular view. The new element which Epicureanism emphasizes in Philodemus' analysis of oikonomia is expediency (τὸ σύμφερον). To live and manage "well" (εὖ) means "in a manner that is greatly and blessedly expedient."[108] The mean for wealth which the wise man has is "the mean of expediency."[109] "The presence of wealth does not trouble the wise man," Philodemus writes, "when he is of such a nature, about the care and preservation of goods . . . since in accordance with expediency especially he both acquires and uses and pays attention to wealth."[110] Again, the good man (σπουδαῖος) is able, "by distinguishing many things with regard to expediency and inexpediency, to choose some things rather than others."[111] Further, it is in accordance with expediency that a good businessman cares for wealth by Epicurean standards, and the man who experiences more pain than pleasure in acquiring wealth is, by this same standard, not a good businessman.[112] The truly wise man, to take a final example, "will therefore measure the expediency both of [wealth's] acquisition and preservation in the very best way, so that he will not labor more for the sake of goods than to live comfortably."[113] Reflected throughout is the Epicurean dictum that the way to make Philodemus truly rich is to take away his inordinate desires.

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[106] Ibid., Col. XII. 5-25: διαλε[ξ]όμεθα τ[ο]ίνυν οὐχ ὡς ἐν οἴκωι καλῶ[ς] ἔστιν βιοῦν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἵστασθαι δεῖ περὶ χρημάτων κτήσεώς τε καὶ φυλακῆς, περὶ [ἃ] τὴν οἰκονομίαν καὶ τὸν οἰκονομικὸν ἰδίως νοεῖσθαι συμβέβηκεν, οὐδὲν διαφερόμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἕτερα τοῖς ὀν[ό]μασιν ὑποτάττειν προαιρ[ο]υμένους, καὶ περὶ τῆς φιλοσόφωι δεούσης κτήσεως, [οὐ] τῆς ὁτωι[δή]ποτε. φ[ιλοσό]φωι δ' ἐστὶ πλούτου μέ[τρ]ον, ὃ παρεδώκαμεν [ἀκολ]ο[ύ]θως τοῖς καθηγε[μόσιν] ἐν τοῖς Περὶ π[λού]του [λόγο]ις, ὥστε τὴν οἰκον[ομικὴ]ν τῆς τε τούτου κ[τή]σε[ως κ]αὶ τῆς τούτου φυλ[ακ]ῆς [ἀποδ]ίδοσθαι.

[107] Ibid., Col. XXI. 35-45: ἐκ δὴ τούτων ἔσ[τιν] διαλαμβά[ν]ειν προα[ι]ρο[υμ]ένοις καὶ τὸ πόσης κτ[ή]σεω[ς] ἐπιμελητέον καὶ τίνα καὶ [π]οίαν οἰκονομίαν ἐν τῶι λόγωι λαμβάνομεν καὶ πῶς οἰκονόμον ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν τὸν σοφὸν καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ χρη[μ]ατιστήν, καὶ τίς οἰκονομ[ί]α τέχνη, καὶ τ[ίς οὐ] τ[έχνη]....

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[108] Ibid., Col. I. 8ff.: ...λαμβανομένου τοῦ ε[ὖ] τοῦ μεγαλωστὶ συμφέροντος καὶ μακαρίως,.... Cf. III a. 6-14: "We would say that the good household manager is the provider of possessions and goods . . . which he sets in order, and his function is to manage a household happily. . . ." ὥστε κἂν [τὸν ἀγαθ]ὸν οἰκονόμον λέ[γ]ωμεν τὸ]ν κτημάτων καὶ [χρημάτων πο[ρισ]τήν, ... [ἃ δι]οικονομεῖ, καὶ ὑπάρχειν [ἔρ]γον αὐτ[οῦ] τὸ μακα[ρί]ω[ς οἶ]κον οἰκεῖν.... Again, no mention of money-making, but the stress on "happily" (μακαρίως).

[109] Ibid., cf. Jensen's summary of the Epicurean argument, p. xxxiii; it could almost be summarized thus: "that only the man who is wise in accordance with Epicurus properly uses wealth, since [sc. such a man] has the standard of expediency." ὅτι μόνος ὁ κατ' Ἐπίκουρον σοφὸς καλῶς χρήσεται τῷ πλούτῳ μέτρον ἔχων τοῦ συμφέροντος.

[110] Ibid., Col. XIX. 32f., 45f.: τοιοῦτον οὖν ὄντα τὸν σοφὸν περὶ τὴν ἐπιμέλ[εια]ν καὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τῶν χρημάτων οὐκ ἐνοχλήσει πλ[οῦ]τος ὑπάρχων, ... ἐπειδὴ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρ[ον] μάλιστ[α] καὶ κτᾶται καὶ χρῆται καὶ ἐπιμέ[λεται πλούτο]υ.

[111] Ibid., Col. XIII. 20-23: οἷο[ς π]ολλὰ τῶι συμφ[έ]ροντι κα[ὶ ἀ]συμφόρωι δ[ιορ]ίζων [ἑλέσθαι] μᾶλλο[ν] ἑτέρ[ω]ν ἕτερα....

This typical Epicurean emphasis on expediency, what is fitting and suitable for the wise man, provides a new turn in the long road the science of household management has taken since its earliest days, and a significant one. This is not to deny that Philodemus agrees with and supports many of the old emphases he found in the earlier treatises about household management; he does. He agrees for instance with Pseudo-Aristotle's analysis that the household comes before the state and that its parts are human beings and possessions;[114] he stresses the need for proper arrangement of possessions in a household, as Xenophon had done.[115] But the new emphasis at which he differs is in regard to expediency, what is fitting and proper for the wise Epicurean, as against the common idea of lavish money-making; and this nuance of expediency in *oikonomia* is one that will turn up again elsewhere.

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[112] Ibid., Col. XX. 16-32: διόπερ εἰ μὲν βουλόμεθα λέγειν ἐν προλήψει τοῦτον ἀγαθὸν χρηματιστὴ[ν] τ̣ὸν κα[τὰ] τὸ συμφέρον κτώμενον [κα]ὶ ἐπιμελόμενον π[λο]ύτου, τὸν σοφὸν μάλιστα το[ι]οῦτον εἶναι ῥητέον· εἰ [δὲ] μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὸν δυνατῶς καὶ ἐντέχνως πολλὰ πορι[ζ]ό[μ̣εν]ον καὶ μήτε αἰσχρῶς ἐννόμ̣[ω]ς τε φέρομεν ἐν π̣ρολήψει τὸν ἀγαθὸν χρηματιστήν, κἂν ὅτι μάλιστα πλεῖ[ον κα]κοπαθῇ κτώμενος [οὕτω]ς ἤπερ ἥδηται, μᾶλ[λο]ν ἄλλο̣[υ]ς τῶν σοφῶν φατέον. "If, on the one hand, we wish to say proleptically that this man is a 'good businessman' who acquires and cares for wealth in accordance with expediency, we must say that the wise man especially is such a man; but if, on the other hand, we rather apply the term 'good businessman' to the man who ably and skillfully provides many things and not shamefully but legally, yet if this man, in making his acquisitions, thus especially suffers more misfortune than he experiences pleasure, we must say rather that these men who thus acquire goods at the expense of pain are different from the really wise men."

[113] Ibid., Col. XVIII. 40-44: μετρήσει μὲν οὖν ἴσω[ς τὸ] συμφέρον καὶ κτήσει καὶ φυλακῆι πολὺ βέλτισθ' οὗτος, ὥστε μὴ πλείω [π]ονεῖν διὰ τὰ χρήματ' ἤπερ εὐπαθεῖν.

We have now traced *oikonomia* in its primary sense of household management from the earliest examples in Greek literature through notices of it in the Greek philosophers and a series of special handbooks on the topic, all the way to Roman times, where the interest still did not stop; admiration for the virtue continued throughout succeeding centuries until the present, skill at *oikonomia* being considered a traditional merit in horoscopes.[116] Peripatetics, Epicureans, philosophers of all types appreciated it, and it remains only to add here a few evidences that Stoics too regarded household management as an especial virtue.

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[114] *Ibid.*, Col. VIII. 15ff.

[115] Order and arrangement are stressed at *ibid.*, Col. XXI. 3, XVI. 24f., (διοίκησις); XV. 3, XXVII. 26 (διοικεῖν); XVI. 36, XX. 37 (οἰκονομία). Often, of course, the terms have the usual senses previously noted: οἰκονομία, "household management," *passim*; once ἡ φιλόσοφος οἰκονομία, "scientific household management," II. 10 (p. 20); the verb οἰκονομεῖν, "to arrange an οἶκος," XVI. 32, 44.; "arrange wealth," XIV. 29; and "engage in household management," VI. 18; and ἡ οἰκονομική, "housecraft," (as in Ps.-Arist.) VII. 47, VIII. 4.

[116] As a stock virtue, *oikonomikos* appears in the horoscope predictions of various astrological manuscripts. Cf. *Catalogue Codicum Astrologorum*

Zeno (335-263 B.C.), founder of Stoicism, characterized the good man as being, among other things, inclined to household management.[117]

Graecorum, Vol. 8, Part I, Codicum Parisinorum (ed. F. Cumont; Brussels, 1929), p. 166, line 11; Vol. 10, Codices Athenienses (ed. A. Delatte, 1924), p. 105, line 16, and 229, line 26; and Vol. 12, Codices Rossicos (ed. M.A.F. Sangin, 1936), p. 183, lines 32f.; 185, lines 2 and 27; 186, line 22; 188, line 3; and 189, line 10.

[117] Stob. Ecl. 2. 7. 11g. (p. 99, 3W), in J. von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta (4 vols.; Leipzig, 1905-1924) (cited hereafter as "SVF"), 1, 52, 25-27 and 53, 8-12 (frag. 216): ἀρέσκει γὰρ τῷ τε Ζήνωνι καὶ τοῖς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ Στωικοῖς φιλοσόφοις δύο γένη τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων, τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων· ... εὐδαίμων δέ ἐστιν μάλιστα καὶ εὐτυχὴς καὶ μακάριος καὶ ὄλβιος καὶ εὐσεβὴς καὶ θεοφιλὴς καὶ ἀξιωματικός, βασιλικός τε καὶ στρατηγικὸς καὶ πολιτικὸς καὶ οἰκονομικὸς καὶ χρηματιστικός. τοὺς δὲ φαύλους ἅπαντα τούτοις ἐναντία ἔχειν. "For Zeno and the Stoic philosophers descended from him are satisfied that there are two types of men, the good and the bad. . . . The former is especially prosperous and fortunate and blessed and happy and pious and god-fearing and very dignified, both inclined to rule and hold military office, and politically inclined and inclined to household management and to business. But the bad are completely contrary to these things." Von Arnim, SVF 3, 150, 16-19 (frag. 567), in Stob. Ecl. 2. 7 (p. 99, 9W), also assigns this same passage, or a part of it, to Chrysippus; the idea is a common one in the Stoic tradition, though it may be uncertain exactly how many Stoic teachers these words are to be attributed to specifically.

Chrysippus (c. 280-207 B.C.), who succeeded Cleanthes as head of the Stoa, stressed oikonomia too as a quality of the Stoic "virtuous man"; thus in his Ethics, presumably in a chapter on the point that the wise man is versed in political and economic matters, Chrysippus wrote that

> they say the good man alone is inclined to household management (οἰκονομικόν) and is a good household manager (οἰκονόμον), and is further a man of business. For ability in household management (οἰκονομικὴν... ἕξιν) is a contemplative and practical skill concerning those things which are expedient for a household; and household management (οἰκονομίαν) is an arrangement concerned with expenditures and tasks and has to do with the care of possessions and of those who work on the land. And skill in business affairs means experience in acquisition of money. . . . But no wicked man becomes a good protector of a household, nor is he able to provide a household which is well managed (εὖ οἰκονομουμένην).[118]

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[118] Stob. Ecl. 2. 95. 9w, SVF 3, 159f., (frag. 623). Von Arnim in his reconstruction of the Ethica assumes Book IX, where he places this fragment, concerned "The Wise Man and the Foolish Man," and this is the seventh of 15 subsections, on the proposition, "The wise man is versed in political and economic matters." οἰκονομικὸν δ᾽ εἶναι μόνον λέγουσι τὸν σπουδαῖον καὶ ἀγαθὸν οἰκονόμον, ἔτι δὲ χρηματιστικόν. τὴν μὲν γὰρ οἰκονομικὴν εἶναι θεωρητικὴν ἕξιν καὶ πρακτικὴν τῶν οἴκω συμφερόντων· τὴν δ᾽ οἰκονομίαν διάταξιν περὶ ἀναλωμάτων καὶ ἔργων καὶ κτήσεως ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ τῶν κατ᾽ ἀγρὸν ἐργαζομένων. τὴν δὲ χρηματιστικὴν ἐμπειρίαν περιποιήσεως, χρημάτων ἀφ᾽ ὧν δέον καὶ ἕξιν ὁμολογουμένως ἀναστρέφεσθαι ποιοῦσαν ἐν συναγωγῇ χρημάτων καὶ τηρήσει καὶ ἀναλώσει πρὸς εὐπορίαν· τὸ δὲ χρηματίζεσθαι τινες μὲν μέσον εἶπον εἶναι τινὲς δὲ ἀστεῖον. φαῦλον δὲ μηδένα προστάτην ἀγαθὸν οἴκου γίνεσθαι, μηδὲ δύνασθαι οἰκίαν εὖ οἰκονομουμένην παρασχεῖν.

Still another passage attributed to Chrysippus' Ethics includes an οἰκονομικὴ ἕξις in a listing of virtues and defines it as "a habit or skill, theoretical and practical, concerned with things expedient for a household."[119] What is true of other philosophers thus is true of Stoics too: household management has a place.

Small wonder, then, in view of all this interest that Seneca, in the first century A.D., having listed the usual three parts of philosophy, moral, natural, and rational, added:

> Certain of the Peripatetic School have added a fourth division, 'civil philosophy,' because it calls for a special sphere of activity and is interested in a different subject matter. Some have added a department for which they use the Greek term οἰκονομική the science of managing one's household.[120]

Though Seneca himself preferred to put such subdivisions under moral philosophy, oikonomia as the science of household management was, if anything, more vigorous than ever in the first-century world, sometimes appearing as a separate department of philosophy.

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[119] Andronicus περὶ παθῶν (ed. Schuchardt, pp. 20f), SVF 3, 65, 35 (frag. 267): οἰκονομικὴ δὲ ἕξις θεωρητικὴ ⟨καὶ πρακτικὴ⟩ τῶν οἴκῳ συμφερόντων.

[120] Sen. Ep. 89. 10, "On the Parts of Philosophy": . . . Quidem adiecerunt his partem, quam οἰκονομικὴν vocant, administrandae familiaris rei scientiam. By moral philosophy, Seneca means that which "keeps the soul in order"; by natural philosophy, that which "investigates the universe"; and by rational philosophy or logic, that which investigates word meanings and combinations especially.

The oikonomos must have been a familiar figure in that world. A fable by Phaedrus (c. 15 B.C. - A.D. 50) pictures him as a slave supervising farm workers,[121] and Varro refers to him as "the governor who is put in charge of agricultural operations" on a farm.[122] Philotimus appears as steward from time to time in the writings of Cicero, managing his affairs.[123] One historian tells how an oikonomos in Sicily who normally had 200 men at work under him inspired five times that many slaves to a revolt.[124] Brutus was reproached by his enemies because one of his ancestors was said to have been a steward's son (οἰκονόμου υἱός).[125] The papyri, as we shall see in the next chapter, are full of references to house managers and their tasks. Oikonomoi of all kinds and sorts there must have been in the first-century world— rural, urban, talented, generous, petty, vindictive, and in many cases greedy and stingy. And so it is not surprising that Numenius, a bit later (c. A.D. 150 - 200), offhandedly refers to this latter type as ὁ λεγόμενος οἰκονομικός, "the proverbial household manager."[126]

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[121] Phaedrus Fables 2. 8. A stag takes refuge in a stable, and none of the workmen notices him. "Even the household manager passes by but does not notice anything" (transit etiam vilicus, nec ille quicquam sentit). But the master does see him and has the stag killed— signifying what must have been often the case: the master has sharper eyes for his own affairs than any hired manager or slave does. A. Brenot, Phèdre, Fables, (Paris: Budé, 1924), 29, notes that it goes without saying all the personnel employed at the villa were slaves.

[122] Varro Rerum Rusticarum Libri III, written in 37 B.C., edited by Goetz (Leipzig, 1929), as cited in Wettstein, op. cit. (supra 5, note 1), sub voce, "Varro vocat principem, qui agriculturae praeponitur."

[123] Cic. Att. 11. 1. 1 (48 B.C.) refers to Philotimus qui eas [res domesticas] dispensavit for him; i.e., managed his private affairs as house steward.

[124] Diod. Sic. 36. 5. 1 (ed. L. Dindorf, Diodori Bibliotheca Historica (Leipzig, 1868), 5, 130): ἐνόσει πρὸς ἀπόστασιν τὰ πλήθη τῶν οἰκετῶν. γίνεται δὲ τούτων ἀρχηγὸς Ἀθηνίων ὄνομα, ἀνὴρ ἀνδρείᾳ διαφέρων, Κίλιξ τὸ γένος. οὗτος οἰκονόμος ὢν δυοῖν ἀδελφῶν μεγαλοπλούτων, καὶ τῆς ἀστρομαντικῆς πολλὴν ἔχων ἐμπειρίαν, ἔπεισε τῶν οἰκετῶν πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς ὑφ' ἑαυτὸν τε-

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ταγμένους περὶ διακοσίους ὄντας, ἔπειτα τοὺς γειτνιῶντας, ὥστε ἐν πέντε ἡμέραις συναχθῆναι πλείους τῶν χιλίων. Here Diodorus describes a slave revolt, led in the area near Marsala, in Sicily, by an oikonomos of two wealthy brothers. The oikonomos, a Cilician, normally had two hundred men under him and was skilled at astral prophecies. In 102 B.C., he roused over 1000 slaves to revolt in 5 days.

[125] Plut. Brut. 1. 4 (Vit. 984D).

[126] Numenius, The Revolt of the Academics against Plato, a fragment preserved by Euseb. Praep. Evang. 14. 7 (734a 7), reprinted in FPG, 3, 153ff. He described Lacydes, a successor to Plato as president of the New Academy from 241-215 B.C., as "rather stingy and in a manner the proverbial economist; for this man, who was in such general good repute, used to open his storeroom himself and shut it himself." E.H. Gifford in his edition Evangelica Praeparatio (4 vols. in 5; Oxford, 1903) 4, 484, says, rightly, the phrase "seems to have become proverbial." ἦν μὲν δὴ Λακύδης ὑπογλισχρότερος, καί τινα τρόπον ὁ λεγόμενος οἰκονομικός, οὗτος ὁ εὐδοκιμῶν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς, αὐτὸς μὲν ἀνοιγνὺς τὸ ταμεῖον, αὐτὸς δ' ἀποκλείων.

2. *Oikonomia* and its Related Terms
Applied to a Larger Household, in the State

In Chapter Two we deal with *oikonomia* and its related terms applied by extension to *the management of a larger household— the ordering, administration, and care of an army or military matters, or of a city or a society or political affairs, especially*, since the term often had commercial or business connotations, *with reference to financial affairs or administration*.

Here οἰκονομία means the art or science of managing such a household larger than an estate; οἰκονομεῖν means to manage or arrange affairs connected with this household; and ὁ οἰκονόμος is the manager or administrator in such a position, often with well-defined and specific functions in the larger οἶκος which is to be cared for. The terms διοικεῖν, ἡ διοίκησις, and ὁ διοικητής are especially to be noted here with reference to financial matters.

We have already observed something of the lines of development from the original meaning of "household management" which lead to these further applications in military, political, and commercial life: the term "household" had been construed from the outset in broad terms; an amazing variety of subjects was included in the handbooks about *oikonomia*; and often the topic spilled over to deal with money-making and business matters. Moreover, there was a natural tendency, we have seen, for writers to compare and relate *oikonomia* by extension to larger households in human society. Thus Plato, we noted, had assumed that the sciences of household management (οἰκονομική), city administration, and kingship are really one and the same, differing only in the size of the *oikos* involved.[1] Aristotle, though admitting a connection, denied that these were quite the same, for he argued that the different types of government (*politikos*, *basilikos*, *oikonomikos*, *despotikos*) differ not only in the size of the *oikos* and number of people ruled, but also in the *type* of government involved;[2] even he, however, in speaking of an absolute monarchy could describe it as household management (οἰκονομία) over a city, a race, or several races.[3]

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[1] *Politicus* 259C; *supra*, 169, note 43.

The prevailing view in the ancient world came to be, therefore, that there is a connection between management of a simple household or estate and the administration of a city-state, an army, or nation, as a large-scale household, and this view, which appealed especially to the Stoics, may be documented, for example, in the fragments from Chrysippus (*c*. B.C. 280-207), preserved, significantly, in Philo of Alexandria.[4] Philo here in dealing with the period Joseph spent as a steward (ἐπίτροπος) in Egypt holds this was beneficial for the future statesman (πολιτικός), who must first be trained and practiced in household management (τὰ κατ' οἰκονομίαν); for, he goes on, evidently quoting Chrysippus, "a household is a city-state compressed into small dimensions, and household management (οἰκονομία) is a sort of epitome of state government, just as a city-state is also a great house, and state management is a public household management of sorts (οἰκονομία). From these facts it is quite clear that the same man is both adept at household management (οἰκονομικόν) and equipped for state administration, even though the magnitude and size of the objects under consideration differ."[5] Similarly, again following Chrysippus, he writes that household management is "a special instance of statecraft on a small scale, since statecraft and household management (οἰκονομία) are related virtues which, it would not be amiss to show, are, as it were, interchangeable, both because statecraft is household management in the state, and because household management is statecraft in the home."[6] In spite, therefore, of the old distinction about size, *oikonomia* and *politeia* are related so that one can speak of household and state management as "the offspring of the same virtue, as equals in species, yet unequals in magnitude, as house and state."[7] And thus the way was open for applying *oikonomia* to the care, administration, and management of larger units in human society than an estate. We turn first to examples of this application in the military household or army.

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[2] *Pol*. 1. 1. 2ff.; *supra*, 173ff., notes 51-53.

[3] *Ibid*., 3. 10. 2; *supra*, 179, note 65.

[4] Attribution of these Stoic passages in Philo specifically to Chrysippus is on the strength of their assignment to him by von Arnim in *SVF*. Philo appears here to use *oikonomia* and kindred terms in exactly the same way as the Stoics did, suggesting that any significant uses the words have in the Stoics may also appear in Philo as a bridge to patristic usage— thus, future examination of Philo is called for.

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[5] Philo *De Josepho* 38, *SVF* 3, 80, 13-16 (*frag*. 323): οἰκία γὰρ πόλις ἐστὶν ἐσταλμένη καὶ βραχεῖα καὶ οἰκονομία συνηγμένη τις πολιτεία, ὡς καὶ πόλις μὲν οἶκος μέγας, πολιτεία δὲ κοινή τις οἰκονομία. δι᾽ ὧν μάλιστα παρίσταται τὸν αὐτὸν οἰκονομικόν τε εἶναι καὶ πολιτικόν, κἂν τὰ πλήθη καὶ μεγέθη τῶν ὑποκειμένων διαλλάττῃ.

[6] Philo *Quaest*. *in Gen*. 4. 165, *SVF* 3, 160, 8-11 (*frag*. 624). This Philo passage, not extant in Greek, but preserved in Armenian, is found in Aucher's older Latin translation, p. 372, and in the recent English translation by Ralph Marcus in the Loeb Library, *Philo*, *Supplement I*, *Questions and Answers on Genesis* (London, 1953), 450f., whose translation I quote. Marcus himself assumes that the Greek word underlying the Armenian here is οἰκονομία. The Latin translation printed in *SVF* reads: unum enim istorum oeconomicum est et urbanitatis exiguae comprehensio; quoniam urbanitas et oeconomia cognatae sunt virtutes, quas translatas fere inter se monstrare non frustra erit: urbanitas namque oeconomia urbis est et oeconomia urbanitas est domi.

Military Usage

As early as Xenophon, the importance of *oikonomia*, the proper arrangement and management of supplies and military matters, is indicated for a general in charge of an army. Cyrus, for example, discussing, in Xenophon's account, the points which must not be neglected in military science and ultimately in ruling the state, describes an incompetent instructor in generalship under whom he had once studied; this teacher told him about tactics but had not instructed him in health and strength, or about enthusiasm in reviewing troops, or on how to secure obedience, or about *oikonomia*. This professional teacher, Cyrus's father reminded him, "did not even make any mention of domestic economy (οἰκονομίας) among the duties of generalship, did he? But soldiers need supplies no less than the servants in your household."[8] Therefore this man was a poor instructor because he did not include *oikonomia* as part of what the ideal general should know.

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[7] Philo *De animalibus adv. Alexandrum* (Aucher's Latin translation of the Armenian, p. 168), *SVF* 2, 209, 26-28 (*frag*. 733): unius enim utraque virtutis proles, etsi sub specie pares, impares tamen magnitudine, ut domus et civitas. *De animalibus* is one of the Armenian fragments of Philo still not translated in the Loeb volumes; cf. E.G. Goodenough's review of Marcus, *Philo Supplement*, in *JBL* 73 (1954), 171.

[8] Xen. *Cyr*. 1. 6. 12: Ἆρα ἐν τοῖς στρατηγικοῖς καὶ οἰκονομίας τί σοι ἐπεμνήσθη ὁ ἀνήρ· οὐδὲν μέντοι ἧττον οἱ στρατιῶται τῶν ἐπιτηδείων δέονται ἢ οἱ ἐν οἴκῳ οἰκέται.

Socrates is likewise depicted by Xenophon arguing in the *Memorabilia* that οἰκονομική ability is characteristic of a good general, that good managers or, the term almost implies, men who do well in private business (οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οἰκονόμοι) will do well in public affairs and will make good generals.[9] This is because such managers are capable of supplying the needs of men and of finding the best experts for each task— such is the way of administrative ability (ἡ οἰκονομικὴ [sc. τέχνη]). But one listener, Nicomachides, objects that he does not see how such administrative or business ability will help when it comes to fighting. Socrates replies: "There it will surely be most helpful. For the man skilled at administration and business (ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς οἰκονόμος), through his knowledge that nothing profits or pays like a victory in a field, . . . will be eager to seek and furnish all aids to victory." Then Xenophon's Socrates goes on significantly:

> Do not scorn these business men, Nicomachides. For the care of private affairs differs from that of public affairs only in regard to number. In other respects, they are very much alike, and especially in this regard: that neither can be carried on without men, and the men employed in private and public affairs are the same. For those who care for public affairs do not employ any men of a different sort than those whom the men who manage their own private affairs (οἱ τὰ ἴδια οἰκονομοῦντες) employ; and those who know how to employ them are successful directors of both public and private concerns, and those who do not, fail in both.[10]

Verhoeven, 116, especially suggests the importance of the military applications of *oikonomia* for the extension of its usage.

[9] *Mem.* 3. 4. 1-12, especially 7, 11 and 12.

[10] *Ibid.*, 3. 4. 11. 12: ἐνταῦθα δήπου καὶ πλεῖστον, ἔφη· ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς οἰκονόμος, εἰδὼς ὅτι οὕτω λυσιτελές τε καὶ κερ-

In other words, there are common standards of efficiency and ability in both private business and public affairs, and the man who is adept at oikonomia can be a success at either, and also at leading an army, to return to Socrates' original point. One is reminded, in this emphasis upon managerial ability common to all these "households," of the example Xenophon had used, when in the Oeconomicus Ischomachus was impressing the importance of order (taxis) on his wife: a well-run house should have everything neatly stored in place with the efficiency of a Phoenician ship.[11] Now, to reverse the figure, a good general, or political leader, should order things as precisely as they are on a well-run estate!

This application of oikonomia to management or arrangement of military affairs continued on down into Hellenistic and Roman times, becoming an especially favorite word of Polybius (c. 202-120 B.C.). Thus, for example, he quotes what is apparently the fragment of a speech from a Macedonian orator about 200 B.C. "What is now happening is most like the arranging and handling (οἰκονομίᾳ καὶ χειρισμῷ) of an army's battle arrays."[12] The same pair of words— and we shall also find them used for

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δαλέον ἐστὶν ὡς τὸ μαχόμενον τοὺς πολεμίους νικᾶν...
προθύμως μὲν τὰ πρὸς τὸ νικᾶν συμφέροντα ζητήσει καὶ παρα-
σκευάσεται. ... μὴ καταφρόνει, ἔφη, ὦ Νικομαχίδη, τῶν οἰκονο-
μικῶν ἀνδρῶν· ἡ γὰρ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιμέλεια πλήθει μόνον διαφέρει
τῆς τῶν κοινῶν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα παραπλήσια ἔχει, τὸ ⟨δὲ⟩ μέγιστον,
ὅτι οὔτε ἄνευ ἀνθρώπων οὐδετέρα γίγνεται οὔτε δι' ἄλλων
μὲν ἀνθρώπων τὰ ἴδια πράττεται, δι' ἄλλων δὲ τὰ κοινά·
οὐ γὰρ ἄλλοις τισὶν ἀνθρώποις οἱ τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμελόμενοι
χρῶνται ἢ οἷσπερ οἱ τὰ ἴδια οἰκονομοῦντες· οἷς οἱ ἐπιστά-
μενοι χρῆσθαι καὶ τὰ ἴδια καὶ τὰ κοινὰ καλῶς πράττουσιν,
οἱ δὲ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι ἀμφοτέρωθι πλημμελοῦσι.

[11] Xen. Oec. 8. 8-9, 11-23.

[12] Polyb. 10. 25. 2: εἶναι γὰρ τὸ νῦν γινόμενον ὁμοιότατον
τῇ περὶ τὰς παρατάξεις οἰκονομίᾳ καὶ χειρισμῷ.

the "arranging and handling" of literary material[13]— is also used by Polybius in describing the arrangement of an army in the Roman military system: "When the allies have also been collected together with the Romans, their organization and handling (τὴν οἰκονομίαν καὶ τὸν χειρισμόν) are undertaken by officers appointed by the consuls, known as praefecti sociorum and twelve in number."[14]

Carried a bit further in the same writer, oikonomia comes also to refer to the conduct of operations in the field by an army, as when Polybius writes, "Concerning preparations for war and general conduct of field campaigns (τῆς ἐν ὑπαίθροις οἰκονομίας), [the Roman consuls] have almost absolute power."[15] Similarly he can speak of the Romans' "arrangement or conduct of operations concerning assaults on cities (ἡ περὶ τὰς τῶν πόλεων καταλήψεις οἰκονομία)."[16] Finally, in another military application, Polybius also uses the term to refer to the "distribution of booty" after an enemy is overcome; thus he writes of the "arrangement" or distribution of spoils (ἡ οἰκονομία τῶν λαφύρων) several times;[17] and "the disposal (οἰκονομία) of captured ships and men."[18] Plainly oikonomia was a convenient and not uncommon word for the management of an army and the administration of various military matters.

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[13] Ibid., 5. 31. 7. See infra, 329, note 63.

[14] 6. 26. 5: ἀθροισθέντων δὲ καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ὁμοῦ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις, τὴν μὲν οἰκονομίαν καὶ τὸν χειρισμὸν ποιοῦνται τούτων αὐτῶν οἱ καθεσταμένοι μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ὑπάτων ἄρχοντες, προσαγορευόμενοι δὲ πραίφεκτοι, δώδεκα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντες.

[15] 6. 12. 5: καὶ μὴν περὶ πολέμου κατασκευῆς καὶ καθόλου τῆς ἐν ὑπαίθροις οἰκονομίας σχεδὸν αὐτοκράτορα τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἔχουσι.

[16] 10. 16. 2: ἔστι δὲ παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις τοιαύτη τις ἡ περὶ τὰς τῶν πόλεων καταλήψεις οἰκονομία.

[17] The phrase is used, after the fall of a city, at 2. 2. 9 and 11, and 4. 86. 4.

[18] 1. 61. 8: ἡ τῶν αἰχμαλώτιον πλοίων καὶ τῶν σωμάτων οἰκονομία;

Political Applications

Oikonomia and its related terms also, however, took on further meanings, by extension to the management or administration of another type of "household," the polis or city-state. Here, in a quite natural way, these terms were applied to political management of a state, the governmental household concerned being of varying sizes, ranging from the polis of Athens to the Persian or Roman Empires.

Application of the words and ideas to these larger units grew inevitably from the usages in household management and the army, at which we have already looked. In a passage that suggests a relation to the military usages, Xenophon describes Cyrus pondering over his vast empire, "how the details of administration (τὰ οἰκονομικά) might go well and there might be the desired leisure" for himself; then he remembered the efficient organization of his army, each subordinate responsible to some higher-up, so that every function is cared for, but the commander-in-chief need issue commands only to his immediate assistants; just as, therefore, he had the army organized, "so also Cyrus centralized the administrative activities (συνεκεφαλαιώσατο τὰς οἰκονομικὰς πράξεις)," thus enabling himself to enjoy more leisure than one who has care of a single household (oikia) or ship.[19]

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cf. 10. 40. 1: ἡ τούτων [10,000 foot and 2,000 horsemen] οἰκονομία.

[19] Xen. Cyr. 8. 1. 14f.: οὕτω δὴ σκοπῶν, ὅπως ἄν τά τε οἰκονομικὰ καλῶς ἔχοι καὶ ἡ σχολὴ γένοιτο, κατενόησέ πως τὴν στρατιωτικὴν σύνταξιν.... ὥσπερ οὖν ταῦτ᾽ ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ ὁ Κῦρος συνεκεφαλαιώσατο τὰς οἰκονομικὰς πράξεις. Cf. Eph. 1: 10.

Aristotle also had applied the term oikonomia to an absolute monarchy over a city or a race because of the type of government it involved, it may be recalled,[20] but the word was not restricted to large empires or to such absolutist governments. This same word in the phrase αἱ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν οἰκονομίαι was applied to the administrations of a democratic Greek city-state in the late fourth century B.C. by the orator Dinarchus.[21] And this type of application provided an important meaning for the word group down into Roman times, the arranging or administration of political affairs in all sorts of governments.

Polybius provides a series of examples from the second century B.C. He uses the verb oikonomein to describe both military and political arrangements made by Philip V of Macedon,[22] or to refer to the Aetolian magistrates making political arrangements or agreements.[23] The passive participle τὰ οἰκονούμενα, "the arrangements," has to do with the administration of political affairs and the way in which they were conducted by an embassy of the Achaean League.[24] And once, young Hiero, later king of Syracuse, is described as "naturally qualified for royal and state political administration (εὐφυῆ βασιλικῆς καὶ πραγματικῆς οἰκονομίας)."[25]

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[20] Arist. Pol. 3. 10. 2 (1285b); supra, 179, note 65.

[21] Dinarchus Orationes (ed. F. Blass, 2nd ed.; Berlin, 1888), 1.97 (p. 43, lines 9ff.): ἔπειτα τὸν ἐν μὲν ταῖς πολεμικαῖς πράξεσιν ἄριστον γεγενημένον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν οἰκονομίαις ἄχρηστον, περιεορακότα δὲ τοὺς ἀντιπολιτευομένους ἅπαντα διαπεπραγμένους ὅσ᾽ ἐβουλήθησαν, μεταβεβλημένον δ᾽ αὐτὸν καὶ τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου πράξεις ἐγκαταλελοιπότα, τοῦτον περιποιῆσαι βουλήσεσθε; "Now the man who has been best in hostile actions but useless in the administrations connected with the city, who has overlooked the members of the opposition party doing whatever they wished, but who turned around and foresook the actions in behalf of the people— this man will you wish to save?"

[22] Polyb. 4. 67. 9: ταῦτα δ᾽ οἰκονομήσας ἀνέζευξε, καὶ προελθὼν κατεστρατοπέδευσε τῆς Φλιασίας περὶ τὸ Διοσκούριον. The passage occurs in an account of a winter campaign by Philip, who suddenly took his army through Thessaly, Euboea, Boeotia, and the Megarid, and seized Corinth; from there he sent messengers to the Achaean cities,

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telling them when and where to meet him in arms; the ταῦτα refers back to these military and political arrangements. With this use of οἰκονομήσας cf. the similar usage at II Macc. 3: 14 and III Macc. 3: 2.

[23] Ibid., 4. 26. 6: γνόντες δὲ παραγινόμενον, ἀπέστειλαν γραμματοφόρον διασαφοῦντες ὡς οὐ δύνανται πρὸ τῆς τῶν Αἰτωλῶν συνόδου δι' αὑτῶν οὐδὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων οἰκονομεῖν. During the negotiations in 220 B.C. with Philip V of Macedon, just prior to the Social War, the Aetolian magistrates were forced to set a date on which to meet with Philip, though they hoped he would not come; "but when they knew that he was coming, they sent a courier, informing him that they were unable, prior to the general assembly of the Aetolians, to arrange anything (or "make any political agreements") by themselves on behalf of the whole."

[24] Ibid., 24. 1. 7: οὐθενὶ δυσαρεστήσασα περὶ τῶν οἰκονουμένων ἡ σύγκλητος ἀπεδέξατο φιλανθρώπως τοὺς πρεσβευτάς. Book 24 (fragmentary; cf. Livy 40. 20) deals with various embassies received at Rome from Greece and the East in 182/81 B.C.; here, when Bippus of Argos and others sent by the Achaean League appeared to explain about steps taken for the restoration of order at Messene, "the Senate received the ambassadors courteously, expressing displeasure with no one for the arrangements (or "the conduct of the matter")."

[25] Ibid., 1. 8. 3: νέον μὲν ὄντα κομιδῇ, πρὸς δέ τι γένος εὐφυῆ

Other examples abound. To take one illustration from the inscriptions, a white marble stele at Pergamum, dated between 159 and 138 B.C., honors Andronicus for his services to the Kingdom of the Attalids, among other things ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὴν πολιτείαν οἰκονομίαις, "in the political arrangements concerning the state"— here referring to his expedient reforms and improvements in the kingdom and also to his embassies to Rome on behalf of the Attalids.[26] Philodemus makes mention of political administration (πολιτικὴ οἰκονομία) in the same breath with legislation and generalship as not alien to the wise man,[27] and in a broader, more

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βασιλικῆς καὶ πραγματικῆς οἰκονομίας. Hiero, in 275 B.C., is described as "being quite young, but naturally qualified for royal and state political administration of a kind."

[26] W. Dittenberger, Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae (2 vols.; Leipzig, 1903-05)(cited hereafter as "OGIS"), Number 322, lines 11ff. (Vol. 1, p. 495): ...τήν τε πατρίδα σπεύδων, ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῶι, διαφέρειν παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὴν πολιτείαν οἰκονομίαις, τὰ μὲν παραλελειμμένα εἰσηγησάμενος ἐπὶ τῶι συνφέροντι διώρθωσεν.... The inscription probably refers to the Andronicus who was twice sent to Rome as legate during the reign of Attalus II, c. 156/5 B.C., a period when Pergamum was Rome's "watchdog" in the East; it reads in part: Since the companion of the king has provided diligent services both to king and people and since "being zealous, in so far as is in him, to distinguish his native country in contrast to the other states, in the political arrangements concerning the state, he has remedied shortcomings by introducing beneficial correctives," the people have voted to him highest honors.

[27] Phld. Volumina Rhetorica (ed. S. Sudhaus; Berlin, 1896), Col. 36,

abstract sense a quotation of Chrysippus, preserved in Plutarch, uses *oikonomia* to refer to a "principle of government, just as in the city-states."[28] That this general political application continued into later Roman times is suggested by the comment in Herodian, the third-century A.D. historian, for example, that even though Alexander Severus was emperor in name and form, "the arrangement of affairs and the management of the government (ἡ μέν τοι διοίκησις τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ ἡ τῆς ἀρχῆς οἰκονομία) was being managed by the women."[29]

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lines 6-12 (Vol. II, p. 32): καὶ κατὰ [τ]ο[ῦθ᾽] ὁ ῥηθεὶς [καὶ ἀ]φυέ[ς τι μεθ]οδε[ύει, ὅτι [ζη]τ[ῶν], εἰ νο[μο]θεσίας ἢ στρα[τηγί]ας ἢ π[ολ]ιτικῆς οἰκ[ο]ν[ομί]ας ὁ σοφὸς ἀλλότριος, οὐδὲν εἶδέ πω τῶν σοφίας ἀγαθῶν. The first five lines of the column are extremely broken and the context is difficult to establish; the sense seems to be, however: "And according to this, the man mentioned also pursues something silly, because, in raising the question whether the wise man is alien to legislation or generalship or political administration, he is still unaware, I suppose, of the goods of wisdom."

[28] Plut. *De Stoic. repugn.* 35 (*Mor.* 1050E), *SVF* 2, 338, 5 (*frag.* 1176), assigned by von Arnim to the *Physica* of Chrysippus. Chrysippus here is quoted as saying "sometimes misfortunes happen to the good, not as to the wicked for the sake of punishment, but in accordance with another principle of government, just as it is in the cities (κατ᾽ ἄλλην οἰκονομίαν, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι)." LSJ, *sub voce*, gives the meaning "principles of government," and the reference ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι assumes an analogy to political life and use of οἰκονομία in this political sense. However, the context plainly shows Chrysippus' reference here is "principles of *divine* government," a further extension of the term; see *infra*, 427, note 59.

[29] Herodianus *Ab excessu divi Marci* (ed. K. Stavenhagen; Berlin, 1922),

It must not be assumed however, that, because some of these uses of oikonomia verge on the sense of "statecraft" or "principles of government," the word had become abstract or vague. On the contrary, the terms usually were quite specific and practical, having to do with political offices and functions directly related to the daily life of the average man. Inscriptions and the papyri offer abundant evidence of the usage of these terms for concrete "arrangements concerning the state or political matters." There is even, for instance, a derivative from the verb oikonomein coined to refer to a particular administrative act or arrangement, τὸ οἰκονόμημα, vouched for in at least two inscriptions, undoubtedly a "made" word, created in order to have a more specific term than the general substantive participle τὰ οἰκονούμενα.[30] Before, however, examining in detail some of the vast amount of evidence which shows how common oikonomia and its related terms

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6. 1. (p. 156): τὸ σχῆμα καὶ ὄνομα τῆς βασιλείας ἐκείνῳ περιέκειτο, ἡ μέν τοι διοίκησις τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ ἡ τῆς ἀρχῆς οἰκονομία ὑπὸ ταῖς γυναιξὶ διῳκεῖτο.

[30] Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum (ed. A. Böckh and others; Berlin, 1825-77), 2737a. 20 (Vol. 2, p. 493)(cited hereafter as CIG), (OGIS, 453. 19): Σόλων Δημητρίου ὑμέτερος πρεσβευτὴς ἐπιμελέστατα πεφροντικὼς τῶν τῆς πόλεως ὑμῶν πραγμάτων οὐ μόνον ἠρκέσθη ἐπὶ τοῖς γεγονόσιν οἰκονο[μή]μασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡμᾶς παρεκάλεσεν εἰς τὸ τοῦ γεγονότος ὑμεῖν ἐπικρίματος καὶ δόγματος καὶ ὁρκίου καὶ νόμου ἀντιπεφωνημένα ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων δέλτων ἐξαποστεῖλαι ὑμεῖν τὰ ἀντίγραφα.
The inscription records a letter from M. Antonius, between 39 and 35 B.C., to the people of Plarasa and Aphrodisias, in Caria; it reads, in part, "Solon, son of Demetrius, your ambassador, having most carefully taken thought for the affairs of your city, not only was satisfied at the acts of administration which have come to pass, but also exhorted us to send you from the public records copies of the replies made to the decree, the resolution, the oath, and the law passed by you."

were in a political sense for men of the Hellenistic and Roman periods, we must first pause to note the financial connotation these terms often took on in their political applications.

The Financial Emphasis

From the very beginning, of course, there was an element of shrewdness and business acumen in _oikonomia_— the very term implied _efficient_, _successful_ household management. In Xenophon already, _oikonomikos_ sometimes suggests being skilled or adept at business and finance, and this element in the idea grew, as we have seen, in the popular Greek understanding of

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Inscriptiones Graecae (Berlin: George Reimer, 1916), 1099. 16ff. (Vol. 2/3, editio minor, part 1, fasc. 2, p. 509) (cited hereafter as _IG_): Πλωτεῖνα σεβαστὴ πασι τοῖς φίλοις χαίρειν. [ἔ]χομεν οὗ τυχεῖν ἐσπεύδομεν· συνκεχώρηται γὰρ τῷ διαδόχῳ, ὃς ἂν μέλλῃ τῆς Ἐπικούρου διαδοχῆς ἀφηγεῖσθαι τῆς οὔσης ἐν Ἀθήναις, καὶ παν τὸ πρὸς τὴν διαδοχὴν ἀν[ῆ]κον οἰκονόμημα Ἑλληνικῇ διαθήκῃ διατάσσεσθαι καὶ αἱρεῖσθαι εἴτε Ἕλληνα εἴτε Ῥωμαῖον βούλοιτο τὸν προστατήσοντα τῆς διαδοχῆς. The inscription, early second century A.D., found near the horologium of Andronicus in Athens, is a letter from Plotina, wife of the Emperor Trajan to the Athenian Epicureans, and deals with the problem of selecting the line of succession for the Epicurean school. Two letters in Latin on the same subject begin the inscription; then this one in Greek reads in part: "Plotina Augusta, to all her friends, greetings. We have what we were anxious to get; for it has been granted to the successor, whoever may be going to continue the existing Epicurean succession in Athens, both to set in order by the Greek disposition the whole administrative matter (or matter of arrangement) relative to the succession, and to choose the man who is to head the succession, Greek or Roman, as he may prefer."

the concept.[31] Aristotle had called someone managing the funds of a city-state carefully "a steward of the state" (τις διοικῶν οἰκονόμος),[32] and the Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise we know as Book II of the Oeconomica had brought the notion of money-making, by fair means or foul, on the part of a state, to the fore.[33]

To this must be added the fact that, occasionally at least, the word oikonomia had the sense of "business arrangements" or "commercial, financial negotiations," as when Polybius says, in describing Tarentum as the only real harbor between Greece and Sicily, that "in this city are made the barters and commercial arrangements (τὰς οἰκονομίας) for all those who inhabit this side of Italy."[34]

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[31] Xen. Ages. 10. 1: ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπαινῶ Ἀγησίλαον· ταῦτα γὰρ οὐχ ὥσπερ εἰ θησαυρῷ τις ἐντύχοι, πλουσιώτερος μὲν ἂν εἴη, οἰκονομικώτερος δ᾽οὐδὲν ἄν. "I therefore praise Agesilaus with regard to such qualities. These are not, as it were, characteristic of the type of man who, if he should find a treasure, would be more wealthy, but in no sense wiser in business acumen."

[32] Pol. 5. 9. 11 (1314b 8); cf. supra, 179, note 66. Cf. also the phrase in Cic. Planc. 25. 62., where he states that in buying a slave to serve as vilicus or household manager, "the only qualities we care about in him are frugality, industry, and vigilance; thus the Roman people selects its magistrates, stewards, as it were, of the republic" (nihil in eo nisi frugalitatem, laborem, vigilantiam esse curamus, sic populus Romanus deligit magistratus quasi rei publicae vilicos).

[33] Supra, 185ff.

[34] Polyb. 10. 1. 5: ὥστε καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ Σικελίας καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος φερομένους, ἐπί τινα τόπον τῶν προειρημένων κατ᾽ἀνάγκην ὁρμεῖν ἐν τοῖς τῶν Ταραντίνων λιμέσι, καὶ τὰς ἀμείψεις

Finally note that the related root dioikein comes to take on specific financial connotations. At times this verb meant, of course, nothing more than to administer or manage the public affairs generally of a city, as for example, in Aristophanes (τὰ τῆς πόλεως διοικεῖν),[35] or to administer and manage private business affairs or property.[36] Likewise dioikēsis

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καὶ τῆς οἰκονομίας πρὸς πάντας τοὺς κατέχοντας ταύτην τὴν πλευρὰν τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐν ταύτῃ ποιεῖσθαι τῇ πόλει. J. Schweighaeuser, Polybii Megalopolitani Historiarum quidquid superest (Leipzig, 1789-1795), 8, 402 defines οἰκονομίας here as "negotia, commercia, facere cum aliquo."

[35] Eccl. 303-305: ἀλλ' οὐχί, Μυρωνίδης
ὅτε ἦρχεν ὁ γεννάδας, οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐτόλμα
τὰ τῆς πόλεως διοικεῖν ἀργύριον φέρων.

"But no, when the noble Myronides was ruling,
No one would have dared to administer the affairs of the city,
While receiving money."

A contrast is implied between the heroic days of the past (c. 457 B.C.) when Myronides with a makeshift army had defeated the Corinthians and Boeotians, and conditions in Aristophanes' own day, when citizens were being paid 3 obels to attend the assembly and administer Athens' affairs! Dioikein in the sense of administer public affairs in government also occurs at Dinarchus II. 17; Arist. Pol. 1313a 35., "in this way the majority of tyrants administer the government (διοικοῦσιν... τὴν ἀρχήν)"; and OGIS 543. 13, 5. 16 and 17, and 48. 16.

[36] Dioikein, to manage or administer private affairs, at Dem. Or. 27. 66 (Against Aphobus I), "I, the most wretched of all men, am at a loss in two regards: how I may give a portion to this woman, and whence I may provide the other things (τἆλλ' ὁπόθεν διοικῶ"; Lycurgus 23 ("to conduct business affairs"); and Dinarchus frag. 66 (cf. frag. 69) ("to administer property").

meant sometimes the administration of one's own business affairs, and sometimes the general administration of a city or a province.[37] But more and more both *dioikein* and *dioikēsis*, as well as other derived terms, came to be applied especially to *financial* administration, to the accounting of money, and to offices concerned with fiscal matters, as the papyri and inscriptions particularly demonstrate.[38] Thus these words derived from

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[37] Cf. *RE* 5, 1, 787; *dioikēsis* is applied to the general administration of a state as distinct from the religious or temple administration, a separation found in both Greece and Egypt. The word is applied to the internal administration of a *polis* at Pl. *Prot*. 319D (ἡ διοίκησις τῆς πόλεως); to a larger political unit by Plut. *De Stoic. repugn*. 37 (*Mor*. 1051B), who speaks of a king committing the administration of his provinces (διοικήσεις) to evil and rash governors and captains (cf. *infra*, 424, note 56) and by Dion. Hal. *Ars Rhetorica* 5. 4. (ed. H. Usener and L. Radermacher, *Dionysii Halicarnasei Opuscula* (Leipzig, 1904), Vol. 2, Part 1, p. 275, line 9), who notes in regard to the method of address for the encomium of a governor (ἡγεμών): "If we also have certain previous activities of his to mention and previously held offices, either in the armed forces or in provincial administrations (ἐν διοικήσεσιν), these too must be added." Later *dioikēsis* came also to be used in the sense of the Latin *conventus*, the "arrangements" or jurisdictions into which the Romans subdivided southern Asia Minor for popular courts and assemblies (Strabo 13. 4. 12). It is possible that even in some of the examples cited in this note *dioikēsis* already has a financial connotation.

[38] Abundant examples in F. Preisigke, *Wörterbuch der griechischen Papyrusurkunden* (3 vols.; Berlin, 1925-29), 1, 386f. (cited hereafter as "Preisigke, *Wörterbuch*"). Further, in classical authors: Aeschines

dioikein were common from fairly early times in connection with city administration involving finance— as the Aristotelian study on *The Constitution of the Athenians* shows, a treatise on government which does not employ *oikonomia* or any words derived directly from it but which does include *dioikein* frequently.[39] What is more, these words from *dioikein* continued to have repeated use in later times in the same, financial sense.

We can expect little uniformity of usage in the precise terms employed for the financial administration of the various cities of the Hellenistic world. A.H.M. Jones reminds us that finance was often the weakest point

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2. 149, who uses ἡ κοινὴ διοίκησις, literally "the common administration," for the regular phrase ἡ διοίκησις τῆς πόλεως, "the department of the treasury"; Dem. *Or*. 24. 96 (*Against Timocrates*), ἔτι τοίνυν ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν διοίκησιν ἀναιρεῖ, τήν θ' ἱερὰν καὶ τὴν ὁσίαν. "Further, O men of Athens, he ruins the financial administration, both sacred and civil"; Hypereides, *frag*. 118, and Xen. *Hell*. 6. 1. 2.

[39] In this treatise, neither *oikonomia* nor *oikonomein*, nor *oikonomos* occur at all, but *dioikein* is cited 17 times, and *dioikēsis* twice, in the sense of administer, manage, or govern, according to the *index verborum* in John E. Sandys, *Aristotle's Constitution of Athens* (London, 1912), 270ff. Apparently none of the forms of οἰκονομ- were used in the official terminology of Athens and thus do not appear in the highly formalized language and vocabulary of Athenian official documents. *Tamias* is, of course, the common, classical Greek term for treasurer, occurring already in Homer; it does not occur in the New Testament or Apostolic Fathers at all, but reappears in its normal sense in later fathers; e.g., Basil the Great, *Ep*. 225 (to Demosthenes, A.D. 375), speaks of "the treasurers of the church funds" (οἱ ταμίαι τῶν ἱερῶν χρημάτων).

in such a polis — there were no real budgets and usually a minimum of centralization.[40] Nonetheless a series of examples from this period will show a surprising number of meanings which words from both oikonomein and dioikein came to have with reference to various financial and commercial aspects of political administration in a state.

An inscription from the island of Samos commends one Straton, an official of Ptolemy Philadelphus (285-247 B.C.), who was sent to the island to collect "the deposits of lawsuits" for Ptolemy, because this Straton, "by arranging (οἰκονομῶν matters well and justly, accomplishes the things for which he was sent, and in other regards shows himself well-intentioned and zealous towards the citizens" — i.e., he handled his fiscal post in the administration fairly enough to inspire the islanders to record this tribute.[41]

A long inscription before the Didymeion near Miletus in Asia Minor from the time of the Seleucid ruler Antiochus II Theos (261-246 B.C.) speaks several times of an oikonomos or "finance officer" named Nicomachus who plays an important part in the local administration, especially in financial matters, for the king. Dittenberger, who edited the text, describes such oikonomoi under the Seleucids as "magistrates who take care of the royal estates and of collecting moneys for the treasury of the king; there seems to have been one for each province (σατραπεία)."[42] The same inscription, however, also speaks at least three times of "Arridaeus, who manages the affairs of Laodicē," the queen (ὁ οἰκονομῶν τῆς Λαοδίκης), and the context indicates that he is no mere private *oikonomos*, but occupies an official position in the palace administration, and is especially concerned with the queen's property and finances.[43] *Oikonomoi* assigned with financial responsibilities of these and other types in political administration must have been common in the ancient world.

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[40] The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian (Oxford, 1940), 241.

[41] OGIS, 41. 6f. (Vol. 1, p. 66): ...ἐφ' ἃ τε ἀπεστάλη [καλῶς καὶ δικαίως οἰκονομῶν διατελεῖ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς εὔνουν καὶ πρόθυμον ἑαυτὸν παρέχεται τοῖς πολίταις.

[42] OGIS, 1, p. 360, note 32. The inscription is number 225 in Dittenberger's collection, and references to Νικόμαχος ὁ οἰκονόμος occur at

To take another example with slightly different significance, a decree carved on a marble stele by King Eumenes I, who ruled the Attalid Kingdom of Pergamum from 263 to 241 B.C., commends five generals for their successful administration of the government, and tells how these men have ruled justly; "both the public revenues of the state and the sacred revenues not only have they by themselves administered expediently for the people and for the gods (ὠικονομήκασι συμφερόντως τῶι δήμωι καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς, but also upon investigating things that were left deficient by the previous

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lines 6 and 37. Cf. Peter Landvogt, *Epigraphische Untersuchungen über den* ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΟΣ (*Ein Beitrag zum Hellenistischen Beamtenwesen*) (Strassburg: Dumont Schauberg, 1908) (cited hereafter as "Landvogt"), 29f., and also the discussion in C. Bradford Welles, *Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), 102, who dates the inscription 254/53 B.C. The Seleucid state was organized in a complex, detailed system, much like that in Ptolemaic Egypt; cf. A.H.M. Jones, *The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian* (Oxford, 1940), 20. The evidence, as we shall see, is much more complete for Egypt, however.

[43] *Ibid.*, lines, 3, 20, and 35; Arridaeus is mentioned in other inscriptions, cited by Dittenberger, as high in the power of the queen.

administrations, . . . they reestablished [them] for the city."[44] Here we have not only the use of the verb *oikonomein* with the specific meaning "to administer public and temple revenues," but the word is also connected with the adverb συμφερόντως, that note of expediency and proper efficiency which, we have seen, was so commonly admired by many Greeks as an essential ingredient of estate or political management. Note, too, that the public administration here involved is "for the people and *for the gods*"; there is a hint, even though the phrase may have become a mere traditional formality which had long since lost any real meaning, if, indeed, it ever had any, that perhaps such an office in political administration which dealt with funds and affairs of the *gods*, as well as of the state, had some *religious* connotation. Perhaps at times one might even speak of such a responsibility not only as a "stewardship for the state," but also as "stewardship for the gods."

Quite aside from such possibilities, it is undeniably clear that in Hellenistic times words derived from *oikonomein* took on a variety of new and specific meanings in political, fiscal usage. At least once the verb *oikonomein* may be cited with the meaning "to disburse funds"; a tablet at Athens tells how a judge in the year 161/60 B.C. "has made reports to the Mētroon [depository of records in Athens] and has given his accounts also to the auditors, concerning all these amounts which he has disbursed (ᾠκονόμηκεν)," the sum of 2,690 drachmae for games, sacrifices, and awards he spent in connection with his office.[45]

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[44] *OGIS*, 267. 6f. (Vol. 1, p. 420): ... καὶ τάς τε κοινὰς τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰς ἱερὰς προσόδους οὐ μόνον ἐφ' αὐτῶν ᾠκονομήκασι συμφερόντως τῶι δήμωι καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς.... Cf. *OGIS* 322. 11ff., *supra*, 216, note 26.

[45] W. Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum* (2nd ed., 3 vols.,

The noun oikonomia takes on the meaning of "the direction or administration of a fund," as when a citizen of Miletus c. 200 B.C. gave money for educating free children in a local school and set down precise stipulations "in order that the arrangement concerning these matters may attain its proper administration or regulation (τῆς προσηκούσης οἰκονομίας)."[46] Again, the same word can even mean "state revenue," "the regular annual revenues of a state," as in a third century B.C. inscription at Halicarnassus, which records the elaborate financial arrangements being made to repay men who had loaned money at no interest to erect a stoa in honor of Apollo and King Ptolemy. The inscription provides that, in addition to revenue from certain specific taxes being set aside to repay these men, "there is also pledged to them [the men who advanced loans without interest] out of the state revenue (ἐκ τῆς οἰκονομίας) each year a talent, whenever those men who have loaned money [i.e., other creditors from whom the state has secured loans] are provided for with reference to principal and interest on the basis of the six talents which have been pledged from the state revenue (ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκονομίας); but the rest is for the public revenue (εἰς τὴν οἰκονομίαν)."[47]

Leipzig, 1898-1901; 3rd ed., 4 vols., Leipzig, 1915-24) (cited hereafter as SIG^2 or SIG^3; here, 2nd ed.), 667. 20f. (Vol. 2, p. 238): καὶ περὶ ἁπάντων ὧν ᾠκονόμηκεν ἀπενήνοχεν λόγους εἰς τὸ μητρῷιον καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λογιστὰς καὶ τὰς εὐθύνας ἔδωκεν.

[46] Ibid., 577. 9f. (Vol. 2, p. 72): ἵνα δ' ἡ περὶ τούτων σύνταξις τυγχάνηι τῆς προσηκούσης οἰκονομίας, Εὔδημον μὲν διαγράψαι τὸ προειρημένον πλῆθος τῶν χρημάτων τοῖς ταμίαις τῶν ἐγκυκλίων....

[47] C.T. Newton, A History of Discoveries at Halicarnassus, Cnidus, and Branchidae (London, 1863), Vol. II, part II, Appendix III, Number 3, lines 13ff. (=OGIS, 46. 13ff.): ...ὑποκεῖσθαι δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐκ τῆς οἰκο-

Finally, a singular usage of the word oikonomia in the sense of "fair" or "market," ἡ περὶ τῶν ὠνίων οἰκονομία, literally "the arrangement about wares for sale," occurs in an inscription dated sometime after 129 B.C. from the temple of Artemis Leucophryena at Magnesia-on-the-Maeander. The inscription records the dedication of a statue of the goddess and the setting aside of a festival day forever to mark the occasion, including the stipulation: "and on this very day the market for wares is also to be held, after the year of the crownbearer Polycleides, which is also on the first day of the year."[48] The year, of course, takes its name from the man who

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νομίας ἑκάστου ἐνιαυτοῦ τάλαντον, ὅταν ἐκκομίσωνται αὐτὸ καὶ τὸν τόκον οἱ δανείσαντες ἐπὶ τοῖς ὑποτεθεῖσιν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκονομίας ἓξ ταλάντοις· τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ ὑπάρχειν εἰς τὴν οἰκονομίαν. The section has to do with the allocation of the general revenue (οἰκονομία) of the polis in its debt-reduction program; the first six talents of it are to go to repay creditors from whom the state has borrowed money at interest; another talent out of this general revenue is set aside to repay the men who have loaned money at no interest for building the stoa — their names are also to be carved on its portico to commemorate their public-spiritedness, and certain other taxes, specifically enumerated earlier, are also earmarked for retiring this debt; the rest of the talents are for the public revenue. Newton, op. cit., p. 692, translates οἰκονομία throughout as "general revenues"; LSJ, sub voce, gives "state revenues," and R. Dareste, in Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique 4 (1880), pp. 341ff. similarly takes it as "regular annual revenues of the state."

[48] SIG^2 552A. 34f. (Vol. 2, p. 243): ὑπάρχειν δὲ ἐν αὐτῆι ταύτηι τῆι ἡμέραι καὶ τὴν περὶ τῶν ὠνίων οἰκονομίαν μετὰ στεφανηφόρον Πολυκλείδην, ἥτις γίνεται καὶ ἐν τῆι πρώτηι ἡμέραι τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ.

held the office of "crownbearer" when the statue was dedicated, and Greek religious festivals often took on a commercial nature;[49] we have already seen that *oikonomiai* can suggest business arrangements or commercial negotiations.[50] This usage is a good example of how widely the word could be applied in the sense of "arrangement," here a commercial "arrangement" for selling household goods; it points the way to the tremendous spread of applications we shall examine in Chapter 3. Before turning to that, however, it may be noted that one line of this same inscription lists the officials in whose presence the annual festivities at Magnesia were to be held; along with the polemarch, the secretary of the council, the general, and others, is mentioned the *oikonomos*.[51] And in order to realize exactly how widespread this title was in political and financial administration in the ancient world, and how much a place such officials played in the daily lives of men, we look now at some of the many applications of the title which can be documented.

See now discussion in F. Sokolowski, *Lois sacrées de l'Asie Mineure* (École Francaise d'Athènes, Travaux et mémoires des anciens membres étrangers de l'école et de divers savants, 9; Paris, 1955), No. 33, pp. 92ff. English translation in F.C. Grant, *Hellenistic Religions* (New York, 1953), 19f.

[49] Cf., e.g., Strabo 10. 5. 4.: ἥ τε πανήγυρις ἐμπορικόν τι πρᾶγμά ἐστιν. "The general festival [at Delos] is a kind of commercial affair."

[50] *Supra*, 220, note 34.

[51] *SIG*^{2} 552A. 39: πολεμάρχων, οἰκονόμων, γραμματέως βουλῆς, στρατηγοῦ.... Note the plural. The *oikonomoi* appear here among a commission of officials at Magnesia who must be present at the cultic festival in robes of office. Cf. Landvogt, 32. Cf. also *SIG*^{2} 552B. 73 [23] ,

Specific Titles in Governmental Administration

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The terms *oikonomos* and *dioikētēs* as titles for particular officials in political administration, usually involving financial affairs, begin to appear at a surprisingly early date. One passage in Xenophon suggests such a title may have been in use in his day, at least in the Persian Empire; Cyrus, it was said, had the best servants (ὑπηρέται) for every task, "and if he should see some steward (οἰκονόμος) who was skillful in a just manner and who improved the territory of which he had charge and who made profits, he would never take anything away but would always add more" to his responsibility.[52] Inscriptional evidence from Greece and elsewhere suggests that *oikonomos* was employed for the title of a subordinate state official in the late fourth or third century B.C., and Peter Landvogt in a doctoral dissertation at Strassburg in 1908 has made a special study of this epigraphical evidence.[53] The noun *dioikētēs* is employed, at least by a later writer, to describe the manager of Alexander the Great's financial affairs,[54] and the verb *dioikein* may be shown to

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as emended by A. Wilhelm, *Beiträge zur griechischen Inschriftenkunde* (Vienna, 1909), 282, note 10, and reported in Sokolowski, *op. cit.* (*supra*, 229, note 48), p. 95.

[52] *An.* 1. 9. 19: εἰ δέ τινα ὁρῴη δεινὸν ὄντα οἰκονόμον ἐκ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ κατασκευάζοντά τε ἧς ἄρχοι χώρας καὶ προσόδους ποιοῦντα, οὐδένα ἂν πώποτε ἀφείλετο, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ πλείω προσεδίδου.

[53] P. Landvogt, *Epigraphische Untersuchungen über den* ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΟΣ (*Ein Beitrag zum Hellenistischen Beamtenwesen*) (Strassburg: Dumont Schauberg, 1908). Cited throughout as "Landvogt." Further *RE* 17, 2, 2118-2119 (article, "*oikonomos*").

[54] Plut. *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*, *Alexander* 7 (*Mor.* 179F). Cf. *RE* 5, 1, 791 (article, "διοικητής").

occur in inscriptions of his time with the sense of "put in charge, install in a government position."[55] Likewise the title ὁ ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει (or less often, with the genitive, ὁ ἐπὶ τῆς διοικήσεως), "the chief of the financial administration," is found at various cities, including Athens in the late fourth and early third centuries B.C., becoming more and more common thereafter.[56]

Drawing on a variety of sources, the inscriptions, the papyri, and secondary studies, we may now try to indicate how common all these terms were as specific titles in governmental administration in both city-states and Hellenistic empires. First we shall survey the findings of Landvogt on the term oikonomos for a general picture, then look at occurrences of these various titles in Asia Minor, other parts of the Greek world, and especially Egypt where the material is fullest. Next some evidence will be cited to show how these titles continued in use in Roman times, after the Hellenistic period. And finally, to complete the chapter, since the titles were employed in realms of life besides government which are larger than the individual household, evidence will be presented and findings summarized on the usage of these terms in guilds and social organizations and in religious activities, thus completing the chapter on applications in "households" bigger than a private estate.

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[55] E.g., OGIS, 4. 24, 25 (Vol. 1, p. 12).

[56] Cf. RE 5, 1, 786-790 (article, "διοίκησις"). Pollux 8. 113 characterizes the office thus: "ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς διοικήσεως was chosen to be in charge of the incomes and expenditures [of the state]." The title is found at Athens, where it seems to have begun to approach the idea of "finance minister," as well as in the Greek cities of Asia Minor; cf. A.H.M. Jones, The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian (Oxford, 1940), 241, and G. Busolt - H. Swoboda, Griechische Staatskunde (I. von Müller's Handbuch, Abt. 4, Pt. 1; 2 vols., 3rd ed.; Munich, 1920-26) (cited hereafter as "Busolt"), 1, 483 and 2, 1149f. Further examples of the title, beyond those cited there, at IG 2. 251 and 2². 667. Landvogt, 42, note 1, holds the title arose in Asia Minor; hence its use in the Seleucid Empire.

Administrative Titles in the Hellenistic World

It is in the period following the death of Alexander the Great that all these titles seem to have come into wider use, as Greek terms were applied during the era of the Diadochi to the host of officials necessary to administer in oriental splendor and with Greek efficiency the empires arising in the wake of Alexander's conquests. Doubtless much of the administrative structure of the older eastern empires continued under the Seleucids and Ptolemies; the terms with which we are concerned, being ready at hand, were now applied as titles for offices new and old, political, fiscal, and even military, in the hierarchy of government.

The designation oikonomos, our especial concern, is the easiest of all these titles to trace in this expanding application. While a few examples appear of oikonomoi in the service of a city-state as early as the fourth century,[57] the term becomes much more common in the third, and it is from the second and first centuries B.C. that material is richest; thereafter it continued in Roman times but on the decline, not so profusely.[58]

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[57] E.g., Lusoi, Greece, in Jahreshefte des Österreichischen Archäologischen Instituts 4 (1901), p. 65; Priene, H. von Gaertringen, Die Inschriften von Priene (Berlin, 1906), 6. 30; Ephesus, The Collection of Ancient Greek Inscriptions in the British Museum (London, 1874-1916), 3, 2, No. 469 (frag.).

[58] Landvogt, 9-12. The usual Latin equivalents in inscriptions in Roman times are dispensator, actor, and vilicus (ibid., 8, with examples cited).

Geographically the term appears earliest and most lushly in the Greek cities of Asia Minor, though there are also a few specimens from the same period in Greece proper; from these Asia Minor city-states, the term, taken over by the rising monarchies and spread, like other institutions, by the Diadochi, went into all the Hellenistic world, as examples will show, especially into Egypt.[59] Generally in the *polis* the *oikonomos* occupied a high and important office; in Seleucid and Ptolemaic empires his position was respected, if subordinate; later, the authority of the man who held the office waned.[60] This pattern is borne out by noting the type of men who were called *oikonomoi* during these various periods: in the free cities the *oikonomos* usually was not only a free man but also a citizen, while in later Roman times he was often a slave toiling in a royal or private household; in the period between the two extremes it is often impossible to tell whether an *oikonomos* was slave or free and exactly what power his office carried with it.[61] Details about qualifications also are obscure and must have varied from situation to situation. Usually only one *oikonomos* is mentioned in a city, occasionally two, and a few times, apparently, a college of them.[62] The method of selection changed constantly, and the term in office for different sorts of *oikonomoi* might vary from a month to a lifetime.[63] It is almost pointless to try to summarize the duties of an *oikonomos* in the Hellenistic period, since the title-bearer might be steward of a city-state, a tribe within a state, a village, a political body, like the *boule* or the *gerousia*, or of the royal household, or of the imperial administration not to mention clubs, societies, and private persons.[64] Even the relationship of the *oikonomos* with the older financial office of *tamias* or treasurer defies classification, there being so many exceptions.[65] The one thing which is undeniably clear is the fact that the *oikonomos* was a ubiquitous official in the Hellenistic world.

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[59] Evidence on Egypt, presented separately, *infra*, 249ff.

[60] Landvogt, 11f.

[61] *Ibid.*, 12-14.

[62] *Ibid.*, 15.

[63] *Ibid.*

The best insight into the duties, the lot, and the type of men serving as Hellenistic *oikonomoi* can be gained from actual examples. We shall examine these on a geographical basis, beginning with the earliest and most detailed picture from the cities of Asia Minor. Normally in the Greek *polis* there, control of finances was a function of the council, but often some special official was named with the public revenues as his special care.[66] These officials might be titled *tamiai*, as traditionally they were from Homer on, or *anataktai*, the term in Miletus, or *oikonomoi*, as in an increasing number of places.[67] The Ionian cities of Priene, Ephesus, Colophon, and Magnesia provide the most interesting material perhaps, data which may be examined with the help of Landvogt's survey and supplemented by further finds since then.

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[64] *Ibid.*, 16-19.

[65] *Ibid.*, 19-21. Landvogt writes that the *tamias* and the *oikonomos* originally occupied different offices, the former having to do only with money, the latter with various properties and possessions of a city as well as financial functions. Sometimes both appear in the same city, as at Aphrodisias. Though the *oikonomos* could step into the office of the *tamias*, this did not happen universally. One should not say that the *oikonomos* replaced the earlier *tamias*; the newer administrative organization rather is a different centralization of power than the older *polis* had.

[66] Cf. David Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor to the End of the Third Century after Christ* (2 vols.; Princeton, 1950) (cited hereafter as "Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor*"), 1, 61.

In Priene, where oikonomos occurs in ten inscriptions, the word in the sense of a city treasury official is demonstrable as early as 330/329 B.C., the officer being charged at that time with paying the expenses for inscribing a decree.[68] Similar instructions are given to the oikonomoi, plural this time, in another inscription of the early third century "to defray the expenses which are incurred" for a statue and the recording of a resolution voted.[69] Other inscriptions of the second and early first century B.C. speak regularly of an "oikonomos of the city" who is to take care of honors of different types voted to various citizens and the financial outlay incurred by these resolutions.[70] Landvogt sums up that this city oikonomos appears in Priene from the fourth to the first centuries B.C., that the method of selection is not indicated, but that there must have been a stipulated term of office.[71] His functions included taking part in the city's financial administration— paying for decrees, statues, crowns, and so forth which had been voted— and while there were no cultic duties indicated, he did at times provide wreaths and crowns voted to men by the city at their funerals.[72] There is also an official titled ὁ ἐπὶ τῆς διοικήσεως, "the chief of financial arrangements" in Priene, who must also have had a part, perhaps more important, in the administration of the public treasury, but the relationship between the two is not clear.[73]

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[67] Busolt, 1, 483f. The anataktai are described as διοικοῦντες τὰς τῆς πόλεως προσόδους at OGIS 213. 34.

[68] H. von Gaertringen, Die Inschriften von Priene (Berlin, 1906), 6. 30 (B.C. 330/329): τὸ δὲ ἀνάλωμα ὑπηρετῆσαι τὸν οἰκονόμον.

[69] Ibid., 18. 19 (=OGIS 215. 19): τὰ δὲ ἀναλώματα τὰ γενόμενα ὑπηρετεῖν τοὺς οἰκονόμους.

[70] Ibid., 83. 10 (τὸν οἰκονόμον τῆς πόλεως ὃς ἂν ἦι τότε); 99. 13 and 20 (τὸν οἰκονόμον τῆς πόλεως ὃς ἂν ἦι τότε ...τοῦ ἐσομένου τότε οἰκονόμου); 108. 347 and 376, cf. 107. 45; 109, 266; 115. 7 (1st cent. B.C., where one man serves both as oikonomos and as neōpoiēs, "treasurer for temples" or temple-warden, though previously the two positions were evidently separate); 117. 71; and 119. 23. Discussion in Landvogt, 36-39, and summary in Magie, Roman Rule in Asia Minor, 2, 850 (note 34).

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[71] Landvogt, 39f. Note the phrases cited supra, note 70, as evidence that there was a stipulated term of office.

[72] Ibid., 40. The clearest picture of his duties at such funerals is given in Inschriften von Priene, op. cit. (supra, note 68), 99. 13ff.: "In order that the city may appear to honor Thrasybulus not only while he is alive, but also in order that, when he happens, of necessity, to die, it may rightly deem him worthy of highest honors, the oikonomos of the city, whoever he be then, is to crown Thrasybulus, son of Demetrius, in behalf of the people with a golden crown, as he is carried out, since he has been a noble gentleman both publicly and privately in all respects. . . the one who will be oikonomos then having made public proclamation." ἵνα δὲ μὴ μόνον ζῶντα φαίνηται τιμῶν Θρασύβουλον, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸ χρεὼ μεταστάσεως τυχόντα τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων ἀξιώσηι δικαίως, τὸν οἰκονόμον τῆς πόλεως ὃς ἂν ἦι τότε στεφανῶσαι ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου Θρασύβουλον Δημητρίου ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκφορᾶς στεφάνωι χρυσέωι, ἄνδρα γεγονότα καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κοινῆι καὶ ἰδίαι, πρὸς πάντων... ποιησαμένου τὴν ἀναγγελίαν τοῦ ἐσομένου τότε οἰκονόμου.

[73] Ibid., 42f. Examples in Inschriften von Priene, op. cit. (supra,

At Ephesus the *oikonomos* also appears in the fourth century, and in an inscription dated 302 B.C., an Ephesian *oikonomos* is instructed to furnish money for a sacrifice and other hospitalities accorded a distinguished visitor. "The priests and the priestess and the *oikonomos*," the text reads, "are to offer sacrifice also to Artemis for the good news brought (εὐαγγέλια, evidently in connection with the visiting benefactor, King Demetrius of Macedon)"; "the *oikonomos* is to take care of the expense for the sacrifice . . . and is to provide the crown."[74] Though he takes part only indirectly

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note 68), 4. 45 (330 B.C.), 33. 6 (first half of the third cent. B.C.), and 14. 24 (third cent. B.C.) (=*OGIS* 11. 24).

[74] *The Collection of Ancient Greek Inscriptions in the British Museum* (London, 1874-1916), 3, 2, No. 448. 5ff.: θύειν δὲ καὶ εὐαγγέλια τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι τοὺς Ἐσσῆνας καὶ τὴν ἱέρειαν καὶ τὸν οἰκονόμον.... τοῦ δὲ ἀναλώματος τοῦ εἰς τὴν θυσίαν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τὸν οἰκονόμον. ...τοῦ δὲ στεφάνου ἐπιμε[λεῖσθαι τὸν οἰκονόμον?]. W. Liebenam, *Städeverwaltung im römischen Kaiserreiche* (Leipzig, 1900), 295, calls the *oikonomos* for Ephesus a sacral official, but Landvogt, 28, writes, correctly, it seems to me, in the absence of any other evidence, "The οἰκονόμος is thus a) mentioned along with . . . the priests and priestess of Artemis, who are to bring a sacrifice to the goddess, b) he provides the money for the sacrifice. Doubtless his office is a high one. He functions as a city official (cf. Brit. Mus. 448. 1) and properly as a financial official. . . . At the sacrifice he appears only as an intermediary official between the higher municipal authority and the priests, thus to take part only in a somewhat indirect sense as a sacral official."

Additional examples of the *oikonomos* at Ephesus, *ibid.*, Numbers 453. 19f. and 469 (frag.).

in the actual sacrifice, his general place and range of duties in the municipal government is interestingly suggested.

Colophon, just to the north of Ephesus, provides evidence in inscriptions of the existence of an oikonomos in the government there, who is charged with supplying funds for inscribing a decree and holding an athletic contest.[75]

Magnesia-on-the-Maeander, where we already saw the noun oikonomia was employed to mean a fair for wares,[76] offers at least nine inscriptional passages referring to the local oikonomoi.[77] Here in the second century B.C.

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[75] Magie, Roman Rule in Asia Minor, 2, 850 (note 34), citing M. Holleaux, Études d'Epigraphie et d'Histoire Grecques (ed. L. Robert) (Paris, 1938-42), 2, p. 51f. (= Jahreshefte des Österreichischen Archäologischen Instituts 9 (1906), Beibl. 59f.; and Bulletin de Correspondence Hellénique 37 (1913), 236f., No. 40, restored in Sitzungsberichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, philos.-hist. Klasse 183 (1921), 3, p. 76.

[76] Supra, 228, note 48.

[77] Texts in O. Kern, Die Inschriften von Magnesia am Maeander (Berlin, 1900) 12. 19; 89. 84f. (τὸ δὲ ἀνάλωμα τὸ ἐσόμενον εἴς τε τὴν στήλην καὶ τὴν ἀναγραφὴν τῶν ψηφισμάτων ὑπηρετῆσαι τοὺς οἰκονόμους ἐκ τῶν πόρων ὧν ἔχουσιν εἰς πόλεως διοίκησιν); 94. 9; 97. 83; 100a. 39 (= SIG^2 552A. 39 or SIG^3 695. 39, cf. supra, note 48 and note 51); 101. 82 and 89; and 103. 67. Discussion in Landvogt, 31-34, with summary in Magie, Roman Rule in Asia Minor, 2, 850 (note 34), and in Busolt, 1, 484, who in note 2 cites a further example printed in the Jahreshefte des Österreichischen Archäologischen Instituts 8 (1905), 163: διδο(μένου αὐτοῖ)ς ὑπὸ τοῦ οἰκονόμου εἴς τε τὴν θυσίαν καὶ τὴν διαφορὴν καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα, ὃ ἂν ὁ δῆμος τάξῃ ..., "there being given to them by the oikonomos for the sacrifice and the passage and the assembly, whatever the people arrange. . . ."

there was a board or college of officials going under this name, the exact number never being given. This group of oikonomoi, which appears to have changed monthly, is noted in the inscriptions as paying for this task or that which is placed in its hands by a popular decree or the state administration. The nature of these tasks vary. Sometimes they are the usual ones noted before of inscribing decrees, providing statues, or hospitality. More strikingly, however, their assignments go beyond the sphere of treasury duties, and they also appear with cultic functions. Thus, one decree from the beginning of the second century, for a festival of Zeus Sosipolis, provides that these "incumbent oikonomoi and those holding office at any time in the future" are to buy a bull for sacrifice, "present it to Zeus on the first day of the month," and "when the bull is presented, let the sacred herald pray, together with the priest and the priestess and the crown-bearer and . . . the polemarchs and the hipparchs and the oikonomoi . . ." and all the other officials.[78] The oikonomoi who happen to be in office that month are further commanded: "let the oikonomoi divide these [three sacrificial victims] in portions," let them see to it that the beasts are fattened up for the sacrifice, and take care of all the financial details.[79]

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[78] Kern, Inschriften von Magnesia, op. cit. (supra, note 77), 98. 10ff. (= SIG^3 589. 10ff.): ὅπως οἱ οἰκονόμοι οἱ ἐνεστηκότες... καὶ οἱ ἀεὶ καθιστάμενοι ἀγοράζωσιν ταῦρον... ἀναδεικνύωσιν τῶι Διὶ ἀρχομένου σπόρου μηνὸς Κρονιῶνος ἐν τῆι νουμηνίαι.... καὶ ἐν τῶι ἀναδείκνυσθαι τὸν ταῦρον κατευχέσθω ὁ ἱεροκῆρυξ μετὰ τοῦ ἱέρεω καὶ τῆς ἱερείας καὶ τοῦ στεφανηφόρου καὶ ... τῶν πολεμάρχων καὶ τῶν ἱππάρχων καὶ τῶν οἰκονόμων.... See now discussion in Sokolowski, op. cit. (supra, 228, note 48), No. 32, pp. 88ff.

[79] Ibid., lines 58ff.: διανε[μέ]τωσαν δὲ ταῦτα οἱ οἰκονόμοι· ὅταν δὲ ἀναδειχθῇ ὁ ταῦ[ρ]ος, ἔγδοσιν ποιείσθωσαν οἱ οἰκο-

It is in light of this evidence that an inscription of about the same period at Magnesia becomes clear. According to a decree for the establishment of a Sarapis shrine, "the *oikonomoi* . . . who provide the sacrifices for the other festivals" are to take over the same task here.[80] Further,

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νόμοι ὅπως τρέφηται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐργολαβήσαντος.... τὸ δὲ ψήφισμα τόδε ἀναγράψαι τοὺς οἰκονόμους εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Διὸς εἰς τὴν παραστάδα.... ἀναλισκέτωσαν δὲ εἰς ταῦτα πάντα τὰ γεγραμμένα οἱ [οἰ]κονόμοι ἐκ τῶν πόρων ὧν ἔχουσιν εἰς πόλεως διο[ίκησιν]. "Let the *oikonomoi* divide these in portions. . . . When the bull is presented, let the *oikonomoi* surrender it, in order that it may be fattened up by the party who has contracted for this. . . . The *oikonomoi* are to record this decree at the Temple of Zeus, at the portico. . . . Let the *oikonomoi* spend for all these things recorded, out of the revenues which they have for the financial administration of the city."

[80] *Ibid*., 99. 5, as restored in *SIG*^{2} 554: οἱ οἰκονόμοι ...[οἱ τὰ θύματα τῶν ἄλλ]ων ἑορτῶν παριστάντες. See now discussion in Sokolowski, *op*. *cit*. (*supra*, 228, note 48), No. 34, pp. 98ff. Sokolowski restores the line slightly differently; his full text reads: [τὰ δὲ θυόμενα τ]ῶι θεῶι παραστήσου[σιν εἰς τὴν ἑορτὴν τοῦ μὲν παρόντος ἐνιαυ]τοῦ οἱ οἰκονόμοι Φαρσαλ[ίωι, οἱ τὰ ἱερὰ εἰς τὰς θυσίας τῶν ἄλλ]ων ἑορτῶν παριστάντες...."During the present year the *oikonomoi*, who present the sacred offerings [or sacred objects] for the sacrifices of the other feasts, shall present to Pharsalios the offerings for the god for the feast. . . ." Sokolowski adds, p. 99, that the Sarapis cult began in Magnesia as a private society, organized perhaps by Pharsalios, but soon became public. These decrees lay down rules for its conduct.

the lease for the new temple is put in their hands: "let the oikonomoi lease out for hire the sacred precincts for the future times," and another clause even gives them administration over the temple goods and revenues, though with the proviso that they must give the perquisites to the priests: "let the oikonomoi take 3 drachmae out of the purchases of wood, and let them give one drachmē out of the purchases of grain to the priest."[81] Plainly the oikonomoi of Magnesia had duties that were partly political and partially cultic. They "had the city's financial administration of Magnesia in their hands,"[82] including the usual political duties of oikonomoi, but they also carried out cultic obligations which included purchase and supervision of sacrificial animals for the Zeus cult, participation in the festival procession, and division of the sacrificial pieces and distribution of the meat, as well as oversight of the leasing of temples and care of goods and priestly perquisites.[83] It is obvious why in the face of such a list of duties a college of oikonomoi was required at Magnesia.

Elsewhere in Asia Minor, outside of these Ionian cities the title oikonomos and the other related designations of office appear frequently, but these examples can be sketched more briefly. Naturally the same titles which we have already observed occur in many cities of Asia Minor, though demonstrable only for a later date in Roman times.[84] Omitting such evidence here, we may note that for Caria during Hellenistic times *oikonomoi* are vouched for in inscriptions at the inland town of Mylasa; here in the second century B.C. there is mention by name of two "*oikonomoi* who were chosen by the tribe of the Otōrkondians" to administer their domains, along with two *tamiai* in charge of financial affairs.[85] In another inscription a bit later from the same area, "*tamiai* and *oikonomoi* of the tribe" of the Hyarbesutai are referred to, evidently citizens with a high office.[86] It would seem that each of the three tribes or *phylai* of Mylasa chose two officials of each type, and the distinction would appear from other evidence to be, according to Landvogt, that the *tamiai* are "expressly characterized as treasury officials, while the οἰκονόμοι . . . appear as administrators of house or temple treasures."[87] Since there also appears reference to "the grain commission" (ἡ σιτικὴ οἰκονομία) at Mylasa apparently with *oikonomoi* in charge of its activities,[88] we may conclude that in this area the title was a common one in a variety of offices.

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[81] Ibid., lines 8-10, 17-19: [εἰς δ]ὲ τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον προσμισθούσθωσαν οἱ [οἰκονόμοι τ]ὰ ἱερὰ καθότι γέγραπται... [λαμβανέτω]σαν δὲ οἱ οἰκονόμοι ἐκ τῶν ξυλίνων ὠ[νῶν δραχμ]ὰς τρεῖς [κ]αὶ ἐκ τῶν σιτηρῶν [ὠ]νῶν (δ)[ραχ](μὴ)ν μ[ίαν ἀπο]δότωσαν τῶι ἱερεῖ. Or is the reference to state revenues, out of which the oikonomoi are to make payment to the priests of the cult?

[82] Landvogt, 35.

[83] Ibid., 34, and Magie, Roman Rule in Asia Minor, 2, 850 (note 34), who specifically assigns to the board of oikonomoi at Magnesia supervision of "the distribution of the meat." Cf., however, infra, 303, note 246, for another possibility.

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[84] Specimen illustrations for cities where only Roman inscriptions are available will be cited, *infra*, 270ff.

[85] P. Le Bas and W.H. Waddington, *Inscriptions Grecques et Latines recueillies en Grèce et en Asie Mineure* (4 vols. in 5, Paris, 1847-48), No. 404 (=*Bulletin de Correspondence Hellénique* 12 (1889), p. 22), discussed in Landvogt, 45, and noted by Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor*, 2, 850 (note 34): ...οἱ αἱρεθέντες ὑπὸ τῆς Ὀτωρκονδέων φυλῆς οἰκονόμοι, Ἑρμίας Ἑκαταίου, Ἰάσων Παμμένου, καὶ οἱ ταμίαι....

[86] C. Michel, *Recueil d'Inscriptions Grecques* (Brussels, 1900-1927), No. 725 (=*Mitteilung des deutschen archäologischen Instituts, Athenische Abteilung* 15 (1890), pp. 268ff.), noted in Landvogt, 45f., and Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor*, 2, 850 (note 34): [τοῖς] ταμί[αι]ς ἢ οἰκονόμοις τῆς φυλῆς. See now also discussion in Sokolowski, *op. cit.* (*supra*, 228, note 48), No. 62, pp. 154ff.

In Bithynia the title *oikonomos* is found at Chalcedon for a city official,[89] and at Nicomedia on the tomb of a former state-slave who gained his freedom, attained great wealth, and became city *oikonomos*.[90] At Kaystros in Lydia during the period of the Attalids, there is reference to a freedman serving in a minor financial post as "*oikonomos* of the village of the Kairēnai."[91] Apparently the term was applied to officials on the local level in Asia Minor at this time. Other instances of the title come from Hierapolis in Phrygia, Galatia, and Lycaonia, though details are obscure in each case.[92]

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[87] Landvogt, 46.

[88] P. Le Bas and W.H. Waddington, *Inscriptions Grecques et Latines recueillies en Grèce et en Asie Mineure* (4 vols. in 5, Paris, 1847-48), Vol. 3, p. 409: ὑπόληψις της σιτικης οἰκονομίας, "the assumption (or payment) of the grain commission."

[89] *CIG* 2. 3793 (= *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 27 (1927), p. 342), discussed in Landvogt, 26, and noted in Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor*, 2, 850 (note 34), who includes it in Hellenistic evidence: Διονύσιος, οἰκονόμος Καλχηδονίων, i.e., οἰκονόμος πόλεως Καλχηδονίων. The date is uncertain however.

[90] *CIG* 2. 3777, discussed in Landvogt, 26.

[91] *Bulletin de Correspondence Hellénique* 18 (1894), p. 540 (= *Mitteilung des deutschen archäologischen Instituts*, *Athenische Abteilung* 20 (1895), p. 241), discussed in Landvogt, 27, cf. note 1 where the translation of κατοικία as "village" rather than "military colony" is justified: οἰκονόμου τῆς Καιρηνῶν κατοικίας.

In Greece proper, outside of Lusoi, where, as previously noted, an oikonomos either of the city or the magistrates is vouched for very early, at the end of the fourth century,[93] and at Athens, where the title ὁ ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει is sometimes found,[94] the titles seem confined to positions in private households or can be proved only with Roman examples. On the island of Cos there is inscriptional evidence for an "oikonomos of the city of the Coans," though the date is uncertain and it may be Roman,[95] and for an *oikonomos* of the *gerousia* or Senate, though nothing is indicated of the functions for such an officer.[96] Minoa on Amorgos seems to have had a city *oikonomos*.[97] Very interesting, however, is a fragmentary inscription from Lesbos, which seems to be pre-Christian, reading: "Let the *oikonomos* be from Mathymna [a city on Lesbos]. . . not younger than 40 years, and let him take care that . . . no other man enter in. . . ."[98] As so often, the text is missing at the most important places, but it has been conjectured that the office had to do with a women's festival (because of the age requirement, duplicated elsewhere), was of some importance (because it required a citizen), and was not a state office (because it demands the

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[92] Hierapolis: W. Judeich, Altertümer von Hierapolis (Berlin, 1898), No. 35: τῶν οἰκονόμων τῆς πόλεως. Somewhere in Phrygia: CIG 4. 6837: Μητρὶ Θεῶν Ἀγδίστει Ἀμέριμνος οἰκονόμος τῆς πόλεως εὐχήν ("Amerimnos, oikonomos of the city, [offers] prayer to Agdistis, the Mother of the gods"); this example was cited long ago from J. Spon by Wettstein on Rom. 16: 23. Galatia: CIG 3. 4132, a tombstone of the πατρίδος οἰκο[νόμον], evidently equivalent to οἰκονόμος τῆς πόλεως. Further examples given with discussion in Landvogt, 47-49.

[93] Supra, note 57, for reference; discussed in Landvogt, 23, especially note 1, who decides he was oikonomos of the magistrates (δαμιοργῶν) at Lusoi, at least the equivalent of a tamias, perhaps with even more power, and possibly connected with the state-cult.

[94] Supra, note 56, for references.

[95] CIG 2. 2512 (= W.R. Paton and E.L. Hicks, Inscriptions of Cos (Oxford, 1891), 308) (= SIG^3 1252): Διονυσίου πόλεως Κώων οἰκονόμου. Cf. also Paton-Hicks, 310: Φιλήτου οἰκονόμου τῆς Κώων πόλεως οἰκον[ο]μήσαντος ἔτη κ̅γ̅ ἀμέμπ[τ]ως. "Of Philetus, oikonomos of the city of the Coans, who served as oikonomos blamelessly for 23 years." There is

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question whether these officials may not have been from Roman times and actually public slaves; cf. Landvogt, 23f., and Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor*, 2, 850 (note 34).

[96] R. Herzog, *Koische Forschungen und Funde* (Leipzig, 1899), No. 129: Δημητρίου ο[ἰκ]ονόμου γερουσίας ἐτῶν λγ. "Of Demetrius, *oikonomos* of the Senate for 33 years." Cf. Landvogt, 24. Probably from the Roman imperial period.

[97] *IG* 12, 7. 287 (= G. Kaibel, *Epigrammata Graeca ex lapidibus conlecta* (Berlin, 1878), 277a 3), restored by Kaibel: [οἰκονόμον] πάτρης, i.e., οἰκονόμος πόλεως.

[98] *IG* 12, 2. 499. 5ff. (= *Bulletin de Correspondence Hellénique* 4 (1880), 440): [οἰ]κονόμος ἔστω μὲν Μαθυ[μναῖος ... μ]ὴ νεώτερος ἐτέων (τ)εσ[σεράκοντα] ... καὶ ἐπιμελήσ[θ]ω [ὅ]πω[ς] ... μήδεις ἄνηρ ἕτερος εἰσέλθῃ.... The text is also given with different conjectured readings in H. Collitz, *Sammlung der griechischen Dialekt-Inschriften* (Göttingen, 1884), 1, page 103, No. 279, though the general sense is the same.

officer be from a specific place).[99] It is all tantalizingly vague, especially whether the post was political or from a more limited social or cult organization.

Elsewhere in the Hellenistic world, a clear example of political oikonomoi appears from the Thracian city of Apollonia, where a college of them administered certain financial affairs, as at Magnesia and Priene.[100] At far-off Olbia, a colony of Miletus on the Black Sea, near the mouths of the Bug and Dnieper rivers, just east of modern Odessa, there was an official "over the public administration and treasury" in the third century.[101]

Oikonomoi thus were fairly common in city-states of all sorts and in villages of the Hellenistic period. Even in Palestine the term appears to have been in some use, though perhaps for private households rather than civil administration.[102] Its usage in the Seleucid empire has already been noted,[103] and the term was likewise employed in the kingdom of the Attalids; here "in each satrapy the royal domain was administered by an **οἰκονόμος,** who saw to it that the land was surveyed, the boundries were respected, and the rents and taxes collected,"[104] a patterm similar to that in Egypt.

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[99] So Landvogt, 25, where further bibliography is given.

[100] SIG^2 545. 41: τὸ δὲ ἀνάλωμα τὸ εἰς τὸν τελαμῶνα δοῦναι τοὺς οἰκονόμους ἀφ' ὧν χειρίζουσιν αὐτοί. "The expense for the telamon the oikonomoi are to give from the funds which they handle." Cf. Landvogt, 49.

[101] SIG^2 226 (= C. Michel, Recueil d'Inscriptions Grecques (Brussels, 1900-1927), No. 337): ἐπί τε τῆς κοινῆς οἰκονομίας καὶ ταμίας, πάντα διώικησεν ὀρθῶς καὶ δικαίως. Protogenes is honored because for three years "having been over the public administration and treasury, he administered all matters rightly and justly."

[102] Landvogt, 50, cites CIG 3. 4553, a fragment from the Palestinian village of Schiab, where an οἰκονόμ[ος] is mentioned. Cf. also the evidence noted supra, 141, note 2.

Before turning to the extensive Egyptian evidence, however, just a word can be said here about the office of *oikonomos* in some of the Hellenistic states as a recognized public service to be assumed by the rich as a dutiful contribution to the whole community, for there is some evidence that an *oikonomia* of this type was regarded sometimes as a *leitourgia* or public service. As is well-known, there were certain public obligations for the rich, called "liturgies," in the ancient Greek *polis*, not performed by elected officials but assumed by citizens in certain classes of wealth as a compulsory duty. Obvious examples included, in Athens, the training and equipping of a chorus for a play at one of the festivals or the providing of a trireme for the navy. In Priene, at least, it would appear that the task of serving as *oikonomos*, which would thus be the duty of *oikonomia*, was such a liturgy. The most complete single list of *leitourgiai* from the ancient world is a second century B.C. inscription from this city of Priene, and it records that the purchaser of the priesthood of Dionysus Phleus, if he should pay over 6,000 drachmae, was to be exempt from the superintendency of the torch race (λαμπαδαρχία), of the games (ἀγωνοθεσία), of horse-breeding (ἱπποτροφία), of the sacred embassy (ἀρχιθεωρία), and the duty of gymnasiarch (γυμνασιαρχία); if he should pay over 12,000 drachmae, he was to be free from other liturgies, involving the supply of triremes, the offices of *oikonomos* and temple-warden, and the duty of advancing money to the state (τριηραρχία, οἰκονομία, νεωποΐα, προεισφορὰ χρημάτων).[105] That this last category of concessions was of some value is suggested by the fact that one purchaser is recorded to have paid 12,002 drachmae for the rights and privileges of this exemption. It may be argued that usually the positions of *oikonomos* and temple-warden in Priene were offices (ἀρχαί), not liturgies, but, as Magie points out, since both came to demand personal activity as well as the expenditure of funds in the case of the liturgy, the distinction gradually disappeared,[106] and we have this evidence at least, that the office of *oikonomos* in this Asia Minor city was regarded as a liturgy incumbent upon certain men in the community's scheme of things.

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[103] *Supra*, 224f., notes 42 and 43; cf. Landvogt, 9 and 29f. Each satrapy of the Seleucid empire had an *oikonomos*, who administered the royal domains; these officials were different from the private *oikonomoi* of the royal family who administered their personal wealth.

[104] Esther V. Hanson, *The Attalids of Pergamon* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1947), 170, Cf. *supra*, 225f., note 44.

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[105] *SIG*^{3} 1003 (2nd cent. B.C.) (= H. von Gaertringen, *Die Inschriften von Priene* (Berlin, 1906), 174).

[106] *Roman Rule in Asia Minor*, 1, 61 and 2, 850ff. (notes 34 and 35). Cf. Landvogt, 40. On the close relationship between regular incomes in a state and the liturgies, cf. Arist. *Pol.* 5. 9. 12 (1314b 14-18): ἔπειτα τὰς εἰσφορὰς καὶ τὰς λειτουργίας δεῖ φαίνεσθαι τῆς τε οἰκονομίας ἕνεκα συνάγοντα κ᾽ἄν ποτε δεηθῇ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμικοὺς καιρούς, ὅλως τε αὑτὸν παρασκευάζειν φύλακα καὶ ταμίαν ὡς κοινῶν ἀλλὰ μὴ ὡς ἰδίων. In the case of a would-be tyrant, "it is necessary, in the second place, that he be seen gathering together the revenues and the liturgies for the sake of the administration of the government, and even if it sometimes be necessary to use these for military opportunities, he must generally conduct himself as a guard and a steward, as it were, of the public treasury but not, as it were, of his own private estate."

Administrative Titles In Ptolemaic Egypt

It is Egypt, however, which provides us with the richest evidence as to how many different official titles there were employing the terms *oikonomos* and *dioikētēs*, how many-sided the office of the *oikonomos* was, and how frequently these officials came into contact with the average man, both in the Hellenistic and the Roman periods. A general picture of the financial administrative structure under the Ptolemies can first be given, with a reasonable degree of confidence, based primarily on the researches of Wilcken and others;[107] then a picture of the duties of these officials and

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[107] Ulrich Wilcken, *Griechische Ostraka aus Aegypten und Nubien* (Berlin, 1899) (cited hereafter as "Wilcken, *Ostraka*"). L. Mitteis and U. Wilcken, *Grundzüge und Chrestomathie der Papyruskunde* (Leipzig-Berlin, 1912; Erster Band: Historischer Teil, Erste Hälfte: Grundzüge, Zweite Hälfte: Chrestomathie, edited by U. Wilcken, cited hereafter as "Wilcken, *Grundzüge*" and "Wilcken, *Chrestomathie*" respectively; Zweiter Band: Juristischer Teil, Erste Hälfte: Grundzüge, Zweiter Hälfte: Chrestomathie, edited by L. Mitteis, cited hereafter as "Mitteis, *Grundzüge*" and "Mitteis, *Chrestomathie*" respectively).

RE 5, 790f. (article, "διοικητής") and 17, 2118f. (article, "οἰκονόμος") give specific information on Egypt. C.C. Edgar, *Zenon Papyri in the University of Michigan Collection* (Ann Arbor, 1931) (cited hereafter as "Edgar, *Zenon Papyri*"). More general treatments in H. Maspero, *Les Finances de l'Egypt sous les Lagides* (Paris, 1905); C. Préaux, *L'économie royale des Lagides* (Brussels, 1939). M.D. and B.A. van Groningen, *Paprological Primer* (Leyden, 1946), 161ff., define the terms briefly and their daily contacts will be sketched, especially from the papyri, and, to complete the picture something will be said about how these titles lingered on in official use during and after Roman times in Egypt and elsewhere.

The state financial administration of Ptolemaic Egypt, probably influenced still from the days of the Pharaohs and the Persian period, and reflecting the absolute character of Ptolemaic rule, was centered in one supreme financial administration called ἡ διοίκησις.[108] Over everything was the Ptolemy himself, of course, but his chief representative was the great financial administrator in Alexandria titled ὁ διοικητής,[109] or sometimes ὁ ἐπὶ τῆς διοικήσεως.[110] This official was "not a secretary in daily contact with the king . . . but [was] . . . more independent, . . . the head of a permanent department with an office of his own, [who] exercised enormous power without the obligation of referring to the king on

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conveniently.

For a detailed listing of the various types of *oikonomoi* which existed in the finance department of Hellenistic Egypt, see F. Preisigke, "Die ptolemäische Staatspost," *Klio* 7 (1907), 261f., and F. Preisigke and W. Spiegelberg, *Die Prinz-Joachim Ostraka, griechische und demotische Beisetzungsurkunden für Ibis-und Falkenmumien aus Ombos* (Schriften der Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft in Strassburg, 19) (Strassburg, 1914) (cited hereafter as "*Prinz-Joachim Ostraka*"), 52-55.

[108] Wilcken, *Grundzüge*, 1, 1, 146f.

[109] *Ibid.*, 148; cf. Cic. *Rab. Post.* 10. 28; Dio Cass. 42. 36. 1; *OGIS* 53. 7, 59. 7, 100. 3, 761. 2; *PTeb.* 5. 27 (118 B.C.); B.P. Grenfell, *Revenue Laws of Ptolemy Philadelphus* (Oxford, 1896), 19. 7; and C. Préaux, *L'économie royale des Lagides* (Brussels, 1939), 445-447 and 415-23.

[110] Wilcken, *Ostraka*, 492; *RE* 5, 790, citing B.P. Grenfell, *Revenue Laws of Ptolemy Philadelphus* (Oxford, 1896), 19. 7.

every question that arose."[111] In fact, the *dioikētēs* may himself have been active in political plots and struggles for power.[112]

The specific duties of this *dioikētēs*, who usually was also a man well-to-do and with business ventures and interests in his own right (thus demonstrating the Socratic dictum that men who do well in private business will be successful in public administration as well),[113] concerned the entire public financial administration of the empire (διοίκησις), apart only from the temple or sacred administration (ἱερά);[114] his work included foreign possessions,[115] as well as every village in Egypt. An important personage, he, as some of the papyri will make clear.

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[111] Edgar, *Zenon Papyri*, p. 5.

[112] *Ibid*., p. 6.

[113] *Supra*, 210.

[114] Wilcken, *Ostraka*, 149, notes that ἡ διοίκησις, the secular or imperial administration, and ἱερά, the sacral or temple, were "the two great departments of the Egyptian provincial financial administration"; the distinction continued on down into Roman times (pp. 656f.); cf. also *RE* 5, 1, 789f. The same distinction had occurred in Greece.

[115] Wilcken, *Grundzüge*, 1, 1, 148. Cf. Wilcken, *Chrestomathie*, 410 (*PCairo* 10250, B.C. 227), and 411 (*PGrenf*. 2. 14b, B.C. 225); an especially clear example of his authority overseas is *OGIS* 1. 59, discussed in Landvogt, 51f., where full bibliography is given, a letter of Ptolemy Euergetes, to be dated Aug. 29, 229 B.C. (so all commentators, according to Landvogt, p. 51, note 1, except Hiller von Gaertringen, who in *Festschrift für O. Hirschfeld* (1903), pp. 92ff., argues for a date in 163 B.C.) to the commander of the military garrison on the island of Thera in the Aegean Sea. In answer to a petition of the troops stationed on Thera, Ptolemy enjoins his *dioikētēs* (in Alexandria— cf. discussion in Landvogt, p. 51, note 2)

To assist in this enormous administrative task, the *dioikētēs* had a host of subordinates reaching from the top-level offices, down through nomes and toparchies, to the smallest village, a veritable "hierarchy of officials," to use Wilcken's term,[116] over whom the *dioikētēs* had exclusive jurisdiction.[117] Many of the details are not clear, including the problem of whether the same term *dioikētēs* was also used to refer to lesser officials or provincial directors in a smaller area responsible to the chief *dioikētēs*

Diogenes to allot to these men proceeds from the royal lands administered by his *oikonomos* in order to defray certain of their expenses: δοῦναι αὐτοῖς τὰ ἀνειλημμένα ὑπὸ τοῦ οἰκονόμου εἰς τὸ βασιλικὸν χωρία — ἀφ' ὧν τὰς προσόδους ἀπέφαινεν γίγνεσθαι κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν Πτολεμαϊκὰς ⊢ ρ̅ι̅α̅ ... ὅπως ἔχωσιν εἴς τε τὰς θυσίας καὶ τὸ ἄλειμμα δαπανᾶν, "to give to them the revenues from the properties taken over by the *oikonomos* for the royal treasury, the revenues from which he declared were 111 Ptolemaic drachmae annually . . . in order that they might be able to pay for both the sacrifices and the oil." Here the authority of the *dioikētēs* plainly extends over a place outside Egypt, garrisoned by the military; we note further there is an *oikonomos* in Thera, administering the royal estates, subject to this *dioikētēs* in Alexandria, and it is to this *oikonomos* that the *dioikētēs* transmits the king's order to allot the troops the usufruct of some of the royal estates in his care.

[116] Wilcken, *Grundzüge*, 1, 1, 149, and *Ostraka*, 493.

[117] Edgar, *Zenon Papyri*, 16. The system is briefly characterized for Egypt by A.H.M. Jones, *The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian* (Oxford, 1940), 18.

in Alexandria.[118] Moreover, there were obviously reorganizations and reshufflings of duties and functions in the course of several centuries, just as in any government. Wilcken's summary of the "chain of command" among these officials in Ptolemaic Egypt, however, is a help in following the bewilderingly profuse series of references to the various officers with whom we are concerned.[119] In the reconstruction he offers for the third century, the organization runs thus:

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[118] For a brief discussion as of 1902, see *PTeb.*, Vol. 1, pp. 33f. In particular, see Wilcken, *Ostraka*, 492f., who argues, against Grenfell, that there were local *dioikētai* for the country outside of Alexandria. In *Grundzüge* 1, 1, 148, he holds that "the controversial question . . . has not yet been resolved in a clear solution," but he feels the existence of the local officials of that name "at least probable." His view is followed in *RE* 5, 790. Edgar, *Zenon Papyri*, p. 5, notes the existence of subdioikētai (ὑποδιοικηταί), "each of whom was probably in charge of a certain district." Certainly it is sometimes difficult to tell which type of *dioikētēs* is meant, but the very number of references leads one to suspect the title was used on the local as well as on the national level. The reference to a *dioikētēs* of the Ptolemaic city of Thebes at *OGIS* 48. 17 (B.C. 240) seems to support Wilcken's view. Some other Ptolemaic references are difficult to reconcile with the view that they must refer to the greatest official in the government of Egypt (e.g., *PPetrie* II. 20. ii. 3), and in Roman times there are definitely references to local *dioikētai* (cf. *POxy*. 2, p. 209). The view of Wilcken, summarized above, that there were local *dioikētai* as well as the supreme one in Alexandria, is also followed by Landvogt, 51, note 2.

[119] Wilcken, *Grundzüge*, 1, 1, 149, note 1.

1) the administrator (διοικητής) in Alexandria;
2) provincial administrators (διοικηταὶ τῶν χωρῶν) (?);
3) overseers (ἐπιμεληταί);
4) *oikonomoi* (οἰκονόμοι);
5) secretaries (ἀντιγραφεῖς).

In the second and first centuries B.C. the bureaucracy grew and several new offices seem to have appeared:

1) the administrator (διοικητής) in Alexandria;
2) provincial administrators (διοικηταὶ τῶν χωρῶν) (?);
3) subadministrators (ὑποδιοικηταί) over several districts, an addition to the earlier organization;
4) public revenue officials (ἐπὶ τῶν προσόδων), over the public revenues in a single district;
5) overseers (ἐπιμεληταί), now placed over still smaller areas;
6) *oikonomoi*, but now subdivided into *oikonomoi* of the grain supply (οἰκονόμοι σιτικῶν) and *oikonomoi* of moneys (οἰκονόμοι ἀργυρικῶν);
7) secretaries (ἀντιγραφεῖς), still associated with the *oikonomoi*.

The titles that especially interest us thus include ὁ διοικητής or supreme financial administrator, a number of assistants also called διοικηταί in charge of smaller areas — the number of references that exist to the activities of an official called διοικητής, far more than can be assigned to any one man at a time, and the fact that the plural occurs several times[120] cause me to assume this was a different office from the chief administrator in Alexandria — and *oikonomoi* of various types.

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[120] Polyb. 27. 13(12). 2 speaks of οἱ βασιλικοὶ διοικηταί in Cyprus

Apparently the *oikonomos* was a more powerful official in the third century than later on. The division or specialization into two types of *oikonomoi* must have led to *more* officials each with *less* power.[121] Further the territory of this officer in the third century was a district, the Arsinoite nome, for example; but from the second century on, a district like the Arsinoite nome was divided into three parts (μερίδες), each having its own pair of *oikonomoi*, one for grain and one for money.[122] Plainly, though, the duties of all *oikonomoi* concerned the administration of money and natural resources— an association with the term we have found from the beginning— specifically such tasks as farming out taxes on lease, the auction connected with such a lease, the supervision of the tax-collectors thus entailed and balancing accounts with them, the transportation of grain from his district to Alexandria, and the administration of public works in his area— the care of canals, and so forth, once even the digging of a wine cellar.[123] In a word, according to Wilcken, "he appears generally as

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under Ptolemy, *c*. 171/70 B.C. The same phrase occurs for the royal Ptolemaic administrators in Cyprus for 56 B.C. in Plut. *Cat*. *Min*. 38. 4 (*Vit*. 778A).

[121] Wilcken, *Grundzüge*, 1, 1, 149ff.; cf. Wilken, *Chrestomathie*, 167 (*PLouvre* 10632, B.C. 131).

[122] *Ibid*., 150.

[123] *Ibid*., 151, cf. 183. Further, on the duties of the *oikonomos*, cf. *RE* 17, 2118f.; Edgar, *Zenon Papyri*, pp. 38-40; and R. Taubenschlag, *The Law of Graeco-Roman Egypt in the Light of the Papyri, 332 B.C.-640 A.D.* (New York, 1944) (cited hereafter as "Taubenschlag"), 291. An interesting list of assorted duties assigned to a district *oikonomos* in the second and first centuries B.C. is given by Preisigke, *Prinz-Joachim Ostraka*, 54, including

the permanent, chief representative of the financial administration of the individual district,"[124] and there seem to have been *oikonomoi*, assisted each by a secretary, for each village, so that the hierarchy reached down into the life of every man.[125]

The papyri, together with inscriptional evidence, provide fresh insights into the functions of officials and their contacts with the people. "In every nome and every dependency [of Ptolemaic Egypt there] was stationed an οἰκονόμος with an ἀντιγραφεύς to check his accounts, a banker working in conjunction with him, and a whole regiment of minor officials."[126] Marble stelae and fragments of accounts written on papyrus again and again witness to the ubiquitous activity of these local finance officials throughout Egypt. A marble column, for example, from the reign of Euergetes (247-221 B.C.) mentions both the *dioikētēs* or supreme financial official in Alexandria and the *oikonomos* or praefect of the financial administration on the island of Thera.[127] A papyrus fragment from the Faiyum in the third century B.C. shows in more detail the "chain of command" which reaches down from *dioikētēs* to the *oikonomos*; a group of men from the Arsinoite nome, who build grain-ships, have been arrested in the district of Herakleopolis, and the local *oikonomos* writes requesting their release; but the sheriff's

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such chores as farming out the fishing tax (Wilcken, *Chrestomathie*, 167, from 131 B.C.), superintendance of the retail oil trade and prevention of oil smuggling (*PTeb*. 1. 39. 11, from 114 B.C.), and the farming out of state land with its attendant tax problems.

[124] Wilcken, *Grundzüge*, 1, 1, 151.

[125] *Ibid*.

[126] Edgar, *Zenon Papyri*, p. 5.

[127] *OGIS* 59. 7-9; cf. *supra*, note 115 for text and discussion.

office refuses to let them go, until he receives instructions from some one higher up, the *epimelētēs* or *dioikētēs* himself.[128]

Duties of the *oikonomos* on the local level must have constantly expanded and imposed new obligations, as we have seen. Certainly the position carried with it quasi legal powers, and the right to judge some cases involving tax matters, doubtless necessary in all the complications of leasing of taxes, bookkeeping, and grain transportation.[129] Small wonder then that the office often became more specialized in the second and first centuries B.C. Duties and authorities were divided among several officeholders. Since, for example, the income of the royal treasury consisted partly of goods in kind (σιτικά) and partly of money (ἀργυρικά),[130] the twin positions of "*oikonomos* for moneys" (οἰκονόμος ἀργυρικῶν) and "*oikonomos* for supplies" (οἰκονόμος σιτικῶν) appear in each district.

An interesting insight into the work of an *oikonomos sitikōn* is contained in an inscription from shortly after 100 B.C. at the village of Dime in the Faiyum, reading:

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[128] Wilcken, *Chrestomathie* 1, 2, 166 (*PPetrie* 2. 20).

[129] On the quasi legal powers of a Ptolemaic *oikonomos*, cf. Edgar, *Zenon Papyri*, p. 38, who includes such tasks as serving a summons, making an arrest, and examining cattle thieves; and Taubenschlag, 372, who concludes that, like the local *dioikētēs* and *epimelētēs*, the *oikonomos* had legal jurisdiction and "judged all cases in which even one of the parties was a ὑποτελής [one subject to taxes], including cases concerning monopolies in concurrence with the διοικητής."

[130] Krebs, *Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*, 1892, p. 535, as cited by Landvogt, 56.

> In behalf of King Ptolemy, also called Alexander, divine Philomētōr, Apollonios, son of Ischyrion, being scribe to Pantaleon, (one) of the chief nobles and oikonomos of the grain supplies (οἰκονόμωι σιτικῶν) for the section of Herakleides, was authorized to give in the sixteenth year [of the king, i.e., 97/6 B.C.] for himself and those working throughout the section under them, for the future, annually, 182 artaba of wheat . . . for the bakery for Soknopaion and Nephersē, the greatest gods.[131]

A similar inscription from the same area a year or two later records a like gift, using the word oikonomia to describe the administration of grain supplies in the section:

> under Anicetus, administrator of the grain supply (οἰκονόμου σιτικῶν) for the section of Herakleides, it was resolved to give from himself and those employed in the administration (οἰκονομίαι) throughout the section each year first fruits (ἀπαρχήν) for the temple of the greatest god, Soknopaion, 182 artaba of wheat.[132]

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[131] OGIS 177. 1ff.: ὑπὲρ βασιλέως Πτολεμαίου τοῦ καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου, θεοῦ Φιλομήτορος, Ἀπολλώνιος Ἰσχυρίωνος γραμματεύων Πανταλέοντι τῶν ὁμοτίμων τοῖς συγγενέσι καὶ οἰκονόμωι σιτικῶν τῆς Ἡρακλείδου μερίδος τὸ ιή L κατηρτίσατο δίδοσθαι παρά τε ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν διὰ τῆς μερίδος ἀσχολουμένων ὑπ' αὐτοὺς καὶ εἰς τὸν μετέπειτα χρόνον κατ' ἔτος πυροῦ ἀρτάβας ρπβ L', ὃ καὶ κατήρξατο ἀπὸ νουμηνίας τοῦ Θῶυβ τοῦ ιθ' L εἰς τὸ ἀρτοκόπιν Σοκνοπαίωι καὶ Νεφερσῆι θεοῖς μεγίστοις. Dittenberger in a note assigns to the oikonomos sitikōn charge of part of the annual revenues which were recorded through the banks of the king, and especially of grain, which was stored in the royal storehouses; he is therefore subject to the supreme dioikētēs in Alexandria; cf. Landvogt, 55ff., and C. Préaux, L'économie royale des Lagides (Brussels, 1939), 481.

[132] OGIS 179. 7ff. (Wilcken, Chrestomathie 1, 2, 168): ...ἐπ' Ἀνικήτου

One duty therefore of those charged with the oikonomia of the annual revenues and royal storehouses involved making such gifts to the local temples, in behalf of the workers and local officials but also the king too.

Further duties had to do with the mechanics of tax-collecting. Oikonomia may at times therefore mean specifically the office involved in such collection of taxes.[133] Detailed provisions doubtless had to be followed for the sublease of taxes, and one of the administrative tasks was to find trustworthy tax-farmers, οἱ διοικοῦντες τὴν ὠνήν, literally, "those who manage the contract for tax-farming."[134]

Other more specific assignments of duty for the oikonomoi are suggested in some of the contemporary titles. "Komon, son of Asclepiades, oikonomos of those (or those estates) at Naucratis" appears to have been the local

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οἰκονόμου σιτικῶν τῆς Ἡρακλείδου μερίδος κατηρτίσθη δίδοσθαι παρά τε ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν ὑπεσχολουμένων ἐν τῆι οἰκονομίαι διὰ τῆς μερίδος κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἀπαρχὴν εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ μεγίστου θεοῦ.... Cf. Landvogt, 57. Further, Wilcken, Chrestomathie 1, 2, 169. line 6 (PGrenf. 2. 37), where οἰκονομία is also used for village or district administration. Here οἰκονομία σιτικῶν is meant; the corresponding term, οἰκονομία τῶν ἀργυρικῶν turns up in PTurin 6. 5 (Landvogt, 56), where in numbers 5-7 ὁ πρὸς τῆι οἰκονομίαι τῶν ἀργυρικῶν τοῦ Παθυρίτου is the "oikonomos for moneys."

[133] Wilcken, Chrestomathie 1, 2, 331 (PTeb. 1. 27. line 21, 113 B.C.): φρόντι[σ]ον ὅπως... πρὸς ταῖς οἰκονομίαις καὶ ἀρχιφυλακι[τ]είαις προχειρ[ισθῶ]σιν ἀξιόλογοι. "Take care that . . . persons of repute are appointed to the posts of oikonomos and chief of the guard." Cf. PTeb. 8. 28 (3rd. cent. B.C.).

[134] Wilcken, Grundzüge 1, 1, 183, note 3. Cf. B.P. Grenfell, Revenue Laws of Ptolemy Philadelphus (Oxford, 1896), 97.

praefect of the imperial financial administration at that city, according to an inscription from the reign of Ptolemy Philopater (221-205 B.C.), or, less likely, the quaestor of that city.[135] The *oikonomos* of the district about Thebes (οἰκονόμος νόμου περὶ Θήβας is mentioned in a papyrus.[136]

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[135] *OGIS* 89. 1ff.: ὑπὲρ Βασιλέως Πτολεμαίου Θεοῦ μεγάλου Φιλοπάτορος Σωτῆρος καὶ Νικηφόρου καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ Πτολεμαίου Ἴσιδι, Σαράπιδι, Ἀπόλλωνι, Κόμων Ἀσκληπιάδου οἰκονόμος τῶν κατὰ Ναύκρατιν. "In behalf of King Ptolemy, the great God, Philopater, Saviour and Victory-bringer, and his son Ptolemy, Komon, son of Asclepiades, *oikonomos* of those at Naucratis, [dedicates this] to Isis, Sarapis, Apollo." See Landvogt, 54f., for literature and discussion.

Several interpretations are possible. Wilcken, *Ostraka*, 433, note 1, cannot decide whether Komon is a royal or city *oikonomos*. P. Meyer, *Das Heerwesen der Ptolemäer und Römer in Aegypten* (1900), p. 6, note 13, less probably, suggests he is an official of a Macedonian military garrison at Naucratis. Dittenberger, p. 139, n. 3, views him as a royal official, a view for which Landvogt, 55, persuasively argues: Komon is not οἰκονόμος *of* Naucratis, but οἰκονόμος τῶν κατὰ Ναύκρατιν = ὃς οἰκονομεῖ τὰ κατὰ Ναύκρατιν, i.e., he administers possessions about Naucratis. Whose possessions? The Ptolemy's, for whom Komon makes the dedication to the gods. He is therefore "the administrator of the domains of King Ptolemy with his headquarters in Naucratis."

[136] *PTeb*. 1, p. 47; I would take this as a reference to a royal *oikonomos*, as in note 135, stationed at Thebes. Cf. Edgar, *Zenon Papyri* (Annales du Service des Antiquités de l'Egypte, 1918ff.), 38. 2 (3rd cent. B.C.): ὁ οἰκονομήσας τὸν Ἀφροδιτοπολίτην νόμον. Further, *PPetrie* III, pp. 340ff. Less certain is the fragmentary papyrus from the third century B.C. reported by Jouguet, *Papyrus grecs* (Institut papyrologique de

The term οἰκονόμος μερίδος, "*oikonomos* of a section" or portion of a district, appears more than once after the reorganizations of the second and first centuries B.C.[137] "Village *oikonomos*" (οἰκονόμος κώμης)[138] and "*oikonomos* for the toparchy" (οἰκονόμος τοπαρχίας)[139] are witnessed to in papyri, as is the more impressive title "*oikonomos* of the king" (οἰκονόμος βασιλέως).[140] It is not certain whether this latter title is always to be equated with that of the Idios Logos (ἴδιος λόγος), another official in Egypt who served as administrator of the king's private treasury, or whether the two refer to separate offices in a Ptolemaic *cursus honorum*, but an inscription from late in the reign of Ptolemy XIII Novus Dionysus, about 57 B.C., tells how a subordinate official, Tryphon, "in behalf of Castor, the kinsman and (representative of the) Idios Logos and *oikonomos* of the king and of his sister and children, . . . has made this place of

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l'Université de Lille, Paris, 1907-08), 3. 51: τοῦ οἰκονομοῦντος τὸν Λ[ατο?] πολίτην.

[137] *PHib*. 1. 133 (3rd cent. B.C.): τοῦ οἰκονο[μοῦντος τὴν Ἡρακλεί]δου μερίδα. Cf. *OGIS* 179. 9, and *PPetrie* II. 18(1). 1.

[138] *PHib*. 1. 107, 108. Cf. *PGrenf*. 2. 37. 6 (2nd/1st cent. B.C.): ἡ οἰκονομία τῆς κώμης.

[139] *PHib*. 1. 169; *PSI* 510. 1 (3rd cent. B.C.): τοῦ [ο]ἰκονομ[ο]ῦ[ντος] τὴν κάτω τοπαρχίαν. Also *PHib*. 2. 210. 4, 240. 2, 248. ii. 7, iii. 6 (all *c*. 250 B.C. concerning Zenodorus, *oikonomos* of one of the toparchies of the Oxyrynchite nome). Discussion in *Prinz-Joachim Ostraka*, p. 53.

[140] Wilcken, *Chrestomathie* 1, 2, 163. Cf. *OGIS* 188, 189; in 188, quoted *infra*, note 141, the title seems to refer to a private official of the royal family, as Landvogt, 58, takes it. Further, *PPassalacqua* 1564A, cited in *Klio* 7 (1907), 261.

worship (τὸ προσκύνημα) for Lady Isis."[141] There is some evidence to suggest that the Idios Logos, a post which might be held by the oikonomos

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[141] Wilcken, Chrestomathie 1, 2, 163 (= OGIS 188 or CIG 3.4904), discussed in Landvogt, 57ff., where additional bibliography is given:
Κάστο[ρ]ος το[ῦ] συ[γ]γενοῦς καὶ πρὸ[ς] τ[ῶι] ἰδ[ίω]ι [λ]όγωι καὶ οἰκον[ό]μου
το[ῦ] βα[σι]λέ[ως] καὶ τῆ[ς] ἀ[δε]λφῆ[ς] καὶ τῶν τέκνων τ[ὸ] π[ροσ]κύ-
[ν]ημ[α] παρὰ [τῆ]ι κυρίαι Ἴσιδι π[ε]ποίη[κε] Τρύφω[ν]ος συνεφήβου
καὶ π[ρο]κεχει[ρισ]μέ[ν]ου ὑπ' αὐτοῦ.
Dittenberger suggests Τρύφωνος is genitive by anacoluthon for the necessary nominative; for a similar grammatical lapse, cf. Prinz-Joachim Ostraka No. 1, lines 1-4, p. 5, where this time a nominative occurs for the necessary genitive (infra, note 233). Keil (who would take the genitive as dependent on προσκύνημα) feels that ⟨ὑπὲρ⟩ has been omitted at the start of the inscription. With these corrections we may render the passage: "In behalf of Castor, the kinsman and (representative of the) Idios Logos and oikonomos of the king and his sister and children, Tryphon, his companion in youth, who was appointed by him [i.e., Castor], has made this place of worship for Lady Isis."

The Idios Logos was a subordinate of the dioikētēs, but nonetheless a powerful officer, arising late in the Ptolemaic period, though sometimes in the first century B.C. the dioikētēs also exercised the powers of this office; C. Préaux, L'économie royale des Lagides (Brussels, 1939), 409f., suggests as a translation for the title of the functionary serving πρὸς τῶι ἰδίωι λόγωι, "chargé des affairs personnelles."

In this inscription plainly there are two titles involved, that of πρὸς τῶι ἰδίωι λόγωι, and that of οἰκονόμος of the royal family. Wilcken, Chrestomathie, p. 196, takes the two as separate, but cites the opinion of P. Meyer, Festschrift für O. Hirschfeld, p. 132, that they are two elements in the complete title of one man. Landvogt, 58f., points out that the of the king, could entail religious functions in the first century B.C.[142] The main duties of such royal *oikonomoi* were financial, however, and their importance in this sphere is testified to by a passage in Plutarch, telling how Cato, after defeating Ptolemy in the east and annexing Cyprus, "persuaded the Senate to bestow freedom on Nicias the steward of the royal household of Ptolemy (τὸν οἰκονόμον τῶν βασιλικῶν), by testifying to his carefulness and trustworthiness" — high praise from the scrupulously honest Cato![143]

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oikonomos was originally an administrator in the general royal treasury (βασιλικόν), but that in the second century B.C. the king's personal treasury was separated from this with the Idios Logos as administrator. Here, perhaps because he was related to the king (συγγενοῦς), perhaps for convenience, Castor holds both offices, that of *oikonomos* and Idios Logos.

[142] Landvogt, 59, points out that in the first century B.C. the Idios Logos had a supervisory position over the priesthood, as the inscription just noted (note 141) suggests; "financial and priestly functions are therefore united in the Idiologos." Cf. further, W. Otto, *Priester und Tempel im hellenistischen Aegyptens* (1905-08), 1, 64. In Roman times the "high priest of Alexandria and all Egypt" was identified with the Idios Logos, one of the chief financial officials (Otto, 1, 61; Wilcken, *Ostraka*, 643ff.). Thus when an *oikonomos* held the additional office of Idios Logos, as Castor did, he had certain religious powers by virtue of the latter office.

[143] Plut. *Vit*. 778C (*Cat*. *Min*. 39. 3). On Nicias, a slave, who was nonetheless administrator of the royal household of the last Ptolemy on Cyprus, cf. *RE* 17, 1, 335.

A few passages seem to link the position of oikonomos with the armed forces — a not unnatural one, we have seen from earlier examples. An inscription at the base of an altar on Thera during the reign of Ptolemy V, Epiphanes (205-181 B.C.), reports the altar was given "by Alexander, scribe of the soldiers and fighting men at Crete and Thera and Arsinoë in the Peloponnesus, and oikonomos at the same places"; the sense may be that of "quaestor of the soldiers," but the phrase also allows him to be a civilian official.[144] A clearer example exists in a first-century B.C. papyrus giving an account of payments to minor officials and mentioning the oikonomos of the commander (οἰκονόμος στρατηγοῦ),[145] and a third-century B.C.

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[144] OGIS 102. 15: γραμμα[τεὺ]ς τῶν κατὰ Κρήτην καὶ Θήρα[ν κ]αὶ Ἀρσινόην τὴν ἐν [Πε]λοποννήσωι στρατιω[τ]ῶν καὶ μαχίμων καὶ οἰκον[όμ]ος τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων. Although P. Meyer, Das Heerwesen der Ptolemäer und Römer in Aegypten (Leipzig, 1900), 6, note 13, interprets the phrase as "quaestor of the soldiers," in distinction to quaestors of the cities and oikonomoi subject to the dioikētēs of the king, Dittenberger holds that even outside of Egypt the oikonomos was a civilian, a view in harmony with the other inscriptional evidence he cites. Edgar, Zenon Papyri, p. 41, takes this as "an instance of a military γραμματεύς being at the same time a civil οἰκονόμος," and Landvogt, 53f., decided similarly that Alexander "united two offices in one person . . . military paymaster . . . and administrator of lands" of the king. Landvogt, 53, incidentally, dates the inscription from the time of Ptolemy VI Philomētōr (181-146 B.C.), a bit later. Cf. OGIS 59, supra, 251, note 115.

[145] PTeb. 121. 34f. (94 or 61 B.C.): Δωρᾶτος οἰκονό(μου) στρα(τηγοῦ). Cf. POxy. 6. 929. 25 (2nd/3rd cent. A.D.), which speaks of "Ninnarus, steward of General Apion."

papyrus appears to speak of the οἰκονόμος of a reserve regiment.[146] One inscription of the second century B.C. lists an official whose titles include "oikonomos of the royal land, in charge of the revenues, commissioner, general"; the supposition is that during the administrative reforms of the period, because of a dearth of qualified men, some officials held several positions with administrative, judicial, and military power.[147] The title dioikētēs occurs more frequently in military use, [148] and we may conclude that both titles were known in the administration of the armed forces, through the accumulation of offices by some, if not through the outright use of the terms in military titles.

The great variety of responsibilities shouldered by these oikonomoi of different sorts, coupled with the fact that they themselves must often have been men of limited abilities, as the scrawling hands on some of the papyri suggest, led to cases of corruption inevitable in any bureaucratic system, and the papyri provide glimpses into what must have been the common lot of many citizens, administrative oppression. One complaint from the year 117 B.C. speaks of peculations of certain officials who "have been appointed without the cognizance of the dioikētēs, (ἄνευ διοικητικῶν χρηματ[ισμῶν), and some have wormed themselves into positions of oikonomos and toparch (οἰκονομ[ίαις] καὶ τοπαρχίαις)."[149] Protests of this type were common enough to prompt the sovereigns in B.C. 114, Cleopatra III and Soter II, to reaffirm an apparently older privilege that charges against subordinates of the central financial administration (διοίκησις) should not be decided by ordinary judges but "the complaints . . . they shall send to Irenaeus, the king's cousin and dioikētēs."[150] Records preserved from the files of the official correspondence of the dioikētēs the next year show vividly how matters progressed through the chain of command in such cases: Irenaeus, as dioikētēs, wrote to Hermias, censuring him for mismanagement; Hermias, in turn, wrote to the official who was in charge of public revenues (ἐπὶ τῶν προσόδων); he, in turn, to the royal secretary (βασιλικὸς γραμματεύς); and the latter, finally, to the local and village secretaries (τοπογραμματεῖς, κωμογραμματεῖς). Among the grounds for censure is the fact that men of repute are not used for the office of *oikonomos*, and instructions are issued that worthy men shall be appointed to the post in the future.[151]

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[146] PHib. 99. 7: ὁμ[ολο]γεῖ Παραμένης Κυρην[αῖ]ο[ς] ο[ἰ]κ[ο]νόμος Τελέστου ἔχε[ιν] παρὰ Διονυσίας....A receipt for rent, dated 27 B.C. "Paramenēs, a Cyrenean, oikonomos of Telestēs, agrees that he has received from Dionysia [the following payment]." Grenfell and Hunt, the editors, in a note, pp. 272f., suggest Paramenēs may be "a military settler acting as agent for his captain, Telestēs" or a regular government official. RE 17, 2119 notes that "duties of a military οἰκονόμος are described in the Diagramma of Chalkis, cf. Kougeas Ἑλληνικά, 1935, p. 195," to which I have not had access.

[147] CIG 3. 4860: οἰκονόμος γῆς βασιλικῆς, ἐπὶ τῶν προσόδων, ἐπιστάτης, στρατηγός, a description of an official during the reign of Euergetes II (ob. 116 B.C.); cf. C. Préaux, L'économie royale des Lagides (Brussels, 1939), 527.

[148] Cf. Preisigke, Wörterbuch, 3, 206 (Abschnitt 10). E.g., PAmh. 72. 1 (3rd cent.): ὁ δεῖνα διοικῶν τὴν στρατίαν.

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[149] PTeb. 24. 61f.: ἄνευ διοικητικῶν χρηματ[ισμῶν κα]θεσταμένων καὶ ἐνίων μὲν αὐτοὺς ἐνειληκότων οἰκονομ[ίαις] καὶ τοπαρχίαις. For an earlier directive in the third century B.C. on similar financial peculations, cf. PTeb. 703. 222-32, and the comments by C. Bradford Welles in The Idea of History in the Ancient Near East (New Haven, 1955), 154.

[150] Ibid., 7. 3-7.: δέχεσθαι ἐγκλήματα κατὰ τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων τῆι διοικήσει μηδ' ἐπισπᾶν μηδ' ἄλλοις ἐπιτρέπειν κατ' αὐτοὺς διεξάγειν, τὰ δὲ ... ἐγκλήματα ... ἀνα[π]έμπειν ἐπ' Εἰρηναῖον τὸν συγγενεῖ [l. συγγενῆ] καὶ διοικ[η]τήν.

The whole system of administration with its many *oikonomoi* was thus familiar to all the people, sometimes bitterly so. This *dioikēsis* or financial administration came directly into the lives of each of them, and one striking illustration points up what a visit by the chief *dioikētēs* from Alexandria on one of his many inspection tours must have meant to the average peasant. Contemporary documents show the great preparations for his coming— *parousia* is the term sometimes employed. The trip by Chrysippus, for example, to the Faiyum in 225 B.C. was marked by the forced selling of grain and the gathering of contributions for a "gift" (ξένια) for him. "Just as you wrote, we have prepared . . . five tame geese, fifty birds, fifty wild geese, 200 birds, 100 doves . . ." and so forth, a minor official writes.[152] Vivid memories the peasants would have, perhaps as with the advent-visits of the Roman emperors later on, the only bright spot being that the local roads might also be fixed up for the visit of the *dioikētēs*!

Oikonomoi, therefore, as governmental officials, or as private stewards, were part and parcel of the daily life of people in Egypt, and so was

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[151] *PTeb*. 27. especially lines 21, 38, 64. On the difficulties connected with the passages, cf. Wilcken, *Chrestomathie* 1, 2, 388, note on line 27. The view that the decree is not a new right but reaffirms an old privilege is taken by C. Préaux, *L'économie royale des Lagides* (Brussels, 1939), 556.

[152] Wilcken, *Chrestomathie* 1, 2, 410 and 411 (*PGrenf*. 2. 14b. lines 1ff.).

oikonomia as an everyday term in administrative procedure. One last example concludes our survey for Egypt by showing just how deeply this concept penetrated. It is a large collection of papyri, letters, accounts, and documents of all sorts, concerned with an *oikonomos* named Zenon, during the reigns of Ptolemy II and III (260-237/6 B.C.), and documents in amazing detail the scope of the terms with which we are concerned.[153] The materials are mostly from Apollonios, the *dioikētēs* in Alexandria, to Zenon his personal administrative assistant, who carries out a variety of tasks for him both in Egypt and abroad, including Palestine. Some of these duties were public, although it seems unlikely that Zenon was a royal *oikonomos* in charge of the finances of a nome or district; others are private.[154] "Agent of Apollonius" (ὁ παρ' Ἀπολλωνίου or τῶν περὶ Ἀπολλώνιον τὸν διοικητήν) is his usual title in documents, and he especially appears as the estate manager for Apollonius at a large model farm in Philadelphia in the Faiyum. Here he had to see to clearing the land, experiment with new crops and breeds of animals, supervise the building of temples and the general expansion of the city, rent out land, and take care of a host of duties connected with commercial and industrial ventures, all as Apollonius' "private secretary and confidential man of business."[155] The series of papyri shows how the multitude of chores included in treatises about oikonomia which were being written in the Hellenistic world at this very time actually were exemplified in an oikonomos of considerable ability and importance. They suggest too how hard it is sometimes to decide whether the title is private, or governmental, or both. And since, in these records, we also read of an oikonomos to handle Apollonius' private affairs in Alexandria, as well as of Zenon himself, and of the dioikētēs, hypodioikētai, and of royal oikonomoi, we begin to get a further idea of the frequency of the titles in Hellenistic times.

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[153] Edgar, *Zenon Papyri*. The *dioecētēs*, Edgar points out (p. 5), appears also in the Jewish *Letter of Aristeas*, a document relating to this same period.

[154] *Ibid*., pp. 27ff., especially p. 38: "There is less to be said for the suggestion, made more than once, that he was a government οἰκονόμος in charge of the finances of a nome or district; what we know about his work and about his relations to government officials seems to me to be quite irreconcilable with this theory."

[155] *Ibid*., p. 19.

Continued Use for Administrative Titles in Roman Times and Beyond

The application of these terms to designate governmental officials, so common in the Hellenistic world, survived into the Roman period and even beyond, but with some changes in meaning. Now generally the word oikonomos applied to a lower, less significant position than previously; often slaves held the post, though sometimes they were men of ability and the office not without influence.[156] The term seems to be especially common in this period for slaves or freedman of the imperial household, assigned to various tasks as oikonomoi of Caesar. The title oikonomos may still designate the treasurer of a city or other political unit, as before. Some new applications appear in the use of the word as part of the title for some petty post in local administration of revenues, not precisely found as in earlier times. And, of course, there are always a host of private oikonomoi, making exact identification of the meaning of the word impossible at times. All of these types of application in the Roman period can be illustrated by examples from the eastern Mediterranean world in inscriptions and papyri, especially in the case of Egypt, to show that *oikonomos* and the related terms continued in common parlance for government officials just at the time Christian terminology was taking shape.

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[156] See Landvogt, 8, 13, 17.

Occasionally in a classical author of Roman times one of these words may be employed for a fairly significant class of officials. Thus Lucian in the second century A.D. calls the procurators of Caesar οἱ Καίσαρος οἰκονόμοι, a usage paralleled for the imperial period in inscriptions and the papyri,[157] and Apollonius of Tyana in a first century A.D. epistle of his makes reference to the procurators in Asia as διοικηταί.[158] Normally, however, in Roman times the terms designate less important offices.

"City treasurer" is a frequent meaning for *oikonomos* in Greek cities of the imperial period, just as it had been previously. No hard-and-fast rules can be laid down for this officer's exact status, however.[159] At

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[157] Lucian *Alex.* 39 (*Luciani Samosatensis Opera*, ed. C. Jacobitz, (Leipzig, 1852), 2, 133). Further examples, in Egypt, for the title Καισάρων (or Καίσαρος) οἰκονόμος οὐικάριος, cf. *BGU* 102. 1., 156. 3 and *POxy*. 735. 6; and Wilcken, *Chrestomathie* 1, 2, 18. 13 (A.D. 197): οἰκονόμος τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν θειοτάτου Αὐτοκράτορος Σεουήρου (Septimus Severus) Περτίνακος.

[158] *Ep*. 31. The authenticity of the letters is questioned, however. The term could apparently be used on the local level too, as at Cyzicus; cf. F.W. Hasluck, "Unpublished Inscriptions from the Cyzicus Neighborhood," *JHS* 24 (1904), 21, note 4, line 67.

[159] Cf. Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor*, 1, 646 and 2, 1514 (note 45), who points out that, as the examples we shall cite show, the *oikonomos* did not replace the *tamias* in Roman times, because in some instances the two existed side by side. He quotes with approval, however, the suggestion of W. Liebenam, *Städteverwaltung im römischen Kaiserreich* (Leipzig, 1900),

Philadelphia in Lydia the οἰκονόμος πόλεως had taken over the functions of the older *tamias* in the second century A.D., we know from an inscription.[160] Smyrna, on the other hand, had one *oikonomos* along with several *tamiai*, he being a freedman apparently with a fairly responsible office.[161] Elsewhere in Asia Minor, Hierapolis had two *oikonomoi*,[162] Dorylaeum a city treasurer designated as οἰκονόμος τῆς πόλεως,[163] and Stratonicea an *oikonomos* referred to in a late third century A.D. inscription.[164] To this list might be added others, but they suffice as evidence for the title given to Erastus in Paul's list of greetings at Romans 16: 23— ὁ οἰκονόμος τῆς πόλεως of Corinth, a designation for which these epigraphical parallels have been found.[165]

295, that the *oikonomos* was a subaltern official.

[160] *Bulletin de Correspondence Hellénique* 1 (1877), p. 84: τοῦ τῆς πόλεως οἰκονόμου. Cf. *Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes* (Paris, 1906) (cited hereafter as *IG Rom*.), 4. 1630.

[161] *CIG* 2. 3151 and 3162, discussed in Landvogt, 27f. Cf. *IG Rom*., 4. 1435.

[162] See *supra*, 244, note 92, for reference, where allowance was made that the fragment may be Hellenistic; cf. *IG Rom*. 4. 813.

[163] A. Koerte, *Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen*, 1897 (I), pp. 400f., number 45, lines 12f., and *Jahreshefte des Österreichischen Archäologischen Instituts* 16 (1913), *Beibl*. 72, number 3.

[164] *CIG* 2. 2717; for text, cf. *infra*, 288, note 213.

[165] Rom. 16: 23: ἀσπάζεται ὑμᾶς Ἔραστος ὁ οἰκονόμος τῆς πόλεως. Cf. Henry J. Cadbury, "Erastus of Corinth," *JBL* 50 (1931), 42-58, where the material in Landvogt is summarized, because, Cadbury feels, the commentaries have generally ignored it and the dissertation is not of easy access.

Sometimes *oikonomos* denotes the treasurer of some political unit other than a city. At Aphrodisias, for instance, he is the treasurer of the council.[166] The words on a tombstone at Smyrna in the later part of the first century A.D. speak of "Neilus, *oikonomos* of Asia," apparently the

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He also discusses the inscription found in excavations at Corinth in 1929, reported in *JHS* 49 (1929), 221, and *AJA* 33 (1929), 525f., reading "ERASTUS. PRO.AED/S.P.STRAVIT." The Erastus of this inscription, it is concluded, is scarcely identifiable with the person of Rom. 16: 23. "PRO.AED" in the inscription apparently stands for *pro aedilitate*, and this Erastus presumably paid the cost for paving a section where the fragment was found in return for the honor of the office of aedile, a fairly high political position. The *oikonomos tēs poleōs*, on the other hand, is to be identified in the last half of the first century of the empire with the *arcarius* (*rei publicae*)— as it is translated in the Vulgate (Ambrosiaster and Old Latin codex g (9th cent.) reading *vel dispensator*)— a position usually filled by a slave or a man of servile origins. Thus the *cursus honorum* of a man would hardly include such dissimilar offices as *arcarius* and *aedilis*. Furthermore, early Christian tradition assumed that a city *oikonomos* was too busy to engage in missionary activity in addition and therefore held either that Erastus resigned his political position in order to carry out the missionary tasks suggested by references at Acts 19: 21 and II Tim. 4: 20 or that several men named Erastus were involved. At any rate, identification of the man of Rom. 16: 23 with the Erastus of the inscription in Corinth is "improbable if not impossible."

[166] *CIG* 2. 2811 (Roman period): ἡ βουλὴ Μένανδρον... υἱὸν Μενάνδρου τοῦ οἰκονόμου αὐτῆς. "The council" honors Menander "son of Menander, its *oikonomos*." Discussion in Landvogt, 44.

fiscal officer of the public treasury of the province of Asia.[167] A similar inscription on a tomb at Olympus in Lycia, at least second century A.D., tells of Macarius, "treasury-steward of the nation of the Lycians," a free man who held this high post in a confederation of some 23 cities.[168]

The word oikonomos or some Latin equivalent also crops up in a miscellany of minor local titles. Near Miletus a bilingual inscription was found, equating the term with the Latin title Quadragesimae Portoriorum (or Portorii) Asiae Vilicus, "steward of the 2½% port taxes (or tax) of Asia." The text reads, "To Felix, the slave of Primo, (who was) steward at Miletus of the (office of the) portorium of 2½% of Asia," the information being given in both languages.[169] Another inscription at Athens, from Roman times, notes in both Latin and Greek the existence of an official who had charge of the payment of the fee on a slave who was manumitted, usually five per cent of the total value of the slave— to give this "five per center" his majestic title, *Vigesimae Libertatis Vilicus* or in Greek εἰκοστῆς ἐλευθερίας οἰκονόμος.[170]

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[167] CIG 2. 3357 (end of the 1st cent. A.D.): Νείλῳ οἰκονόμῳ Ἀσίας. Landvogt, 27, refers to him as an official of the κοινὸν τῆς Ἀσίας, on which see RE 2, 1553ff.

[168] Bulletin de Correspondence Hellénique 16 (1892), pp. 225f., No. 81 (= Tituli Asiae Minoris, (Vienna, 1901-30), 2, 1151): Μακαρίῳ, οἰκονόμῳ τοῦ Λυκίων ἔθνους.... Discussion in Landvogt, 46f.

[169] H. Dessau, Inscriptiones Latinae selectae (3 vols.; Berlin, 1892-1916), 1862 (= Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (Berlin, 1862-1936) (cited hereafter as "CIL"), 3. 447). The text in Dessau reads: Felici Primioni [s] XXXX port(orii) Asiae vilic(i) Mil(eti) se[r](vo). Φήλικι Πρειμίωνος, κοιν(οῦ) τεσσερακοστῆς λιμεν(ικῶν) Ἀσίας οἰκον(όμου) Μειλήτῳ δούλῳ. The phrase, "vilicus of the (office of the) portorium," could mean "steward of the socii (i.e., corporation) who collected the tax (or farmed it)." The equation of the Greek and Latin titles is given in D. Magie, De Romanorum iuris publici sacrique vocabulis sollemnibus in Graecum sermonem conversis (Leipzig, 1905), 116. Dittenberger, OGIS, Vol. 2, p. 180, note 3,

An inscription similar to that at Miletus refers to "Pulcher, *oikonomos* in Iasos of the tax-collectors of the harbors of Asia," a slave apparently in the service of the *publicani*, or tax-collectors, doubtless a familiar figure of the day.[171] Public slaves also appear in the position of *oikonomoi*

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suggests reading the inscription with the plural, "XXXX portoriorum Asiae, in Greek κοινωνῶν, μ̄ λιμένων Ἀσίας, which Landvogt, 30, follows. The sense would be steward "of the 2½% customs taxes of Asia" or "for the tax-collectors of the 2½% customs tax," κοινωνῶν being taken in the sense of *publicani*. Cf. also *CIG* 2. 2852 and 2895.

[170] *IG*, Vol. 3, part 2, No. 1446 (=*CIG* 1. 963 and *CIL* 3. 555): Q. Calpurnio Eutycho Philetus p(u)bl(ici) XX [i.e., vigesimae] lib(ertatis) vi(li)cus fecit. Κ(όιντῳ) Καλπουρνί(ῳ) Εὐτύχ(ῳ) Φίλητος εἰκοστῆς ἐλευθερίας (ο)ἰκονόμος ἐποίησεν γνη(σί)ῳ στρατι(ώ)τῃ. "To Q. Calpurnius Eutychus, Philētus official in charge of the five per cent tax on manumission has made (this monument). To Q. Calpurnius Eutychus, a noble warrior, Philētus *oikonomos* for the five per cent tax on manumission has made (this)." D. Magie, *De Romanorum iuris publici sacrique vocabulis sollemnis in Graecum sermonem conversis* (Leipzig, 1905), 116, notes the equation of the Greek and Latin titles. The date of the inscription is uncertain, but Roman. Further discussion in Landvogt, 22.

[171] *OGIS* 522. 5: Πούλχερ κοινωνῶν λιμένων Ἀσίας οἰκονόμος ἐν Ἰασῷ. Dittenberger comments, Vol. 2, p. 180, note 3, "Pulcher was a slave rather than a free man," and equates οἰκονόμος with *vilicus*, comparing

in Greece, at Sparta, for example, under the empire.[172]

The imperial *oikonomoi*, slaves or freedmen of the household of Caesar, it has been noted, were quite common. Such a *dispensator Augusti* might be connected with the general administration of the emperor's property or might be attached to some specific imperial estate.[173] Accordingly such persons might be found anywhere throughout the empire. Typical is the designation of one of these creatures, "Ateimetos, Cesar's slave, *oikonomos*."[174] Examples can be cited from Ephesus, Elaundus (between Lydia and Phrygia), Pisidia, Cappadocia, Cilicia, and Thessaly in Greece.[175] One

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CIL 3. 447 (*supra*, note 169). Landvogt, 30, allowing that he may have been a freedman, points out such petty officials were frequent in the organizations of the *publicani*.

[172] For Sparta, see *CIG* 1. 1276, where the reference to φιλοδέσποτος οἰκονόμος is taken by Landvogt, 23, as meaning a slave in some subordinate office in Roman times. Similarly the inscription on a grave-stone from the region of Taenarum, *CIG* 1. 1498 (=G. Kaibel, *Epigrammata Graeca ex lapidibus conlecta* (Berlin, 1878), 479): Εὔτυχον οἰκονόμον, πόλλην φιλίην πορίσαντα. "Eutychos, an *oikonomos* who provided much friendship," a designation which Kaibel takes as a reference to a public *oikonomos*, but Landvogt, 23, a private slave.

[173] Cf. Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor*, 2, 1548.

[174] *IG Rom.*, 4. 1699: Ἀτείμητος Κέσαρος δοῦλος οἰκονόμος. D. Magie, *De Romanorum iuris publici sacrique vocabulis sollemnibus in Graecum sermonem conversis* (Leipzig, 1905), 116, equates the term with *vilicus* in Latin.

[175] For Ephesus, see *CIL* 3. 6575 (Aug. n. verna dispensator rationis extraord. provinc. Asiae) and 3. 7130 ([qui dis]pensavi[t in provin]cia

bilingual illustration from Cios in Bithynia suffices: here there was a slave of Caesar who served as "*oikonomos* (*dispensator*) over the grain supply," suggestive of the usage of the word observed earlier in Mylasa in Asia Minor and in Egypt.[176]

In Egypt itself, although the reorganization by Augustus in 27 B.C. and the following years meant many changes in the administrative procedures, the old title ἡ διοίκησις remained for the financial administration.[177] The term, in fact, broadened in concept at times so as to mean "administration"[178] generally, though the old distinction between διοίκησις as secular or imperial fiscal administration and the sacred or temple administration (τὰ ἱερατικά) also lingered on.[179] Likewise the title διοικητής

Asia), and *IG* *Rom*. 4. 1296. For Elaundus, *IG* *Rom*. 4. 1699 (Καίσαρος δοῦλος οἰκονόμος). Pisidia, *CIL* 3. 6082. Cappadocia, *CIL* 3. 12135. Cilicia, *CIL* 6. 6639 and 8577. Thessaly (Volo), *IG* 12, 2, 1124.

[176] *CIG* 2. 3738 (= *CIL* 3. 333 or *IG* *Rom*. 3. 25): Καίσαρος δούλου, οἰκονόμου [= dispensator] ἐπὶ τοῦ σείτου. Cf. *supra*, 243, note 88, and 257, note 130.

[177] Wilcken, *Grundzüge* 1, 1, 154; *Chrestomathie* 1, 2, 341.

[178] Cf. Wilcken, *Chrestomathie* 1, 2, 92 (*BGU* 337), where διοίκησις is used of the financial administration or expenditures of a temple of Soknopaios in the Faiyum, second or third century A.D., and 1, 2, 341 (*PFlorentinus* Z. 1-12, ed. Vitelli, *Atene et Roma* 7. 122f.). Further, *PMich*. 3, 147. 5 (Egypt, A.D. 145-47), which speaks of the water administration (ἡ τῶν ὑδάτων διοίκησις).

[179] Wilcken, *Ostraka* 656f.; *Grundzüge* 1, 1, 301. Both διοίκησις and τὰ ἱερατικά may be part of the state administration sometimes, as at *Chrestomathie* 1, 1, 341. But cf. *BGU* 20. 3f. (A.D. 141/42): διοικ[ή]σεως

persisted, although now Caesar was the top official, not Ptolemy.[180] The *praefectus Aegypti*, appointed by Caesar, seems to have filled the role of the former *dioikētēs* of Alexandria,[181] but in inscriptions the title ἐπίτροπος ἐπὶ διοικήσεως [Ἀλεξανδρείας] or in Latin *procurator ad dioecēsin Alexandreae* also appears, with its exact relation to the old Ptolemaic office not precisely clear.[182] Certainly, however the term *dioikētēs* for the official Roman title, imperial procurator, was still in use in the third century, and, according to one papyrus record as late as the sixth.[183] *Dioikētai* in the country, just as we concluded existed under the Ptolemaic administration, also are referred to in the Roman period in Egypt.[184]

A host of minor officials bearing the general title *oikonomos*, often qualified or described with further nouns or adjectives are vouched for from a number of sources in the Roman period too. *Oikonomoi* of Caesar

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τῆς τε βασιλικῆς καὶ ἱερᾶς.

[180] Wilcken, *Grundzüge* 1, 1, 156.

[181] *Ibid.*; cf. P.M. Meyer, "Διοίκησις und Ἴδιος λόγος" in *Festschrift für O. Hirschfeld*, (1903), p. 146.

[182] *Ibid.* Cf. *RE* 5, 1, 790. The phrase occurs, e.g., in *CIL* 3. 431 and Wilcken, *Chrestomathie* 1, 2, 170, line 29 (*BGU* 1. 8).

[183] Wilcken, *Ostraka*, 498, note 2. Third century: *BGU* 8. II. 29; *POxy*. 1, 61. 15; sixth or seventh century: *PGrenf*. 1, 63. 3. Further examples: *POxy*. 291. 15. (A.D. 25/26, Egypt); Strabo 17. 3. 25. and Plut. *Ant*. 67. use διοικητής as equivalent to the Latin *procurator*.

[184] Wilcken, *Grundzüge* 1, 1, 156, where it is argued these Roman *dioecētai* in the country where more insignificant than their counterparts in the Ptolemaic period. Examples in *POxy*. 2, 291 and *PTeb*. 2, 408 and 409.

(Καίσαρος οἰκονόμοι) are mentioned by Strabo, along with freedmen, as "having been entrusted with affairs of greater or lesser importance."[185] Such men who took part in the imperial administration of Egypt, are mentioned by name again and again in the papyri, reaching in a hierarchy of officials down to the village level, just as before, though to what extent they correspond to the Ptolemaic oikonomoi is again by no means clear.[186]

A very clear example of a Roman oikonomos in Egypt is the long inscription, OGIS 669 (=CIG 3. 4957), carved on the propylon of the Temple at the Great Oasis of Ghirge, in Egypt, an edict dated A.D. 68 from the praefect Tiberius Julius Alexander; a section on illegal extension of fiscal privileges reads in part (22ff.): "I command, therefore, whoever henceforth, epitropos or oikonomos of his lord, has any suspicion of those who are in public office . . . shall publicly proclaim his name. . . ." The ἐπίτροπος τοῦ κυρίου ἢ οἰκονόμος (same titles and order as at Gal. 4: 2,

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[185] Strabo 17. 797, cited by Wilcken, Grundzüge 1, 1, 159 (cf. Ostraka 499, note 4): παρέπονται δὲ τούτοις ἀπελεύθεροι Καίσαρος καὶ οἰκονόμοι, μείζω καὶ ἐλάττω πεπιστευμένοι πράγματα.

[186] Wilcken, Grundzüge 1, 1, 159 calls them the direct successors of the οἰκονόμοι τοῦ βασιλέως of the Ptolemaic period, though earlier (Ostraka 499, note 4) he wrote: "To what extent they basically correspond to the Ptolemaic οἰκονόμοι remains to be investigated." Specific references to such οἰκονόμοι include PTeb. 2, 296 (A.D. 123); and Chrestomathie 1, 2, 81 (A.D. 197) and 1, 2, 175 (BGU 156. 3, A.D. 201). In spite of the implication in Strabo, they are not really δοῦλοι, Wilcken notes (Grundzüge 1, 1, 159; cf. PTeb. 2, 296). A fragmentary petition by Alexandrian Jews c. 5 or 4 B.C. speaks of a δ[η]μ̣ό̣σ̣ι̣(ον) ο̣ἰ̣κ̣ο̣ν̣ό̣μ̣[ον] (BGU 4, 140. 10; Wilcken, Chrestomathie 1, 2, 58.), but just where such an official would fit into the administrative system is not clear.

Along with this variety of offices and multitude of different duties assigned to officials bearing the title oikonomos, it was inevitable that the noun oikonomia should also continue in use during Roman times with the sense of "the care and administration of such an office." The papyri illustrate this usage, as when a note in a cursive hand, dated Jan. 19, A.D. 188, from Aurelius, the procurator at Herakleopolis Magna, in Egypt, instructs a steward (οἰκονόμος) Elita, "Whatever things need to happen in the bathing-house which is under your administration (ἐν τῷ ὑπὸ τὴν οἰκονομίαν σου βαλανείῳ), let them be done quickly, in order that when the fine gentlemen are present, there may be no fault-finding at all."[187] Similarly another document from A.D. 157 speaks about the administration of affairs (περὶ οἰκονομία̣ς̣) by a stratēgos.[188]

We may conclude that the terms διοίκησις, διοικητής, and οἰκονόμος and οἰκονομία continued in use in Roman times, thus strengthening the

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by the way) are identified by Landvogt, 60, as two subordinate officials of the praefect, both active in a supervisory capacity in the same branch of the financial administration. Cf., further, O. Hirschfeld, Die kaiserlichen Verwaltungsbeamten von Augustus bis Diocletian (2nd ed., 1905), 367ff. A recently edited papyrus fragment, PHib. 2, 215. 2, refers to this same Tiberius Julius Alexander, a nephew of Philo and a Roman commander in the Jewish war, as being himself at one time a Καίσαρος οἰκονόμος.

[187] BGU 926. 3: π(αρὰ) Αυρηλ(ίου) Πλουτογέν[ο]υς ἐπιτρόπ(ου). ὅσα δέεται γενέσθαι ἐν τῷ ὑπὸ τὴν οἰκονομίαν σου βαλανείῳ, ἐν τάχει γενέσθαι, ἵνα παραγενομένων τ[ῶν] κρατίστων εὐσχημό̣ν̣[ων] μη̣δ̣[ε]μία μέμψις γένη[ται]. Ἠλίτᾳ οἰκον[όμῳ]....

[188] J. de M. Johnson, V. Martin, and A.S. Hunt, Catalogue of the Greek Papyri in the John Rylands Library (Manchester, 1911-15) 2. 78. 30.

familiarity any Christian writer of the period would have with them, and further also, beyond Roman times. In the Byzantine period in Egypt, for example, the terms διοικητής and οἰκονόμος are not much used in public financial administration — because they became so very common in ecclesiastical usage, one would guess — but in the Arabic period διοίκησις and διοικητής are still found as late as the eighth century.[189]

The Terminology in Guilds, Social Organizations, and Religious Activities

A final area of evidence may be adduced to show that oikonomos and related terms found a place during the Hellenistic and Roman periods, not only in private households and governmental administration, but also in regard to the affairs and offices of guilds and other societies and even in religious groups and temples.

Landvogt, in his summary of the epigraphical materials, concludes that the title oikonomos was employed for an official in a private club or organization as early as the fourth century B.C. and that this usage continued into Roman times, in Asia Minor and Egypt especially.[190]

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[189] Wilcken, Grundzüge 1, 1, 161ff. and 233. For a survey of Christian usage of the titles, cf. Preisigke, Wörterbuch 3, 137.

[190] Landvogt, 9 and 18. He states, p. 9, that oikonomos occurs for "an official in a private society in Lycia: Olympus (1st cent. B.C.); Caria: Iasos (Roman period); Ionia: Miletus (Roman period) and Smyrna (1st cent. A.D.); Lesbos (Roman period); Egypt: Ptolemaïs (3rd cent. B.C.)," but does not cite any references there. In the case of Iasos and Miletus, he seems to have in mind the oikonomoi of the publicani, in the sense that these tax-collectors represented a private syndicate, not an actual government bureau; cf. supra, 273f., notes 169 and 171. For Smyrna he may intend the

Specific evidence for the title *oikonomos* meaning the treasurer of a guild of artists devoted to Dionysus appears in Egyptian inscriptions as early as, if not earlier than, the same term is found in governmental circles there. A stone discovered in the town of Menshijeh and dated *c.* 240 B.C. records the information: "It seemed good to the artists devoted to Dionysus and the brother gods [i.e., Ptolemy Philadelphus and his wife] and to those who administer the society (τὴν σύνοδον νέμουσιν) to crown Dionysius, son of Mosaeus, who is prytanis for life, with a crown of ivy . . . [and to erect a stele]. The *oikonomos* Sosibius is to pay the cost for the stele."[191] A similar inscription from the same town a few years later preserves the resolution of the same *synodos* of artists to

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reference to the treasurer of the κοινὸν τῆς Ἀσίας , *supra*, 273, note 167, arguing that this confederation is not part of the imperial administration; but cf. *CIG* 2. 3173. 14 also. For Lesbos, the text discussed *supra*, 245, notes 98f., would fit. For Olympus, I am not sure what he has in mind, certainly not the reference to an *oikonomos* there given *supra*, 273, note 168, since that inscription is at least second century A.D. For the Ptolemaïs references, see *infra*, note 191.

[191] *OGIS* 50: ἔδοξεν τοῖς τεχνίταις τοῖς περὶ τὸν Διόνυσον... τὸ δὲ ἀνάλωμα τὸ εἰς τὴν στήλην δοῦναι τὸν οἰκονόμον Σωσίβιον. Dittenberger concludes, rightly, in his note that Sosibius is treasurer for the society of Dionysiac artists, not of the city. The inscription is translated in F.C. Grant, *Hellenistic Religions* (New York, 1953), p. 14.

On this type of society of Dionysiac craftsmen, cf. F. Poland, *de collegiis artificum Dionysiacorum* (Dresden, 1895); Erich Ziebarth, *Das griechische Vereinswesen* (Preisschriften gekrönt und herausgegeben von der Fürstlich Jablonowski'schen Gesellschaft zu Leipzig, 34: Leipzig, 1895), 74-90; and F. Poland, bestow like honors upon another man, Lysimachus, again concluding with the provision that the treasurer of the society is to pay the costs.[192] The verb *oikonomein*, meaning "to manage financial affairs," also occurs in regard to a guild of Dionysiac artists, as in the correspondence of Eumenes II of Pergamum.[193]

Dioikētēs must have been a fairly common title for an officer in social organizations of the ancient world too— "commissioner" or "administrator" perhaps makes a satisfactory rendering here. At least the term occurs in

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Geschichte der griechischen Vereinswesens (Preisschriften gekrönt und herausgegeben von der Fürstlich Jablonowski'schen Gesellschaft zu Leipzig, 38; Leipzig, 1909), 129-147 and 376f., where further bibliography is given. This sort of *synodos* of various musical performers, organized to further their common interests, with religious purposes playing an important role, arose under the influence of Alexander the Great and his successors. The organizations appeared in Athens, especially flourishing in the second century B.C., performing at games, festivals, and some cultic functions. They spread elsewhere, and in the Roman Empire an imperial *synodos* with Trajan or Hadrian as protector, appeared.

The use of οἰκονόμος for the treasurer of such a society is not unknown in Hellenistic times (cf. *RE* 17, 2119), but Landvogt, 50f., notes that in almost all κοινά from the third century B.C. on the title ταμίας is more common.

[192] *OGIS* 51, especially line 26. Discussion and detailed bibliography in F. Poland, *Vereinswesen*, *op. cit.* (*supra*, 281, note 191), 378.

[193] Cf. C. Bradford Welles, *Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period* (New Haven, 1934), p. 223 (53. IIB. 1.).

the singular in a professional guild at Perinthos in Thrace;[194] for an official in a phratry, a semireligious brotherhood stressing good citizenship, at Neapolis in Italy;[195] and elsewhere in Asia Minor and Egypt.[196] The plural appears in inscriptions from Iasos, where in a gymnastic society the colleges of both the elders and the young men elected annual commissioners or *dioikētai*, who cared for such obvious duties as the purchase of olive oil for the athletes, but who also apparently had something to do with providing sacrifices and even the sale of a priesthood.[197] One inscription from Iasos honors a former *dioikētēs* who had filled his position rightly and properly with his fellow-commissioners (τῶν συνδιοικητῶν).[198]

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[194] *Archäologisch-epigraphische Mitteilungen aus Österreich-Ungarn* 19 (1896), p. 67, line a 1; cf. J.P. Waltzing, *Étude historique sur les corporations professionelles chez les Romains* (Louvain, 1895ff.), 3, p. 75, number 208, line a 1.

[195] *CIG* 3. 5785; *dioikētai* are also mentioned here.

[196] Cf. F. Poland, *Vereinswesen*, *op*. *cit*. (*supra*, 281, note 191), 378, citing *Archiv für Papyrusforschung* 4 (1907), p. 167, line 1 (Hellenistic, συ[ναγωγὸς] καὶ διο[ικη]τ[ής]), and a 1st cent. B.C. inscription from Cyzicus, reported in *Mitteilungen des deutschen archäologischen Instituts, Athenische Abteilungen* 10 (1885), p. 203, line 2, and in C. Michel, *Recueil d'Inscriptions Grecques* (Brussels, 1900-1927), 1226.

[197] T. Reinach, "Inscriptions d'Iasos," *Revue des Études Grecques* 6 (1893), 153ff. See especially 157ff., No. 3, B. 26ff.: τοῖς διοικηταῖς τῶν νέων οἵτινες ἀνηλώσουσιν τὸν τόκον εἰς τὸ ἄλ(ε)ιμμα τοῦ ἕκτου μηνὸς προσαγοράζοντες τὸ ἔλαιον . . .; and pp. 170ff., No. 7, lines 9, 12, and 19. Further discussion in F. Poland, *Vereinswesen*, *op*. *cit*. (*supra*, 281, note 191), 378.

[198] *Ibid*., pp. 169ff., No. 6, lines 4, 8, and 9.

Sometimes societies such as we have been noting were thus involved in religious duties or interests, the offering of sacrifices, for example. In other cases, the organizations must have existed for specifically religious purposes and thus their officers had distinctly cultic tasks. For instance, an oikonomos previously mentioned on the island of Lesbos in pre-Christian times seems to have had charge of a women's festival, his office not being a state one but presumably a post in some private cultic organization; apparently too the duties of such an oikonomos would include general care for the temple or cult-house, at least its financial affairs.[199] A recently published papyrus from Egypt about 250 B.C. seems to be a list of people who are "members of an association or club," according to the editor, E.G. Turner, "which organized the celebrations of festivals for certain Greek gods"; the list includes an oikonomos, apparently of that religious society, though it is possible that was his title either in a private household or in some governmental position, of course.[200]

Besides these duties involving religious matters for oikonomoi in private organizations of various sorts, the man who held the post of oikonomos in state administration sometimes had assignments of a religious nature. To review, the oikonomos at Ephesus in Hellenistic times, we saw, was charged with providing the sacrifice and paying for it on certain state occasions, and also was to take part in that sacrifice along with priests and priestess, though as an intermediary of the city government, not as a cult official.[201] At Magnesia the college of *oikonomoi* had even more detailed tasks in this area: to provide the animal sacrifices for the Zeus and Sarapis cults, as well as paying for these items, and to be present with the other officials for the prayers at such sacrifices; and to lease certain temple buildings, supervise the finances, and even manage the priests' perquisites.[202] At Priene the *oikonomos* apparently had no such functions, but he did take charge of certain honors voted by the people at funerals.[203] Officials at Pergamum, to take a final example from Asia Minor, were said, in what may have been a quite conventional phrase, "to have administered affairs expediently for the people and for the gods."[204] In Egypt, we have also seen, the noun *dioikēsis* was used for the financial administration of a temple,[205] and the chores of a Ptolemaic *oikonomos* at times included making annual contributions to a local temple.[206]

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[199] Supra, 245, notes 98 and 99. Landvogt, 18, suggests the official had supervision over the cult's temple service, though the text itself does not clearly state this.

[200] PHib. 2. 214, line 16: Ἀρτεμίδωρος οἰκ[ονόμος?] καὶ μουσικ[ὸ]ν στ[...] Ἀπολλώνιος γρ(αμματεὺς) θ[εοῦ Σωτῆρος] καὶ Ἀρτέμιδος.... Turner's discussion is at 2, 132-34, with the quotation on 133. The mousikon may be a festival for the muses, or music in general; the theos Sōtēr is Ptolemy I.

In view of all this evidence, the question may be asked, was the term *oikonomos* ever specifically employed in the pre-Christian period to refer to the steward or manager of a religious cult, particularly in the mystery religions? Such a usage would shed light on its application in certain early Christian literature.[207]

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[201] *Supra*, 237, note 74.

[202] *Supra*, 238ff., notes 77-83.

[203] *Supra*, 236, note 72, and Landvogt, 40.

[204] *Supra*, 226, note 44.

[205] *Supra*, 276, note 178.

[206] *Supra*, 258f., notes 131 and 132.

[207] I Cor. 4: 1-2: οὕτως ἡμᾶς λογιζέσθω ἄνθρωπος ὡς ὑπηρέτας Χριστοῦ καὶ οἰκονόμους μυστηρίων θεοῦ. Titus 1: 7, the *episkopos*,

The verb *oikonomein* is at least once employed, it is to be noted, first of all, with the sense "administer a sacred office," and quite early at that, in a papyrus letter from the mid-third century B.C., when a son writes home: "Polycrates to his father, greetings. If you are well and your affairs are according to your wishes, it would be well, and we ourselves also are well. Know that I have been and am administering the sacred office (τὴν ἱεροποίαν ὠικονομημέ[νον])."[208] But since this verb had a notoriously broad usage in this period for administering all sorts of offices, this single passage proves little conclusively.

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as θεοῦ οἰκονόμον, is to be blameless. I Pet. 4: 10, Christians are to employ God's gifts as καλοὶ οἰκονόμοι ποικίλης χάριτος θεοῦ. Ignatius *Pol*. 6. 1, admonishes the congregation to watch over one another as θεοῦ οἰκονόμοι καὶ πάρεδροι καὶ ὑπηρέται.

[208] Stanislaus Witkowski, *Epistulae privatae graecae, quae in papyris aetatis Lagidarum servantur* (Leipzig, 1911), p. 6 (*PPetrie* 2. 11. 2): εἰ ἔρρωσαι καὶ τὰ λοιπά σοι κατὰ γνώμην ἐστίν, καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι, ἐρρώμεθα δὲ καὶ αὐτοί. γίνωσκέ με τὴν ἱεροποΐαν ὠικονομημέ[νον]. . . . Witkowski in a note on line 2 assumes the sense is that the son has prepared those things which are necessary for the feast days. This would fit with the evidence we have seen that organizations existed to care for such cult matters, among the officials of which were *oikonomoi* (*supra*, 284f.). W. Otto, *Priester und Tempel im hellenistischen Aegypten* (Leipzig, 1905-08), 2, 200 and 247, calls Polycrates a cult official, but admits the phrase could be applied to a private person. The participle is periphrastic. The middle-passive is unusual, but finds a parallel in the passive at Arist. *Pol*. 3. 18. 1 (1288a 34): πολιτεία ἀρίστη ἡ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων οἰκονομουμένη, and in the middle at Lucian *Iupp*. *Trag*. 37 (*infra*, Ch. 4, 478, note 139): τὰ...ἄπειρα...οἰκονομούμενοι.

Inscriptions at Eleusis talk of managers for the mysteries there, but the term employed there apparently is never oikonomos but usually ἐπιμελητής,[209] though it may be added that oikonomos and epimelētēs are frequently associated with each other, both occuring in Egyptian government administration,[210] and may have been at times interchangeable. However no passage has been found as yet, referring to an οἰκονόμος μυστηρίων among the officials in a mystery cult (though this could be due to the scantiness of our sources on such matters), nor significantly do any of the New Testament commentaries, in dealing with passages where Paul or someone else calls himself an "oikonomos of the mysteries of God," cite such evidence.[211]

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[209] Thus F.C. Grant's Hellenistic Religions (New York, 1953), p. 15, speaks of "chosen stewards of the mysteries," but the Greek reads οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ τῶν μυστηρίων in SIG², 650. 11 and 43, 649. 8, and 620. 10. On the latter examples (τῶν ἐπὶ Λυκειώ[ι π]ερὶ μυστηρίων [ἐπιμ]ελητῶν), cf. Arist. Ath. Pol. 57. 1., where the same phrase occurs.

Busolt, 502, in discussing the various cultic officials, recites the titles used in the temple administration, such as tamiai, hierotamiai, hieronomoi, hierarchai, and neōpoioi, but does not include the oikonomos. For Eleusis he specifically mentions the ἐπιστάται Ἐλευσινόθεν and the ταμίαι τοῖν θεοῖν, but no officials called oikonomoi. Here and there, he does point out, as we have seen for Magnesia, administration of temple treasures was entrusted to secular city officials. P. Stengel, Die griechischen Kultusaltertümer (I. von Müller's Handbuch der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft 5, 3) (3rd ed.; Munich, 1920), 50ff., lists the duties of the epimelētai at Delphi, including the bringing of sacrifices and sharing in the sacrificial meal, and the role tamiai played in cult administration, but he, too, is silent on the existence of oikonomoi in such mystery cults.

[210] Supra, 254ff. Further, e.g., PTeb. 61b. 22.

We have already noted the fact that a person holding the office of oikonomos is sometimes recorded as engaging in prayer and sacrifice, apparently as a part of his office. What of this? Cases where the oikonomos is the manager of the private estates of some individual, like the inscription from Bithynia where a freedman, who is in charge of cattle breeding and goods generally on a private estate, wrote, "We, Claudius Seērus Ophelion, oikonomos, and Hēlias, have dedicated (this) because of a vow to Zeus Epidēmios for children and cattle,"[212] prove nothing; this is merely an individual's act. The fact that the state oikonomos did take part in religious sacrifice and prayers as an official duty is somewhat different, though; it is a practice which continued into Roman times, as witness this inscription from Stratonicea in Caria in the third century A.D.[213] At the time when, during the reign of Valerian and Gallienus (A.D. 253-260), Asia was being laid waste by barbarians, especially the Scythians, the great temple of Ephesus recently having been burned by them, the city of Stratonicea addressed a petition to the gods through its oikonomos, asking whether the barbarians would ravage the land again in the coming year. He must have been a citizen, holding a fairly important office, for the city addresses the gods through him.

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[211] So, e.g., Bauer, sub voce, but cf. infra, 289ff., on one passage; G. Kittel, Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, sub voce; standard commentaries on I Cor. 4: 1-2.

[212] Mitteilungen des deutschen archäologischen Instituts, Athenische Abteilung 19 (1894), p. 372: Διὶ ἐπιδημίῳ Κλαύδιος Σεῆρος Ὀφελίων οἰκονόμος καὶ Ἡλιὰς ὑπὲρ τέκνων καὶ τῶν βοῶν εὐχῆς χάριν ἀνεστήσαμεν. Discussed in Landvogt, 25f.

[213] CIG 2. 2717: ἡ πόλις, ὡς ἐκέλευσε καὶ Σέραπις, ἐρωτᾷ διὰ Φιλοκάλου β̄ οἰκονόμου, εἰ ἐπιστήσονται οἱ ἀλιτήριοι βάρβαροι τῇ πόλει ἢ τῇ χώρᾳ τῷ ἐνεστῶτι ἔτει. "The city, as also Sarapis commanded, asks through Philokalos the oikonomos whether the guilt-laden barbarians will attack the city or the country in the year at hand." Discussed by Landvogt, 44f. Cf. also supra, 244, note 92 (Hierapolis).

In evaluating such evidence, it must be remembered that cultus was always a prime concern of ancient state officials.[214] Not separation of church and state, but intertwining of the two was the custom, so that cult was a bulwark, though often quite nominal and religiously meaningless, to the state. Accordingly all state officials had certain religious duties to perform, including sacrifice and prayer as a part of their office. The archōn, for example, as well as the oikonomos, performed religious functions along with political ones.[215] The oikonomos, it will be noted, usually appears in religious activities, not alone, but in company with a number of other state officers; nor does he have seemingly any more important actions, religiously speaking, to perform, nor a greater number than other functionaries. Therefore, it must be concluded that although such a person bearing the title oikonomos, as part of his private devotions or in line with civic duties incumbent on him as a political officer but also required of all other political figures, might perform religious duties, these do not make him a cult official.

However, there exists one passage, which, according to its editor, seems to answer in the affirmative the question of whether or not oikonomoi existed in pre-Christian pagan religion. But even here the evidence is not without difficulties, and curiously, New Testament scholars, with one exception, have failed to apply the material to passages where Christians speak of themselves as *oikonomoi* of God.[216]

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[214] Cf. Busolt, 514ff. In ancient sources, e.g., Arist. Pol. 6. 8 (1322b and 1328b).

[215] Cf. RE 2, 579-81.

The passage in question is a papyrus fragment from the temple of Sarapis, a whole complex of sacred buildings and precincts at Memphis, in Egypt, an account of bread supplies issued to cult priestesses there called the "twins" (δίδυμαι) between 164/63 and 161/60 B.C., edited, translated, and discussed at some length by Ulrich Wilcken in his definitive treatment on the Sarapis cult.[217] Although exact origins of Sarapis as a deity are

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[216] The passage here under discussion is cited by Bauer, *sub* *voce*. The reference in Preisigke, *Wörterbuch*, 2, 161, in connection with οἰκονόμος, "Siehe Abschnitt 20, Heidnischer Kultus," is misleading; the index there lists neither οἰκονόμος nor διοικητής.

[217] Ulrich Wilcken, *Urkunden* *der* *Ptolemäerzeit* (*Ältere* *Funde*) (2 vols.; Berlin and Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter and Company, 1927-1935) (cited hereafter as "Wilcken, *UPZ*"), No. 56 (Vol. 1, pp. 280-282). Wilcken's work is recognized as a classic discussion on the Sarapis cult; cf. *OCD*, 793. For brief summaries, cf. *RE*, Series 2, Vol. 2, pt. 1, 2394-2426 (article, "Sarapis"); *CAH* 7, 145f.; and O. Weinreich, *Neue* *Urkunden* *zur* *Sarapis* - *Religion* (Sammlung gemeinverständlicher Vorträge und Schriften aus dem Gebiet der Theologie und Religionsgeschichte, 86; Tübingen, 1919), 4ff., where the possible influence of the formula εἷς Ζεὺς Σάραπις and other motifs of the cult upon Christian creedal slogans is especially discussed.

The papyri, of which this text is a part, where found by a native in 1820 near the temple, deposited in a jug. These records, in addition to shedding light on the internal administration of the cult, stirred up considerable discussion about the phrase in the documents, "those who live uncertain, it would appear that his cult arose at the temple in Memphis where Apis, a sacred bull, traditionally was kept, each bull being mummified ("Osirified," from a connection with the god Osiris) upon death. Sarapis thus was brought into connection with the older, traditional Egyptian deities, including Isis, the wife of Osiris, but he himself seems to have been primarily a product of the Hellenistic age, a syncretistic blending of Osiris, Zeus, and other Greek gods and therefore a reflection of the Ptolemaic culture of the times. His cult, encouraged by the ruling classes, seems especially to have appealed to Greeks and Macedonians in the military and civil services of the Ptolemy, and they erected splendid temples like the Sarapeum at Alexandria, reckoned among the wonders of the ancient world and finally destroyed by Bishop Theophilus only in A.D. 391. This cult of Sarapis, often including worship of other gods, spread in late Hellenistic and Roman times beyond Egypt throughout the Mediterranean world to become one of the significant religious movements of the day.

The bread account from the Memphis temple, with which we are concerned, is one of a series of administrative records covering the thirteenth to the twenty-ninth years of the reign of Ptolemy VI Philomētōr (169-152 B.C.). It is written in the hand of one Ptolemaios, Glaukias' son, and may be translated as follows:

ἐν κατοχῇ ," literally "in possession." Were they members of a religious order, a group akin to the monks of later Christianity, men "in possession of the spirit," as suggested, e.g., by Erwin Preuschen, "Mönchtum und Sarapiskult," Jahresbericht Ludwig-Georg-Gymnasium (Darmstadt, 1899)? Or were they sick people sheltered in the temple, or debtors imprisioned at the temple jail for nonpayment of taxes? Cf. RE, Ser. 2, 2, 1, 2412f. for summation of views and bibliography.

(Year) 18 [=164/63 B.C.], Thoyth [a month in the Egyptian calendar corresponding roughly to September] 1, account of the bread of the twins and of Achamanrēs. They have received payment from Thoyth 1 until Mechir [roughly February] 7.

(Year) 19 [= 163/62 B.C.], Thoyth 1, until Mechir 15 . . . they have received payment. From Phamenoth [roughly March] 1 until Pachon [May] 30, at half rate. In Payni [June], 30 pairs. In Epiph and Mesore [roughly July and August], at half rate. The names of the *oikonomoi*: Petobastis and Sompatous.

(Year) 20 [=162/61 B.C.], Thoyth 10 [*sic*, for 1], until Choiach [December] 10 they have received three parts (quarters) payment. The *oikonomos* Achamanrēs.

(Year) 21 [= 161/60 B.C.], Phaophi [October] 10, until the thirtieth, at half rate. Hathyr [November], of grain 3/4. Choiach and Tybi [December and January] at half rate. In Mechir and Phamenoth they have received nothing. Pharmuth [April] and Payni [read Pachon] grain dr. . . . Payni artab. (?) . . . .[218]

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[218] Wilcken, *UPZ*, No. 56 (Vol. 1, p. 281, with commentary on p. 282). The papyrus fragment, entitled by Wilcken "A Bread Account (λόγος τῶν ἄρτων)," is in the Louvre in Paris, Entrée 7172 Recto col. vii, and was previously edited by H. Weil under the title "Un papyrus inédit de la bibliothèque de M. Ambroise Firmin-Didot," in *Monuments grecs publiés par l'association pour l'encouragement des États grecques en France*, 1879, pp. 34ff. (Ἔτους) ιη Θωὺθ ᾱ τῶν διδυμῶν λόγος τῶν ἄρτων καὶ Ἀχαμανρῆτι. Ἀπέχουσι ἀπὸ Θωὺθ ᾱ ἕως Μεχεὶρ ζ̄. (Ἔτους) ιθ Θωὺθ ᾱ ἕως Μεχεὶρ ιε̄ [[..]] ἀπέχουσιν.

The document thus lists allotments over a four year period to the twins, cult priestesses whom Wilcken calls an ancient Egyptian institution,[219] and also makes mention of *oikonomoi*. For the eighteenth year a man named Achamanrēs is mentioned, though without any title; for the nineteenth year two *oikonomoi* are named, Petobastis and Sompatous; in the twentieth year the aforementioned Achamanrēs is given the title *oikonomos*, and in the twenty-first year no officials are named, but the text is broken and incomplète. What is to be made of these facts?

Since previous investigators have not examined the passage, Wilcken discusses it in some detail and decides these *oikonomoi* must be part of

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5 ʼΑπὸ Παμενὼθ ᾱ ἕως Παχὼν λ̄ κατὰ τὸ
ἥμισυ. Παῦνι ζεύγη λ. ʼΕπεὶφ καὶ Μεσορὴ [.]
κατὰ τὸ ἥμισυ. Τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν οἰκονόμων
Πετοβάστιος καὶ Σομπατοῦ. (Ἔτους) κ Θῶυθ ῑ
ἕως Χοίαχ ῑ τρία μέρη ἀ(πέ)χουσι.) οἱ οἰκονό^{μο}ς
ʼΑχαμανρῆ-
10 ⟦ρη⟧ς. (Ἔτους) κα Φαῶφι ῑ ἕως λ̄ κατὰ τὸ
ἥμεισυ. Ἁθὺρ σίτου ∟δ̄. Χοίαχ καὶ Τῦβι
κατὰ τὸ ἥμισυ. Μεχεὶρ καὶ Παμενὼθ οὐθὲν εἰ-
λήφασιν. Φαρμοῦθι καὶ Παῦνι σ[ί]του δραχ[μ....]
Παῦνι ∟

The dative ʼΑχαμανρῆτι in line 2 Wilcken takes as a mistake for the genitive ʼΑχαμανρῆτος, an error also occurring at *UPZ* 104. 2ff., which Ptolemaios likewise wrote. The phrase in line 9 τρία μέρη he suggests means 3/4, as at 54. 25. The abbreviation ∟δ̄ in line 11, which Weil had taken to mean 4000 drachmae, Wilcken refers to 3/4 artabe, a Persian dry measure of over 11 gallons. For the plural οἱ in line 9, Wilcken reads the singular ὁ.

[219] Wilcken, *UPZ*, Vol. 1, pp. 46f.

the administration of the Sarapeum.[220] They are not oikonomoi of the Ptolemaic government, he reasons, since none of the royal oikonomoi would fit the functions here. The οἰκονόμος τοῦ νόμου or τῆς μερίδος might furnish grain to a temple like the Sarapeum, as we have seen,[221] but the priestesses on the temple staff would receive this grain or the bread made out of it from the temple administration, not from the provincial finance department. The oikonomoi in the text, Wilcken argues, are rather officials with whom the twins stand in a direct administrative relationship,[222] to whom they are immediately indebted for supplies, and such a connection is to be sought in the temple administration, rather than in the finance department of the state.

A series of arguments are then advanced for considering these oikonomoi to be officials of the Sarapeum. It is to be observed, first of all, that for the nineteenth year of the account, two oikonomoi are mentioned. These two officers could not refer to the twin political positions of "oikonomos for moneys" and "oikonomos for supplies" which had appeared in each district of Egypt in the second century B.C.,[223] since only the latter of these two would be concerned with supplying bread. On the other hand, Wilcken goes on, there is no reason why the Sarapeum could not have two oikonomoi working together at the same time; certainly we have seen several examples of more than one oikonomos in office at once.[224] It is odd, Wilcken admits, that for the years eighteen and twenty of the account only one such official is mentioned, and he offers the hypothesis that during the nineteenth year the first one named, Petobastis, had died in office, and his term was filled out by Sompatous. Admittedly, though, the phrase τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν οἰκονόμων does not support this idea, and, it might be added, this ingenious explanation for two oikonomoi in a single year might just as well be applied to remove an obstacle from the view that these were officials of the royal provincial administration, the one Ptolemaic oikonomos having died in office and been replaced by a successor for the remainder of the year. Or shall we say that the plural article οἱ is correct in line 9, but that for some reason, unknown to us, only one oikonomos is then named for that year? That, in other words, there were two temple oikonomoi each year?

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[220] Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 280f., from which his discussion is here summarized.

[221] Supra, 258f., notes 131, 132.

[222] Cf. lines 1f. in the text (supra, 292, note 218): τῶν διδυμῶν λόγος τῶν ἄρτων καὶ Ἀλχαμανρῆτι.

[223] Supra, 254 and 257.

[224] Supra, 233, note 62; for example, in Magnesia, 229, note 51, 238ff., notes 77-81; in Priene, 235, note 69; in Mylasa, 242f., notes 85 and 86;

Secondly, Wilcken holds, the men named in the document as oikonomoi all have purely Egyptian names, Achamanrēs, Petobastis, and Sompatous, and this suggests men in temple administration, rather than in the royal administration, since men in the important posts of district government at this time were generally Greeks. It is true that in passages we have already examined where an oikonomos was mentioned by name in Hellenistic Egypt, the name was usually Greek,[225] whereas the whole Sarapis cult movement was syncretistic, combining both Greek and Egyptian elements and men. Wilcken's contention is that Egyptians with Egyptian names might more readily

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in Apollonia, 246, note 100.

[225] E.g., supra, oikonomoi mentioned in Ptolemaic administration by name included Apollonius son of Ischyrion (note 131), Anicetus (note 132), Komon (note 135), Castor (note 141), Nicias (note 143), Alexander (note 144), and Zenon (note 153).

gain positions of some import in the religious cult than in governmental circles. Egyptians, like Manetho, the high priest, whose history of Egypt was so often used by patristic writers to establish biblical chronologies, did reach positions of leadership in the Sarapis movement and the cult itself was basically Egyptian.[226] But, it must be remembered, this religious movement was also under the aegis of the Ptolemies and seems to have taken root particularly among the ruling Greek classes in Egypt. Therefore, to argue that the oikonomoi here must be attached to the temple administration on the basis of the fact that the three mentioned have Egyptian names is somewhat bold.

A third point, also unimpressive perhaps alone, but more decisive when united to these other bits of evidence, is brought forward by Wilcken. The oikonomoi mentioned here are appointed annually; this practice speaks against identifying them with the provincial oikonomoi, since nothing is apparently known of any such yearly appointment to that post. It may be countered, for whatever it is worth, that in cities in Asia Minor during this same Hellenistic period oikonomoi were selected for terms as short as a month,[227] but on the whole the argument again points towards the possibility that temple rather than governmental oikonomoi are meant.

Wilcken next goes on to point out how a temple like the Sarapeum would have its own economic officials. Other temple records in the Sarapeum and the Asclepieion speak of "men appointed for the business arrangements," officials of whom the temple personnel said, "it is customary for us to receive our necessities from them."[228] Such temple officials evidently constituted the authority to whom royal officers delivered the regular grain assignments and from whom priestesses like the twins and other cult personnel received bread. Such a task, indicated in these other passages, might well be assigned to the oikonomoi mentioned in the bread account given above. The oikonomoi there mentioned thus seem to have belonged to the group of officials "appointed for business arrangements" and, in fact, may have stood at the top of the temple's administrative staff, though the question must be left open as to whether the two terms are simply synonymous.

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[226] Elizabeth Visser, Götter und Kulte im Ptolemäischen Alexandrien (Allard Pierson Stichting, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Archaeologisch-historische Bijdragen, 5) (Amsterdam, 1938), 20-24, remarks that the Greeks had always looked to the Egyptians in things religious from the times of Herodotus on and concludes that in the Ptolemaic period Sarapis "is and remains, even in Alexandrian cult, an Egyptian god" (p. 23).

[227] E.g., in Magnesia, supra, 239.

Wilcken therefore reaches the conclusion in his discussion that this text demonstrates for the first time that temple oikonomoi existed in the Sarapis cult of Hellenistic Egypt, officials in charge of "household management" and food distribution within the temple precincts, apparently serving for a one year term.[229] It was an office for which he cites parallels in other societies and clubs of the day[230] and for which he claims a final bit of support in the fact that "later the Christian church, which took over so much from the temples, had its οἰκονόμος too."[231] This latter argument, of course, runs in exactly the opposition direction from what we are interested in demonstrating.

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[228] Wilcken, UPZ, 42. 19 and 34: οἱ πρὸς τοῖς Χειρισμοῖς τεταγμένοι...παρ' ὧν ἔθος ἐστὶν ἡμᾶς τὰ δέοντα κομίζεσθαι.

[229] Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 281.

[230] Ibid., citing OGIS 50 and 51, discussed supra, 281ff., notes 191 and 192, and the Prinz-Joachim Ostraka, l. 6, discussed infra, 298ff.

[231] Ibid., 281.

One other bit of more direct evidence, put forward by Wilcken in a footnote, to demonstrate his contention that *oikonomoi* existed in pagan cult prior to Christian times, must now be considered. He proposes that the Hermias mentioned in a phrase in the *Prinz-Joachim Ostraka*, Ἑρμίου οἰκο(νόμου) καὶ τῶν ἄλλων θιασιτῶν, is an official, not of the government, but of a cult society. These *Prinz-Joachim Ostraka* are a collection of 29 sherds from Ombos in Egypt dated between 79 and 53 B.C., during the reign of Ptolemy XIII Neos Dionysos (Auletes), who was on the throne from 80 to 51 B.C.[232] The fragments record the annual burial rites of sacred bird mummies, of the ibis or the falcon, conducted by a *thiasos* or cult group. The actual ceremony seems to have been carried out by this cult organization rather than the priests, and the chief civil officials of the area also apparently were members of the cult group and take a part in its activities. Text Number 1, dated January 17, 79 B.C., is typical; as Preisigke understands the text and emends it, it reads:

> "In year 2, on Tybi 8, under the reign of King Ptolemy and Queen Cleopatra, called Tryphaena, his sister, Theoi Philopatores, sacred animals have been presented, in the presence of Menandros the general, the *oikonomos* Hermias, son of Kallias, the topogrammateus Totoeus, Euanthes, the son of Stasias, as well as the other members of the *thiasos*. The number [of animals was] 357."[233]

Preisigke's rash treatment of the Greek text, however, is scarcely justified by the reason he offers for conflating, inverting, and omitting a word in lines 5 and 7; he explains, "Since an οἰκονόμος Καλλίας otherwise never appears in these ostraca, there is evidently a scribal error here."[234] This sort of restoration seems extreme in view of the fact that in the 22 Greek fragments preserved, often only a line or two in length, the titles of some individuals are never given and others are not cited in full, while the names that do occur in the texts are certainly a confusing array— besides the Hermias, son of Kallias, which Preisigke proposes here, and which does occur at 2. 7, and 5. 5, and 8. 7, in the latter two of which he is designated as an oikonomos again, there is also a Kallias, son of Hermias (2. 11; 3. 9; 5. 6, 7; 13. 7, 8; 17. 5, 6); a Hermias, son of Hermias,

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[232] So Preisigke, *Prinz-Joachim Ostraka*, p. 20; *OCD*, 746, refers to the ruler from 80 to 51 B.C. as Ptolemy XII, and *The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature* (Oxford, 1937), 352, as Ptolemy XII.

[233] *Prinz-Joachim Ostraka*, p. 5:



"Ἔτους β, Τῦβι η̅, ἐπὶ Βασιλέως
Πτολεμαίου καὶ Βασίλισσα Κλεοπάτρα
ἡ καὶ Τρύφαινα ἡ ἀδελφὴ θεοὶ Φιλοπά-
τορες καθέστακαι ἱερὰ ρῶια ἐπὶ Με-
νάνδρου στρατηγοῦ, Καλλίου οἰκονό(μου)
Τοτοεῦς τοπογρα(μματέως), Εὐάνθου τ̣ο̣ῦ̣ Στασίου,
Ἑρμίου οἰκο(νόμου), καὶ τῶν ἄλλων θιασιτῶν,
ἀριθ(μῶι) τνϛ.

Preisigke corrects the nominatives to genitives in lines 2-4, reading καὶ βασιλίσσης Κλεοπάτρας... φιλοπατόρων, and then suggests for lines 5 and 7, "Read, instead of Καλλίου οἰκονόμου (line 5) and Ἑρμίου οἰκονόμου (line 7), Ἑρμίου τοῦ Καλλίου οἰκονόμου." Should ἐπὶ in line 4 be given the same meaning as in line 1, so that the sense is "in the generalship of Menander"?

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[234] *Ibid.*, p. 53.

oikonomos (6. 2, 3), and a plain Hermias, also an *oikonomos* (7. 6), besides one text that reads "through Hermias, the son of Kallias, and Porthotes who are both over the revenues and royal accounts and the other forms, and Kallias, son of Porenbekios, and Kallias, son of Hermias, the leader of the *thiasos*, and all those of the group (συνόδου) of Hermias."[235] If this is not enough to discourage dogmatism, there is another text which speaks within three lines of "Hermias, the son of Kallias, the *oikonomos*, and Porthotes, Kallias, the son of Hermias, the topogrammateus . . ." (5. 5-7)!

Faced by such a display of similar names and titles, one must feel uncertain about denying the possibility of any "*oikonomos* Kallias," and one is further tempted to try to make sense of the text as it stands, assuming there are *two* *oikonomoi* involved, one named Kallias, the other named Hermias, and that, as Wilcken suggests, one is in the government, the other an official of the cult group.

Preisigke himself points out there definitely was such a cult group in the area, referred to once as "the society of Hermias" (ἡ τοῦ Ἑρμαίου σύνοδος).[236] This group further, he says, had a leader called in one text the ἀρχιθιασίτης (2. 11), who in the year 78 B.C. was Kallias the son of Hermias. This is the same man, Preisigke believes, who appears throughout the texts in a variety of governmental positions, and so he concludes that such a man must have held political offices in addition to his title in the cult group.[237] One later text in 54 B.C. speaks of Kallias, son of Hermias, as "president of Hermes-Thoth" (προστάτης τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ, 17. 5, 6), not a priestly office, but a position of leadership in the local cultic organization of the god Hermes Trismegistus. Preisigke assumes that this is another way of referring to the society (σύνοδος) mentioned above, pointing out that the title "president or manager for Isis" (προστάτης Ἴσιδος) is fairly common in that cult movement.[238] Spiegelberg adds that in demotic documents the designation "manager for Isis" occurs as a translation of this Greek phrase.[239]

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[235] *Ibid.*, 2. 7-13, p. 6, as emended by Preisigke, correcting the nominatives to genitives: δι' Ἑρμίου τοῦ Καλλίου καὶ Πορθώτου ⟨τῶν⟩ ἐπὶ τῶν προσόδων καὶ βασιλικ(ῆς) γραμματείας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἰδῶν, καὶ Καλλίου Πορενβήκ(ιος) καὶ Καλλίου Ἑρμίου ἀρχιθιασίτου, καὶ τῶν ἐκ ⟨τῆς⟩ τοῦ Ἑρμαίου συνόδου πάντων....

[236] *Ibid.*, 2. 12, 13; cf. p. 37.

Putting all this evidence together we have the probability, admitted by Preisigke, that Kallias, son of Hermias, designated as "president of Hermes-Thoth" in 54 B.C., had been referred to in 78 B.C. as ἀρχιθιασίτης of the σύνοδος of Hermias. We would add simply that one can also assume then that the Hermias mentioned as oikonomos in 79 B.C. (Text 1, line 7) was the manager or steward of that cult group and is not to be confused with the Kallias mentioned two lines earlier who must have been the oikonomos of the state. This view implies that the Hermias mentioned in 79 as active in cult affairs is the father of the Kallias described as holding positions of leadership in the cult in 78 and 54.

But there are other possibilities. The photographic reproduction of Text 1 in Preisigke's edition[240] definitely suggests that something has been lost at the end of lines 6 and 7. The last words in line 6 as Preisigke gives them are Εὐάνθου τ̣ο̣ῦ Στιστίου, but no title is supplied for him and he never occurs anywhere else in the ostraca fragments either. Preisigke in his "Wörterliste"[241] identifies him as "Εὐάνθης, Sohn des Στασίας, οἰκονόμος 1. 6"; however in his translation of Text 1 he refers only to "Euanthes, Sohnes des Stasias, sowie der übrigen Thiasten."[242] Several conjectures suggest themselves. Assuming Euanthes was a governmental official, one might supply a title like νομ(άρχου) or ἐπὶ τῶν προσόδων and even add Καλλίου at the end of the line, making the next phrase read "Kallias, son of Hermias, oikonomos" of the cult, the same person who holds office in it as 2. 11 and 17. 5, 6. Or one could assume the elusive Euanthes was a cult leader and supply some title of that group; this has the merit of listing first the civil officials and then mentioning the cult leader followed by the cult oikonomos, as at 17. 6, 7.[243] Wilcken's reading follows this line;[244] he proposes: Εὐάνθου προστάτου for the uncertain τ̣ο̣ῦ̣ Στασίου and a study of the photographic reproduction reassures one of the possibility of this reading. Whatever interpretation or restoration is followed, it is certain that one cannot be too rigid in excluding the possibility that there is a reference here to an oikonomos in a cult group connected with Hermes-Thoth. Since we have already seen that oikonomoi for just such societies devoted to religious festivals did exist in Egypt long before this,[245] and have found oikonomoi indicated in the Sarapis cult, it is probable that the position existed in other religious associations of the day, such as this Hermes Trismegistus society.

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[237] Ibid., p. 36.

[238] Ibid., p. 59, with specific references in note 2.

[239] Ibid., p. 60, "Verwalter der Isis," with references in note 1.

[240] Ibid., Tafel 2, No. 4.

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[241] Ibid., p. 65.

[242] Ibid., p. 5.

[243] Ibid., 17. 3-7, p. 11: ἐπὶ Πελαίο(υ) στρα(τηγοῦ), Ἑρμίου Καλλίου τῶν ἐπὶ τῶν προσόδ(ων) Καλλίου Πορεμβήκι, Καλλίας Ἑρμίου προστάτης τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ, Πετεσουχ^{ω} οἰκονόμ^{ω}.

[244] Wilcken, UPZ, Vol. 1, p. 281.

[245] Supra, 284, note 200.

It may be concluded now, in spite of the fact that only these few texts mention temple _oikonomoi_ (a condition to be explained perhaps from the dearth of contemporary cult records extant today, particularly for the mystery religions), that there is good reason to decide for the existence of such officials, at least in the Sarapis cult, perhaps in the Hermes Trismegistus circles. The import of such a conclusion is obvious. For one thing, Wilcken points out that if _oikonomoi_ existed in the Sarapeum and perhaps also the Asclepieion, presumably they were also part of the staff in other great temples of the time,[246] thus suggesting that the temple _oikonomos_ had a widespread existence.

But to confine ourselves just to the Sarapis movement, in some places this cult took on aspects of the mystery religions, while elsewhere it seems to have been regarded as a public cult. T.A. Brady writes that "in many Greek cities there were cult societies of _Sarapiastai_ who held banquets on certain days, passed decrees, voted crown to officials of the society and to distinguished strangers, and who set up _stelae_ recording thereon their official acts."[247] Even without specific records referring to the officials of such Sarapis societies as oikonomoi, this description fits perfectly with what we have already seen to be the duties of oikonomoi in this same period in a synodos in Egypt or a city-state in Asia Minor.[248] The spread of the Sarapis cult, usually in combination with other Hellenistic deities and often in connection with the extremely popular Isis, throughout the Roman empire in the early Christian period, is well known; thus the oikonomos or temple administrator of the "one Zeus Sarapis" could therefore have been a fairly common figure in the world contemporary with the primitive Christian writings.

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[246] _Ibid._; cf. also his introductory description of the administrative hierarchy for the temple of Sarapis at Memphis, 1, 46ff., where _oikonomoi_ are included in the administration on the basis of this text. Could the _oikonomoi_ mentioned in connection with the administration of a Sarapis temple in Magnesia, discussed _supra_, 240f., notes 80-83, be taken as administrators on the _temple_ staff, rather than as _oikonomoi_ of the city, as Landvogt assumed?

[247] _OCD_, 793, article "Sarapis."

We have already noted the suggestion of Cullmann, Dinkler, Fridrichsen, and others that the self-designation used by Paul, "oikonomos of the mysteries of God," may root in the understanding they find in that apostle of a divine oikonomia or plan of Heilsgeschichte, in which the individual apostle has a definite place and part assigned by God.[249] Dinkler further suggested that this whole method of thinking may have had its source in Jewish apocalyptic.[250] It would now appear that there is a more definite background to help account for this term "oikonomoi of God," namely in the pre-Christian pagan usage of the word, especially in cult administration.

To sum up, private and state oikonomoi might engage in religious functions, but this, we saw, did not make of them cult officials, since they were acting as individuals in the one case, or, in the other, as public servants with no more of a religious duty than the archōn or any other official had. The oikonomoi of societies and guilds presented a closer parallel to the early Christian usage, in that they might perform religious tasks, but this made them cult officials only when the society was of a religious nature to begin with; groups formed to put on festivals in honor of the gods, of which we had one example, might fall in this category. But when the verb oikonomein is used of administering a sacred office and the title oikonomos appears in the records of the Sarapis cult, there would appear to be good evidence for concluding that this many-sided family of words had found application, already prior to New Testament times, in the "household management" of a god's house or temple, and that, to this extent, there was a pagan background behind the Christian application of these terms.

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[248] Cf. supra, 281ff. and 235ff.

[249] Supra, 107, 112, note 47.

[250] Supra, 118.

3. *Oikonomia* and its Related Terms

Applied to Arrangement Generally

This Chapter takes up *oikonomia* and its related terms applied by further extension, literally or metaphorically, to *arrangement in general— management, ordering, direction, or regulation in various specific areas, including legal arrangements of many types; the arrangement of the body, or life generally; arrangement of materials in the arts, especially literature and rhetoric*, sometimes with the added notion of *purposeful and deceitful arrangement*; and even the *arrangement of one's conduct*, again *according to inner purposes* and sometimes *with a deceitful or shady connotation*.

The words under study provided a convenient set of terms for a host of uses in many spheres of life in the period prior to A.D. 100 and also beyond; οἰκονομία came to mean an "arrangement" of almost any sort, οἰκονομεῖν "to arrange or manage," and διοικεῖν and its derivitives can be cited at times in much the same senses. Since we have just seen in the preceeding section how widespread our terms were in governmental usage, it is convenient to begin with examples of *oikonomia* in a sense which ties in with this political and administrative background.

Oikonomia Applied to a Legal Arrangement

Since, as we saw, *oikonomia* and its kindred terms were so commonly a part of the technical jargon for the procedures of the political and economic administration of the ancient world by state officials, it was natural that the terms should often take on the meaning "to arrange legally," "a legal arrangement," as part of these very administrative duties, especially in regard to transactions of a commercial nature subject to governmental supervision.

Thus, for example, the verb oikonomein had frequently referred to arrangements in general, as in the phrase "our future arrangements" (τοῖς ὑφ' ἡμῶν οἰκονομηθησομένοις);[1] or to some specific detail in commercial life, as, for example, "to make arrangements" (οἰκονομήσασθαι) to transport barley and wheat;[2] or to some phase of administrative procedure, as when a papyrus speaks of "having arranged about the income,"[3] or that a matter concerning cowherds be settled "in whatever way it may be managed."[4] This verb now also took on the specific meaning of making legal arrangements or taking legally binding steps. So a Ptolemaic official, in the year 223/22 B.C. summoned a subordinate to appear before him, "bringing along all your documents and, if you have made any other legal arrangements ([εἴ τι ἄλ]λ̣ο̣ ὠικονόμηκ[ας]), the copies also of the contracts which you have made for yourself."[5] And some petitioners in the first century A.D. write stating their position for the collector of external debts, "in order that he may take no legal step against us (μηδὲν καθ' ἡμῶν οἰκονομήσῃ) before the trial of the case."[6]

Hence the noun oikonomia, by a similar course of development, comes to mean a "legal arrangement or legal step." It is, as Mitteis wrote, "a very many-sided expression and can signify private (and governmental) legal measures."[7] *Oikonomia* here means, as Preisigke defines it, in the broadest sense, in his dictionary of terms employed in the public administration of Ptolemaic and Roman Egypt, "every measure with legally binding effect."[8]

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[1] BGU 4. 1209. 19 (23 B.C.).

[2] PSI 6. 584. 17 (3rd cent. B.C.).

[3] Ibid., 597. 3 (3rd cent. B.C.): οἰκονομησάμενος περὶ τῆς εἰσόδου.

[4] PPetrie 2. 38(c). 60 (3rd cent. B.C.): περὶ βούτων ὃν ἂν [τρό]πον οἰκονομήθ[ηι]. Cf. F. Preisigke, Sammelbuch griechischer Urkunden aus Ägypten, (Berlin, 1913-27), 3925. 5 (2nd cent. B.C.): ὃν ἂν τρόπον οἰκονομήσωμεν.

[5] PEleph. 9. 5 (B.C. 223-22): κομίζων πάντα τὰ γράμματα καὶ [εἴ τι ἄλ]λ̣ο̣ ὠικονόμηκ[ας] καὶ ὧν πεποίησαι διαγραφῶν τὰ ἀντίγραφα.

[6] POxy. 9. 1203. 27.

Often these legally binding measures refer specifically to details of tax collection. A letter from the Ptolemaic *dioikētēs* in Alexandria instructs his assistant: "Report to me the existing administrative procedure (τὴν γενομένην οἰκονο[μίαν])"; the phrase means almost his "daily routine of business," but it would refer especially to the legal steps and measures he was following in the administration of his stewardship.[9] Change the participle to the present, and the phrase might mean "the new procedure" in administering government affairs.[10] This sense of *oikonomia*, as legal arrangements in connection with taxation, was one of the most common for the term.[11]

Frequently the legal steps or transactions referred to in a papyrus fragment are not precisely certain, but the very number of citations which may be advanced suggests just how common this sense of legal transaction and procedure must have been. A Zenon papyrus in the third century B.C. asks at one point, "What step have you taken? (τίνα οἰκονομίαν προσενήνοχας)."[12] Other papyri from the same century speak similarly of taking "measures" or "necessary steps concerning matters."[13] A first century B.C. writer urges that "no legal step (μη]δεμίαν οἰκον[ο]μίαν) be taken against me,"[14] and still another protests the secretaries "were ignorant of the transaction affecting me."[15]

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[7] Mitteis, *Grundzüge* 2, 1, 73, note 4.

[8] F. Preisigke, *Fachwörter des öffentlichen Verwaltungsdienstes Ägyptens in den griechischen Papyrusurkunden der ptolemäisch-römischen Zeit* (Göttingen, 1915) (cited hereafter as "Preisigke, *Fachwörter*"), 132.

[9] Wilcken, *Chrestomathie* 1, 2, 2. 28 (*PTeb*. 1. 8. 28) (201 B.C.). Cf. Preisigke, *Fachwörter*, 132, and his *Girowesen im griechischen Ägypten* (1910), 425 and 503.

[10] *PParis* 65 (146 B.C.): γινομένην οἰκονομίαν. Cf. C. Préaux, *L'économie royale des Lagides* (Brussels, 1939), 321.

[11] Cf. Preisigke, *Wörterbuch* 2, 160, "οἰκονομία," meaning Number 1.

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[12] Edgar, Zenon Papyri 240. 10.

[13] PEleph. 11. 7 (223-22 B.C.): ὧν δ' ἂν πρά]ξηις γ' οἰκ[ονομιῶν, cited by Moulton-Milligan with the general sense "measures." Papyrus de Magdola (Papyrus grecs de Lille II; Paris, 1912), 32. 6 (217 B.C.): μεθ' οὗ τὰς περὶ τούτων οἰκονομίας θήσομεν, rendered by its editor, "avec l'assistance de qui je puisse passer les actes nécessaires."

[14] Papyrus grecs et démotiques (Paris, 1905), 7. 34 (141 B.C.?): μη]δεμίαν οἰκον[ο]μίαν κατ' ἐμοῦ ἐποιεῖσθαι. Cf. POxy. 9. 1203. 27, supra, 307, note 6.

[15] PTeb. 1. 30. 18 (115 B.C.): τῶν δὲ πρὸς ταῖς γραμματείαις ἀγνοούντων τὴν γεγονυῖαν περὶ ἐ[μοῦ] οἰκονομίαν. Further examples of oikonomia in the sense of legal arrangement or legal instrument: PSI 8. 904. 3 (A.D. 47); 918. 4 (A.D. 38/9); BGU 457. 10 (2nd cent. A.D.); 888. 4; 1573. 5 (A.D. 141/42); 1818. 11 (60/59 B.C.); 1848. 7 (48-46 B.C.). F. Preisigke and F. Bilabel, Sammelbuch griechischer Urkunden aus Ägypten (Berlin, 1915ff.), 7031. 11 (A.D. 72); 7421. 20 (1st cent. A.D.). C. Wessely, Corpus Papyrorum Raineri (Vienna, 1895), 4. 1. G. Zereteli, O. Krüger, P. Jernstedt, Papyri Russischer und Georgischer Sammlungen (Tiflis, 1925ff.), 2. 29. 8 (A.D. 146).

But while *oikonomia* thus applies in this sense of legal arrangement especially to tax matters or is not precisely clear as to what it refers, there are a surprising number of specific applications to exact legal usages which can be pinned down.

Oikonomia can refer to a legal arrangement for the sale of a piece of ground,[16] or to the purchase of something,[17] or, in the verb form, at least, to the renting or hiring of property — in the latter sense the verbs *oikonomein* and *dioikein* often appear together in later documents.[18] Sometimes, in line with this same sense, the word means the legal arrangement for *land registration*.[19] One extremely important passage, a rescript of the praefect, dated A.D. 104, applies the word to the legal arrangement for the *registration of people*, a census, in other words, which in striking parallel to Luke 2: 1ff., enjoins all people residing outside of their own districts to return to their homes, "in order that they may fulfill the regular order (or accustomed legal arrangement) of the census (ἵν[α] καὶ τὴν συνήθη [οἰ]κονομίαν τῆ[ς ἀπο]γραφῆς πληρώσωσιν)."[20]

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[16] *PTeb*. 1. 31. 18 (112 B.C.): τὴν γεγονυῖαν οἰκονομίαν, the sale (of a piece of ground) which has occurred (so Preisigke, *Fachwörter*, 132).

[17] *PLondon* 3. 1164. 7 (A.D. 212, a transaction at the bank of Anubion in Antinoöpolis, Egypt): ἐπεσπάσατο πρὸς μόνην ταύτην τὴν οἰκονομίαν, "he was invited to this agreement to buy alone. . . ." Further, cf. Mitteis, *Grundzüge* 2, 1, 73, note 4, and *BGU* 301. 14 (αὐτὰς τὰς οἰκονομίας); 859. 14.

[18] Mitteis, *Grundzüge* 2, 1, 73, note 4, citing P. Le Bas and W.H. Waddington, *Inscriptiones Grecques et Latines recueillies en Grèce et en Asie Mineure* (Paris, 1847-48), 136a. 36. *Dioikein* occurs in the sense of "rent or farm," according to LSJ, 432, at *PTeb*. 1. 79. 8 (148 B.C.): ἀπὸ νομῶν [τῶν ἐκτὸς μι]σθώσεως πρὸς χαλ[κ]ὸν διοικουμένων, "from pasture lands which are rented without rent for copper." The noun *dioikēsis* means "farming, renting," according to LSJ, 432, at *PTeb*. 61(a). 206f. (118/117 B.C.): [χλωροῖς] ὧν τὴν διοίκησις (sic!) ἐπ' ἐσχάτωι τέτακται. [τὰ δ' ἀπ' αὐ]τῆς συνα(γόμενα) ἐνταῦθα ἀνειλ[ή]φαμεν. ". . . green stuffs, the arrangement (or renting) of which is set forth at the end; we repeat here its results." The same phrase occurs at *ibid*., 67. 41-43. I am not convinced of the suggested translation "farming."

To return to the use of *oikonomia* in regard to property, however, once at least the term seems to mean legal arrangements in the sense of *encumbrances*; a late papyrus instructs that a man shall present his farm land "free from other legal arrangements (οἰκονομιῶν)."[21] References to such legal arrangements are common in papyrus documents of various sorts, and the verb *oikonomein* was employed in a series of stock phrases to denote legal transactions. Thus, as early as the mid-first century B.C., the phrase appears, "in accordance with the legal arrangements" (ἀκολούθως τοῖς ᾠκονομημένοις).[22] In the Christian centuries the phrase οἰκονομεῖν

Oikonomein in the sense of "rent or hire" occurs in *PLondon* 3. 1158. 4 (A.D. 226-27, abbreviated οἰκο.), and 3. 1298. 4 (A.D. 231), and coupled with *dioikein* at 977. 32f. (A.D. 330), 978. 15 (A.D. 331), and 1044. 21 (6th cent.).

[19] Mitteis, *Grundzüge* 2, 1, 73, note 4, with examples cited there.

[20] *PLondon* 904. 25. The affinity to the language of Col. 1: 25 has been noted by Moulton-Milligan, 442.

[21] *PRainer* 64. *22* (A.D. 227): παρέξεται αὐτὰς [ἀρούρας] καθαρὰς ἀπὸ ἑτέρων οἰκονομιῶν.

[22] *POxy*. 14. 1635. 4 (44-37 B.C.).

περὶ τῆς γῆς crops up in legal documents, with the meaning "make arrangements about, dispose of, land,"[23] and a frequent combination in the third century A.D. includes the verbs χρῆσθαι καὶ οἰκονομεῖν, to "use and administer, or dispose of, property."[24]

Finally— and all this does not fully exhaust the nuances *oikonomia* had as the term for a legal arrangement[25]— the words under study seem to occur with reference to *wills* or testaments in the Ptolemaic and Roman periods. One third-century B.C. papyrus uses the phrase, "It would be my right to administer my own affairs (τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ οἰκονομεῖν) while I am healthy," the sense here being akin to some of the stock legal phrases just noted.[26] The clearest example, however, of this sort of application comes in Roman times when a papyrus from the Faiyum in Egypt, dated May 26, A.D. 184, uses the word *oikonomia* to refer to a will, the final testament of a Roman citizen who has died sometime before.[27] This significant application of the noun occurs in the summary of a legal case "out of the records of Apollōnios, general of the section of Herakleidos." The case deals with

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[23] *POxy*. 8. 1123. 22 (A.D. 158/9); 9. 1208. 19 (A.D. 291).

[24] *POxy*. 10. 1276. 14 (A.D. 249); 12. 1475. 28 (A.D. 267); 14. 1634. 15 (A.D. 222); 1696. 14; 1697. 21; 1698. 17; 1699. 15; 1702. 7.

[25] *PTeb*. 2. 318. 19 (notice of a claim, A.D. 166), τ̣ὸ εἴς με δίκαι[ον] οἰκονομε̣ί̣[ας], has the sense "my right of procedure," according to the editors. Elsewhere, the idea of a legal arrangement to administer an orphan's property seems to be present; cf. Preisigke, *Wörterbuch* 2, 159, "οἰκονομέω"; and *POxy*. 1. 56. 16.

[26] *PPetrie* 1. 18. 1, 8 (3rd cent. B.C.). Cf. *supra*, notes 23 and 24; the sense of "administer" may be here "dispose of."

[27] *BGU* 361. III. 2. The 29 lines in Col. I of this papyrus text are extremely fragmentary; the opening lines of Col. II evidently deal with a different legal case heard by a *stratēgos*. The text from Col. II, line 10

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through Col. III, line 20, after which the lines are extremely broken and unintelligible again for the most part, is as follows:

10 Ἄλλου ὁμοίως ἐξ ὑπομνηματισμῶν
Ἀπολλωνίου στρ(ατηγοῦ) Ἡρακλ(είδου) μερίδος,
κδ ς Παῦνι ᾱ.
Ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐν τῇ Σεβαστῇ ἀγορᾷ βήματος προσ-
ελθόντος Κασίου τοῦ καὶ ἡγουμένου Ἀντινο-
έως, παρόντος Ἰσιδώρου Τιβερίνου ἀφήλι- → [sic]
15 κος, συνόντος αὐτοῦ [l. αὐτῷ] Λογγείνου Χαιρημο-
νιανοῦ ἀδελφοῦ ὁμομητρίου καὶ ἐγδίκου,
Φιλώτας ῥήτωρ ὑπὲρ Κασίου εἶπεν· Συγγε-
νὴς τοῦ ἡμετέρου μέλλων τελευτᾶν τ[ὸν]
βίον Ῥωμαῖος ὢν διαθήκην γράψας μετ[ε]-
20 πέμψατο αὐτὸν καὶ ἐδεήθη αὐτοῦ ταύτην
ἔχειν παρ' ἑαυτῷ, ἐντειλάμενος, ἐπὰν [l. ἐπεὰν] τε-
λευτήσῃ, προκομίσαι καὶ ἀξιῶσαι λύ[εσθ]αι,
ἵνα τὸ βούλημα αὐτοῦ φανερὸν γέ̣[ν]ηται. [Τ]ε-
λευτήσαντος οὖν ἐκείνου προσῆλθεν τ̣[οῖς]
25 σφραγισταῖς, ἀξιῶν αὐτοὺς παρὰ λύ[σιν] [or παρα[τ]υχε[ῖν]],
ὅπως τὰ ἀκόλουθα γένηται. Ἐπεὶ δὲ [το]ῦ̣τ̣ο̣
οὐκ ἐποίουν, ἴσως κωλυόμενοι ὑπό τι̣νων,
ἀναγκαίως ἐνέτυχεν σοί, ἀξ[ι]ῶν̣ αὐτο[ὺς]
μεταπεμφθῆναι, ὑποδικνυς [l. ὑποδεικνὺς] ὅτ̣ι̣ α[ὐτῷ]
30 πρόστιμον ὡρίσθη, ἐπὰν [l. ἐπεὰν] διαθήκη ἄλυ̣[τος]

Col. III

μείνῃ, καὶ σὺ ἀκόλουθα ποιῶν μετεπέμψω αὐτούς. Ἐπεὶ δὲ πάρει̣σ̣[ιν]
ἐξ αὐτῶν τέσσαρες, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὁ νομικὸς ὁ τὴν οἰκονομίαν γρά-
ψας, [...]
[..τ]ὴν διαθήκην ἐπιφέρων τοὺς [l. τοῦ] συγγενοῦς κατὰ τὰς
ἐκε[ίν]ου..το[...]

a dispute over whether a will (διαθήκη, the term occurs at least six times in the incomplete papyrus) which is being presented for probate is genuine

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ταύτην λυθῆναι. Εἰ δέ τις βούλεται πρὸ τῆς λύσεως πρὸς
τὴν [διαθήκην]
5 [λ]έγειν, χώραν οὐκ ἔχει, οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος, τί ἐκεῖνος ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπ.[......]
Λόγγος ῥήτωρ ἀπεκρείνατο· Ὁ ἀντίδικος δεδοικὼ[ς....]..μα[...λύ]-
σεως παρέρχεται καί φησιν διαθήκην εἰληφέναι παρὰ συγγ̣ε̣ν̣[οῦς αὐ]-
του, ἥνπερ ἐπιφέρειν βούλεται, καὶ ὅτι [μὲ]ν συγγενὴς ἑαυτοῦ
ἐ[κεῖνος],
οὔκ ἐστιν ἐντεῦθεν διαβεβαιοῦμαι. Τελευτήσαντος δ'αὐτοῦ
Τα[σεῦς],
10 δούλη τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ ἀφήλικος, πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ ἐβάστ[ασεν],
ὅπερ μαθὼν ὁ ὁμομήτριος ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ πρόσε[ι]σιν ἐγδικ[άσων]
αὐτόν. Καὶ περὶ τῆς διαθήκης δὲ ἀποκρείνομαι, ὅτι ἐν
πάσαις τ[αῖς δια]-
θήκαις ἑπτά εἰσιν σφραγισταί. Εἰ οὖν ἐκῖ ἐν ταύτῃ ἑπτὰ ἐσ̣[φράγι]-
σαν, ἡκέτωσαν καὶ τὰς σφραγίδας αὐτῶν πρότερον ἐπιγν[ώτω]-
15 σαν. Εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἑπτὰ τέσσαρες ἐνθάδε εἰσὶ καὶ νομικὸ[ς...
βή?]-
μ̣α̣τος ἔρχεται ἀξιῶν λυθῆναι τὴν διαθήκην, οὐκ ἐν ὀλίγῃ
ὑπ[οψίᾳ]
γε[ί]νομαι. Ἀπολλωνιανὸς ῥήτωρ π̣ρ̣[οσ]έθηκεν· ὅτι ὁ ἀντιδίκ[ος..]
π[...]η̣λησεν̣ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκίας, ἐὰν μεταπέμψῃ Κρονοῦν θεράπ[οντα]
αὐτοῦ, μαρτυρήσει ὅτι ἡ Τασεὺς σύνερ̣[γ]ος αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο
[καὶ πάν]-
20 τ̣α̣ ἅμα αὐτῷ ὀφείλε̣[τ]ο, κ[αὶ π]ερὶ τῆς διαθήκης δὲ λέγω
ὅτ[ι ...]

In addition to the obvious corrections, given above, by the editor of the text, Fr. Krebs, Wilcken conjectures (BGU, Vol. 1, p. 359) the following: II. 13, read Ἡγουμένου; II. 25, read παρε[τ]υχε[ιν] for παρα λυ[σιν]. I have adopted the first of these, and given a translation for both conjectured readings in the second case, in the following translation:

or not. While some of the details of the situation are confused and far from certain, due to the abruptness of the treatment and the fragmentary

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"Another case, likewise out of the records of Apollōnios, stratēgos of the section of Herakleidos, year 24, Payni 1 [May 26, A.D. 184] . When Kasios, who is also Hegoumenos, from Antinoeus [cf. the indices of persons and places, pp. 364 and 376], had come forward to the rostra in the market place of Augustus, Isidoros Tiberinos, a minor, being present, Longinus Chairēmonianos, his brother by the same mother and mandatary being present with him, Philotas, the orator for Kasios, said: 'A kinsman of our [client], when he was about to end his life, being a Roman, after he had written a will, summoned him [our client] and begged him to have this will from him, enjoining him that, when he died, he should produce the will and petition to have it probated, in order that his final disposition might become manifest. When that man died therefore, he went to the "sealers" [i.e., the witnesses who placed their seals on the document], petitioning them [sc. to act] in accordance with the opening [of the document; or, better, with Wilcken's conjecture, παρα[τ]υχε[ιν], to happen to be present], in order that the various consequent steps might take place. But since they were consistently not doing this, perhaps because they were being prevented by some, he was forced to appeal to you, petitioning them to be summoned, claiming that the award had been appointed to him [Preisigke, Wörterbuch, 2, 415, reads αὐτοῖς, "claiming that the penalty for delay had been appointed for them"] since the will remains irrevocable, [Col. III] and you, carrying out the consequent steps, did summon them. And since there are present four of them, and in addition also the notary who wrote the document, . . . bringing forth the will of the kinsman in accordance with the . . . of that man . . . that this [the will] be opened. But if someone nature of the text, it appears that one Kasios claims to have received a will from a kinsman who was about to die. Subsequent difficulty over putting into effect this will of the deceased which Kasios presents has brought the case before the *stratēgos* of the section. Part of the controversy centers around the seven seals of the seven witnesses required for a will by Roman law, according to which the will had to be sealed seven times in order to be authenticated and according to which, further, the will could not be carried into effect until all the seven seals were loosed. Apparently in the case under consideration, only four of these seven witnesses

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wishes, before the unsealing, to address himself to the will, he is in no position to do so, because he does not know what that man [sc. said?] in it. . . .'

"Longos the orator answered, 'The opponent, in fear . . . of the opening takes the stand and says that he received from his kinsman the will which he wishes to produce, and I assert that that man is not his kinsman. But when he died, Taseus, a slave (girl) of the father of the minor, took away all the things in the house; upon learning this, his brother, born of the same mother, approaches, to prosecute him [Preisigke, *Wörterbuch*, 1, 442, reads αὐτήν, "the thieving slave girl"— thus his brother comes to prosecute her]. And also concerning the will, I answer that in all wills there are seven sealers. If therefore there in this one seven men sealed it, let them come forward and let them identify their seals first. But if, of the seven sealers, four are here and the notary . . . he comes to the rostra, demanding the will be opened, I am suspicious to no small degree.'

"Apollōnianos the orator added his reply: 'That the opponent . . . the things in the house, if you summon Kronos his attendant, he will testify that Taseus was his fellow-worker and took away everything together with him, and also concerning the will I say . . . '"

who had sealed the document which Kasios had were able to appear at the hearing before the *stratēgos*, plus the notary who had originally written the will. The opponents of Kasios dispute the authenticity of the document being presented, cast doubt on whether Kasios got it from the deceased, and question even whether the two men were kinsmen. The important phrase with which we are concerned comes when the counsel for Kasios notes that of the witnesses who placed their seals on his client's document, "four of them are present, and in addition also the lawyer who wrote the document" (or legal arrangement, πάρε̣ι̣σ̣[ιν] ἐξ αὐτῶν τέσσαρες, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὁ νομικὸς ὁ τὴν οἰκονομίαν γράψας, Col. III, lines 1-2). The application of the term "document" or "legal arrangement" (*oikonomia*) here to a will is unmistakable, not only from the total context, but also because the noun for will or testament, *diathēkē*, occurs in this same sentence in the next line, in the preceeding sentence, and in the next paragraph in the reply by an opposing orator. Thus it is quite clear that in the year A.D. 184, presumably also at a date sometime before this, to which the case refers, and probably for some period of time as well, the noun *oikonomia*, which we have already seen was conveniently applied to legal arrangements or agreements of all sorts, was now used specifically for a *diathēkē*, the last will and testament of a Roman citizen, the covenant sealed with seven seals disposing of his property. This application is suggestive, to say the least, as a clue in explaining the patristic usage, in precisely this same general period, the late second century A.D., of the word *oikonomia* in covenantal theology for a "testament" or "(legal) arrangement in a will" by God or Christ to distribute certain goods to man.[28]

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[28] For further discussion and tentative application of this evidence along the lines suggested, see Part III, Conclusions, *infra*, 569ff., where

It will be observed that in many of the applications of *oikonomia* pointed out above, the word refers not only to some legal agreement which has been reached, but also the record or document itself which is involved. Such a sense can be demonstrated, not only in the examples above, but in a multitude of other cases. Thus, according to Taubenschlag, *oikonomia* was one of several terms in use to refer to such agreements from the first century B.C. to the second century A.D.,[29] and Preisigke gives to *oikonomia* the specific meaning "stipulated agreement, record."[30] Hence the phrase ἀκολούθως αἷς ἔχωι οἰκονομίαις in a papyrus of A.D. 14 means "according to the records of possession or documents which are found in my hand."[31] "Contract or

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a possible connection is also suggested between the well-known fact that a Roman will required seven seals, as vouched for in the Praetorian testament of the Republican period, for example, and the so-called book with the seven seals in Revelation 5: 1ff. On the Roman legal custom involved, cf. William Smith, William Wayte, and G.E. Martin, *A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities* (3rd ed., 2 vols.; London, 1891), 2, 803f.; H.J. Roby, *Roman Private Law in the Times of Cicero and of the Antonines* (Cambridge, 1902), 1, 255, note 2; and W.W. Buckland, *The Main Institutions of Roman Private Law* (Cambridge, 1931), 184f.

[29] Taubenschlag, 224, where he notes οἰκονομία was in use in this period in the sense of "agreement" along with συνάλλαγμα, συγγραφή, and συνθῆκαι.

[30] Preisigke, *Fachwörter*, 132, meaning Number 2. Cf. further *POxy*. 12. 1474. 7 (A.D. 216), and the note there on the line (p. 222); and *BGU* 301. 14f. (A.D. 157), ἀναδέδωκα δέ σοι αὐτὰς τὰς οἰκονομίας πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν τοῦ προκειμένου κεφαλαίου καὶ τόκων, "I have given you the documents themselves for security against the stipulated principal and interest."

[31] Mitteis, *Chrestomathie* 2, 2, 68.; cf. Preisigke, *Fachwörter*, 132.

legal instrument" is a satisfactory rendering sometimes for the word,[32] and "deeds" fits the plural which occurs so often in legal documents that have to do with the sale of land— hence the clause, "the boundries of which are set forth in the deeds relating to these matters" (αἱ γειτονέιαι διὰ τῶν περὶ τούτων οἰκονομειῶν δηλοῦνται).[33] Thus also the phrase: "the document for the transfer and cession of land" (ἡ τῆς μετεπιγραφῆς καὶ παραχωρήσεως οἰκονομία).[34]

Unquestionably therefore oikonomia had wide vogue in the period down to A.D. 100— and beyond that, as these examples have shown— as a technical term for all sorts of legal arrangements, usually involving money and property and governmental regulation. The idea of business transaction becomes especially clear at times, as when a petition found at Oxyrynchus requests "that I may have assigned to me Amoitas as my guardian for this transaction only (πρὸς μόνην ταύτην τὴν οἰκονομίαν),"[35] or when a

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Further, PMich. 5. 276. 11, 27, and 35 (A.D. 47): ἀκολούθως αἷς πεποιήμεθα αὐτῇ οἰκονομίαις, "in accordance with the contracts we made with her."

[32] See LSJ, sub voce οἰκονομία. Further, e.g., POxy. 1. 34. I. 10 (A.D. 127); 2. 238. 2 (A.D. 72); 3. 504. 13 (early 2nd cent. A.D.); 12. 1467. 8 and 20 (A.D. 263); BGU 361. III. 2: ὁ νομικὸς ὁ τὴν οἰκονομίαν γράψας (supra, 312, note 27).

[33] PMich. 3. 186. 11 (A.D. 72); 187. 8 (A.D. 75). Further, cf. PMich. 5. 235. 10 (A.D. 41); 322 a. 17, 19, 29 (A.D. 46-51); 340. 15, 91 (A.D. 45-46); 341. 2 (A.D. 47).

[34] PMich. 2. 121. recto II. IX. 3 (A.D. 42); and PMich. 5. 262. 10 (A.D. 35/36) and (pl.) line 31; 303. 8 (1st cent. A.D.).

[35] POxy. 1. 56. 17 (A.D. 211). Cf. 12. 1473. 22 and 29 (A.D. 201), and also supra, 310, note 17.

law is cited that women, in virtue of having three children and the ability to write, are permitted "to act without a guardian in all business arrangements which they transact (ἐν αἷς ποιοῦν[τ]αι οἰκονομίαις)."[36] Elsewhere it is the financial side that emerges, in regard to a mortgage, for instance.[37] Occasionally the inevitable element of corruption rears its head— a government official in the year A.D. 13 is instructed to make sure during an investigation that "nothing be concealed or 'arranged' by favor (πρὸς χάριν οἰκονομηθῆναι)."[38] The terms are even common enough to be abbreviated— Χρασ$^{\theta}$ καὶ οἰκο for Χρῆσθαι καὶ οἰκονομεῖν[39]— and misspelled at times— οἰκωνωμία appears in a papyri of A.D. 29.[40] But through its many usages in legal, commercial, and political matters, *oikonomia* was plainly a term that was "in the air" of the first-century A.D. world.

Oikonomia and its related terms were in fact so much in the air that it became natural to apply the words to arrangement generally in all sorts of matters. We may note typical examples briefly before examining the more crucial applications in literature and rhetoric.

In Medical Terminology

At times these terms come into medical discourses in the sense of arrangement. Hippocrates, in the title of a section which is corrupt and difficult to translate, but which is attributed to the fifth-century B.C.

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[36] *POxy*. 12. 1467. 8 (A.D. 263).

[37] *PLondon* 870. 13 (4th cent. A.D.).

[38] *POxy*. 11. 1188. 5.

[39] *PLondon* 932. 7 (A.D. 211), a deed full of abbreviations; cf. 1158. 4, another deed, where the abbreviation Χρω̄ καὶ οἰκο̄ occurs.

[40] *PMich*. 5. page 298, and 328 (A.D. 29).

Father of Medicine, seems to speak about "the arrangement or disposition about the patient (ἡ περὶ τὸν νοσέοντα οἰκονομίη)."[41] Galen, the likewise famous physician of the second century A.D., uses the phrase "the administration of medicines" or "management of drugs" (τὰς τῶν φαρμάκων οἰκονομίας),[42] and a papyrus from the same century speaks of the arrangement of the blood: "If the region of the liver becomes diseased, the whole body immediately becomes jaundiced or dropsical and like a corpse, because the blood is not being properly disposed (τοῦ αἵματος μὴ οἰκουνομουμένου δεξιῶς)."[43] This application of *oikonomia* to the arrangement or internal organization of the human body, it may be noted here, also occurs in Christian literature of precisely the same period.[44]

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[41] Hippoc. *On Epidemics* 6. 2. 24 (F.Z. Ermerins, *Hippocratis et Aliorum Medicorum Veterum* (1859), Vol. 1, p. 572, who marks the passage "locus corruptus" and makes no attempt at emending the paragraph, though he does suggest a brief reconstruction.). E. Littré, *Oeuvres complètes d'Hippocrate* (Paris, 1864), Vol. 5, pp. 290f., prints the same phrase and renders it, "Les arrangements autour du malade." In view of the vexing problems of text and genuineness about the Hippocratic corpus, all we can safely conclude is that someone in antiquity used the term, so common elsewhere, in a medical sense, and the paragraph has come down to us in the collection of books attributed to Hippocrates.

[42] Gal. *Commentary* (on the [spurious] Hippocrates' *Epidemiorum* 2) 3. 8. 159 (C.G. Kühn, *Medicorum Graecorum Omnia*, *Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia* (Leipzig, 1829), Vol. 17, part 1, p. 402): διαχειρισμοὺς δὲ λέγει τὰς τῶν φαρμάκων οἰκονομίας τε καὶ παρασκευὰς καὶ συνθέσεις καὶ δόσεις. "He calls the management and preparation and compounding and administration of drugs manipulation."

[43] *PMich.* 3. 149. Col. 4. line 28. Since the passage occurs in an astrological treatise and relates anatomy and human well-being to Jupiter in the heavens, the sense is apparently "arranged or managed" by that heavenly body.

It is, however, especially in regard to the arrangement of food in the human body, i.e., the digestion of nourishment, that the terms are applied. Aretaeus of Cappadocia, a medical writer between A.D. 150-200, applies *oikonomia* thus: "A moderate amount of sleep is expedient for the distribution (τὴν τῆς τροφῆς οἰκονομίην) of nourishment."[45] Plutarch similarly employs *dioikēsis* for the internal administration or digestion of food: more pains than pleasures derive from food, he claims, and what pleasure there is, is brief and limited in area, "and the bother and annoyance of so many ugly and distressing details connected with its digestion (διοίκησιν), why need we give a full account of them?"[46] Diogenes Laertius in the early third century A.D. employs the verb dioikein to mean "digest food," or, to put it precisely in our idion, "[Diogenes the Cynic] tried to eat meat raw, but he couldn't manage it (οὐ διῴκησε)."[47] The same idea appears in the fourth century A.D. when Oribasius, another medical writer, employs dioikētikos to mean "digestive."[48] These few examples suggest how our terms, especially in the Christian centuries, were applied to arrangements of medicine or the human body.

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[44] The *Martyrdom of Polycarp* (A.D. 156) 2. 2 speaks of the arrangement (internal organization, οἰκονομία) of the flesh of the martyrs, visible right down to the inner veins and arteries, and Tatian (*c*. 170) *Orat*. 12. 2 says the human body is of a single arrangement (οἰκονομίας), and that there is an arrangement (οἰκονομία) also of the hair and of the internal organs. Cf. also Iren. *Adv*. *Haer*. 5. 2. 3.

[45] Aretaeus of Cappadocia, *Treatment of Lingering Diseases* 1. 3 (C.G. Kühn, *Medicorum Graecorum Omnia*, *Aretaei Cappadocis Opera Omnia* (Leipzig, 1828), Vol. 24, p. 305): ξύμφορος δὲ ὁ μέτριος [ὕπνος] ἐς τὴν τῆς τροφῆς οἰκονομίην καὶ ἐς ἀνάπαυλαν τῶν δι' ἡμέρας καμάτων.

[46] Plut. *Conv*. *sept*. *sap*. 16 (*Mor*. 160A): ἡ δὲ περὶ τὴν διοίκησιν αὐτῆς ἀσχολία καὶ δυσχέρεια τί δεῖ λέγειν ὅσων αἰσχρῶν καὶ ὀδυνηρῶν ἡμᾶς ἐμπίπλησιν. Cf. *De amicorum multitudine* 6 (*Mor*. 95E), where διοικεῖν is used in a similar sense of "manage" in regard to the stomach: the monster Briareus, although he had a hundred hands to feed fifty bellies, had no advantage over us, "who manage one belly with two

Managing One's Life

Several times these terms are applied quite naturally to the arrangement or management of one's life. The only two passages in Isocrates which employ the verb oikonomein use it in just this sense; his oration to Demonicus has as its purpose "to advise what things it is necessary for young men to aspire toward, what words they should avoid, with what sort of men they should associate, and how they should regulate their own life (πῶς τὸν ἑαυτῶν βίον οἰκονομεῖν)";[49] later he advises, "devoted labors for virtue, and the wise ordering of one's life (τὸ ... σωφρόνως τὸν αὑτοῦ βίον οἰκονομεῖν) always yield the delights which are pure as sunlight

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hands (τῶν ἀπὸ δυεῖν χεροῖν μίαν κοιλίαν διοικούντων)." Cf. also Philo Spec. 3. 203 (Cohn-Wendland 5, 206, 23, πρὸς τὴν διοίκησιν [τροφῶν]), and Abr. 241 (4, 53, 14).

[47] Diog. Laert. 6. 34: καὶ ὠμὰ δὲ κρέα ἐπεχείρησε φαγεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐ διῴκησε.

[48] Oribasius 45. 29. 17 (U.C. Bussemaker and C. Daremberg, Oeuvres d' Oribase (Paris, 1862), Vol. 4, p. 69, line 3): ἕνεκα τοῦ κινῆσαι τὰς διοικητικὰς τῆς τροφῆς ἐνεργείας, "because of moving the digestive activities of the food." Cf. also 5. 29. 10, where the phrase σιτία προδιῳκημένα is employed, "predigested foods."

[49] Isoc, To Demonicus 5: μέλλομέν σοι συμβουλεύειν ὧν χρὴ τοὺς

and more lasting."[50] Euphro, the poet of New Comedy in the third century B.C., picks up much the same figure of speech in the lines:

The man who arranges (οἰκονομῶν) his own life badly,
How would this man preserve any of the external things?[51]

Menander, in a striking fragment, extends the figure metaphorically to picture man, the human being than which no living creature suffers more sudden change of fortune:

For although the human creature is exceeding weak
By nature, it is steward (οἰκονομεῖται) o'er the most vast affairs
Yet whenever it has a fall, brings down with it many noble things.[52]

Chrysippus, in a typical passage, employs dioikein when speaking of life being ordered according to knowledge or ignorance.[53] This concept of

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νεωτέρους ὀρέγεσθαι καὶ τίνων ἔργων ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ ποίοις τισὶν ἀνθρώποις ὁμιλεῖν καὶ πῶς τὸν ἑαυτῶν βίον οἰκονομεῖν. on word occurrence, cf. S. Preuss, Index Isocrateus (Leipzig, 1904).

[50] Ibid., 46: τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν ἀρέτην φιλοπονεῖν καὶ σωφρόνως τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον οἰκονομεῖν ἀεὶ τὰς τέρψεις εἰλικρινεῖς καὶ βεβαιοτέρας ἀποδίδωσι.

[51] Euphro (in Flor. 15. 2) (A. Meineke, FCG, Vol. 4, p. 490):

ὁ γὰρ τὸν ἴδιον οἰκονομῶν κακῶς βίον,
πῶς οὗτος ἂν σώσειε τῶν ἔξω τινά;

[52] Men. (in [Plut.] Cons. ad Apoll. 103D) (A. Meineke, FCG, Vol. 4, p. 227) 2. 15:

…ἀσθενέστατον γὰρ ὂν
φύσει, μεγίστοις οἰκονομεῖται πράγμασιν
ὅταν πέσῃ δέ, πλεῖστα συντρίβει καλά.

The neuter subject, ζῷον οὐθὲν, refers back to man. For οἰκονομεῖται the verb διαπονεῖται has been conjectured, "toil hard at," but F.G. Allinson, in his Loeb translation, Menander, the Principal Fragments (London, 1921), p. 478, line 14, also reads οἰκονομεῖται.

[53] Chrysippus (in Galen de H. et Plat. decr. 7. 2 (208. 591 M), SVF 3, 60, 28-31 (frag. 256): καλῶς γὰρ ἅπαντα γινωσκόντων τε καὶ

governing one's life and of human life being governed by various things must have been a common one. Epictetus, to take a final illustration, employs oikonomia in the sense of managing all the details of one's external, physical life; he, the philosopher, should strive to prevent there being any young men among his followers who, "upon realizing their kinship with the gods and that we have these fetters, as it were, fastened upon us, the body and its possessions, and whatever things are on their account necessary to us for management and conduct in life (εἰς οἰκονομίαν καὶ ἀναστροφὴν τὴν ἐν βίῳ), may wish to throw away all these things as burdensome and vexatious and useless, and to depart to their kinsmen," the gods.[54]

πραττόντων ἡμῶν ἂν ὁ βίος διοικοῖτο κατὰ ἐπιστήμην, κακῶς δὲ καὶ ψευδῶς γινωσκόντων τε καὶ πραττόντων κατὰ ἄγνοιαν, ὡς αὐτὸς ὁ Χρύσιππος βούλεται. "If we both know and do all things well, life would be ordered according to knowledge, but if we know and do them badly and falsely, it is ordered according to ignorance, as Chrysippus himself prefers." Cf. Philo De praemiis et poenis 81 (Cohn-Wendland, 5, 354, 14): phronēsis is πρὸς ἀνθρωπίνου βίου διοίκησιν. Josephus AJ 2. 8. 2 (198) speaks of Joseph, λογισμῷ πάντα διοικῶν; cf. 1. 4 (19) and 16. 11. 5 (16, 382).

[54] Arr. Epict. Diss. 1. 9. 11: ἐπιγνόντες τὴν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς συγγένειαν καὶ ὅτι δεσμά τινα ταῦτα προσηρτήμεθα τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν κτῆσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἕνεκα ἀναγκαῖα ἡμῖν γίνεται εἰς οἰκονομίαν καὶ ἀναστροφὴν τὴν ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ὡς βάρη τινὰ καὶ ἀνιαρὰ καὶ ἄχρηστα ἀπορρῖψαι θέλωσιν καὶ ἀπελθεῖν πρὸς τοὺς συγγενεῖς. D.S. Sharp, Epictetus and the New Testament (London, 1914), 117, compares the notion of "fetters of the body" here with Rom. 7: 24 ("Who shall deliver me from this body of death?") and

Arrangement in the Arts

Oikonomia as a technical term meaning arrangement in various types of art appears quite frequently. Vitruvius, active in the latter part of the first century B.C., mentions it, for example, as one of the several elements constituting architecture; he writes, near the beginning of his treatise on that subject, "Now architecture consists of order, which in Greek is called *taxis*, and of arrangement (*dispositio*), which the Greeks name *diathesis*, and of proportion and symmetry and decor and distribution which in Greek is called *oeconomia*."[55] Vitruvius' division and distinctions are none too clear, and he may be reflecting terms that crop up in contemporary aesthetic criticism, as we shall see.[56] But a brief definition for distribution is offered a bit later on; it is "the suitable disposal (*dispensatio*)

II Cor. 5: 4 ("While we are still in this tent, we sigh with anxiety").

[55] Vitr. *De Arch*. 1. 2. 1: Architectura autem constat ex ordinatione, quae graece taxis dicitur, et ex dispositione, hanc autem Graeci diathesin vocitant, et eurythmia et symmetria et decore et distributione quae graece oeconomia dicitur.

[56] It is not clear whether Vitruvius has in mind three parts, *taxis*, *diathesis*, and *oeconomia*, or includes *eurythmia* as a fourth, or means even more subdivisions with *oeconomia* referring only to the last one, *distributio*. The terms *taxis* and *oeconomia* are also paired in rhetoric and aesthetics, as at [Longinus] *Subl*. 1. 4. F. Granger, in a note to his Loeb translation of Vitruvius (London, 1931-34), Vol. 1, p. 24, note 2, feels Vitruvius' three terms correspond to Democritus' *ordo*, *positura*, and *figurae*, given in Lucretius 1. 685, for the order, placement, and shapes of atoms.

of supplies and the site, and the thrifty, wise control of expense in the operations,"[57] a definition that does not depart too far from the original Greek notion of household management, but which also brings *oikonomia* into connection with architecture.

One doubtful passage may bring the word *oikonomia* into connection with *music*. Diogenes Laertius writes of Polemon, the head of the Academy at Athens, 314/13-270 B.C., "He was always mindful of Xenocrates [his predecessor who converted him to philosophy] and clothed himself with the guilelessness and austerity of that man, and with gravity, as if it were some sort of Dorian arrangement (οἱονεὶ Δώριός τις οἰκονομία)."[58] Modern editors, however, usually read Δωριστὶ ἁρμονίας, "dignity which is proper to the Dorian mode."[59] Much clearer applications of the word appear, though, in regard to literature.

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[57] *De Arch*. 1. 2. 8: distributio autem est copiarum locique commoda dispensatio parcaque in operibus sumptus ratione temperatio.

[58] Diog. Laert. 4. 19 (ed. H.G. Heubner; Leipzig, 1828): ἀεὶ γοῦν ἐμέμνητο ὁ Πολέμων αὐτοῦ τήν τε ἀκακίαν καὶ τὸν αὐχμὸν ἐνεδέδυτο τ'ἀνδρὸς καὶ τὸ βάρος οἱονεὶ Δώριός τις οἰκονομία. Heubner renders it, ". . . induerat illius quoque innocentiam, severitatem et gravitatem veluti Doricus quidem in musica modus," and defends his reading, which goes back at least to Suidas (s.v. Δώριος), in his *Commentarii in Diogenem Laertium* (Leipzig, 1830), 1, 545f. A. Adler, in the most recent critical edition of Suidas, *Suidae Lexicon* (Leipzig, 1931), Part II (Δ-Θ), p. 136, entry 1462, reads (with no variants or emendations reported): καὶ Δώριος οἰκονομία. τήν τε ἀκακίαν καὶ τὸν αὐχμὸν ὁ Πολέμων ἐνεδέδυτο Ξενοκράτους καὶ τὸ βάρος, οἱονεὶ Δώριος οἰκονομία. Adler does refer back to the source in Diogenes Laertius, however.

[59] C.G. Cobet (Paris, 1862), and R.D. Hicks in his Loeb edition (London,

Literary Arrangement

The noun oikonomia and its kindred terms were made to order for reference to the arrangement of a literary work, be it a drama, history, an oration, a book, or even just a letter. Specific examples of such applications occur as early as Aristotle. In his famous comment about Euripides in the *Poetics*, he commends Euripides because his plays meet one of the basic tests of a tragedy, namely, that it should be single in its issue, dealing with one man passing from good fortune to bad, the unhappy ending, for which others censured Euripides. In view of this quality, he concludes, "Euripides, even though he does not manage the other matters well (εὖ οἰκονομεῖ— referring apparently to the other details that go into making a good tragic drama), nonetheless appears at any rate most tragic of poets."[60] Another writer, Chamaeleon, who flourished a bit later than Aristotle, between 320 and 300 B.C. applied the word oikonomia to another aspect of managing a drama, the technical side, what might be called today "production"; he is quoted as saying, "[Aeschylus] was the first to give poses to his chorus, employing no dancing-teachers, but devising himself the figures of the dance, and in general taking upon himself the entire management of the tragedy (τὴν τῆς τραγῳδίας οἰκονομίαν)."[61]

1925), following the Didot text of Cobet, both read Δωριστὶ ἁρμονίας. Even if οἰκονομία is read, it may mean nothing more than "some sort of Dorian get-up" and have nothing to do with music.

[60] Arist. *Poet.* 1453a 29: καὶ ὁ Εὐριπίδης, εἰ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μὴ εὖ οἰκονομεῖ, ἀλλὰ τραγικώτατός γε τῶν ποιητῶν φαίνεται.

[61] Chamaeleon, in Athenaeus *The Deipnosophists* 1. 21e (E. Köpke, *De Cham. Heracleota* (1856), *frag.* 21): Χαμαιλέων γοῦν πρῶτον αὐτόν

It is Polybius, however, who especially applies the word oikonomia to literary effort, speaking in a striking way about the arrangement of historical narrative. At the outset, for example, of his History, stating that he will summarize certain events at the end of his Introduction, before coming to the real theme of his account, he refers quite consciously to this procedure of ordering as his oikonomia: "Thus there will be no break in the narrative and it will be seen that I have been justified in touching on events which have been previously narrated by others, while this arrangement (ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης οἰκονομίας) will render the approach to what follows intelligible and easy for students."[62]

Elsewhere there is indicated a conscious concern for the arrangement of his material: "Since my design is to write the history not of certain particular matters but of what happened all over the world, and indeed, as I have previously stated, I have undertaken, I may say, a vaster task than any of my predecessors, it is my duty to pay particular attention to the matter of arrangement and treatment (ποιεῖσθαι πρόνοιαν καὶ τοῦ χειρισμοῦ καὶ τῆς οἰκονομίας), so that both as a whole and in all its details my work may have the quality of clearness."[63]

φησι σχηματίσαι τοὺς χοροὺς ὀρχηστοδιδασκάλοις οὐ χρησάμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸν τοῖς χοροῖς τὰ σχήματα ποιοῦντα τῶν ὀρχήσεων, καὶ ὅλως πᾶσαν τὴν τῆς τραγῳδίας οἰκονομίαν εἰς ἑαυτὸν περιιστάντα.

[62] Polyb. 1. 13. 9. In order that there may be no subjective element of special pleading on my part in the translation of the significant passages in Polybius and Diodorus Siculus, I shall quote the translations in the Loeb Classical Library, here by W.R. Paton (6 vols.; London, 1922-27), 1, 33.

[63] Ibid., 5. 31. 7; cf. 6. 26. 5 and 10. 25. 2, supra, 211f., notes 12 and 14.

Polybius thus pays great attention to the arrangement or organization of his history, and there is a reason for this which he indicates: he himself sees an over-all arrangement to history, a pattern to events guided by Fortune or Chance (Tychē), and it is this comprehensive scheme of historical events which he hopes to discover and present to his readers. He must pay attention to arrangement, because there is a general arrangement of history presided over by Fortune herself! Let him explain his theory in a long quotation from Book 1:

> Fortune (ἡ τύχη) having guided almost all the affairs of the world in one direction and having forced them to incline towards one and the same end, a historian should therefore bring his readers under one synoptical view the operations by which she has accomplished her general purpose (καὶ δεῖ διὰ τῆς ἱστορίας ὑπὸ μίαν σύνοψιν ἀγαγεῖν τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν τὸν χειρισμὸν τῆς τύχης, ᾧ κέχρηται πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅλων πραγμάτων).[64]

The "one direction" that Polybius sees is, of course, the sudden and dramatic rise of Rome to power in the Mediterranean, and he is a singer of the imperial song about the greatness of Rome long before the days of the Empire. But to continue:

> Indeed it was this chiefly that invited and encouraged me to undertake my task; and secondly the fact that none of my contemporaries have undertaken to write a general history, in which case I should have been much less eager to take this in hand.
>
> As it is, I observe that while several modern writers deal with particular wars and certain matters connected with them, no one, as far as I am aware, has even attempted to inquire critically when and whence the

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[64] Ibid., 1. 4. 1-2.

> general and comprehensive scheme of events (τὴν δὲ καθόλου καὶ συλλήβδην οἰκονομίαν τῶν γεγονότων) originated and how it led up to the end.
>
> I therefore thought it quite necessary not to leave unnoticed or allow to pass into oblivion this the finest and most beneficent of the performances of Fortune.[65]

Thus, Polybius implies, the events of history do have a pattern or arrangement, an οἰκονομία which the historian is to find. And this οἰκονομία is the handling or arrangement or guiding of affairs by Fortune— the one superhuman power in which Polybius had a genuine faith[66]— an arrangement

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[65] Ibid., 1. 4. 2-4.

[66] H.J. Rose, A Handbook of Greek Literature (3rd ed.; London, 1948), 371; cf. Polyb. 29. 21.

There have been a variety of opinions as to Polybius' view of Fortune. R. Hirzel, Untersuchungen zu Cicero's Philosophischen Schriften (Leipzig, 1877), 2, 866ff., identified the tychē of Polybius with the Stoic pronoia (cf. infra, Chapter 4, note 15). W.W. Fowler, "Polybius' Conception of Τύχη," The Classical Review 17 (1903), 445-49, while arguing that Polybius' view was cosmopolitan, connected with no local cult of fortune and allied with no single school, though he is closest to the Stoics at times, sees two main uses of the term: 1) a broad, quasiphilosophical one, and 2) a narrow, popular sense. In the first use, tychē is not Chance, but "an agent or power working to a definite end" (p. 446) with no caprice; very similar to it is physis in Book 6, a more scientific term for the recurring process of political history, while tychē is related to "the Stoic idea of Nature, Fate, ἡ εἱμαρμένη" (cf. 37. 9. 1, where τύχη and εἱμαρμένη occur together in almost the same sense). Tychē, however, as used of history which has now come to its greatest triumph in the rise of Rome in his own day. But it is an over-all order or arrangement of general

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by the historian, must not be pressed to a philosophical dogma, and does not exclude human agency; "man is subject no doubt to the οἰκονομία τῆς φύσεως, but he is himself an important factor in it" (p. 447). The popular use sees *tychē* as "a divine interposition in the ordinary affairs of the world" (p. 448), as when the successes of Scipio Africanus are attributed popularly to the gods rather than his own foresight (10. 9. 2), or the degeneracy and depopulation of Greece is attributed to *tychē* (37. 9), or *tychē* is personalized as a goddess, like Nemesis (23. 10). This type of *tychē* is capricious, addicted to sudden change, and is dragged in only when Polybius cannot find a scientific ground of causation. At the bottom of the two uses, connecting them, is a realization that there is a limit to our knowledge of causation, so that a popular, understandable term must be used. "Whether [Polybius] really believed in a Divine government of the world," Fowler concludes (449), "is hard to say; but it is certain that he did not trouble himself about it where he could dispense with it in his expositions" (cf. 37. 9).

A similar position is taken by Paul Shorey, "Τύχη in Polybius," *Classical Philology* 16 (1921), 280-283, who combats the view of Rudolph von Scala (*Die Studien des Polybius und sein Werk* (1890), 1, 159ff.) that Polybius first began with "Demetrius of Phaleron's sentimental and rhetorical conception of the role of Fortune in human affairs" but then advanced on to "the stern scientific faith in causation" which left no room for such gods. Rather, Shorey writes, Polybius "is always willing to dramatize or personify Fortune," although "where he has, or thinks he has, an explanation by traceable causes, he is always . . . contemptuous . . . of the cheap and history that must be seen first — to use Polybius' own analogy:

> We can no more hope to perceive this from histories dealing with particular events than to get at once a notion of the form of the whole

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easy resort to chance or supernatural intervention." Thus, while Polybius' main thesis is "that the Roman conquest of the world was not due to Fortune, but to Roman character and institutions, he does allow himself to lapse into rhetoric and speaks of Fortune as reducing all things to unity, and of his work as intended to bring out this design of Fortune and the consequent lesson of the unity of world history" (p. 282). There is no need to assume that his concept changed, as von Scala proposed, or that Polybius was really inconsistent in his usage. Another discussion, leaning heavily on Fowler's views, is found in M. Nilsson, Geschichte der griechischen Religion (Munich, 1941-50), 2, 193-195.

An excellent, recent (1952) survey on Polybius will be found in RE 21, 2, 1440-1578, by K. Ziegler (article, "Polybios"). According to this author, Polybius saw history as a teacher (col. 1501), and the real purpose of history is to get at the truth, the real cause (αἰτία αἰτίας), yet also to seek a σύστασις τῆς πολιτείας (col. 1516). Tychē is treated in cols. 1532-1543. Polybius laid more stress on this old theme than any other ancient historian. While he reflects different views toward tychē, and the historian's job is primarily to show causes, this concept does help account for the "irrational" in history. Sometimes Polybius connects it with the θεῖον or the θεοί, something beyond man that reaches into human history (col. 1536; cf. Pr. 1. 4. 1, where the sense of plan or goal is implied, or 38. 18. 8, where Fortune counteracts the folly of a statesman, or 1. 58. 1, where tychē appears as an administrator of battles). Polybius lays great stress on the Roman virtues of fidelity and staunchness, world, its disposition and order (τὸ τῆς ὅλης οἰκουμένης σχῆμα καὶ τὴν σύμπασαν αὐτῆς θέσιν καὶ τάξιν), by visiting, each in turn, the most famous cities; or indeed by looking at separate plans of each.[67]

History therefore has a general oikonomia which a writer seeks, but Polybius also looks for the arrangement or oikonomia of particular parts of history including remote and immediate causes and consequences as with a war, in order to put these in their place in the over-all scheme of things. One last citation serves to set forth the sharp but positive opinion of Polybius on such matters:

> I maintain that far the most essential part of history is the consideration of the remote or immediate consequences of events and especially that of causes. Thus I regard the war with Antiochus as deriving its origin from that with Philip, the latter as resulting from that with Hannibal, and the Hannibalic war as a consequence of that about Sicily, the immediate events, however many and various their character, all tending to the same purpose.

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but religion is given a definite pedagogical value in the state. Personally, Polybius himself was a sceptic and may have been opposed to the popular cults, yet he had a sense, Ziegler feels, of other powers at work in the world and among men. In his phrase, Polybius was "a respectful agnostic," and while in theory he was closer to the Academy, in practice he bowed to the Stoic maxims (cols. 1524f.). In the face of all these opinions, the statement in the text by Rose seems a fair summary of Polybius' position.

The question, whether Rome's greatness was due to tychē or aretē, is also discussed by Plutarch in his essay De fortuna Romanorum; he reaches a conclusion similar to Polybius, cf. infra, Part III, Chapter 1, 520.

[67] Polyb. 1. 4. 6.

> All this can be recognized and understood from a general history, but not at all from the historians of the wars themselves, such as the war with Perseus or that with Philip, unless indeed anyone reading their descriptions of the battles alone conceives that he has acquired an adequate knowledge of the management and nature of the whole war (τὴν τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ σύμπαντος οἰκονομίαν καὶ διάθεσιν). This, however, is not at all so, and I consider that my history differs to its advantage as much from the works on particular episodes as learning does from listening.[68]

Polybius thus recognizes in his approach to history a general arrangement or oikonomia by Tychē, Fortune personified, and within this framework, some sort of arrangement of the parts, which can be discerned and to which the historian must pay great care. Is it too much to say, that, substitute for Tychē, God or the divine Logos, and you begin to have a view not unlike the approach with which many Christian fathers wrote?

No other writer emphasized quite so much as Polybius the idea of a general oikonomia of history presided over by Fortune, but the importance of arrangement in presenting historical narrative is recognized by other writers. One of the clearest statements about the importance of such historical arrangement is contained in Diodorus Siculus, of the first century B.C. He wrote, in a statement that shows an awareness of the old, original sense of oikonomia, plus a consciousness of the need for arranging materials well, and an insight akin to Polybius' approach:

> It should be the special care of historians, when they compose their works, to give attention to everything which may be of utility, and especially to the arrangement of the varied material they present (τῆς κατὰ μέρος οἰκονομίας). This eye to arrangement, for instance, is

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[68] Ibid., 3. 32. 9.

not only of great help to persons in the disposition of their private affairs, if they want to preserve and increase their property, but also, when men come to writing history, it offers them not a few advantages.

Some historians, indeed, although they are worthy objects of praise in the matter of style and in the breadth of experience derived from the events which they record, have nevertheless fallen short in respect of the way in which they have handled the matter of arrangement (ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομίαν χειρισμῷ διήμαρτον with the result that, whereas the effort and care which they expended receive the approbation of the readers, yet the order (τάξιν) which they give to the material they have recorded is the object of just censure.

Timaeus, for example, bestowed, it is true, the greatest attention upon the precision of his chronology, and had due regard for the breadth of knowledge gained through experience, but he is criticized with good reason for his untimely and long censures, and because of the excess to which he went in censuring he has been given by some men the name Epitimaeus or Censurer.

Ephorus, on the other hand, in the universal history which he composed has achieved success, not alone in the style of his composition, but also as regards the arrangement of his work (ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομίαν ἐπιτέτευχε); for each one of his Books is so constructed as to embrace events which fall under a single topic. Consequently we also have given our preference to this method of handling our material, and, in so far as it is possible, are adhering to this general principle.[69]

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[69] Diod. Sic. 5. 1. Translation in Loeb Classical Library by C.H. Oldfather, (London, 1939), Vol. 3, pp. 96f, who comments (note 1): "The word oikonomia, literally 'management of a household,' translated 'arrangement'

Enough said to show that for Diodorus, too, oikonomia is a virtue of real import in writing history.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, a slightly younger contemporary of Diodorus, also stresses the arrangement of literary material and employs oikonomia for this meaning. As we shall see later, he especially uses it in discussing rhetoric and the devices of arrangement there; here it is sufficient to indicate that he also talks about oikonomia in literary composition of history, as for example when he mentions the virtue of "paying great attention to the matter of arrangement in the ideas" (πόλλην δ'... ἔχειν ... πρόνοιαν τῆς τε ἐν τοῖς νοήμασιν οἰκονομίας),[70] and

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in the preceding sentence and 'disposition of private affairs' here, in its transferred sense may mean 'prudent management,' 'good organization of material,' or, as here, 'skillful disposition and arrangement.'" Cf. Diod. Sic. 1. 1ff., where he states his view that authors of universal history are, as it were, "ministers of some sort of Divine Providence (ὥσπερ τινὲς ὑπουργοὶ τῆς θείας προνοίας)." "For just as Providence, having brought the orderly arrangement (διακόσμησιν) of the visible stars and the natures of men together into one common relationship, continually directs their courses through all eternity, apportioning to each that which falls to it by the direction of fate, so likewise the historians, in recording the common affairs of the inhabited world as though they were those of a single state, have made of their treatises a single reckoning of past events and a common clearing-house of knowledge concerning them." Translation in Loeb Classical Library by C.H. Oldfather, Diodorus of Sicily (London, 1933), Vol. 1, p. 7.

[70] Dion. Hal. Comp. 25. Cf. De ant. orat. Dem. 51: τῆς ἐν τοῖς νοήμασιν οἰκονομίας πολλὴν ἐποιεῖτο δόσιν, "he laid great stress on

that he judges other writers sometimes on their literary arrangement. Xenophon is praised for his oikonomia— arrangement of subject matter here, not his views on household management; for Xenophon employed in his compositions, it is said, "the most suitable beginnings, and he gives the endings most fit for each, he both divided and arranged well (καλῶς καὶ τέταχεν), and embroidered his writing."[71] Theopompus of Chios is lauded in similar terms: "first, because of the subject matter of the histories . . . then, because of his arrangement of subject matter (ἔπειτα τῆς οἰκονομίας)."[72]

Oikonomia was therefore, without doubt, a quality of which well-trained writers in the first Christian century had to be aware. Its presence in the minds of men of letters is indicated by the references even authors in Latin make to it during this general period. Cicero, in a letter to his friend Atticus, dated Feb. 24, 50 B.C., shows it was already a loan word in this literary sense, which one man trained in rhetoric might employ in discourse with a cultured friend; he resolves at the outset of his note to answer the letter of Atticus point for point, and that will excuse

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the arrangement of thoughts."

[71] Dion. Hal. Pomp. 4: οὐ μόνον δὲ τῶν ὑποθέσεων χάριν ἄξιος ἐπαινεῖσθαι [ζηλωτὴς Ἡροδότου γενόμενος], ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς οἰκονομίας· ταῖς τε γὰρ ἀρχαῖς αὐτῶν ταῖς πρεπωδεστάταις κέχρηται καὶ τελευτὰς ἑκάστῃ τὰς ἐπιτηδειοτάτας ἀποδέδωκε, μεμέρικέν τε καλῶς καὶ τέταχεν καὶ πεποίκιλκε τὴν γραφήν. The words in brackets, perhaps a gloss, are paralleled in thought at Vett. Cens. 3. 2 (cf. infra, 362, note 136).

[72] Ibid., 6: ἱστορίαν πεπραγματευμένος ἄξιος ἐπαινεῖσθαι πρῶτον μὲν τῆς ὑποθέσεως τῶν ἱστοριῶν ... ἔπειτα τῆς οἰκονομίας.

any faulty arrangement in his own letter: "I will not start an οἰκονομία of my own, but will preserve your order. . . . But if the οἰκονομία is rather upset, I blame it on you, because I am following you in an offhand way."[73]

Quintilian in the first century A.D. employs the same word, transliterated into Latin now, to refer to the dramatic structure of the older Latin poets: "The quality of arrangement (*oeconomia*) will also be present in them in a more careful way than in the majority of moderns, who think subject matter (*sententias*) is the sole virtue of all works."[74] *Oeconomia* seems here to mean internal organization in contrast with *sententiae*,[75] which implies expression of contents especially with epigrammatic turns of phrase.

Longinus, in the famous essay *On the Sublime*, in the first or second century A.D., mentions *oikonomia* along with *taxis* in the sense of the arranging or marshalling of facts: "skill at invention and the ordering and arranging of materials (τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων τάξιν καὶ οἰκονομίαν) are not shown out of one or two instances," rather they emerge out of the whole composition.[76] Elsewhere the treatise states that amplification of a point can be accomplished, among other ways, by the "careful husbandry of facts or feelings" (ἐποικονομίαν ἔργων ἢ παθῶν).[77]

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[73] Cic. *Att*. 6. 1. 1 and 11: nec οἰκονομίαν meam instituam, sed ordinem conservabo tuum. . . . Sed enim οἰκονομία si perturbatior est, tibi adsignato, te enim sequor σχεδιάζοντα. Use of such Greek phrases, of course, came naturally to Cicero; he has quoted in the preceeding sentence the Greek of *Il*. 6. 235.

[74] Quint. *Inst*. 1. 8. 9: oeconomia quoque in iis diligentior quam in plerisque novorum erit, qui omnium operum solam virtutem sententias putaverunt.

[75] So Prestige^2, 100.

The epitomizer, to take a last example, who has preserved for us excerpts of The Wise Men at Dinner, originally written by Athenaeus at the end of the second century A.D., likens the oikonomia of this book to a feast, a feast of reason, over which Athenaeus himself presides as steward: "The arrangement (οἰκονομία) of the discourse is an imitation of the rich bounty of a feast, and the ordering of the book the courses in the dinner. Such a delightful feast of reason, this wonderful steward of discourse (τοῦ λόγου οἰκονόμος— or shall we say "chef of reason"?) Athenaeus, introduces, surpassing even himself; like the Athenian orators, he is carried away. . . by the ardor in his speaking."[78] This reference to the orators serves to lead us on to that important branch of study in the ancient world so closely connected with literature, the art of rhetoric, where we shall also find oikonomia used in significant ways, but before examining this, a word may be added about an important survival of this literary meaning of our terms as "arrangement," in the later scholiasts.

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[76] [Longinus] Subl. 1. 4: καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐμπειρίαν τῆς εὑρέσεως καὶ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων τάξιν καὶ οἰκονομίαν οὐκ ἐξ ἑνὸς οὐδ᾽ ἐκ δυεῖν.

[77] Ibid., 11. 2.

[78] Athenaeus The Deipnosophists 1. 1b. Book 1 is extant only in excerpts by the epitomizer, preserved in a MS of the tenth century, though the epitome was doubtless compiled some centuries earlier. καί ἔστιν ἡ τοῦ λόγου οἰκονομία μίμημα τῆς τοῦ δείπνου πολυτελείας, καὶ ἡ τῆς βίβλου διασκευὴ τῆς ἐν τῷ δείπνῳ παρασκευῆς. τοιοῦτον ὁ θαυμαστὸς οὗτος τοῦ λόγου οἰκονόμος Ἀθήναιος ἥδιστον λογόδειπνον εἰσηγεῖται κρείττων τε αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ γινόμενος, ὥσπερ οἱ Ἀθήνησι ῥήτορες, ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τῷ λέγειν θερμότητος... ὑπεράλλεται.

The army of commentators down through the years, especially from the fourth century A.D. on, who added notes of varying value to the works of the authors of antiquity, frequently employ *oikonomia* or a term derived from it to refer to the arrangement of style or plot, especially in a play. Donatus, for example, the fourth-century grammarian and teacher of Jerome, uses the Greek word again and again in his commentaries on Virgil and Terence. For instance, in regard to a line in Terance's *Andria*, where a character comes on stage saying, "I hear, Archilis, I hear; your orders are to fetch Lesbia," Donatus observes: "These words are poetic invention, so that they may add an element of witticism to the arrangement (*oeconomiam* or almost "plot"); for it is an arrangement (οἰκονομία or "device") so that the midwife may be summoned and Pamphilus encountered."[79] A host of additional examples occur in Donatus' other comments.[80]

Servius, another well-known commentator on Virgil a little later in the fourth century, not only makes use of *oeconomia* in describing an "arrangement" in the plot, but also the compound word *prooeconomia*, "prior arrangement." Thus in *Aeneid* 12, Turnus is to be killed by Aeneas in battle when his sword breaks fighting the Trojan hero and he is left helpless. Now the fateful sword which breaks is not the stout blade of his father he usually carries, but another one borrowed earlier in the day from his charioteer, Metiscus— a fact Turnus has forgotten when he goes into battle against Aeneas. Between the time he borrows this sword and the fatal encounter with Aeneas, however, Turnus also meets and slays Eumedes, an action described by Virgil in the line: "[Turnus] takes away his [Eumedes'] sword from his right hand and wets the shining blade deep in his throat." Servius comments on this detail of action: "It is, as it were, a 'prior arrangement' (prooeconomia), so that he may not kill Eumedes with his own [Turnus'] sword, lest he recognize that which is Metiscus' and immediately now demand his own; this detail having been taken care of, he was able to die following the arrangement (oeconomia) of the broken sword."[81] In like fashion, when Palinurus, the helmsman on Aeneas' ship, falls overboard "with part of the ship's stern" (cum puppis parte), Servius picks up this little touch, adding: "a 'prior arrangement' (prooeconomia), so that he will be able to swim for three days" and reach Italy, as subsequent action requires.[82]

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[79] Donat. *An*. 1. 4. 1 (P. Wessner, *Aeli Donati quod fertur Commentum Terenti* (Leipzig, 1902), Vol. 1, pp. 98f., on *An*. line 228): haec sunt inventionis poeticae, ut ad oeconomiam facetiae aliquid addant; nam οἰκονομία est ut accersatur obstetrix, et conveniatur Pamphilus.

[80] On Ter. *Ad*. 78, 211, 356, 441; *An*. 399, 459, 481, 623; *Eun*. 230, 359, 434, 440, 446, 501, 609; *Haut*. 175; *Phorm*. 534, 750.

The scholia on the plays of Sophocles refer with some frequency to dramatic arrangements in the plots by words derived from oikonomia. The brilliant stroke in the Electra, whereby the old slave of Orestes comes first reporting to Clytemnestra the death of his master in the chariot races, so that Orestes himself may later enter in disguise, claiming to bring the ashes of Orestes, is characterized by the scholiast in these words: "the arrangement (οἰκονομία) of the poet is wonderful, not to introduce the remains at the same time with the report of the death."[83] Again, the fact that a man appears on stage in the Oedipus at Colonus at the very moment Antigone is to leave her blind father, evokes the comment, "the details of the dramatic arrangement (τὰ τῆς οἰκονομίας) are good in order that Oedipus may not be left alone."[84] Elsewhere the scholiast comments, "good theater" (εὖ τῇ οἰκονομίᾳ),[85] "Top-notch in dramatic structure"

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[81] Serv. on Aen. 12. 357f. (G. Thilo and H. Hagen, Servii Grammatici qui feruntur in Vergili carmina commentarii (Leipzig, 1923), Vol. 2, p. 609): dextrae mucronem extorquet et alto Fulgentem tinxit jugulo. Quasi prooeconomia est, ut non eum suo interimat gladio, ne agnoscat quod Metisci est, et jam nunc suum requirat: quo facto perire poterat sequens fracti gladii oeconomia. Cf. Aen. 12. 728ff. on Turnus' death.

[82] Ibid., on Aen. 5. 858 (Vol. 1, p. 654): prooeconomia: ut triduo natare potuerit. Cf. 6. 350ff. for the sequel.

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[83] Schol. on Soph. El. 760 and 1098ff. (P.N. Papageorgius, Scholia in Sophoclis Tragoedias Vetera (Leipzig, 1888), p. 150, line 6): θαυμαστὴ δὲ ἡ οἰκονομία τοῦ ποιητοῦ, μὴ ἅμα τῇ ἀπαγγελίᾳ τοῦ θανάτου κομίσαι τὰ λείψανα.

[84] Ibid., on OC 28 (p. 398, line 19): καλῶς δὲ τὰ τῆς οἰκονομίας ἔχει, ἵνα μὴ μόνος ὁ Οἰδίπους ἀπολειφθῇ.

[85] Schol. on Soph. OC 295ff. (P. Elmsley, Scholia in Sophoclis Tragoedias Septem e Codice MS. Laurentiano (Oxford, 1825), p. 57) (or in P.N. Papageorgius, Scholia, p. 416, line 4):

Χο. τοὺς δὲ τῆσδε γῆς
[295] ἄνακτας ἀρκεῖ ταῦτά μοι διειδέναι. [295]
Οἰ. καὶ ποῦ 'σθ' ὁ κραίνων τῆσδε τῆς χώρας, ξένοι;
Χο. πατρῷον ἄστυ γῆς ἔχει· σκοπὸς δέ νιν,
ὃς κἀμὲ δεῦρ' ἔπεμψεν, οἴχεται στελῶν.

Scholiast: εὖ τῇ οἰκονομίᾳ, ὥστε μὴ διατριβὰς γενέσθαι, τίς ὁ καλέσων ἔσται.

"Chorus [after hearing Oedipus story]: 'It suffices for me
[295] That the lords of this land decide these matters.'

(ἄκρως τῇ οἰκονομίᾳ),[86] and "Wisely he employed his arrangement" (σοφῶς ἄγαν ἐχρήσατο τῇ οἰκονομίᾳ).[87]

Sometimes the scholiast on Sophocles takes the verb oikonomein to express his admiration for the handling of dramatic arrangement. The details in the scene where Oedipus inquires about the death of Laius in the Oedipus Tyrannus, he says, "have been well arranged" (καλῶς δὲ ᾠκονόμηται),[88]

"Oedipus: 'And where is the ruler of this country, friends?'

"Chorus: 'He holds the paternal citadel of the land. But a messenger
Who also sent me hither has gone to fetch him.'

"Scholiast: 'Well-done in arrangement, with the result that there are no delays as to who it will be who will summon him.'"

[86] Ibid., on Soph. OC 887 (Elmsley, p. 75) (or in Papageorgius, Scholia, p. 440, line 10): ἄκρως τῇ οἰκονομίᾳ τὸ μαθεῖν τὸν Θησέα τὰ γενόμενα. When Theseus enters with the words, "Why this outcry?" as Creon tries to carry off Oedipus, the scholiast comments: "Top-notch in dramatic structure, the fact that Theseus learns what has happened."

[87] Schol. on Soph. OC 887 (W. Dindorf, Scholia in Sophocles (Oxford, 1852), a somewhat expanded form of the comment on the line in the Laurentian scholia, supra, note 86). Cf., further, schol. on OC 551 (Elmsley, p. 32; Papageorgius, p. 429, line 2): Χρηστὸς ὁ Θησεὺς τὸ ἦθος εἰσάγεται· καὶ ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῆς οἰκονομίας δεξιώτατα, "Theseus is introduced excellent in character; and he [Sophocles] is also in this degree of arrangement most clever"; OC 237 (Papageorgius, p. 413, line 3): Θαυμαστή τίς ἐστιν ἡ οἰκονομία τοῦ δράματος; and Aj. 342 (Papageorgius, p. 33, line 13): τὸ δὲ ἀπεῖναι Τεῦκρον χρήσιμον τῇ οἰκονομίᾳ, "The absence of Teucer is beneficial to the plot."

[88] Schol. on Soph. OT 118 (Papageorgius, p. 169, line 25).

and the circumstance in the *Electra*, that Aegisthus happens to be away at the start of the play, is said to be "ingeniously arranged (δαιμονίως ᾠκονόμηται) for the subduing of Clytemnestra."[89] In connection with the prologue to the *Philoctetes* of Sophocles, the ancient commentator sees the clear parallels to the same-titled play by Euripides, whose influence on Sophocles here is generally recognized, but he also points out that Sophocles puts his prologue, not just in the mouth of Odysseus, as Euripides had done, but in the form of a dialogue, and "by introducing Neoptolemus, makes his dramatic arrangement (διὰ τούτου οἰκονομεῖται) through him."[90]

Even the adverb οἰκονομικῶς is pressed into service at times by the scholiasts. Thus it is to the lines in Sophocles where Electra says,

> I will not, for future time, enter in[to the house]
> As a fellow-resident, but here at this gate
> Lie down and waste away my life, friendless,

that the scholiast's words are directed: "This, by way of an economy (τοῦτο οἰκονομικῶς). For if she, at a loss on the basis of the tidings announced [the death of her brother Orestes reported by the slave], killed herself, the plot would have to come to an end!"[91] The idea involved in his reference to the "arrangement" here borders on the sense of the ironical— the poet says something he cannot mean too seriously, and it is spoken κατ' οἰκονομίαν, as a device, the somewhat shady sense, ethically speaking, we shall find this term came to have at times.

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[89] *Ibid.*, on *El*. 312 (p. 119, line 11).

[90] *Ibid.*, on *Phil*. 1 (p. 350, line 4). Cf. W.N. Bates, *Sophocles, Poet and Dramatist* (Philadelphia, 1940), 148f.

[91] Schol. on Soph. *El*. 818 (Elmsley, p. 336): Ξύνοικος ἔσομαι: τοῦτο οἰκονομικῶς· εἰ γὰρ ἀπορήσασα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἠγγελμένοις ἀπέκλινεν ἑαυτήν, διελύετο ἂν ἡ ὑπόθεσις. Elmsley refers the scholium to line 785 in his edition of 1825 (ξύνοικος ἦν μοι); Otto Jahn, in his edition *Sophoclis Electra* (Bonn, 1872), p. 95, rightly refers it to line 818, as I have done, and emends ἀπέκλινεν to ἀπέκτεινεν:

Some of the later scholiasts who employ the terms under discussion to refer to an arrangement in a plot may well have been Christians of a later period, the word oikonomia being naturally familiar to them from patristic theology. One thirteenth-century manuscript of scholia on the *Odyssey*, at least, which has Christian interpolations elsewhere, states that the song by the minstrel, about the woes of the Achaeans on their way home from Troy, sung in the hall of Penelope at the opening of the *Odyssey*, if it had included the details about Odysseus' misfortunes, would have prevented Telemachus from driving out his mother's suitors or setting forth in search of his father, "and the whole arrangement of the plot (ἡ πᾶσα οἰκονομία τῆς ὑποθέσεως) would have been broken up."[92] The same scholia

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[817] ἀλλ' οὔ τι μὴν ἔγωγε τοῦ λοιποῦ χρόνου
ξύνοικος εἴσειμ' ἀλλὰ τῇδε πρὸς πύλῃ
παρεῖσ' ἐμαυτὴν ἄφιλος αὐανῶ βίον.

The adverb οἰκονομικῶς also occurs in the schol. on Thuc. 1. 63 (ed. C. Hude; Leipzig, 1927) with the meaning, "in a well-ordered manner."

[92] Schol. on *Od*. 1. 328 (W. Dindorf, *Scholia Graeca in Odysseam* (2 vols.; Oxford, 1855) Vol. 1, p. 58): 1. 328.

τοῦ δ' ὑπερωϊόθεν φρεσὶ σύνθετο θέσπιν ἀοιδὴν
κούρη Ἰκαρίοιο, περίφρων Πηνελόπεια.

Scholium: ὑπερωϊόθεν] κωλύεται τὰ περὶ Ὀδυσσέως λέγειν ὁ ᾠδὸς, ἐπεὶ τάχα ἀκούσας ὁ Τηλέμαχος οὐκ ἂν ἀπεδήμησε, καὶ οἱ μνηστῆρες ἀπηλλάττοντο τῆς Πηνελόπης, οὕτω δὲ ἡ πᾶσα οἰκονομία τῆς ὑποθέσεως διελύετο.

"Wise Penelope, daughter of Icarius,

Heard in her mind his wondrous song from her chamber above."

employ the unusual adverbial form οἰκονομημένως to mean "by way of an arrangement, with adjustment to a purpose."[93] Unquestionably, the application of oikonomia to the arrangement of a literary work, which we encountered as early as Aristotle, thus lingered on, and was perhaps strengthened, taking on new connotations, down through the Christian period.

Scholium on "from her chamber above": "The singer is prevented from speaking the details about Odysseus, since Telemachus, if he heard, would probably not set forth, and the suitors would leave Penelope, and thus the whole arrangement of the plot would be broken up." The comment occurs in 2 manuscripts, according to Dindorf, MS H, Harleianus (British Museum 5674, 13th cent.) and MS Q, Mediolanensis (Ambrosianae Bibliothecae, 14th cent.), and MS. H elsewhere has Christian interpolations, as at Od. 18. 2.

[93] Ibid., on Od. 3. 296 (Vol. 1, p. 148): 3. 296. ἐς Φαιστόν, μικρὸς δὲ λίθος μέγα κῦμ' ἀποέργει. Scholium: μικρὸς δὲ λίθος] μικρὸν λίθον εἶπεν ὡς πρὸς σύγκρισιν τῶν ἐκεῖ γινομένων κυμάτων· ὅλον δὲ οἰκονομημένως, ἵνα τοῖς περὶ τὸ χωρίον αὐτῶν ἀσινὴς ἡ ἔκβασις γένηται προεκλυομένου τοῦ κύματος.

Nestor, describing to Telemachus, the seacoast where some of Menelaus' ships were wrecked, though the crews landed safely, tells how gales drive great breakers against a headland, "towards Phaestus, but a small reef (or rock) holds back a great wave."

Scholium on "a small reef": "He said 'a small reef' as in comparison with the waves which come there; but on the whole, with adjustment to a purpose, in order that for those at the spot their landing might be unharmed, the wave breaking in advance." The form οἰκονομημένως is also vouched for in J.A. Cramer, Anecdota Graeca e Codd. Manuscriptis Bibliothecae Regiae Parisiensis (4 vols.; Oxford, 1839-41), 3, 435.

Applications in Rhetoric

The important place which rhetoric, the art of oratory, held in the ancient world, particularly in the last two centuries B.C. and the first two of the Christian era, is hard for us to appreciate, since we know classical rhetoric mostly for its dull hairsplitting over techniques and have to deal with it mainly through a mass of manuscript remains that are difficult to date and to assign, crabbed in style to read, and no longer occupy the place in scholarly interests which they did fifty years ago.[94] Yet in the various Greek and Roman writers on rhetoric the terms we study occur quite often in a technical sense,[95] and an examination of this admittedly difficult evidence is in order because it helps explain the somewhat shady meaning of *oikonomia*— i.e., as a not-altogether-honest "arrangement" of material— which the word comes to suggest in pagan and patristic writers.

There was an early interest on the part of the Greeks in rhetoric from the days of the Sophists, and with it came the tendency to analyze rhetoric from the theoretical standpoint, a typical Greek trait. At the outset, rhetoric was thought to be composed of two parts: content, which the speaker brought to the oration out of his general experience or the particular case; and form, which was the author's own contribution.[96] Such a twofold division is reflected, for example, in the time of Isocrates, when the concern is for content and presentation of that content, and later in the writings of Dionysius of Halicarnassus.[97] As early as Anaximenes, however, a sophist of the fourth century, a third element was hinted at, namely arrangement of material,[98] and in the Rhetoric of Aristotle, who laid the foundations for all future study of the art, we find the threefold classification, into εὕρεσις, invention or discovery of content; λέξις, expression in or presentation of the speech; and τάξις, or arrangement of it.[99] It is this latter term, taxis, or dispositio as the Romans sometimes referred to it, that interests us, for, in the course of development, οἰκονομία was a word often associated with this matter of arrangement in rhetoric. Later analyses of rhetorical theory added a fourth part, ὑπόκρισις or delivery of the speech,[100] and sometimes a fifth, an emphasis on μνήμη or memory,[101] but we shall note only those writers who employ the term οἰκονομία in dealing with arrangement as an essential element or subdivision or appendage in their analysis of oratory.

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[94] On the place of rhetoric in classical education and its influence on Christianity, cf. especially Edwin Hatch, *The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church* (London, 1907) (cited hereafter as "Hatch, *Greek Ideas*"), 50ff., 86ff. For a brief, facile survey, cf. G. Saintsbury, *A History of Criticism and Literary Taste in Europe* (3rd ed.; New York, 1908), 1, 87ff., and the standard works noted *infra*.

[95] Thus, e.g., J.C.T. Ernesti, *Lexicon Technologiae Graecorum Rhetoricae* (Leipzig, 1795), defines οἰκονομία (p. 229, "the arrangement of materials and of each matter in comparison with a definite order"), ἐποικονομία (p. 135), and τάξις (pp. 347f.).

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[96] So Richard Volkmann, Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer in systematischer Übersicht (Leipzig, 1885) (cited hereafter as "Volkmann, Rhetorik"), 16ff.; cf. Quint. Inst. 3. 5. 1.

[97] Ibid., 27; for the period of Isocrates, cf. Thuc. 2. 60 and 8. 68, where the importance of being able to think logically and to express one's thoughts clearly in public life is indicated— i.e., εὕρεσις or inventio, and λέξις or elocutio. On the basic twofold outline of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, cf. infra, 360f.

[98] Ibid., 28 and 363. Volkmann rightly assigns the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, formerly attributed to Aristotle, to Anaximenes of Lampsacus (c. 380-320 B.C.), the fourth century date of which is now demonstrated by PHib. 26.

[99] Arist. Rh. 3. 13-19. Aristotle takes up the materials of rhetoric

The first man to be considered then is Hermagoras of Temnos in Mysia, who flourished about 150 B.C. and led a rhetorical revival in reaction to

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in this order, and, while he recognizes ὑπόκρισις also as a fourth part of the subject, he expressly notes that in his day it was not a concern of rhetoric (3. 1).

[100] Volkmann, *Rhetorik*, 29, sums up: "Thrasymachus had declared that ὑπόκρισις was a natural gift and has nothing to do with technique (Quint. *Inst*. 3. 3. 4). The first who treated it appears to have been Theophrastus, whose writing περὶ ὑποκρίσεως is mentioned. But Philodemus 19. 19 and Cornificius 3. 11. 19 suggest it had not yet been discussed carefully and analyzed." The Stoics often give the fourfold division (e.g., Diog. Laert. 7. 43); cf. *Rhetorik*, 364f.

[101] *Ibid*. The "standard" division of rhetoric into five parts is found, e.g., in Quint. *Inst*. 3. 3; Cic. *Inv*. *Rhet*. 1. 7. 9; [Cornificius] *Rhet*. *Her*. 1. 2. 2. The usual names for the parts are: εὕρεσις, *inventio*, discovery or conception of contents; λέξις, *elocutio*, expression; τάξις, *dispositio*, arrangement; ὑπόκρισις, *pronuntatio* or *actio*, delivery; μνήμη, *memoria*, or memory. This "standard," fivefold division, with οἰκονομία as a substitute sometimes for τάξις, is assumed for the first century A.D., for example, by Robert Jeuckens in his thesis, *Plutarch von Chaeronea und die Rhetorik* (Strassburg: Karl J. Trübner, 1907), 107, reprinted in *Dissertationes Philologicae Argentoratenses Selectae*, 12 (1908), [445] (cited hereafter as "R. Jeuckens, *Plutarch* . . . *und die Rhetorik*").

the current hostility against that subject.[102] In a period when the florid Asianic school of rhetoric, which cared little about theory, was generally dominant, Hermagoras was able to claim more serious consideration for rhetoric and was able to evolve a system that had wide acceptance and made its compiler "perhaps the most influential rhetorical theorist after Aristotle."[103] Though his precepts were called "dry as dust (*aridissimus*)" by Tacitus[104] and have been more severely flayed by a modern writer as "sterile analyses, mechanical, cut-and-dried systems, [with] abundant categories and technical terms,"[105] nonetheless he was the guide in rhetoric for Cicero, who used Hermagoras heavily in his *De Inventione*. Hermagoras himself, a man of limited abilities, may not have been a genuine Atticist, and little survives directly of his six or seven books on *Rhetorical Techniques* (τέχναι ῥητορικαί), but we can tell, from what had been reconstructed of his elaborate system, that especial emphasis was placed upon *oikonomia*, "arrangement or

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Volkmann, *Rhetorik*, 29, also notes the other varied arrangements in ancient authors.

[102] On Hermagoras, in addition to the standard sources, cf. Richard Volkmann, *Hermagoras oder Elemente der Rhetorik* (Stettin, 1865); Franz Susemihl, *Geschichte der griechischen Litteratur in der Alexandrinerzeit* (Leipzig, 1892), 2, 471ff.; and G. Thiele, *Hermagoras* (Strassburg, 1893), to which I have not had access. *RE* 8, 692-95 presents a brief summary, distinguishing him from another Hermagoras, teacher of Tiberius (*fl*. *c*. 30 B.C.), and Hermagoras rhetor, *c*. A.D. 150.

[103] So G.L. Hendrickson, Cicero, *Brutus* (Loeb Classical Library, London, 1939), p. 226.

[104] Tac. *Dial*. 19.

[105] J.W.H. Atkins, *Literary Criticism in Antiquity* (Cambridge, 1934), 2, 15.

'economy' of thought."[106]

The exact details of the rhetorical method of Hermagoras are by no means clear. The term "scholastic"[107] characterizes it admirably, because of the great subtleties involved, distinctions so delicate that scholars today cannot agree on the exact outline his scheme followed. There is a key passage in Quintilian, however, which informs us that Hermagoras did lay great stress on *oikonomia* in rhetoric, though the exact sense is disputed.[108] Quintilian, just prior to this reference to Hermagoras, has given his familiar fivefold division of the art of oratory into invention, arrangement (*dispositio*), expression, delivery, and memorization, but then notes that other analyses of the parts had been adopted by other rhetoricians, into three parts or even six.[109] An otherwise unknown Dio (not Chrysostom), he says, "taught that oratory consisted only of invention and arrangement (*dispositio*), but that each of these departments was twofold *in* nature, while memory must be added."[110] The followers of Theodorus of Gadara (*fl*. *c*. 30 B.C.) divided invention into two parts, we are told, but then added three others. Then of Hermagoras, Quintilian says: "Hermagoras places judgment, division, order, and everything relating to delivery under the heading of economy (*oeconomia*), a Greek word meaning the management of domestic affairs, which is applied here 'metaphorically' (*per abusionem!*) and has no Latin equivalent."[111]

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[106] F. Susemihl, *Geschichte der griechischen Litteratur in der Alexandrinerzeit* (Leipzig, 1892), 2, 474: "He appears to have worked out more precisely only the part of rhetoric dealing with invention and the part dealing with the 'economy' of thought. . . . Today it is possible to reconstruct this system of his only in the essential basic premises, from allusions in later writers. . . ." J.W.H. Atkins in *OCD*, "Hermagoras of Temnos," 417, gives the number of books in the τέχναι ῥητορικαί as six; Susemihl as seven; *RE* 8, 692, as six, citing Suidas.

[107] *Ibid*., 2, 471.

[108] *Inst*. 3. 3. 9.

[109] *Ibid*., 3. 3. 1ff. Six parts are arrived at by listing *ordo* (order) in addition to arrangement.

[110] *Ibid*., 3. 3. 6. The system of Dio is summarized by Volkmann,

On the precise reconstruction of Hermagoras' general outline there is considerable debate— whether it fell into three main parts,[112] or two,[113]

Rhetorik, 29, thus:

- A. Invention
    - 1. Contents
    - 2. Expression (*elocutio*)
- B. *dispositio* (arrangement)
    - 1. Contents
    - 2. Expression
- C. Memory.

[111] *Ibid.*, 3. 3. 9: Hermagoras iudicium, partitionem, ordinem, quaeque sunt elocutionis, subiicit oeconomiae, quae graece appellata ex cura rerum domesticarum et hic per abusionem posita nomine Latino caret. Because of the varying interpretations I quote the translation of H.E. Butler in the Loeb Classical Library (London, 1920), 1, p. 387.

[112] Carl Wilhelm Piderit, *De Hermagora Rhetore* (Hersfeld, 1839), 24, concludes for a threefold division: οἰκονομία including inventio, partitio, dispositio, and elocutio; memory; and actio or delivery. Volkmann, *Rhetorik*, 29, assumes Hermagoras "divided the entire area of rhetoric into three main parts, νόησις [division], εὕρεσις, and διάθεσις [disposition] or οἰκονομία. The latter encompassed as subdivisions κρίσις, διαιρεσις, τάξις and λέξις."

[113] F. Susemihl, *Geschichte der griechischen Litteratur in der Alexandrinerzeit* (Leipzig, 1892), 2, 474, note 90, suggests, as one possibility,

or perhaps four divisions[114]— but what is perfectly clear is that, according to Hermagoras, "arrangement" was one of the essential elements of rhetoric; for this sense of the internal organization in an oration he used the word οἰκονομία, and under this heading he lumped together four items, judgment, division, order (τάξις), and the details of delivery (λέξις), the latter two especially, terms that were earlier employed and continued to be used in later times in rhetoric.[115]

Hermagoras' doctrines, thus including emphasis on the term οἰκονομία, became dominant in the second century B.C., perhaps because they met the need of leading the baroque Asianic style back to classical models, by providing a detailed, though often dull, compendium on theory.[116] Successors and followers carried these views to Rome. Cicero mentions Titus Accius of Pisaurum, the Latin tragic poet, c. 170-85 B.C., as being "trained in

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in opposition to Volkmann, Piderit, and others, but in agreement with Thiele, that "Hermagoras distinguished two main parts of rhetoric, εὕρεσις and οἰκονομία."

[114] Susemihl, ibid., suggests, as the other possibility, that Hermagoras "also added in addition μνήμη and ὑπόκρισις."

[115] All the editors agree in making οἰκονομία one of the two, three, or four main headings in Hermagoras' system. On the subdivision of οἰκονομία into 4 (or 3!) parts, cf. Susemihl, ibid., who, citing the various conjectures, would take partitio in the sense of ἡ κατὰ μέρος ἐξεργασία, as Thiele does, and would view κρίσις, τάξις, and λέξις as the three subdivisions then.

[116] Cf. Susemihl, ibid., 2, 474. Hermagoras seems to have had more influence on theory than on practical oratory (RE 8, 695).

the precepts of Hermagoras,"[117] and calls Gnaeus Sicinius, the tribune of the plebs in 76 B.C., a member of Hermagoras' school;[118] Cicero himself, we saw, was under the same influence, and Quintilian in the first century A.D. reflects Hermagoras at points.[119] We may conclude that the introduction of οἰκονομία by Hermagoras into rhetorical use was no brief excursion for the term into this area; application continued in both Greek and Latin rhetoricians from the first century B.C. on.

Thus, for instance, the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, called the first significant work of the first century B.C., a work long attributed to Cicero, but actually characteristic of conditions in the youth of Cicero and more likely attributable to Cornificius and datable in the age of Sulla, about 86 B.C., carries over from Hellenistic rhetoric the Greek terms and ideas into Latin, including apparently Hermagoras' emphasis on *oikonomia*.[120] Accordingly *dispositio* is included as one of the main elements of oratory, and there is, moreover, a brief but interesting reference to both "natural and artistic arrangement (*dispositio*)" in a speech, the one being the type of arrangement accomplished by the use of art, the other being that which is accommodated to the opportunity of time.[121]

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[117] Cic. *Brut*. 271: "[Titus Accius] was moreover trained in the precepts of Hermagoras, which though they do not supply the richer embellishments of oratory, yet furnish outlines of argument ready made and applicable to every type of case— spears, as it were, ready fitted with straps for the skirmisher to throw." Tr. by G.L. Hendrickson in the Loeb Classical Library, *op*. *cit*. (*supra*, 351, note 103), 235. Further, cf. *RE* 1, 142-147.

[118] *Ibid*., 263: "Gnaeus Sicinius . . . was from the school of Hermagoras, which though meagre in embellishment, is effective in invention. It furnishes certain general principles and rules which have the virtue of order (*ordinem*) and of fixing lines which do not permit one to stray." Tr. by G.L. Hendrickson, *ibid*., 227. Further, cf. *RE*, Series 2, 2, 2198.

[119] On Cicero, cf. *supra*, 351, and cf. his brief discussion on *dispositio* at *Orat*. 50. On Quintilian, cf. *supra*, 353, note 111, and the use of *dispositio* throughout the *Inst*., as at 6. 4. 1, or of *oeconomia*, as at 1. 8. 17: the teacher of literature will impress on men's minds the value of proper arrangement (*oeconomia*).

The famous essay *On the Sublime*, which we have seen employs οἰκονομία as a term for literary arrangement, reflects the traditional rhetorical procedures continuing at the end of the first century A.D., and it too includes arrangement as one part of the subject of rhetoric.[122]

Quintilian, too, in addition to preserving allusions to Hermagoras' usage of *oikonomia* in connection with the subject earlier, makes *dispositio* one of the five parts of his rhetoric, showing the Greek influence when he also employs the loan word *oeconomia* in this connection. Thus he devotes the entire seventh Book of the *Institutio oratoria* (*c*. A.D. 95) to *dispositio*, without which, he says, all discovery of material (*inventio*) "is useless."[123] Such an art, however, of arranging material, he goes on, is hard to acquire, because of the difficulty in laying down rules that will fit all cases; arrangement to the particular case at hand therefore is what counts. *Dispositio*, accordingly, he defines as "the distribution of things and parts to the places which it is expedient that they should occupy. We must remember that *dispositio* is generally dependent on expediency (*dispositionem plerumque utilitatem mutari*)."[124]

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[120] Cf. J.W.H. Atkins, *Literary Criticism in Antiquity* (Cambridge, 1934), 2, 16.

[121] [Cornificius] *Rhet*. *Her*. 3. 9. 16. The two types of arrangement are referred to as dispositionis genus ab institutione artis profectum and genus ad casum temporis accommodatum. Cf. further, Volkmann, *Rhetorik*, 366.

[122] *Supra*, 340, notes 76 and 77.

[123] Quin. *Inst*. 7. Pr. 2, reading *dispositioni* for the MSS *divisioni*. The longer translations of Quintilian which follow are again drawn from the standard English version in the Loeb Classical Library by H.E. Butler

This notion, that an oration must be arranged in view of the case at hand and in the light of expediency, is referred to by Quintilian at one point as "economic arrangement": "the most powerful, and what is properly called the most ecomonical arrangement (*oeconomica* . . . *dispositio*) of a case as a whole, is that which cannot be determined except when we have the specific facts before us."[125] Later Quintilian shows what this economic presentation of a case amounts to:

> It consists in the power to determine when the *exordium* [or introduction] is necessary and when it should be omitted; when we should make our statement of facts continuous, and when we should subdivide it; when we should begin at the very beginning, when, like Homer, start at the middle or the end; when we should omit the statement of facts altogether; when we should begin by dealing with the arguments advanced by our opponents, and when with our own; when we should place the strongest proofs first and when the weakest; in what cases we should prefix questions to the *exordium*, and what

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(4 vols.; London, 1920-1922).

[124] *Ibid*., 7. 1. 1-2.

[125] *Ibid*., 7. 10. 11: illa enim potentissima est, quaeque vere dicitur oeconomica totius causae dispositio, quae nullo modo constitui nisi velut in re praesente potest.

> preparation is necessary to pave the way for these questions; what arguments the judge will accept at once and to what he requires to be led by degrees; whether we should refute our opponent's arguments as a whole or in detail; whether we should reserve (reservandi) emotional appeals for the peroration or distribute them throughout the whole speech; whether we should first advance (or refute) charges as to past offences or the charges connected with the actual trial; or, again, if the case is complicated, what order we should adopt, what evidence or documents of any kind should be read out in the course of the speech, and what reserved (reservandae) for a later stage.[126]

Then an interesting analogy: "This gift of arrangement (haec [sc. oeconomica . . . dispositio from 7. 10. 11]) is to oratory what generalship is to war"— i.e., the ability to arrange resources well as a good manager, the root idea we have seen throughout in oikonomia, now applied to rhetoric, not just generally, but in regard to the individual parts of an oration, too, for Quintilian adds, "It is not enough merely to arrange the various parts; each several part has its own internal economy (dispositio)."[127] Thus we see the "economic presentation" of a case, for the Latin rhetoricians, has to do with internal organization of material, the proportion and coordination of constitutent elements, all with a dash of expediency to fit the individual case.[128] That such a concept of arrangement was common in rhetoric during the years just prior to the Christian era and, furthermore, continued on for several centuries, with a more frequent stress on expediency in arrangement, even to the point of shrewdness and dishonesty, is shown strikingly in the writings first of Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Caecilius of Calacte and then of the later, often anonymous, rhetoricians.

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[126] Ibid., 7. 10. 11ff. Note the comparison to Homer and the idea of reserving certain portions for the expedient moment.

[127] Ibid., 7. 10. 13-16.

[128] So Prestige^2, 100.

The Atticist Movement in rhetoric, which rejected the florid Asianic style and under the influence of Roman common sense returned to the more sober classical models, set in, beginning around 50 B.C. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, active leader of a literary circle at Rome from about 30 to 8 B.C., was one of the prime movers in his trend in which, to use his own phrase, "harlot Asianism gives place to the true wife."[129] Although he himself was sometimes "reminiscent of the sterile analyses of the earlier rhetoricians, with their stylistic discussions of the choice (εὕρεσις) and arrangement (οἰκονομία) of material, and their subdivisions of 'distribution,' 'order,' 'treatment of detail,' and the like,"[130] Dionysius nonetheless managed to bring some fresh insights to his subject, and worked out a basic twofold outline of rhetorical theory that was plainly indebted to Isocrates, Theophrastus, and Hermagoras, but which also found room for the newer concerns of his day.[131]

A passage in his essay on Demosthenes shows his basic twofold analysis of rhetoric into the area of subject matter and the area of style or expression, and the further subdivision of each of these:

> The area of subject matter, on the one hand, is divided into preparation, which the ancients called invention (εὕρεσις), and into the use of the materials which have been prepared, which they term arrangement

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[129] Dion. Hal. De ant. orat. 1. 2. On Dionysius himself, cf. RE 5, 934-971, especially 961ff. on the rhetorical works.

[130] J.W.H. Atkins, Literary Criticism in Antiquity (Cambridge, 1934), 2, 131.

[131] Volkmann, Rhetorik, 27f., 363. Cf. supra, 349.

> (οἰκονομία). The area of expression, on the other hand, is divided into the choice of terms, and the composition of the terms chosen. In each of these cases, the latter element has more influence: the matter of arrangement (τὸ μὲν οἰκονομικόν) in the area of subject matter, and the matter of composition in the area of expression.[132]

To outline this scheme a bit more fully, Dionysius has in mind a division like this:[133]

A. The area related to subject matter (ὁ πραγματικὸς τόπος)
  1. Preparation (ἡ παρασκευή), including what the older writers called invention (εὕρεσις) and judgment (κρίσις);
  2. The application or use of the materials which have been prepared (ἡ χρῆσις τῶν παρεσκευασμένων). Here, just as Hermagoras, Dionysius employs the word οἰκονομία in place of the older term for arrangement, τάξις. Likewise, as with Hermagoras, this important principle of οἰκονομία is further subdivided into subordinate parts:
     a. division (διαίρεσις),
     b. order (τάξις), and
     c. treatment in detail (ἐξεργασία).

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[132] Dion. Hal. Dem. 51: τοῦ πραγματικοῦ μὲν εἴς τε τὴν παρασκευήν, ἣν οἱ παλαιοὶ καλοῦσιν εὕρεσιν, καὶ εἰς τὴν χρῆσιν τῶν παρεσκευασμένων, ἣν προσαγορεύουσιν οἰκονομίαν, τοῦ λεκτικοῦ δὲ εἴς τε τὴν ἐκλογὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ εἰς τὴν σύνθεσιν τῶν ἐκλεγέντων ἐν ἑκατέρῳ τούτων πλείω μοῖραν ἔχει τὰ δεύτερα τῶν προτέρων· τὸ μὲν οἰκονομικὸν ἐν τῷ πραγματικῷ, τὸ δὲ συνθετικὸν ἐν τῷ λεκτικῷ.

[133] Cf. Volkmann, Rhetorik, 27f., and W. Rhys Roberts, Dionysius of Halicarnassus: The Three Literary Letters (Cambridge, 1901), 8f.

B. The area of style or expression (ὁ λεκτικὸς τόπος)

1. The selection of words (ἡ ἐκλογὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων)

   a. proper phraseology (κυρία φράσις)

   b. figurative style (τροπικὴ παρασκευή)

2. The composition of the words (ἡ σύνθεσις τῶν ὀνομάτων).

Thus in the system of Dionysius, οἰκονομία has a precise and important place, as the arrangement or usage of material brought together in preparatory investigation (εὕρεσις); indeed, it is even more important than the discovery of material itself, he says.

Accordingly Dionysius can speak of the arrangement of subject matter (ἡ πραγματικὴ οἰκονομία),[134] and call this οἰκονομία the "more artful part of the area of subject matter (τεχνικώτερον μέρος τοῦ πραγματικοῦ) . . . which is sought after in all writings."[135] Furthermore he can and does venture opinions on other writers or orators on the basis of how they handle this important matter of arrangement. Thus Xenophon is commended because he was "a follower of Herodotus in regard to the virtues which are connected with subject matter and with arrangement (ἀρετὰς . . . οἰκονομίας)."[136] Thucydides, on the other hand, is censured for his οἰκονομία, i.e., the annalistic method he employed for handling his material; further, the fact that Thucydides treated the alleged causes for the Peloponnesian War first is criticized, because "direct entry into the narrative would have turned out far better than such an arrangement (τοιαύτης οἰκονομίας)";[137] at another point, Dionysius comments of Thucydides that "the narrative was not arranged (ᾠκονομῆσθαι) in the best way by him."[138] In similar fashion, the great ancient orators are criticized.[139]

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[134] Isoc. 4.

[135] Thuc. 9: ἃ δ' ἐλλιπέστερον κατεσκεύασε καὶ ἐφ' οἷς ἐγκαλοῦσιν αὐτῷ τινες, περὶ τὸ τεχνικώτερον μέρος ἐστὶ τοῦ πραγματικοῦ, τὸ λεγόμενον μὲν οἰκονομικόν, ἐν ἁπάσαις δὲ γραφαῖς ἐπιζητούμενον, ἐάν τε φιλοσόφους προέληταί τις ὑποθέσεις ἐάν τε ῥητορικάς. ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν τάξιν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐξεργασίας. "The elements which [Thucydides] has provided in a more defective way and for which some men censure him are concerned with the more artful part of the area of subject matter, namely that which is called economical and which is sought after in all writings. These elements are those concerning division, those concerned with order, and those concerned with treatment in detail."

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[136] *Vett. Cens.* 3. 2: ὁ μὲν Ξενοφῶν Ἡροδότου ζηλωτὴς ἐγένετο κατά τε τὰς πραγματικὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς οἰκονομικάς.

[137] *Thuc.* 11: ἥ τε τῆς διηγήσεως εἰσβολὴ κρείττων ἂν ἐγίνετο μακρῷ τοιαύτης οἰκονομίας τυχοῦσα. Cf. 9 and 10. Further, cf. Volkmann, *Rhetorik*, 364; and W. Rhys Roberts, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus: The Three Literary Letters* (Cambridge, 1901), 33: "Under the heading of subject matter (τὸ πραγματικὸν μέρος), Dionysius discusses (1. 20) not only Thucydides' choice of theme, but also his method of handling it (οἰκονομία). The topic of οἰκονομία ('management') in its turn yields such subdivisions as 'distribution' (διαίρεσις), 'order' (τάξις), and 'treatment in detail' (ἐξεργασία), under which heading he groups criticisms of the annalistic method of Thucydides."

[138] *Thuc.* 12: ἱκανὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῦτο τεκμήριον ἦν τοῦ μὴ κατὰ τὸν ἄριστον τρόπον ᾠκονομῆσθαι τὴν διήγησιν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. "This then was proof enough that the narrative was not arranged in the best way by him." Cf. *De ant. orat., de Lysia iud.* 24:

Caecilius of Calacte, roughly contemporary with Dionysius, a freedman from Sicily, of Jewish background, according to Suidas, who taught rhetoric at Rome during the reign of Augustus, likewise made *oikonomia* a standard of judgment in measuring orators of the past. One statement in Photius reads, "Caecilius errs, agreeing that the man [Lysias] is inventive, . . . but that he is not able thus to arrange (οἰκονομῆσαι) the materials invented."[140] A fragmentary passage suggests Caecilius leveled similar criticism at Isocrates for his arrangement: "Especially for him [Isocrates in his *Panegyricus*] the discovery of the materials and their arrangement (διοίκησις) provided such a hindrance; for the topics and the proofs, with which the argument, in being organized (οἰκονομούμενος), is perfected, if one should consider them carefully and each part by part, he would find them far from coming to a conclusion."[141] Other fragments attributed to Caecilius seem to commend Homer for his arrangement.[142]

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[139] *De ant. orat.*, *passim*. Cf. W. Rhys Roberts, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus: The Three Literary Letters* (Cambridge, 1901), 20: "The three essays devoted to Lysias, Isocrates, and Isaeus are modelled on an identical plan—one which comprises a few particulars of the life of each orator, an estimate of his style . . . , a similar estimate of his skill in dealing with his subject matter (the headings here being πραγματικὸς τόπος, εὕρεσις, οἰκονομία, etc.)."

[140] *Caecilii Calactini Fragmenta* (ed. E. Offenloch; Leipzig, 1907), p. 99, lines 5f. (*frag*. 110, Photius bibl. cod. 262, p. 489b 3f., assigned to a discussion of the ten orators): Κεκίλιος δὲ ἁμαρτάνει εὑρετικὸν μὲν τὸν ἄνδρα, ..., συνομολογῶν, οἰκονομῆσαι δὲ τὰ εὑρεθέντα οὐχ οὕτως ἱκανόν. Cf. *frag*. 110a (Hermias Alexandrinus in Plat. Phaedr. schol., p. 227, 1ff.): τριῶν δὲ ὄντων τούτων εὑρέσεως καὶ τάξεως ἐν παντὶ λόγῳ καὶ φράσεως, μέμφεται (ὁ Πλάτων) τὸν Λυσίαν οὐκ ἐν τῇ εὑρέσει ἀλλὰ ἐν τῇ οἰκονομίᾳ καὶ φράσει. "In the light of these three elements, invention, and arrangement in every word, and expression, Plato finds fault with Lysias, not in inventiveness, but in arrangement and expression." Note how is synonymous here with in this threefold division of rhetoric.

Oikonomia, it can be seen from these examples, played a significant part in the rhetorical analysis and judgments of Dionysius and his contemporaries. It remains now to point out how this matter of arrangement or shaping of material sometimes takes on for him and his successors a somewhat "shady" sense, by which the very arrangement of the material conceals more than it reveals or implies more than it seems to say. One passage in Dionysius himself, expressing opinions on Isaeus and the arrangement of his orations, concludes:

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[141] Ibid., p. 105, lines 22ff. (frag. 121, Photius bibl. cod. 260): μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῷ ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων εὕρεσις καὶ διοίκησις τὴν τοσαύτην ἀσχολίαν ἐνεποίησε· τὰ γὰρ κεφάλαια καὶ τὰ ἐπιχειρήματα, οἷς ὁ λόγος οἰκονομούμενος ἀπαρτίζεται, εἴ τις ἐπιμελῶς καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον μέρος ἐπισκέψοιτο, εὑρήσει συντελεσθῆναι πολλοῦ δεόμενα χρόνου.

[142] Ibid., p. 193, line 17 (frag. 156, Marcellinus, vita Thucyd. 35, p. 193, 79 Westerm.): ζηλωτὴς δὲ γέγονεν ὁ Θουκυδίδης εἰς μὲν τὴν οἰκονομίαν Ὁμήρου, Πινδάρου δ'εἰς τὸ μεγαλοφυὲς καὶ ὑψηλὸν τοῦ χαρακτῆρος. "Thucydides became an admirer of Homer for (dramatic?) arrangement, and of Pindar for nobility and sublimity of character." Ibid., p. 195, line 12 (frag. 156a (Scholion Thucyd. IV, 135, 2, p. 89b 20, Haase): εἰς δὲ τὴν οἰκονομίαν τὸν ποιητήν. Thucydides imitated Aeschylus and Pindar for refinement of language, . . . the Socratics, Euripides, and others for the gnomic style, "but for arrangement, the poet [i.e., Homer]."

> I would be able to provide many other narrations also, arranged by the speaker for the sake of expediency (πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον ᾠκονομημένας, with prefaces, preparations, subdivisions, changes of places, transposals of narrative, the reversing of the main points, mentioning the actions not in chronological order, not mentioning all details, or not as it was natural to be done, or not as some simple layman would tell it, not fairly, with ten thousand other such devices.[143]

All this is suggested by economic arrangement!

The whole range of often ethically dubious nuances, which our terms took on, can be viewed more clearly, however, in the *Ars Rhetorica* attributed to Dionysius, where *dioikēsis* and other compounds from that root are employed for the purpose, and then very clearly in a host of other rhetoricians, some of them much later, where *oikonomia* occurs in this sense.

The Τέχνη, falsely ascribed to Dionysius, but really a handbook by several later rhetoricians on composing epideictic speeches, frequently employs *dioikēsis* in the sense of rhetorical arrangement.[144] An example of the connotations the term may take on is supplied in a section on the use of figures of speech, where the term διοίκησις for an expedient arrangement is further derived from a line in Demosthenes' *On the Crown*:

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[143] *De ant. orat., de Isaeo ind.* 15: πολλὰς δ' ἂν ἔχοιμι καὶ ἄλλας παρασχέσθαι διηγήσεις, πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον ᾠκονομημένας ὑπὸ τοῦ ῥήτορος, προκατασκευαῖς, παρασκευαῖς, μερισμοῖς, χωρίων ἀλλαγαῖς, πραγμάτων μεταγωγαῖς, τῷ τὰ κεφάλαια ἀνεστράφθαι, τῷ μὴ κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους τὰ πραχθέντα εἰρῆσθαι, τῷ μὴ πάντα, μηδ' ἂν ὡς φύσιν εἶχε πραχθῆναι, μηδ' ὡς ἂν ἰδιώτης τις εἴποι, λέγεσθαι, μὴ μετρίως, μυρίοις ἄλλοις τοιούτοις τρόποις.

[144] The text of the Τέχνη or *Ars Rhetorica* is printed in *Opuscula Dionysii Halicarnasei*, Vol. 1 (ed. H. Usener and L. Radermacher; Leipzig, 1894), from which references will be cited. On authorship, cf. *OCD*, 288, and *RE* 5, 969f. Although Blass (*De Dionysii Halicarnassensis scriptis rhetoricis*,

> Demosthenes speaks thus and introduces in his argument the name of the art: "When the ambassadors go to Thebes, how am I to advise pursuing the matter? To this you turn my attention completely. Do not ask anything of the Thebans (for the situation is shameful), but announce that you will help, since those men are at their limits, but we foresee what is going to happen better than they, in order that, if they accept this offer and are persuaded by us, we shall both have arranged (ὦμεν διῳκημένοι) what we wish, and shall have done these things with a form worthy of the city." You see both the function of the arrangement (τὸ ἔργον τῆς διοικήσεως) and the name applied to the function, the "form."
>
> The same Demosthenes, in the oration *On the Embassy*, in order that we may begin from a forensic speech, while he holds forth some things, is preparing other things, through all the book arranging such an arrangement (διοικούμενος διοίκησίν τινα τοιαύτην). There are important points which, even though they are weak for Demosthenes, if they are put forth on their own, are offered as proof; in order that he may make these persuasive, he puts forth at one point other arguments of a different

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diss., Bonn, 1863) had conjectured a genuine work by Dionysius under this title, Usener, the Teubner editor, believes that nothing in the manuscript comes from his hand; one part, he assumes, consists of excerpts from a handbook on forensic eloquence from the time of the Antonines, and the other, including the section περὶ ἐσχηματισμένων and two other chapters, comes out of the same school, perhaps still in the first century A.D. (preface, pp. v-vi).

> nature, but, catching the hearer while he is paying attention to those [stronger] arguments which have been set forth, he weaves in the arguments of the weak points with those that are being set forth.[145]

Dioikēsis has here become a matter of strategic arrangement, covering weak arguments with strong ones.

Slightly different senses emerge when the term is applied to figurative style, as in Homer. Sometimes the idea of "arranging what is fitting" in a speech (διοικεῖ τὸ εὐπρεπές) is stressed, as illustrated by the words of Iris in the Iliad, when she gets Poseidon to tone down wisely his answer to a request of Zeus.[146]

Again, to let our rhetorician speak for himself, there is the case also where "the speech says one thing but arranges something else into its discourse (ὁ δὲ ἕτερα λέγων καὶ ἕτερα διοικούμενος λόγος)." An example is the line of Thetis to Achilles in the Iliad,

> which seems to be senseless, unless a person knows the figure. For in consoling her son at the death of Patroclus, she says:
>
> "It is good, nonetheless, to be united with a woman in love." What would be more unbecoming from a mother than this advice? But in consoling him in motherly fashion, she hints to Achilles that he must not be discontented, but must remember also the former charm about Briseis, that Zeus assisted him and, in order to recover her, the Achaeans suffered terrible misfortunes. Therefore, in order that he may not reproach this, she, in extending consolation for grief, recalled to his mind the fact also that he had slept with the girl.[147]

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[145] Ibid., 8. 5, referring to Dem. De Cor. 178. Cf. 9. B. 9., where the same example is used to illustrate artful arrangement (ἡ διοίκησις).

[146] Ibid., 9. B. 3, referring to Il. 15. 201-203.

[147] Ibid., 9. B. 4, referring to Il. 24. 130f. Cf. 9. B. 10, where

Another long example is also taken from the Iliad, which I set forth, in spite of its length, because the interpretation offered by this anonymous critic is something of an analogue to the interpretation put on the fight at Antioch between Peter and Paul by Chrysostom and other church fathers.[148] The rhetorician goes on:

> The speech of Diomedes to Agamemnon will more clearly exemplify this form, when Agamemnon makes trial of the best of the Greeks, exhorting them for a second time to flee:
>
> "Lord Atreides, I quarrel with you, first of all, you in your senselessness;
> In the assembly, my lord, there is equality of speech, and you must not be angered at all.
> Now first you reproached my valor among the Danaae,
> Declaring me unwarlike and not valiant. All these things
> Argives, young as well as old, now know.
> Yet to you the son of crafty Cronus has granted things by halves:
> He gave you with the sceptre the right to be revered by all,
> But valor he did not grant to you, which is the greatest power.
> Sir, do you thus think the sons of the Achaeans
> To be unwarlike and not valiant, as you implied?
> If your own desire is set upon returning,
> Go, the way is clear. Your ships are standing
> By the sea, a multitude of them which fetched you from Mycenae.

Dem. Or. 14. 3 and 10-11 is given as an example of "the device of saying one thing and arranging another into the discourse (τὸ δὲ ἕτερα λέγειν καὶ ἕτερα διοικεῖσθαι)."

[148] Supra, 3, note 3.

> But the other Achaeans with their long hair will wait
> Until we sack Troy completely; but even if they also leave,
> Let them flee with ships to their dear native land;
> We two, I and Sthenelus, shall fight until we reach
> The goal of Troy; for it is with God that we are come!"
>
> This speech, unless there is arranged in it (διοικῆται) something different than it says, is utterly absurd and without form. For it is most indecorous. . . .
>
> But it is necessary to understand that these reproaches against Agamemnon were dear to Agamemnon. For in the figure of being angry at him, he [Diomedes] concurs with him! And while wishing to urge the bravest men to remain and not to go away, he does not argue in the form of an exhortation, but under the form of anger against Agamemnon he boldly presumed to set forth such an opinion. . . . For the point for which it was necessary for him . . . to persuade them, namely, to remain, this he states, as if he were angry. . . . For he does not deem it proper to advise them to remain, but he argues as a man who has been persuaded himself. Then, fearing lest they might go, he also concedes that they might flee. This figurative speech is an example of a man who, while saying one thing, arranges other things into his discourse (τοῦ ἄλλα λέγοντα ἄλλα διοικεῖν).[149]

The whole tone of the interpretation is to claim that words say one thing but mean another, and for this phenomenon the word dioikein is employed, almost with the sense of "arrange, work in, imply" something else than the plain sense of the words in a speech, with an element of feigning or pretense involved.

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[149] [Pseudo-Dion.] Ars Rhetorica 9. B. 4, referring to Il. 9. 32-49 (cf. 2. 111-118). The general tone of the remarks is somewhat paralleled by the aside at I Cor. 4: 6, "I have applied all this to myself and Apollos for your benefit, brethren."

This whole device is carried at least one step further by the same commentator when he offers an example of "arranging (διοικεῖσθαι) into a discourse things which are opposite of what one says": the public address of Agamemnon in Iliad 2, when he offers the Greeks the chance to sail home and desert the war.

> The cause of the experiment is clear to anyone with a head on his shoulders: namely, that since Achilles has withdrawn from the Greeks and is not fighting together with them . . . , he is investigating how they would go forth without Achilles. . . . He wishes them to let their rage burst forth and to show that they are angry, and to be restrained by the best men. And this happens; they appear ready to go home, but Odysseus and Nestor check them.
>
> Agamemnon, therefore, having tested these things openly, teaches the lesson of the figure; for he speaks things contrary to what he wishes. The method of these words is something marvelous and extraordinary; for this form makes clear that these defects in rhetorical arguments are virtues!
>
> Defects of rhetorical arguments include saying what is easy to refute. . . . It is necessary for us to teach how, on the one hand, he says things easy to refute, but on the other hand, the chief point, how in doing this he escaped notice. That he does say what is easy to refute is indicated by these lines:
>
> "[Zeus] who before promised me and granted to me
> That I would return home after having sacked well-walled Ilium . . ."
>
> If he promised such a thing, one must wait for it!

> > "Now has resolved upon an evil decit, and bids me
> > Inglorious go to Argos."
>
> Again he is vulnerable at points; for he need not go away "inglorious." . . .
>
> How then does he arrange (διοικεῖ) the discourse? It is evident that, on the one hand, he says things easy to refute; yet further, if someone will go over in detail the art-form (τέχνη) of the words, he will find out. And what is the art of such things? To set forth pathos (πάθους προβολή) before the argument, in order that the argument may seem to be borne by grief for him, not to be arranged by design (ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς διοικεῖσθαι). It is for this reason Agamemnon began with a passionate complaint:
>
> > "Zeus, great son of Cronus, has ensnared me with grievous delusion and ruin,
> > Cruel Zeus. . . ."
>
> The man who thus attacks and blasphemes Zeus is clearly out of his mind with grief and says things which are at variance with himself. Therefore to set forth pathos becomes an act of stealth for artistic arrangement (διοικήσεως τεχνικῆς). Such is the figure of saying things contrary to what one really wishes.[150]

Arrangement here implies a crafty ordering of arguments, even with a veneer of emotion to mislead the hearers. Other examples are present in Pseudo-Dionysius, employing διοίκησις, προδιοίκησις, and the verbs διοικεῖσθαι, προδιοικεῖσθαι, and ἐνδιοικεῖσθαι for the arrangement of a speech,[151] but the lengthy examples above already suggest the idea the terms began to convey. It remains now to show that oikonomia also had something of this same sense in later rhetoricians.

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[150] Ibid., 9. B. 5, referring to Il. 2. 72-75, 112f., 115f., and 111.

[151] Further, διοίκησις at 9. B. 7 bis (p. 336, line 11; p. 339, line 24); 9. B. 8 (p. 342, line 2); 9. 10 ter (p. 343, line 8; p. 344, lines

The second century A.D. saw another revival of interest in oratory, a period often referred to as the "Second Sophistic" phase. Rhetoric became entrenched again in education; chairs of rhetoric were established in major cities, at Athens, for example by the emperor himself, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (A.D. 161-80); and σοφιστής became a quasi professional title.[152] Again there was a Greek revival, marked by some genuine concern for the great Attic standards of the past but also by sterile, scholastic methods—Hermogenes, about A.D. 170, "the phoenix of rhetoricians," in Saintsbury's striking phrase, "who became a master at fifteen and an idiot at five and twenty," helped restore the systematic approach and terms popularized some three centuries before by Hermagoras of Temnos.[153] Again, too, oikonomia

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3 and 10); 9. 11 (p. 345, line 9); 9. B. 13 (p. 349, line 7).

προδιοίκησις— 10. 13 (p. 369, line 2).

διοικεῖσθαι— 9. B. 7 (p. 338, line 15); 9. 11 bis (p. 345, lines 11 and 15); 9. 12 (p. 348, line 8); 9. 13 (p. 349, line 9).

προδιοικεῖσθαι— 9. B. 7 (p. 337, line 17).

ἐνδιοικεῖσθαι— 9. B. 8 (p. 340, lines 7-8), a form not noted in LSJ.

[152] OCD, 767, and H.J. Rose, A Handbook of Greek Literature (3rd ed.; London, 1948), 401f. That, however, these same rhetoricians and sophists could stoop to the tricks of "economical arrangement" for an oration should not surprise us; on the censure contemporaries often heaped on them, cf. Hatch, Greek Ideas, 100ff.

[153] G. Saintsbury, A History of Criticism and Literary Taste in Europe (3rd ed.; New York, 1908), 1, 90. The extant writings of Hermogenes and

found a place in rhetorical systems, especially among the writers of the Stoic school. Although this Stoic emphasis on the term in oratory must have existed already in pre-Christian decades and in the first century A.D., it is from the second century A.D. and beyond that our clearest evidence comes of its usage, particularly with the connotation of "arrangement" which is purposeful and at times deceitful. It is therefore important to present this somewhat later evidence, noting that some of the examples cited stem precisely from the period when the patristic writers were employing the same term in a similar "shady" sense.

The Stoics, in their theories of rhetoric, Volkmann has observed, varied in the number of main divisions they made in the tasks of the orator, but arrangement in one form or another, usually referred to as διάθεσις or *dispositio*, was regularly included.[154] Generally too, *oikonomia* was included at some point, frequently coupled with *taxis*; in fact, "where we

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other rhetoricians of this period are collected in C. Walz, *Rhetores Graeci* (9 vols. in 10; Tübingen, Stuttgart, and London, 1834), cited hereafter as "*Rh*. *Gr*. (Walz)." Hermogenes became "*the* textbook of later Greek Rhetoric," Saintsbury points out, and no clearer evidence of this could be supplied than the fact that volumes 4-8 in *Rhetores Graeci* consist of scholia on Hermogenes, though "the authorship and date of most are quite unknown" (Saintsbury, 1, 102) and some sections in Walz' collection are as late as George Pachymeres, a contemporary of Dante!

The "Second Sophistic" phase did not, of course, arise without any connections to the past. A link to the Attacist revival of the days of Dionysius of Halicarnassus appears in the works of Plutarch; cf. R. Jeuckens, *Plutarch* . . . *und die Rhetorik*, and *infra*, 517f.

[154] *Rhetorik*, 29, 364f. A *four*fold division of rhetoric for Stoics is

come upon οἰκονομία and τάξις placed side by side," he points out, "we may undoubtedly conclude there is a Stoic foundation."[155] Thus, for

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indicated by Diog. Laert. 7. 43, into εὕρεσις, φράσις, τάξις, and ὑπόκρισις. A *five*fold division of the ἔργα τοῦ ῥήτορος is suggested by Fortunatianus (p. 81), adding memory. The *three*fold division is very common: Sen. (*Ep*. 89. 17, λέξις, εὕρεσις, τάξις), for example; or, in a view that prevailed widely, νόησις, εὕρεσις, and (instead of τάξις) διάθεσις—thus, e.g., Sulpicius Victor, where the last category is further subdivided into τάξις, οἰκονομία, λέξις, and ὑπόκρισις.

The use of διάθεσις as a term interchangeable with τάξις or οἰκονομία is noted in Plutarch already, according to R. Jeuckens, *Plutarch . . . und die Rhetorik*, 108 [446], who concludes Plutarch did not hold himself to any fixed terminology but employed τάξις, οἰκονομία, and διάθεσις synonymously as *termini technici*, for one of the five divisions of rhetoric. Plutarch therefore, while using διάθεσις, does not have any division of it into τάξις and οἰκονομία; he does not apparently make any distinction between these latter two terms, nor does he associate λέξις with διάθεσις, so far as we can tell.

As a parallel to the type of shady meaning which *oikonomia* and *dioikēsis* had begun to acquire by this time may be cited the similar double meaning of ὑπόκρισις. Though one of the main branches of rhetoric, in the sense of the "delivery" of a speech, it had also, since Arist. and Polyb., the meaning of "play-acting" or, as in the New Testament, "pretense, hypocrisy." The difference would seem to be that *oikonomia* and *dioikēsis* acquired the sense of "feigning" or artful manipulation of material in rhetorical use, rather than somewhere else.

[155] *Ibid.*, 364. Volkmann notes among his examples, Philo *Somn*. 1. 35, where it is stated the lover of wisdom gets from wisdom εὕρεσις, φράσις,

example, one passage records that Minucianus the Elder, a rhetorician of Athens in the second century A.D., and an even earlier Theodectēs said "the tasks of the orator are invention, order (τάξις), arrangement (οἰκονομία), memory, delivery, interpretation,"[156] and Volkmann even conjectures that such men and others like them were links between Aristotle and the Stoics in these matters.[157]

But what did οἰκονομία mean to these Stoic rhetoricians in contrast to τάξις or *ordo*? The distinction is very clearly indicated in a paragraph from Sulpicius Victor. He deals with *dispositio* or arrangement as the third task of the orator, which includes for him *ordo* (τάξις), οἰκονομία (the Greek term is kept in his Latin handbook), *elocutio*, and *pronuntiatio*— the latter two subdivisions making clear that for Sulpicius Victor *dispositio* falls into the area of style or expression (λεκτικὸς τόπος).[158] He writes:

τάξις, οἰκονομία, μνήμη, and ὑπόκρισις.

[156] *Rh*. *Gr*. (Walz) 6, 585: Μινουκιανὸς... καθάπερ πρὸ τούτου καὶ Θεοδέκτης, ὀλίγοις πάνυ τοῖς ῥήμασι τὴν πᾶσαν ῥητορικὴν περιέλαβε δύναμιν, εἰπὼν ἔργα ῥήτορος εἶναι εὕρεσιν, τάξιν, οἰκονομίαν, μνημοσύνην, ὑπόκρισιν, ἑρμηνείαν. On the Minucianus mentioned, cf. *RE* 15, 2, 1975-86. Walz himself ascribes the passage to Sulpicius Victor. Cf. also *Rh*. *Gr*. 7, 26, where the five parts of rhetoric are given as εὕρεσις, οἰκονομία, φράσις, ἐπίκρισις, and διάταξις τῶν εὑρημάτων.

[157] *Rhetorik*, 364, note 1.

[158] Volkmann, *Rhetorik*, 365. Thus for Sulpicius Victor, the *officia oratoris* are 1) intellectio (νόησις);

2) inventio (εὕρεσις);

More of art is involved in *dispositio* (arrangement) . . . ; for it is of greatest importance to set those things which have been invented [by εὕρεσις] in place for usefulness and victorious effect and to arrange (*disponere*) them in order. In *dispositio* the subdivisions are *ordo*, together with that which is called in Greek οἰκονομία, next *elocutio*, then *pronuntiatio*.

It is a matter of *ordo* (i.e., τάξις, natural order) that we follow each event in accordance with its natural connection, first in the parts of delivery, where there is, of course, first an *exordium*, then a *narratio*, then the sections of the arguments, and last a final *peroratio*.

But rightly there is closely associated with this natural order an οἰκονομία which differs from the order mentioned above in that the one (*ordo* or τάξις) is a natural order, but this is an artificial order. Now in those very parts of oratory which we taught above, it is the natural order, as we have shown, that the initial points (*principia*) hold first place, then *narratio*, then others follow.

It is artificial order (i.e., οἰκονομία) for us to turn this order itself about for the most part, if an occasion so demands it. For sometimes initial points are to be omitted; other times the *narratio* ought to be subdivided and interrupted, presenting it in part and the argument being offered incomplete. For not without cause did Cicero in the oration *Pro Milone*, in a passage by means of arguments before the narrative, refute the prior opinions of the Senate and Pompey. . . . This οἰκονομία

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3) dispositio (διάθεσις), including
- a) ordo (τάξις);
- b) οἰκονομία;
- c) elocutio (λέξις);
- d) pronuntiatio (ὑπόκρισις).

> will be most powerful and become so strong that even those things which, if they be presented and brought forth in another way, would perhaps work against the orator's cause, may be useful all the more.[159]

Oikonomia therefore here implies a deliberate deviation from the accustomed, natural order in an oration, artificial order which seeks to strengthen its case by these very deviations which cover up weak points with strong arguments, just as Dionysius and the *Ars Rhetorica* attributed to him had advocated; there the term was διοίκησις, here οἰκονομία.[160]

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[159] *Rhetores Latini Minores* (ed. C. Halm; Leipzig, 1863), p. 320: In dispositione plus artis est . . . : plurimi enim momenti est ea, quae inventa sunt, ad utilitatem et victoriae effectum digerere in ordinem atque disponere. In dispositione haec sunt: ordo cum ea, quae graece appellatur οἰκονομία, dehinc elocutio, tum pronuntiatio. Ordo est, ut secundum textum naturalem singula persequamur, primum in partibus elocutionis, ut sit scilicet primum exordium, tum narratio, tum partes argumentationis, peroratio demum extrema. Sed bene huic ordini οἰκονομία proxima adiuncta est, quae hoc distat a superiore, quod ille quidem ordo naturalis, hic ordo artificiosus est. Iam in istis ipsis, quas supra docuimus, partibus orationis iste naturalis est ordo, quem ad modum ostendimus, ut primum locum principia teneant, mox narratio, deinde cetera subsequantur.

Artificiosus ordo est, ut hunc ipsum ordinem, si ita causa poscit, plerumque vertamus. Nam aliquando omittenda principia, aliquando subdividenda et interrumpenda narratio, ex parte ponenda et imperfecta argumentatione reddenda. Nec enim sine causa Tullius pro Milone ante narrationem argumentationis loco praeiudicia senatus et Pompei refutavit. . . . haec οἰκονομία plurimum poterit ac tantum valebit, ut etiam quae, si aliter posita atque prolata essent, fortasse contraria operentur ad causam, ea plurimum prosint.

Other anonymous rhetoricians, presumably Stoics,[161] exhibit this same distinction between τάξις and οἰκονομία, with the latter term again taking on the idea of purposeful arrangement, contrary to what is natural. One such teacher of rhetoric wrote:

> Τάξις differs from οἰκονομία because τάξις, on the one hand, is characterized by a following of the chief points and by knowing how to use them in accordance with their natural order (κατὰ τάξιν), which one first, or which second; but οἰκονομία, on the other hand, is characterized by expediency: for very often we overthrow the natural order on account of expediency, and use the first event, if it is expedient, second. It occurs also when we leave out some one of the main events.[162]

Another one sums the matter up thus:

> Arrangement (διάθεσις) is divided into two parts: τάξις and οἰκονομία. Τάξις, on the one hand, occurs, as I have said, when, in

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Cicero's odd example of inserting three questions before going on in his address Pro Milone is also noted by Quint. Inst. 4. 2. 25.

[160] Supra, 364ff.

[161] So Volkmann, Rhetorik, 29 and 364, because of their general division of rhetoric and the fact that οἰκονομία and τάξις occur together.

[162] Rh. Gr. (Walz) 7, 35, an anonymous προλεγόμενα τῆς ῥητορικῆς: διαφέρει δὲ τάξις οἰκονομίας, ὅτι ἡ μὲν τάξις τῆς ἀκολουθίας ἐστὶ τῶν κεφαλαίων, καὶ τοῦ εἰδέναι κατὰ τάξιν χρήσασθαι αὐτοῖς ποίῳ τινὶ πρώτῳ, ἢ ποίῳ δευτέρῳ, ἡ δὲ οἰκονομία ἐστὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος· πολλάκις γὰρ διὰ τὸ συμφέρον ἀναστρέφομεν τὴν τάξιν, καὶ χρώμεθα τῷ πρώτῳ, εἰ συμφέρει, δευτέρῳ. ἔσθ' ὅτε δὲ καὶ παραλείπομέν τινα τῶν κεφαλαίων. Here τάξις and οἰκονομία are the two subdivisions of διάθεσις, the third of the four functions of the orator.

> the area of subject matter, that which is right (τὸ δίκαιον) comes first, then that which is expedient (τὸ συμφέρον); and this is τάξις. But οἰκονομία, on the other hand, is the changing of the chief elements for expediency (ἡ πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τῶν κεφαλαίων ἐναλλαγή), as Demosthenes in the oration *On the Crown*, when he was weak as regards legality, but strong with respect to justice; for he arranged first the just part (τὸ δίκαιον), dividing it in two; then the legal part, and after it again, the emphasis on justice (τὸ δίκαιον). And by the aid of the just part on each side he concealed the weakness of the legality of it.[163]

Clearly here— and the thrust of both these paragraphs fits right in with the rhetorical precepts of Dionysius of Halicarnassus and his successors cited above, even to the example offered from Demosthenes— *oikonomia* has come to mean a *departure from the natural order of things for the sake of expediency in an oration*. Involved also is an element of deceitful arrangement, shuffling arguments about, to make the weak appear strong and cover flaws by "economical organization."

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[163] *Ibid*., 7. part 1, 17, anonymous προλεγόμενα τῶν στάσεων: ἡ δὲ διάθεσις εἰς δύο διαιρεῖται, εἰς τάξιν καὶ οἰκονομίαν· τάξις μὲν, ὡς ἂν εἴπω, ὅτι ἐν τῇ πραγματικῇ πρῶτον μὲν τὸ δίκαιον, εἶτα τὸ συμφέρον, καὶ αὕτη μὲν ἡ τάξις· οἰκονομία δὲ ἡ πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τῶν κεφαλαίων ἐναλλαγὴ, ὡς Δημοσθένης ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ στεφάνου, ἐπειδὴ κατὰ τὸ νόμιμον ἠσθένει, ἔρρωτο τῷ δικαίῳ· προὔταξε μὲν τὸ δίκαιον, εἰς δύο διελών· εἶτα τὸ νόμιμον, καὶ μετ᾽ αὐτὸ πάλιν, τὸ δίκαιον· καὶ τῇ τοῦ δικαίου ἑκατέρωθεν βοηθείᾳ τὸ ἀσθενὲς τοῦ νομίμου κατέκρυψε.

It may be objected that these examples are, for the most part, anonymous and late. But it can be answered, first, that the whole idea of such "economical," somewhat deceitful arrangement in rhetoric had its origins at least as early as Dionysius of Halicarnassus himself, according to the evidence now at our disposal, and may have been in vogue even earlier.[164] Secondly, it must be added that passages may be adduced from rhetoricians who may be dated more definitely, which speak of oikonomia in much the same way. Thus, for instance, Aelius Aristides, the noted orator of the second century (ob. A.D. 189), makes economy of speech (οἰκονομία λόγου) include "the order which is fitting" to an occasion and the stratagem of anticipating opponents' arguments and turning them to our own good, by "displaying some of the arguments of the opponents as being weak, and the others as being very strong — in our behalf!"[165] To take a later illustration, Cassius Longinus (A.D. 213-73), the eminent teacher— Porphyry was one of his pupils— and counsellor to Zenobia, queen of Palymra, also included a section "Concerning Arrangement (οἰκονομία)" in his Τέχνη ῥητορική, where, interestingly, he couples the terms οἰκονομία and διοίκησις; and when he advises in this section in regard to the arrangement of proofs in argumentation,

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[164] Supra, 364ff., especially note 143.

[165] Rh. Gr. (Walz) 9, 443 (also in Rhetores Graeci (ed. L. Spengel; Leipzig, 1853ff.) 2, 357; and in Rhetores Graeci (ed. W. Schmidt; Leipzig, 1926) 5, section 77, p. 103, whose text I follow): περὶ οἰκονομίας. οἰκονομία δὲ λόγου ἐφ' ἅπαντι ἡ ἁρμόζουσα τάξις καὶ ἡ προσδοκία τῶν λεγομένων καὶ τὸ ἐξηρτῆσθαι ἀλλήλων τὰ νοήματα καὶ τὰ ἐπιχειρήματα ⟨τὰ⟩ ἐχόμενα τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα θεωρήματα, ὅσα τῆς ἀφελοῦς οἰκονομίας ἐστί. λέγω δή, ἐὰν μὲν ἓν κεφάλαιον ᾖ, ἄνευ προλήψεως εἰπόντα ⟨ἃ⟩ δεῖ τῶν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ἐνδόξων οὕτως καταθεῖναι τὴν πρόληψιν, προλαβόντα τι ⟨τῶν⟩ κατὰ τοῦ ἀντιδίκου ἐνδόξων, ἔπειθ' οὕτως, ἐάν τι καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιφέρωσι, σκοπεῖν. ἐὰν ⟨δὲ⟩ ᾖ πλείω τὰ παρὰ τοῦ ἀντιδίκου, σκοπεῖν δεῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ἡ γὰρ αὐτή ἐστι μέθοδος· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κεφάλαιον, ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἀσθενῆ ὄντα ἀποφαίνειν, τὰ δὲ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πολὺ ὑπερέχοντα.

> place first and last all the most powerful of them and refute the points of the opponents, arranging first the unsound and weak points of the arguments advanced by those opponents, and as many points as you may readily overthrow, but do not expose yourself to danger to them in like fashion,[166]

"Concerning Arrangement.

Arrangement of speech generally includes the order which is fitting, and the anticipation of the things which are said, and the process of attaching the ideas to one another and the attempted proofs which exist for the subject at hand, and further also the other principles, as many as are characteristic of the simple arrangement. I mean that, if, on the one hand, there is one chief point, it is necessary, having declared without anticipation some of the points which are generally admitted on his behalf, thus to lay down the anticipation [of the opponent's argument]; having anticipated something of the things generally admitted against the opponent, then to give consideration thus, whether they also provide something in our behalf. If, on the other hand, the points from the opponent are many, it is necessary to consider the situation; for the method is the same: the chief thing is that it is necessary to display some of the arguments of the enemies as being weak, and the others as being very strong in our behalf."

[166] *Rh*. *Gr*. (ed. L. Spengel, Leipzig, 1853) 1, 303: ... τούτων πρῶτα θήσεις καὶ τελευταῖα τὰ πάντων κράτιστα καὶ ἐξελέγξεις τὰ τῶν

we are reminded of the old example of Demosthenes and all the traditional advice of the rhetoricians about "economical arrangement."

Finally it is to be observed that these datable examples, as well as the whole tendency to use oikonomia thus in rhetoric, while not clearly demonstrable in the first century B.C., do fall precisely into the period when the church fathers were employing the term and giving it a not unrelated sense of purposeful, sometimes deceitful, "arrangement" with regard to human or divine actions, especially in the biblical narratives. In short, there seems some reason for concluding that this technical usage of oikonomia in rhetoric, as purposeful, sometimes deceitful, arrangement, characterized by expediency, not only provides more evidence of how common the term was in the early Christian centuries, but also supplies a more specific background than any previous investigation has been able to point out for the notion of expedient, purposeful, but somewhat deceitful conduct,

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ἀντιδίκων, τὰ σαθρὰ καὶ ἀσθενῆ τῶν εἰρημένων ὑπ' ἐκείνων προτάττων, καὶ ὅσα ῥᾳδίως λῦσαι δυνήσῃ, προτενεῖς δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις. This section of Λογγίνου Τέχνη ῥητορική is entitled περὶ οἰκονομίας and begins (p. 302), "Concerning the arrangement and disposition of prooemiums (οἰκονομία καὶ διοίκησις προοιμίων). . . ."

The reference in Stephanus, Thesaurus, p. 1792 ("Porro οἰκονομία et διοίκησις προοιμίων jungitur Apsini Rhet., p. 712 ed. Ald. Conf.), is now to be referred, not to Apsines of Gadara, the Athenian orator c. A.D. 190-250, but to Cassius Longinus. The confusion stems from the fact that Longinus' treatise περὶ ῥητορικῆς was formerly preserved only in a MS where it was mixed together with a treatise by Apsines, and the whole treatise was attributed to the latter; Ruhnken first perceived this treatise of Longinus to be inserted in Apsines, and later a MS was recovered containing Apsines alone. (Cf. Spengel, Vol. 1, pp. xx f.).

as found in the Stoic writers on ethics and in the writings of the Christian fathers.

Ethical "Arrangement" of Conduct

Actually what I have called this Stoic "ethical sense" for oikonomia — as an arrangement of actions or direction of them in accordance with inner purposes, which are really often different from what appears on the surface — does not appear very clearly in extant documents prior to A.D. 100, and it remained for later philosophers like Marcus Aurelius to give voice to it. But that a background already existed for such usage is our contention.

We have seen amply enough how common the word oikonomia was for all sorts of arrangements in general, and how often it took on the emphasis of shrewd, designing management of things. Already in Polybius just such meanings are given to it at times. For example, the device which Hannibal concocted in preparing for war with Rome — sending soldiers from Africa to Spain and vice versa — is referred to as an οἰκονομία.[167] On another occasion, the word has been taken by some to mean "wicked devices," "treacherous arrangements," almost "plots" in a Seleucid court.[168] Very significantly, the word once denotes a ruler's political designs and real intention, which he must conceal by saying and doing things which create just the opposite impression; oikonomia, in other words, as far back as Polybius, could indicate one's actual policy or real line of action, although a degree of dissimulation is involved and a man may have to say and do one thing while meaning another in order to achieve his oikonomia![169] Still

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[167] Polyb. 3. 33. 8: πάνυ δ' ἐμπείρως καὶ φρονίμως ἐκλογιζόμενος ἐκ μὲν Λιβύης εἰς Ἰβηρίαν, ἐκ δ' Ἰβηρίας εἰς Λιβύην διεβίβαζε στρατιώτας, ἐκδεσμεύων τὴν ἑκατέρων πίστιν εἰς ἀλλήλους διὰ τῆς τοιαύτης οἰκονομίας. "[Hannibal] took precautions for the safety of Africa, adopting the very sensible and wise policy of sending soldiers from Africa to Spain, and vice versa, binding by this device the two provinces to mutual loyalty."

[168] 5. 50. 5. When Antiochus III the Great was making plans for an

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expedition against Media, court dissension caused difficulties; Epigenes, an able soldier, should have had command, but Hermeias, who was anxious for power, took advantage of the fact that a sum of money was owed the assembled soldiers for back pay: he proposed he would discharge the entire sum due if the king would consent that Epigenes should have no part in the campaign. The king wanted to refuse, but, "being encompassed and prevented by means of arrangements and guards and attendants by the maliciousness of Hermeias, was not his own master (περιεχόμενος δὲ καὶ προκατειλημμένος οἰκονομίαις καὶ φυλακαῖς καὶ θεραπείαις ὑπὸ τῆς Ἑρμείου κακοηθείας, οὐκ ἦν αὑτοῦ κύριος)," and gave in.

J. Schweighaeuser, Lexicon Polybianum, op. cit. (supra, Ch. 2, 221, note 34), 402, comments: "I take it 'surrounded by wicked devices'; thus Casaubon, 'in wicked treachery'; it is perhaps also possible to understand various business negotiations of a kind." "Business arrangements" is a quite possible sense, since Antiochus was harassed by the agreement he had made with Hermeias over paying the troops (5. 50. 1), and Polybius uses the pl. οἰκονομίαι in this sense at 10. 1. 5. Paton, in his Loeb Classical Library edition, 3, 123, renders it, "by court etiquette."

[169] 2. 47. 10. Aratus, leader of the Achaean League, which his efforts had led to fresh successes as a bulwark against Macedonia, found a new menace appearing in 227 B.C., a revitalized Sparta; Aratus decided to approach Antigonus III of Macedon for aid against Sparta, but not openly, lest

other passages in Polybius seem to apply *oikonomia* to mean "the execution of an intention."[170]

Cleomenes, the Spartan ruler, outbid him and lest the morale of his own troops be lowered by rumors of such negotiations. Hence he carried out his plan covertly (ἀδήλως), and "consequently was compelled in public both to say and to do many things contrary to his own intention, through which he was going to keep his real design secret by exhibiting the opposite impression (ἐξ οὗ πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἠναγκάζετο καὶ λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν πρὸς τοὺς ἐκτός, δι᾽ ὧν ἤμελλε τὴν ἐναντίαν ἔμφασιν ὑποδεικνύων ταύτην ἐπικρύψεσθαι τὴν οἰκονομίαν)."

[170] 5. 40. 3: τοῦ δ᾽ ἀσμένως δεξαμένου τὴν ἐλπίδα, ταχεῖαν ἐλάμβανε τὸ πρᾶγμα τὴν οἰκονομίαν. "[Antiochus] having received the hope gladly, the matter was receiving its swift execution." J. Schweighauser, *Lexicon Polybianum*, *op*. *cit*. (*supra*, Ch. 2, 221, note 34), 402, renders it "execution of an intention"; J.A. Robinson, *St*. *Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians* (London, 1907), 145, "the project quickly began to work itself out."

4. 65. 11. Philip of Macedon fortified the citadel of Oeniadae and planned a wall connecting it with the harbor, "using the building materials from Paeonium for the arrangement" (χρώμενος πρὸς τὴν οἰκονομίαν ταῖς ἐκ τοῦ Παιανίου παρασκευαῖς). J. Schweighaeusen, *ibid*., after noting Reiske's emendation to εἰς τὴν οἰκοδομίαν, suggests οἰκονομίαν is to be kept, interpreted as "the execution of an intention, as at 5. 40. 3." Confusion between *oikodomia* and *oikonomia* is frequent in ancient MSS. *Oikonomein* and *oikodomein* are confused at Soph. *El*. 190 (cf. *supra*, 155, note 5); *epoikonomia* and *epoikodomia* at [Longinus] *Subl*. 11. 2; the verbs at III Macc. 3: 2; *oikonomoi* and *oikodomoi* at I Chron. 29: 6;

Plainly all these earlier applications of the word, as well as the meaning that crops out in its use in rhetoric, would appear to be behind the Stoic ethical meaning for oikonomia as arrangement of one's actions in accordance with inner intentions and purposes, involving a degree of feigning and dissimulation at times. This sense can be perceived most patently in later writers, but one passage in Epictetus suggests the concept was already alive in the late first century A.D.; an aphorism of his states, "Of things which are done, some are done with an express purpose, others on occasion [i.e., as the circumstances permit], others κατ' οἰκονομίαν, others are required by tact [i.e., out of an accommodating indulgence], and others in accordance with a formal plan."[171] Κατ' οἰκονομίαν could mean merely "as a matter of good management," but more likely it is employed "in its specifically Stoic sense of inner disposition or

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oikonomian and oikodomēn at I Tim. 1: 4; oikonomēsen and oikodomēsei in the Acts of Thomas, 19 (R.A. Lipsius and M. Bonnet, Acta Apostolorum Apocrypha, Vol. 2, part 2 (Leipzig, 1903), p. 130, line 11); even autonomia and oikonomia are apparently once confused in Chion of Heracles Ep. 14. 5 (I.C. Orelli, Memnonis Historiarum Heracleae Ponti Excerpta Servata e Photio (Leipzig, 1816), pp. 177 and 292). Polybius does use oikodomia elsewhere (10. 22. 7 and 9. 21. 8). However T. Büttner-Wobst, in his Teubner edition of Polyb., Vol. 2, p. 80, reads oikonomian with no emendation suggested. As a parallel to this usage of oikonomia, I note Xen. Cyr. 5. 3. 25. "Cyrus was busy with the arrangement (i.e., construction) concerning the fortress" (ἐκαθέζετο ὁ Κῦρος ἀμφὶ τὴν περὶ τὸ φρούριον οἰκονομίαν).

[171] Arr. Epict. Diss. 3. 14. 7: τῶν πραττομένων τὰ μὲν προηγουμένως πράττεται, τὰ δὲ κατὰ περίστασιν, τὰ δὲ κατ' οἰκονομίαν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ συμπεριφοράν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ ἔνστασιν.

direction of actions in accordance with purposes."[172] One can therefore even in this period begin to speak of "economical actions," or, as they were later called "accommodations."[173]

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[172] Adolf Bonhöffer, *Epiktet und das Neue Testament* ("Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten," 10; Giessen, 1911), p. 121, note 2. Perhaps "out of clever calculation" (Lillge, 8) catches the spirit of the phrase. J. Schweighaeuser, *Polybii* . . . *quidquid superest*, *op. cit.* (*supra*, Ch. 2, 221, note 34), 2, 680 comments: "I do not understand 'domestic matters,' but a sort of plan conceived for doing a thing at the right moment. Thus Michael Palaeologus, according to George Pachymeres, was eager to enter into a treaty with the Roman pope κατ' οἰκονομίαν, in order that he might be out of danger from attacks and violence from the Gauls and Germans."

[173] Cf., e.g., the usages of the word in the second century A.D. by Marcus Aurelius Antoninus. *Med.* 11. 18. 5: πολλὰ γὰρ κατ' οἰκονομίαν γίνεται. καὶ ὅλως πολλὰ δεῖ πρότερον μαθεῖν, ἵνα τις περὶ ἀλλοτρίας πράξεως καταληπτικῶς ἀποφήνηται. Amid perversity, the good man will examine what is happening, remembering, among other things, what sort of men are doing these things, that they may do so out of ignorance, that he himself does many a wrong, and that these men have not necessarily been proven to have done wrong, "for many things are done 'by arrangement,' and generally it is necessary to learn many things first, in order that one may express an adequate opinion concerning the activity of another man." In other words, that man's "arrangement" or economical action may mask his real purpose. C.R. Haines in his Loeb translation (London, 1916), renders it "by way of policy" or "with an eye to circumstances," "with some further view in mind," knowledge of which would justify the action or show its necessity. In his glossary, p. 411,

There were additional applications of oikonomia by non-Christian writers in the later Christian centuries— e.g., in the area of magic rites,[174]

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he adds: "Management, and so policy, expediency, adaptation to circumstances, ulterior end, secondary purpose, and even finesse."

Med. 4. 19 suggests how vain it is to seek after fame; to the dead man, praise means nothing; "and to the living man what is praise? Nothing except some sort of accommodating means to an end" (ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν ζῶντα τί ὁ ἔπαινος; πλὴν ἄρα δι' οἰκονομίαν τινά). At 4. 51 the advice is given to run the short way, the way of nature, in speech and art, "for such a resolve sets one free from troubles and strife and from all 'arrangement' (or "all mental reservation," as Haines suggests) and rascality" (ἀπαλλάσσει γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη πρόθεσις κόπων καὶ στρατείας, καὶ πάσης οἰκονομίας καὶ κομψείας). Here, from the context, the pejorative sense later attached to oikonomia is most obvious. All of these passages have the underlying idea of moral arrangement noted above, and the examples in the later Stoics like Marcus Aurelius as well as in the church fathers ought to be viewed against this general background.

[174] Lillge, 12, lists three examples where oikonomia occurs with the sense of "magical transaction, magic formula, through the usage of which man wants to win over the help of the heavenly powers." They are in K. Preisendanz, Papyri Graecae Magicae (Vol. 1, Berlin, 1928), p. 192, line 357 (Pap. Gr. XLVI, Brit. Mus., 4th cent. A.D.: [ἡ] δὲ αὐτὴ οἰκονομία γράφεται ἐπὶ μολυβοῦ πετάλου..., "the same magic formula is written on a little lead tablet"); p. 82, line 292 (Great Paris Magical Papyri, Bibl. Nat. suppl. gr. 574, from the library of an Egyptian gnostic, perhaps 2nd cent. A.D., more likely 4th cent.: ἐὰν ἀπορηθῶ τῆσδε τῆς οἰκονομίας.... "If I have no success with this magical transaction, [an

but the tremendous extent to which the word was already in use should be clear from this survey of its applications as an "arrangement" of various sorts — in legal matters, medicine, the arts, literature, rhetoric, and conduct. What is more, however — and this is the justification for the length of this examination — in this general usage we find the background that helps explain some of the patristic applications of oikonomia to

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incantation formula follows]"); and p. 76, line 161 (Paris, Bibl. Nat. suppl. gr. 574: θαυμάσεις τὸ παράδοξον τῆς οἰκονομίας ταύτης· "you will marvel at the wonder of this magical transaction").

To this list must be added ibid., p. 134, lines 2009 and 2013 (Great Paris Magical Papyrus): ἀναγκαῖον ἡγησάμην σοι ἐπιστεῖλαι τήνδε τὴν οἰκονομίαν ὡς οὖσαν ἀξιέραστον καὶ δυναμένην σοι ὑπεραρέσκειν. καί σοι ὑποτάξω ἀπενεύθεν τὴν οἰκονομίαν...."I have thought it necessary to send to you this magical procedure since it is very desirable and is able to please you beyond measure. And I shall in the following treatise set before you the procedure." Cf. also ibid., line 2107, ἡ οἰκονομία αὕτη, "this magical procedure." The verb oikonomein occurs at p. 111, lines 490f. (Rijksmuseum, Leiden, J 395, dated c. A.D. 300-350), apparently the cultic lectionary of a gnostic group, where the statement reads "Through Hermes all was arranged" (δι' οὗ οἰκονομήθη τὸ πᾶν). Dioikein is found, p. 196, line 465 (4th cent. A.D. Pap. Gr. Brit. Mus. XLVI), where Nous is addressed as "the upright one who administers the universe" (ἔννομος τὸ πᾶν διοικῶν). Finally dioikētai, in a series of titles for gods, occurs at PLondon 1, 121, line 366, "administrators of things which are boundless" (ἀπείρων διοικηταί). Cf. on this last passage, T. Hopfner, Griechisch-Ägyptischer Offenbarungszauber: Seine Methoden (Studien zur Paläographie und Papyrusurkunde, 23; Leipzig, 1924), "arrangements" which are morally dubious by some standards. The word took on such connotations in its normal course of prepatristic development.

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p. 79, section 160.

It will be noted that none of these examples is earlier than the second century A.D. and more likely all fall in the fourth century. They should be studied in connection with the whole gnostic-Hermetic movement as a background for patristic usage in the later centuries.

4. Oikonomia and its Related Terms Applied to the Largest "Household," the Universe

In this final Chapter, we find *oikonomia* and its related terms applied, by ultimate extension, to *the management of the largest "household" imaginable, the universe*— therefore, *the arrangement, ordering, regulation, or direction, of the cosmos, the world, its parts, and the people in it, by nature or by God, especially with reference to providence*.

We come here to an area of application for our terms which has tremendous import, for it has to do with a "divine economy," God's administration of an orderly universe which he arranged and continues to guide— all of which grew up as a concept *prior to* and *outside of* Christian circles. What Christian writers did was to build upon and transform this existing concept, so prevalent in the world into which the Gospel came; they did *not* create *ex nihilo* the notion of an οἰκονομία τοῦ θεοῦ. This non-Christian, pre-patristic Greek idea of a divine economy in the world and its affairs must be traced out in some detail, precisely because previous investigations into the Christian usage of the term *oikonomia* have seldom noted the pagan background at this crucial point.[1]

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[1] Lillge, 4ff., following LSJ, omits this sense of "world management" completely, although Gass, 467f., had hinted at it, and H.A. Daniel's old work *Tatianus der Apologet* (Halle, 1837), 159ff., had noted it. Verhoeven, 116-118, does not include this meaning among his four main classical uses of the word, but seems to be aware of the sense elsewhere — e.g., in regard to Philo, 119, and when, 123, "direction of the cosmos and the world administration of God" is listed as one of the Jewish-Christian senses in which the word is applied to "God and his arrangements"; however, when

It is not surprising that oikonomia and its related terms spread to have application to the world-household and its management. Such extension in meaning was characteristic of the words, from the original, etymological sense of "household management," which, we saw, developed to include all sorts of things, thence on to the added sense of "state management" in a larger household, the polis, and also from there on to the general meaning of "arrangement" in legal or commercial affairs, the arts, and life as a whole. Now, as we might logically expect, the terms come in a "perfectly natural and characteristic" way to refer also to an encompassing arrangement and even divine government of the universe.[2]

Behind this easy transfer of oikonomia from one size of household, the state, to another, larger one, the world, lay the view, held by many ancients, of the world as a sort of large polis or city-state. According to one investigator, such a view stems ultimately from Pythagorean ideas, with their emphasis on the "concord of opposites," in this case, gods and men in one great polis.[3] Be that as it may, the view was espoused especially by the Stoics and is expressed again and again in the writings of the doxographers. The first century B.C. Stoic, Arius Didymus, is representative, when he writes: "The universe (ὁ κόσμος) is like a city (πόλις) comprised of gods and men, the gods exercising the authority, the men being

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Verhoeven derives this latter Jewish-Christian application from his second and third "profane" uses [2) in regard to political households, and 3) arrangement generally], he seems to miss the mark and omits a wealth of important material. The clearest treatment of the topic I have found is in Hatch, Greek Ideas, 171-233.

[2] Cf. A. Bonhöffer, Epiktet und das Neue Testament (Giessen, 1911), 121.

[3] So Louis Sanders, L'Hellénisme de Saint Clément de Rome et le Paulinisme

subject to them; but real community exists between them, the one group with the other, because of the fact that they participate in reason, which is nature's law."[4] Others echo the refrain, "the cosmos is a city-state,"[5] and the church fathers pick up the theme, reiterating the Stoic idea that the world is a great city, and adding their own harmonies to the leitmotif as to how God administers this world-state.[6] Since we have already seen how

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(Studia Hellenistica, 2; Louvain, 1943), 128.

[4] Arius Didymus, in Euseb. Praep. Evang. 15. 15. 4f., SVF 2, 169, 26-29 (frag. 528) or H. Diels, Doxographi Graeci (Berlin, 1879) (cited hereafter as "Diels, Dox. Graec."), 465 (frag. 29): οὕτω καὶ ὁ κόσμος οἱονεὶ πόλις ἐστὶν ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων συνεστῶσα, τῶν μὲν θεῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἐχόντων, τῶν δὲ ἀνθρώπων ὑποτεταγμένων. κοινωνίαν δ᾽ ὑπάρχειν πρὸς ἀλλήλους διὰ τὸ λόγου μετέχειν, ὅς ἐστι φύσει νόμος. Cf. Cic. Fin. 3. 19. 64.

[5] E.g., Plut. De comm. not. 34, SVF 2, 194, 17 (frag. 645): τόν γε κόσμον εἶναι πόλιν; Arist. [Mund.] 400b: ἐπὶ τῆς μείζονος πόλεως, λέγω δὲ τοῦ κόσμου; Cic. Nat. D. 2. 154, SVF 2, 328, 9f. (frag. 1131): est enim mundus quasi communis deorum atque hominum domus aut urbs utrorumque; Aristocles, quoting Zeno and the Stoics, in Euseb. Praep. Evang. 15 (816d), SVF 1, 27, 21-23 (frag. 98): ταύτῃ δὲ πάντα διοικεῖσθαι τὰ κατὰ τὸν κόσμον ὑπέρευ, καθάπερ ἐν εὐνομωτάτῃ τινὶ πολιτείᾳ, "in this way all things concerning the world are administered exceedingly well, just as in some most well-ordered state."

[6] E.g., Clem. Al. Strom. 4. 26 (172, 2), SVF 3, 80, 40ff. (frag. 327): λέγουσι γὰρ καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τὸν μὲν οὐρανὸν κυρίως πόλιν.... σπουδαῖον γὰρ ἡ πόλις καὶ ὁ δῆμος ἀστεῖόν τι σύστημα καὶ πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων ὑπὸ νόμου διοικούμενον. "For the Stoics also say that heaven is properly a city. . . . For the city is a thing

common *oikonomia* and its related terms were in connection with political administration, it was inevitable, in the face of a concept that the world was merely a big *polis*, that these same words should be applied to the universe as well. And it is possible, from the sources at our disposal, especially in the Greek philosophers, to trace in some detail, how this "world administration" motif developed and how widespread it was in the period down to A.D. 100.

We have already observed a tendency to apply the terms under study to larger, more significant areas than an estate, a fiscal department, or even a kingdom. Plato spoke, for example, of the soul regulating (διοικεῖν) the heavens and the universe.[7] The Hellenistic treatise *Oeconomica* attributed to Aristotle spoke of how the very nature of man and woman had been previously ordered by the divine (προῳκονόμηται ὑπὸ τοῦ θείου) for community together, a sort of "providential arrangement" underlying the family.[8] Moreover, Aristle himself, had described nature at one point as a "good housekeeper" (οἰκονόμος ἀγαθός).[9]

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of consequence and the people an urban association, a mass of men administered by law."

[7] *Leg*. 896E: ψυχὴν δὴ διοικοῦσαν καὶ ἐνοικοῦσαν ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς πάντῃ κινουμένοις μῶν οὐ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνάγκη διοικεῖν φάναι; "Is it not also necessary to say that soul, since it regulates and indwells in all things which are moved everywhere, regulates heaven too?"

Phdr. 246C: πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ ... τελέα μὲν οὖν οὖσα καὶ ἐπτερωμένη μετεωροπορεῖ τὲ καὶ πάντα τὸν κόσμον διοικεῖ. "Soul, collectively, . . . when it is perfect and full-winged, mounts upward and governs all the universe."

[8] Arist. [*Oec.*] 1343b; *supra*, 184.

[9] *Gen*. *An*. 744b; *supra*, 184.

It was perhaps not unnatural then for men to begin to look for order and arrangement and all the evidences of efficient household management in nature, to find these things, and, what is more, to employ the term oikonomia or some similar word to characterize this arrangement in nature. Such system was observed especially in the heavenly bodies. So, for instance, Polybius speaks of "the arrangement and order (οἰκονομίᾳ καὶ τάξει) of the twelve signs of the Zodiac in the starry sky."[10] Epicurus, to take an illustration from an unlikely source, once mentions, with a very uncharacteristic term, the "regulation" (οἰκονομίαν) of the celestial phenomena, suggesting that even before Immanuel Kant the starry skies filled some men with awe, though not Epicurus.[11] The sun, to take a final case, is sometimes spoken of as providing "the governance of the universe" (ἡ τῶν ὅλων διοίκησις), i.e., "holding the office of providence and assuring permanence of order in the universe."[12] We do well to remind ourselves at this point that Aristotle saw this very order (εὐταξία) of the heavens as one of the reasons for the origin of religion; people "thought some god was the cause of such motion and orderliness."[13]

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[10] Polyb. 9. 15. 7: ἐὰν μή τις ἐπὶ τοῦ φαινομένου τῇ τῶν δώδεκα ζῳδίων οἰκονομίᾳ καὶ τάξει συμπεριφέρηται. It is difficult to tell the time at night, "if a person is not well acquainted with the arrangement and order of the twelve signs of the Zodiac in the starry sky."

[11] Epicurus Ep. 1. 79 (H. Usener, Epicurea (Leipzig, 1887), p. 29): τάχα δὲ καὶ πλείους, ὅταν τὸ θάμβος ἐκ τῆς τούτων προσκατανοήσεως μὴ δύνηται τὴν λύσιν λαμβάνειν καὶ τὴν περὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων οἰκονομίαν. Epicurus, arguing it is essential for our happiness to know generally about the nature of the heavenly bodies, but not in detail, points out that people who perceive changes, eclipses, etc., in the celestial phenomena but do not know the nature of these things, are afraid; "indeed, they perhaps fear even more, since the wonder which arises from the observation of these things cannot discover any solution or realize the arrangement of the essentials (or ruling

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elements)." Cyril Bailey, Epicurus: The Extant Remains (Oxford, 1926), 253, comments: "οἰκονομίαν, 'ordering,' 'regulation,': a curiously personal word for Epicurus to use, when he is so carefully disclaiming personal agency."

[12] Louis Sanders, L'Hellénisme de Saint Clément de Rome et le Paulinisme (Studia Hellenistica, 2: Louvain, 1943), 109f. E.g., the phrase is attributed to Cleanthes, according to Arius Didymus, in Euseb. Praep. Evang. 15. 15. 7, SVF 1, 112, 3 (frag. 499); to Cleomedes, the astronomer (A.D. 150-200), in his De motu circulari Corporum Caelestium (ed. H. Ziegler; Leipzig, 1891) 2. 1, lines 84-86: παρέχεται τὴν τῶν ὅλων διοίκησιν, the sun in a most harmonious manner "provides the administration of the universe."

[13] Arist. Fr. 10, in Sext. Em. Adv. dogmaticos 3. 20ff.: . . . ἀπὸ τῶν μετεώρων... θεασάμενοι γὰρ μεθ' ἡμέραν μὲν ἥλιον περιπολοῦντα, νύκτωρ δὲ τὴν εὔτακτον τῶν ἄλλων ἀστέρων κίνησιν, ἐνόμισαν εἶναί τινα θεὸν τὸν τῆς τοιαύτης κινήσεως καὶ εὐταξίας αἴτιον. Aristotle said that the conception of the gods arose from two sources, first from the things which happen concerning the soul, and also "from celestial phenomena . . . for when men observed the sun, on the one hand, revolving by day, and, on the other hand, at night the orderly motion of the other stars, they thought that some god was the cause of such motion and orderliness." The normal Greek word for "world," ὁ κόσμος, it should be recalled,

Men saw not only the heavenly bodies as evidence of order and arrangement in nature, however; they also found it elsewhere. Epictetus, at one point, while trying to show that death is not a matter of destruction, but rather a change from that which now is, not into what is not, but into what is not *now* (⟨οὐκ⟩ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ νῦν μὴ ὄν), uses a series of analogies from nature to demonstrate his point: the harvesting grain, the turning of the fresh fig into the dried fig, and of the cluster of grapes into raisins— all these, he says, "are changes from a preliminary state into something else; it is not destruction, but some sort of ordered arrangement and management (τεταγμένη τις οἰκονομία καὶ διοίκησις)"— i.e., the appointed administration of things in nature.[14]

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signified originally "order, arrangement," in contrast to chaos— a view that appears as early as the philosophy of Pythagoras (Plut. *De plac. phil.* 886C; Diog. Laert. 8. 48; cf. *infra*, 399, note 16).

[14] Arr. *Epict. Diss.* 3. 24. 92: πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν προτέρων εἰσὶν εἰς ἕτερα μεταβολαί· οὐκ ἀπώλεια, ἀλλὰ τεταγμένη τις οἰκονομία καὶ διοίκησις. Douglas S. Sharp, *Epictetus and the New Testament* (London, 1914), 25, notes the passage and points out that the word *oikonomia* "is used in E[pictetus] and St. Paul's writings in the metaphorical sense of 'arrangement,' 'management,' 'dispensation,'" citing Eph. 3: 2 and Col. 1: 25 as parallels. It seems to me that underlying the usage in both authors is the notion of "change from a preliminary state into something else through well-ordered management in nature and life by a divine power." Such a concept, which Epictetus here seems to apply to *death*, was a natural one for the Christian writers to bring into connection with *God's* management of the scheme of salvation revealed in Christ, i.e., his "dispensation" of grace.

The whole concept is admirably summed up in a phrase φύσεως οἰκονομία employed by Polybius, "the course appointed by nature," which he applies, however, not to nature's care for the heavenly bodies or the crops in the field, but further to "the cycle of political revolution, . . . in accordance with which the forms of government change, disappear, and again return to the point from which they started."[15] This too is a "natural course."

The Greeks therefore observed in many ways an order and arrangement to things in nature and life, and this ordering of the universe they attributed to a god or gods of varying kinds. Perhaps most surprising is how early this notion of a divine administration of the universe can be documented— in the pre-Socratics, in fact.

Early Examples

According to one much later report, Pythagoras (fl. c. 530 B.C.), "because he was amazed at the management of the whole universe (τὴν διοίκησιν τῶν ὅλων), deemed it good that his pupils at first keep silence," and observe this dioikēsis before beginning study of his philosophical system.[16] That such an ordering of the universe had a place in Pythagorean philosophy is further suggested by the passage preserved from an anonymous teacher of the school, who held that the sun is the chief god "and is the destiny (εἱμαρμένην) of all things and is also in turn the cause of their administration (διοικήσεως)."[17] Xenophanes of Colophon (fl. c. 545-500 B.C.), the first philosophic theologian who stressed one supreme deity, talks similarly about the sun: it "is useful both for the genesis and administration (διοίκησιν) of the world and of the living creatures in it."[18]

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[15] Polyb. 6. 9. 10: αὕτη πολιτειῶν ἀνακύκλωσις, αὕτη φύσεως οἰκονομία, καθ' ἣν μεταβάλλει καὶ μεθίσταται καὶ πάλιν εἰς αὑτὰ καταντᾷ τὰ κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας. The cycle referred to is the familiar one in Greek political theory: kingship, tyranny, aristocracy, oligarchy, democratic reaction, and, in a generation or two, rule by force and violence, and finally a master monarch arising again. R. Hirzel, Untersuchungen zu Cicero's Philosophischen Schriften (Leipzig, 1877), 2, 871, writes of Polybius' phrase: "he thus uses a word of which the Stoics liked to avail themselves in order to designate the order and preciseness in the whole universe, and he thereby reminds us that the cycle, which the historian discovers in the succession of state constitutions, is only the earthly counterpart of the greater cycle, which in the opinion of the Stoics the whole Nature in its eternal development always was to recapitulate anew."

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[16] Hippol. Haer. 1. 2. 3, Diels, Dox. Graec., p. 555, lines 22f.: θαυμάσας δὲ τὴν διοίκησιν τῶν ὅλων ἠξίωσε [Pythagoras] τὰ πρῶτα σιγᾶν τοὺς μαθητὰς οἱονεὶ μύστας τοῦ παντὸς εἰς τὸν κόσμον ἥκοντας. In later writers this theme is common, that by contemplation of the universe man recognizes its order and also the divine providence, and should then reproduce this perfection; it occurs especially in the polemic of the Stoic school against the amoralism of the Epicureans (e.g., in Cleomedes, and Dio Chrys. 12. 35-37).

[17] Diog. Laert. 8. 24, Diels, Vorsokr. 1, 449, 20ff.: ἐπικρατεῖ γὰρ τὸ θερμὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὅπερ ἐστὶ ζωῆς αἴτιον. τήν τε σελήνην λάμπεσθαι ὑφ' ἡλίου. καὶ ἀνθρώπων εἶναι πρὸς θεοὺς συγγένειαν κατὰ τὸ μετέχειν ἄνθρωπον θερμοῦ· διὸ καὶ προνοεῖσθαι τὸν θεὸν ἡμῶν. εἱμαρμένην τε τῶν ὅλων καὶ κατὰ μέρος αἰτίαν εἶναι τῆς διοικήσεως. διήκειν τε ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου ἀκτῖνα διὰ τοῦ αἰθέρος τοῦ τε ψυχροῦ καὶ παχέος. The sun and moon and the other stars are gods. "For the hot governs among them, which very thing is the cause of life. And the moon is lighted up by the sun. And for men there is a relationship with the gods in regard to the fact that man partakes of the hot. Hence also god provides for us. And it (the hot) is the destiny of all things and is in turn cause of their administration. And from the sun, rays come through the ether which is

In the fragments of Heraclitus (fl. c. 500 B.C.) which have come down to us, the phrase διοίκησις τῶν ὅλων is likewise included. Once he speaks of Keraunos, the Thunderbolt or everlasting fire, as the "prudent cause of the arrangement of all things (διοικήσεως τῶν ὅλων)."[19] On another occasion, he is reported as referring to the "logos which administers all things (λόγωι τῶι τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦντι)."[20] Empedocles

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cold and thick." Would not the whole concept lend itself to a gnosticlike notion of the administration of the universe, in which rays are projected from above to the world below, with a hierarchy of ruling authorities?

[18] Aëtius De plac. phil. 2. 30. 8, Diels, Vorsokr. 1, 125, 11: τὸν μὲν ἥλιον χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐν αὐτῶι ζώιων γένεσίν τε καὶ διοίκησιν, τὴν δὲ σελήνην παρέλκειν.

[19] Heraclitus, frag. 64, Diels, Vorsokr. 1, 165, 3: τὰ δὲ πάντα οἰακίζει Κεραυνός, τουτέστι κατευθύνει, κεραυνὸν τὸ πῦρ λέγων τὸ αἰώνιον. λέγει δὲ καὶ φρόνιμον τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ πῦρ καὶ τῆς διοικήσεως τῶν ὅλων αἴτιον. "Keraunos guides all things, i.e., guides aright, meaning by keraunos the eternal fire, but he also says this fire is prudent and the cause of the arrangement of all things."

Cf. also frag. 16, in Sext. Emp. Math. 7. 133, Diels, Vorsokr. 1, 148, 29: ἡ τοῦ παντὸς διοίκησις, "the administration of everything."

[20] Ibid., frag. 72, in M. Aur. Ant. Med. 4. 46, Diels, Vorsokr. 1, 167, 10: ...ὧι μάλιστα διηνεκῶς ὁμιλοῦσι λόγωι τῶι τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦντι τούτωι διαφέρονται, καὶ οἷς καθ' ἡμέραν ἐγκυροῦσι, ταῦτα αὐτοῖς ξένα φαίνεται. ". . . That with which especially men deal continually, the logos which administers all things, with this men are at variance; and things which they meet daily appear strange to them."

(c. 493-33 B.C.) is quoted as claiming that daemons "are busied in administering (διοικοῦντες) the affairs concerning the earth."[21] And a contemporary, Anaxagoras (c. 500-428 B.C.), describes the cosmos as "being administered (διοικούμενον) and determined by Nous."[22]

Cf. further Clem. Al. *Strom*. 5. 14 (104, 4), who writes that according to Heraclitus "fire is changed through air into moisture by God the Word who administers the universe (ὑπὸ τοῦ διοικοῦντος λόγου καὶ θεοῦ)." The context suggests, however, that the phrase διοικῶν λόγος καὶ θεός, which Clement identifies with the Christian Logos, was not in the words of Heraclitus himself, but was an interpretation by his followers. Cf. on this point E.H. Gifford's edition of Euseb. *Praep*. *Evang*. (Oxford, 1903), 4, 455, note on 676c 4.

[21] In Hippol. *Haer*. 1. 3. 1, Diels, *Dox*. *Graec*., p. 558, lines 14-16: Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ μετὰ τούτους γενόμενος καὶ περὶ δαιμόνων φύσεως εἶπε πολλά, ὡς ἀναστρέφονται διοικοῦντες τὰ κατὰ τὴν γῆν, ὄντες πλεῖστοι. "Empedocles, although coming after these men [Pythagoras and the Egyptian sages] also said many things about the nature of daemons, claiming that they are busied in administering the affairs concerning the earth and that they are many in number."

[22] Simplicius *De* *Phys*. 154. 29 (in Arist. Comment., ed. Ac. Berol.), Diels, *Vorsokr*. 2, 21, 35: τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν λέγειν ἅπαξ γενόμενον τὸν κόσμον ἐκ τοῦ μίγματος διαμένειν λοιπὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ ἐφεστῶτος διοικούμενόν τε καὶ διακρινόμενον. "Anaxagoras said that once the cosmos originated out of the mixture it continues for the future being administered and determined by Nous, as he is set over things."

Cf. Euseb. *Praep*. *Evang*. 10. 14 (504b 4-6): ἦν γὰρ ἀρχήν, φησί, τὰ πράγματα ὁμοῦ πεφυρμένα· Νοῦς δὲ εἰσελθῶν αὐτὰ ἐκ τῆς

In all these tantalizing fragments there is the idea of a divine power of some sort administering things, the root dioikein being used. It was only a matter of time before the parallel root oikonomein would be employed, and what is apparently the first extant case occurs in that writer who had so much to say about oikonomia elsewhere, Xenophon; he says, quite in line with the natural theology we have been observing, a theology which reasons back from the order of nature to a deity of order who arranges things: "the one who coordinates and holds together the whole world . . . this one is manifest as he does his supreme works, but he is invisible to us as he orders (οἰκονομῶν) them."[23]

Thus there is found in some of the earliest Greek thinkers a notion of order in nature and behind that, a deity of some kind who arranges things, manages, administers, dispenses them. This concept is implicit in the epithet ταμίας, "dispenser," which is sometimes given to Zeus, as early as Homer, for instance, in the phrase "Zeus, dispenser of war," or in an oracle that speaks of Apollo as "dispenser (ταμίης) of times and seasons, winds and showers," or in Plato's remark, "We must not admit that Zeus, as dispenser (ταμίας), assigns both goods and evils."[24] This concept of God,

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ἀταξίας εἰς τάξιν ἤγαγεν. "For in the beginning, [Anaxagoras] says, all things were confused together. But Mind, entering in, brought them out of disorder into order."

[23] Mem. 4. 3. 13: ὁ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον συντάττων τε καὶ συνέχων ... οὗτος τὰ μέγιστα μὲν πράττων ὁρᾶται, τάδε δὲ οἰκονομῶν ἀόρατος ἡμῖν ἐστιν.

[24] In Homer: Il 4. 84 and 19. 224: ταμίης πολέμοιο. The Apollo oracle is quoted by Euseb. Praep. Evang. 3. 15 (125d): ὡρῶν καὶ καιρῶν ταμίης, ἀνέμων τε καὶ ὄμβρων. Pl. Resp. 379E: οὐδ' ὡς ταμίας ὁ

as dispenser, "the one who disposes," is implicit too in the etymology of the common word for "god," *theos*, offered by Herodotus but followed by many of the church fathers: *theos*, assumed to mean "disposer," is connected with *tithenai*, "to dispose."[25] Related with the god-concept of some Greeks, therefore, was unquestionably the idea of the deity as the disposer (θεός) or dispenser (ταμίας) or administrator (διοικῶν, οἰκονομῶν) of the universe, whose ordering of things could be observed especially in nature.

This complex of ideas, which can be seen in a limited way in early Greek thinkers, did not, of course, appeal to all subsequent schools of philosophy. The Epicureans, for example, with their atomic physics, arguing that the order of things in the world is but "one of a thousand possible combinations

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Ζεὺς ἀγαθῶν τε κακῶν τε τέτυκται. Further: Eur. *Med*. 170; Isoc. 224A. At Pind. *Ol*. 6. 7. ταμίας Διός, "steward of Zeus," occurs, for which the scholiast gives διοικητής. In a passage from Aelius Aristides, Sarapis is referred to in terms similar to the Apollo oracle quoted above: "Sarapis is the one who is really manager of the winds, far more than the islander whom Homer makes so [i.e., Aeolus, at *Od*. 10. 22]." Teubner text edited by B. Keil, Vol. 2, pp. 360f., 29ff: οὗτός [Sarapis] ἐστιν ὁ τῷ ὄντι ταμίας ἀνέμων πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ὁ νησιώτης.

[25] Hdt. 2. 52: θεοὺς δὲ προσωνόμασαν σφέας ἀπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου, ὅτι κόσμῳ θέντες τὰ πάντα πρήγματα καὶ πάσας νομὰς εἶχον. The Pelasgians "called them gods out of the notion that they had disposed all things and held all distributions in the world." The view is followed, e.g., by Theophilus of Antioch *ad Aut*. 1. 4, and Clem. Al. *Strom*. 1. 29 (182, 2). For other views of the fathers, connecting θεός with θεῖν "to run," or with θεωρεῖν or θεᾶσθαι, "to behold," both of which depended in part on astronomy and the heavenly bodies, cf. Prestige², 1f.

produced in the infinity of time and space,"[26] found such a notion of *oikonomia* uncongenial; indeed, they denied any rule of god over the world at all or any providential care for man by him— a fact which helps account for the hostile attitude of Judaism toward the Epicureans, an attitude carried over also into Christianity.[27]

The Stoics and the Divine Administration

In Stoicism, however, this complex of ideas did find lodgment to an amazing degree. There developed in this school a strong emphasis on the order in the universe and the providential rule of God over the world— in a phrase, an οἰκονομία τοῦ θεοῦ— an ingredient in Stoicism which helps account for the favorable attitude toward this philosophy in Judaism and Christianity and the inclusion of many of its teachings, including this very motif, in Philo and Josephus and the church fathers.

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[26] Emil Bréhier, *Histoire de la Philosophie,* Tome premier: L'Antiquité et le moyen age, fascicle 2: Période Hellenistique et Romaine (Paris, 1948) (cited hereafter as "Bréhier, *Hist. Phil.*, 1, 2"), 1, 2, 348.

[27] On the Jewish attitude toward Epicureanism, cf. A. Schlatter, *Wie Sprach Josephus von Gott?* (Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie; Gütersloh, 1910), 50, especially note 1. Thus, e.g., Josephus complains the Epicureans "toss providence out of life and do not think God governs (ἐπιτροπεύειν) affairs" (*AJ* 10. 278), and in the Palestinian synagogue "the concept, 'Epicurean,' serves as a name for every impious method of thought." On the Christian attitude, cf., e.g., Justin Martyr 1. 4. 7. 26; 2. 7. 12. 15. Schlatter argues it was because of this Christian rejection of the school that most Epicurean literature in Greek was not transmitted. Further, on the rabbis, cf. Heller's article, "Epikuros," *Encyclop. Jud.* 6, col. 686ff. A concise statement with documentary evidence, on pagan, Philonic, and patristic attitudes towards the "atheism" of Epicurus himself, is available in H. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1956), 1, 83f.

There is no need here to trace in detail the rise of the Stoic school or the different contributions of its first three leaders: Zeno, the founder (322-264 B.C.), Cleanthes, his successor (264-232 B.C.), and Chrysippus, the second founder of the movement (232-204 B.C.).[28] It will suffice, rather, to note two elements in Stoic thought which helped give rise to its teaching about a divine oikonomia, and then to look at the extant fragments from these three great teachers of the school in the Hellenistic period, which employ our terms.

The first factor in Stoicism which helps explain that philosophy's stress on order in the world is the school's teaching on physics, its doctrines about nature and the material world. The Hellenistic period, after the death of Alexander the Great, was a time when there was less preoccupation with political theory in philosophy and more concern about universal rules of conduct and the attainment of happiness. Along with this there had developed the notion that man cannot find these rules or attain such happiness "without the support of a conception of a universe determined by reason."[29] Accordingly, Stoic physics especially laid emphasis upon a world dominated by reason.[30] Such a reasonable world was inevitably one of universal order; even movement, time, and change were not regarded as indications of imperfection, but as examples of the activity of this reason, to be explained as part of the natural, logical arrangement of the whole. Furthermore, history was viewed as cyclical, and reason, or Zeus, or fire, or divine law, or nature, or destiny— the terms are interchangeable in many Stoics— was said to guide the world through its series of cycles. God or fate is thus the universal "reason according to which past events have taken place, the present occurs, and the future will happen."[31] Or, to put it another way, there was held to be a causal necessity over all, a destiny, and all these elements were combined together in a definite scheme or pattern in the Stoic view of the universe and nature. It is worth noting that the older deities were tied in as part of this scheme, often allegorized to mean something else— Zeus, for example, being equated with reason— thus giving a framework from the old popular religion. There was, moreover, an influence from the old pre-Socratic physics, which we saw had some suggestion of an ordering of things, to which the Stoics added a further emphasis on such an ordering or governing of the universe in their treatment of the subject.[32]

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[28] Cf. especially on Stoicism, Bréhier, Hist. Phil., 1, 2, 294-318, 404ff.; E. Bréhier, Chrysippe et l'ancien stoïcisme (Paris, 1951); E. Zeller, The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics (tr. Oswald J. Reichel; London, 1870); and E. Zeller, A History of Eclecticism in Greek Philosophy (tr. S.F. Alleyne; London, 1883).

[29] Bréhier, Hist. Phil., 1, 2, 285.

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[30] I follow in this section Bréhier, Hist. Phil., 1, 2, 307ff.

[31] Stob. Ecl. 1. 79. 1W quoting Chrysippus, SVF 2, 264, 20f. (frag. 913): „εἱμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ κόσμου λόγος" ἢ „λόγος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων" ἢ „λόγος καθ' ὃν τὰ μὲν γεγονότα γέγονε, τὰ δὲ γινόμενα γίνεται, τὰ δὲ γενησόμενα γενήσεται.

[32] E.g., Chrysippus, in Gal. introductio s. medicus 9. Vol. 14, p. 698K, SVF 2, 137, 25ff. (frag. 416): "The four elements of man are not first substances, fire, and air, and water, and earth, but their qualities, the

A second element in Stoic thought, along with this view of the world, which led to the notion of a divine economy, was the theology or concept of God found in the school. In Stoicism there appear some traits in the Gottesbild not encountered before in Greek thought, for the god of the Stoics differs from the deity depicted in both popular Hellenic myth and the philosophers, who "has his life apart and who in his perfect existence ignores the movements and ills of humanity as well as the vicissitudes of the world," and also from the figure portrayed in Dionysiac cult, a deity "who does not descend to man, but allows him to mount up to himself."[33] The god of the Stoics, as Bréhier characterizes him, "is neither an Olympian nor a Dionysus; he is a god who lives in society with men and with reasonable beings, and who disposes all things in the universe in their favor; his power penetrates all things, and no detail escapes his providence, be it ever so minute a one."[34] This god is no "solitary stranger to the world who attracts by his beauty," but is the craftsman of the world, its artificer, governor, helmsman, and ruler, to use some of the favorite terms of the school.

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hot, and the cold, and the dry, and the wet, two of which are posited as the creative causes, the hot and the cold, and two as the material, the dry and the wet, and a fifth comes in according to the Stoics, the spirit which pervades all things, by which all things are held together and are governed (τὸ διῆκον διὰ πάντων πνεῦμα, ὑφ' οὗ τὰ πάντα συνέχεσθαι καὶ διοικεῖσθαι)." Further, cf. Bréhier, Hist. Phil., 1, 2, 294f.

[33] Bréhier, Hist. Phil., 1, 2, 296f.

[34] Ibid., 297.

Such a conception of god which developed in Stoicism has definite affinities with Semitic thought. Zeno, it must be remembered, came from Citium in Cyprus before he settled in Athens, Cleanthes was from Assos in the Troad, and Chrysippus was born near Tarsus in Cilicia. All three of them express what Bréhier calls "the Semitic ideal of God all-powerful, governing the destiny of men and of things, so different from the Hellenic conception." "Zenon the Phoenician is going to set the tone for Hellenism," he goes on, and while this theme of God as creator and provident ruler was by no means new in Greek thought, "with Zenon it becomes the dominant theme of philosophy."[35]

Stoic theology may also stress God's immanence in the world, but its god is always the one who rules over the world and governs it, as in Cleanthes' famous Hymn to Zeus.[36] In this administration by God of the universe, evil must be explained, and Stoic philosophers struggle manfully to account for this element in the divine administration of things. But this is their constant theme: the world is like a well-administered city, governed by God, who rules over his universe, managing its affairs. Just how this government-of-the-world idea worked out in detail can be seen by examining some of the fragmentary passages from the early Stoic leaders where our terms are employed.

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[35] Ibid., 298. Further on the oriental origins of Stoicism, cf. Emil Bréhier, Chrysippe et l'ancien stoïcisme (Paris, 1951), 7ff., and M. Pohlenz, "Stoa und Semitismus," Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung 2 (1926), 257-269.

[36] Stob. Ecl. 1. 1. 12, SVF 1, 121, 33ff. (frag. 537); translated in F.C. Grant, Hellenistic Religions (New York, 1953), 152ff.

One of the fundamental Stoic principles was that "the world is governed (διοικεῖσθαι) by nature."[37] So it is that nature arranges (οἰκονομεῖ) plant life,[38] but also animal and human affairs. While, however, nature regulates (οἰκονομεῖ) plant life without using the devices of impulse and desire, these qualities were held by the Stoics to have been added in the case of animals, so that nature's rule for them is "to be governed according to the impulse (τῷ κατὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν διοικεῖσθαι)"; in the case of man, however, reason was also believed added to his make-up, so as to shape impulse scientifically.[39] The virtuous life for man, according to Stoic ethics, therefore, was "life in accordance with this reason" he is endowed with, or, to put it another way, since reason and nature agree, "life in accordance with nature," virtue being, in Stoic thought, "the goal towards which nature guides us." This whole concept of ethics, reason, nature, and natural law is connected with the Stoic idea of an orderly universe ruled over by God in a striking passage preserved in a discussion by Diogenes Laertius on the Stoics:

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[37] Chrysippus, in Ps.-Plut. De fato 11. 574D, SVF 2, 264, 7-8 (frag. 912): τὸ φύσει διοικεῖσθαι τόνδε τὸν κόσμον, σύμπνουν καὶ συμπαθῆ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ ὄντα.

[38] Chrysippus, in Diog. Laert. 7. 85, SVF 3, 43, 13-16 (frag. 178): οὐδέν τε, φασί, διήλλαξεν ἡ φύσις ἐπὶ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων, ὅτε χωρὶς ὁρμῆς καὶ αἰσθήσεως κἀκεῖνα οἰκονομεῖ, καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν τινα φυτοειδῶς γίνεται. "Nature, [the Stoics] say, did not change anything in the case of plants and in the case of living creatures, when she arranges the former without desire and perception, and in our case certain things exist in a plant-like manner."

[39] Ibid., SVF 3, 43, 16-20 (frag. 178).

The goal may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or, in other words, in accordance with our human nature, as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical with Zeus, this one who is governor of the administration of the things which exist (τῷ Διΐ, καθηγεμόνι τούτῳ τῆς τῶν ὄντων διοικήσεως ὄντι). And this very thing constitutes the virtue of the happy man and the smooth current of life, when all actions promote the harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will of him who orders the universe (πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου διοικητοῦ βούλησιν).[40]

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[40] Ibid., 7. 87, SVF 3, 3, 30ff. (frag. 4). The passage is an excellent summary of Stoic agreement on these points; it begins: "Zeno was the first (in his treatise On the Nature of Man) to designate as the goal 'life in agreement with nature,' which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us. So too Cleanthes in his treatise On Pleasure, as also Posidonius, and Hecato in his work On Ends. Again living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature, as Chrysippus states in the First Book of his On Ends; for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe." Then follows the part translated above: διόπερ τέλος γίνεται τὸ ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν· ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατά τε τὴν αὑτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὅλων, οὐδὲν ἐνεργοῦντας ὧν ἀπαγορεύειν εἴωθεν ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινός, ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν τῷ Διΐ, καθηγεμόνι τούτῳ τῆς τῶν ὄντων διοικήσεως ὄντι. εἶναι δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ εὐδαίμονος ἀρετὴν καὶ εὔροιαν βίου, ὅταν πάντα πράττηται κατὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν τοῦ παρ' ἑκάστῳ δαίμονος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου διοικητοῦ βούλησιν.

Let us look further at two elements mentioned in this paragraph: first, the concept of an "administration of existing things"; then secondly, the feeling that there is a governor behind this administration, "one who orders the universe," here called Zeus or reason.

The Administration of the Universe and its Administrator

The phrase "administration or government of the world" (ἡ τοῦ κόσμου διοίκησις) is a not uncommon one in the Stoic fragments; Chrysippus seems to have used it frequently.[41] Sometimes, however, the noun oikonomia is employed as an equivalent term, as in the phrase ἡ τοῦ παντὸς οἰκονομία, "the administration of the universe," or ἡ τῶν ὅλων οἰκονομία, literally, "the administration of the whole."[42] It is with this administration of the universe and its affairs that the virtuous man is to be in accord, Chrysippus wrote, an administration of things which is identified with nature, reason, fate, and Zeus at different times in the Stoics;[43] as Plutarch put it, describing Chrysippus' stress on these points:

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[41] E.g., in Alexander of Aphrodisias De fato 37 (ed. I. Bruns, p. 210), SVF 2, 297, 9 (frag. 1005); in Plut. De Stoic. repugn. 9. 1035C, SVF 3, 17, 7 (frag. 68). Cf. G. Bardy, "Expressions stoiciennes dans la I^{a} Clementis," Recherches de Science Religieuse 12 (1922), 76, especially note 2.

[42] ἡ τοῦ παντὸς οἰκονομία — Chrysippus, in Alexander of Aphrodisias De fato 22 (ed. I. Bruns, p. 191), SVF 2, 273, 28 (frag. 945).

ἡ τῶν ὅλων οἰκονομία — Chrysippus, in Plut. De Stoic. repugn. 34. 1050A, SVF 2, 269, 4 (frag. 937). Cf. ibid., 35, 1050E, SVF 2, 338, 9 (frag. 1176):

[43] In Diog. Laert. 7. 87, SVF 3, 3, 27ff. (frag. 4); supra, note 40,

The notion that common nature and the common reason of nature are fate and providence and Zeus has not escaped the notice even of the Antipodes. For everywhere these things are talked about by them [the Stoics] ; and the phrase,

"the will of Zeus was accomplished,"

Chrysippus claims Homer said rightly, referring to fate and the nature of the universe, in accordance with which all things are administered (καθ' ἣν πάντα διοικεῖται).[44]

The world, therefore, is one, its arrangement and government is a chain of ordered cause and effect, in which all is necessity and there are no uncaused happenings, and pervading this whole, quite definite arrangement of things is what the Stoics called nature or reason or fate or Zeus. A long passage from Alexander of Aphrodisias summarizes admirably these views of Chrysippus and the Stoics:

> [The Stoics] say that this world, since it is one and encompasses all things in itself, and since it is governed by nature (ὑπὸ φύσεως διοικούμενον) . . . , has its government of the existing things (ἔχειν

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where Zeus is τῆς τῶν ὄντων διοικήσεως καθηγεμών.

[44] Chrysippus, in Plut. *De Stoic. repugn*. 34. 1050A, *SVF* 2, 269, 12-18 (*frag*. 937): ὅτι δ' ἡ κοινὴ φύσις καὶ ὁ κοινὸς τῆς φύσεως λόγος εἱμαρμένη καὶ πρόνοια καὶ Ζεύς ἐστιν, οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀντίποδας λέληθε· πανταχοῦ γὰρ ταῦτα θρυλεῖται ὑπ' αὐτῶν· καὶ τὸ

Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή, [*Il*. 1. 5]

τὸν Ὅμηρον εἰρηκέναι φησὶν ὀρθῶς, ἐπὶ τὴν εἱμαρμένην ἀναφέροντα καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅλων φύσιν, καθ' ἣν πάντα διοικεῖται. Here Chrysippus' position as a determinist certainly emerges.

τὴν τῶν ὄντων διοίκησιν) in accordance with some series and advancing order. The first things are causes for the things that happen after these, and in this way all things are bound together to one another. Thus nothing happens in the world . . . so as not to be tied completely to something else as a cause, nor, in turn, is any of the things which happen afterwards able to be loosed from the things which happened previously, so as not to follow some one of them. The result is that something else follows after everything which happens, being of necessity dependent upon it as a cause, and everything which happens has something before it, to which it is tied together as to a cause.

Nothing either exists or happens of the things in the world without a cause, because of the fact that none of the things in it exists both sundered and separated from all the things which have happened previously. The world, since it is always governed in accord with both one ordering and arrangement (αἰεὶ κατὰ μίαν τάξιν τε καὶ οἰκονομίαν διοικούμενον) would be divided and torn asunder and would no longer remain one, if some movement should enter in uncaused. This movement would enter in, unless all the things which both exist and happen should have certain causes which happened previously, which they follow of necessity. For the Stoics say that the term "without a cause" is similar to (and in a similar fashion, as impossible as) the proposition that something comes into being out of what does not exist.

The Stoics say further that the government of the whole universe (τὴν τοῦ παντὸς διοίκησιν), since it is of such a nature, is active and unceasing from infinite to infinite. But if there is some difficulty in the causes, in expounding this, they reckon up a swarm of causes, some immediate, some secondary. . . . And although there are many causes, they say that . . . it is impossible that . . . sometimes a thing should somehow turn out in this way, but other times not turn out thus. For if it should happen thus, there would be some motion without a cause. But they say that fate itself and nature and reason, in accordance with which everything is governed (καθ' ὃν διοικεῖται τὸ πᾶν), is divine, fate existing in all things both which are and which come into being, fate thus using the proper nature of all the things which exist for the government of the universe (πρὸς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οἰκονομίαν).[45]

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[45] Chrysippus, in Alexander of Aphrodisias De fato 22 (ed. I. Bruns, p. 191), SVF 2, 272, 38 - 273, 29 (frag. 945): φασὶν δὴ τὸν κόσμον τόνδε, ἕνα ὄντα καὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐν αὐτῷ περιέχοντα, καὶ ὑπὸ φύσεως διοικούμενον... ἔχειν τὴν τῶν ὄντων διοίκησιν ἀΐδιον κατὰ εἱρμόν τινα καὶ τάξιν προϊοῦσαν, τῶν πρώτων τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα γινομένοις αἰτίων γινομένων καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ συνδεομένων ἀλλήλοις ἁπάντων, καὶ μήτε οὕτως τινὸς ἐν αὐτῷ γινομένου, ὡς μὴ πάντως ἐπακολουθεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ συνῆφθαι ὡς αἰτίῳ ἕτερόν τι, μήτ' αὖ τῶν ἐπιγινομένων, τινὸς ἀπολελύσθαι δυναμένου τῶν προγεγονότων, ὡς μή τινι αὐτῶν ἀκολουθεῖν ὥσπερ συνδεόμενον, ἀλλὰ παντί τε τῷ γενομένῳ ἕτερόν τι ἐπακολουθεῖν, ἠρτημένον ⟨ἐξ⟩ αὐτοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὡς αἰτίου, καὶ πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἔχειν τι πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ᾧ ὡς αἰτίῳ συνήρτηται.

μηδὲν γὰρ ἀναιτίως μήτε εἶναι μήτε γίνεσθαι τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἀπολελυμένον τε καὶ κεχωρισμένον τῶν προγεγονότων ἁπάντων. διασπᾶσθαι γὰρ καὶ διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ μηκέτι τὸν κόσμον ἕνα μένειν, ἀεὶ κατὰ μίαν τάξιν τε καὶ οἰκονομίαν διοικούμενον, εἰ ἀναίτιός τις εἰσάγοιτο κίνησις· ἣν εἰσάγεσθαι, εἰ μὴ πάντα τὰ ὄντα τε καὶ γινόμενα ἔχοι τινὰ αἴτια προγεγονότα, οἷς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἕπεται· ὅμοιόν τε εἶναί φασιν καὶ ὁμοίως ἀδύνατον τὸ ἀναιτίως τῷ γίνεσθαί τι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος.

There is thus a government of the universe, called either the oikonomia or dioikēsis in Stoic thought, and this government implies, to move on to our second point, a governor or administrator, who is regularly referred to in Stoic literature as ὁ (τοῦ ὅλου) διοικητής, and identified with Zeus, right reason, common law, and nature, as we have seen.[46] The titles are frequently interchangeable in Stoic theology, as a series of passages

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τοιαύτην δὲ οὖσαν τὴν τοῦ παντὸς διοίκησιν ἐξ ἀπείρου εἰς ἄπειρον ἐνεργῶς τε καὶ ἀκαταστρόφως γίνεσθαι. οὔσης δέ τινος διαφορᾶς ἐν τοῖς αἰτίοις, ἣν ἐκτισθέντες σμῆνος [γὰρ] αἰτίων καταλέγουσιν, τὰ μὲν προκαταρκτικά, τὰ δὲ συναίτια, ... ὄντων δὴ πλειόντων αἰτίων, ... φασιν εἶναι τὸ ἀδύνατον ... ὁτὲ μεν δὴ μὴ οὑτωσί πως συμβαίνειν, ὁτὲ δὲ οὕτως. ἔσεσθαι γάρ, εἰ οὕτως γίνοιτο ἀναίτιόν τινα κίνησιν. τὴν δὲ εἱμαρμένην αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸν λόγον, καθ' ὃν διοικεῖται τὸ πᾶν, θεὸν εἶναί φασιν, οὖσαν ἐν τοῖς οὖσίν τε καὶ γινομένοις ἅπασιν καὶ οὕτως χρωμένην ἁπάντων τῶν ὄντων τῇ οἰκείᾳ φύσει πρὸς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οἰκονομίαν.

[46] (ὁ) τοῦ ὅλου διοικητής — Chrysippus, in Diog. Laert. 7. 87, SVF 3, 4, 7 (frag. 4); supra, 410, note 40. διοικητής as a title for god is also vouched for in Diogenianus, the Epicurean of the second century A.D., Answers to Chrysippus, quoted in Euseb. Praep. Evang. 6. 8 (265b 4), "men ascribed events to gods as rulers and artificers (διοικητὰς καὶ δημιουργούς)." Much more common, however, is the phrase ὁ διοικῶν... θεός, found in pagan and patristic authors, as at SVF 2, 340, 40 (frag. 1185, Origen De prin. 3, p. 162, ed. Delaure), περὶ τοῦ τέχνῃ ἀφάτῳ καὶ δυνάμει διοικοῦντος τὰ ὅλα θεοῦ, "concerning the God who rules the universe with ineffable skill and power."

shows, but again and again some word from the verb *dioikein* — apparently never *oikonomein* — is employed to describe the administrative function of this Stoic deity. The absence of ὁ οἰκονόμος as a title or even of the participle οἰκονομῶν in these descriptions of god by Stoic philosophers, although they speak of his οἰκονομία, is noteworthy here, because in the church fathers, God's *oikonomia* is also frequently mentioned, but he is seldom, if ever, referred to as *oikonomos*;[47] it would appear that this patristic preference, to call God "administrator" or "governor," but not "steward," has some precedent in the earlier Stoic usage which these passages demonstrate.

To turn now to examples where the Stoic god is referred to by these terms, Zeus, according to one example quoted from Chrysippus, is said to be "the reason who administers all things (τὸ]ν ἅπαντ[α διοικοῦ]ντα λόγον)."[48] In another illustration Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, is reported by the church fathers to have spoken similarly of this reason or *logos*; according to them, he called this *logos* not only the "arranger of the nature of things" (*rerum naturae dispositorem*) but also the maker of the universe, and identified him with Zeus and further with necessity and fate.[49]

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[47] So Verhoeven, *supra* 77, note 58, with the one apparent exception at Iren. *Adv. Haer.* 4. 20. 7, where *dispensator* is applied to Christ. The statement requires slight correction, however, in the light of some evidence from the fathers and other sources, cf. *infra*, 541ff., note 14. The obvious reason for this apparent reluctance of the Stoics to call God an *oikonomos*, as will be pointed out in connection with the application of this material to patristic usage, *infra*, 545f., is the fact that an *oikonomos* was regularly a subordinate person; thus God could not be anyone's steward.

[48] Phld. *De pietate* 11, lines 13ff. (ed. Gomperz, p. 77), in Diels, *Dox. Graec.*, p. 545B, lines 13ff.: Χρύσιππος ... [ἐν μὲ]ν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ Θεῶν Δία φη[σὶν εἶναι τὸ]ν ἅπαντ[α διοικοῦ]ντα λόγον κ[αὶ τὴν] τοῦ ὅλου ψυχή[ν]. The conjecture is credited to Sauppe, marked (?) by Gomperz, and does not appear in the *SVF index verborum*.

This identification of Zeus or reason, the ruling deity in the universe, with fate or destiny was especially popular among the Stoics. Chrysippus is quoted rather frequently referring to fate in this sense. Once he made the identification like this: "destiny (πεπρωμένην) is a certain arrangement determined and concluded (πεπερασμένην τινά ... διοίκησιν), and fate is a kind of bond woven (εἱμαρμένην, εἰρομένην) either out of the will of Zeus or of some other cause."[50] Again, from a paragraph in Stobaeus:

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[49] Zeno, in Lactant. *De vera sap*. 9 (*Div*. *Inst*. 4. 9), *SVF* 1, 42, 23-25 (*frag*. 160): Zeno rerum naturae dispositorem atque artificem universitatis λόγον praedicat, quem et fatum et necessitatem rerum et deum et animum Iovis nuncupat. "Zeno proclaims the λόγος as arranger of the nature of things and maker of the universe, whom he calls also fate and necessity of things and god and mind of Zeus." Cf. Tert. *Apol*. 21, *SVF* 1, 42, 26-30 (*frag*. 160): Apud vestros quoque sapientes λόγον, id est sermonem atque rationem constat artificem videri universitatis. Hunc enim Zeno determinat factitatorem, qui cuncta in dispositione formaverit, eundem et fatum vocari et deum et animum Iovis et necessitatem omnium rerum. "Among your wise men, also it is well known that λόγος, i.e., sermo (word) and ratio (reason), is seen as maker of the universe. For Zeno marks this one as the maker, who formed all things in arrangement, (and says) he is called both fate and god and mind of Zeus and necessity of all things." The church fathers are doubtless here under the influence of their own Logos doctrine, but it is significant they trace the characteristic Stoic teaching of God as arranger or Logos-administrator back to the founder of the school.

> Chrysippus says that the essence of fate is a spiritual power, controlling the universe with order (τάξει τοῦ παντὸς διοικητικήν). . . . Here and there he appears very often saying: "Fate is the reason of the world," or "reason of the things which are governed by providence in the world (λόγος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνόιᾳ διοικουμένων)."[51]

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[50] Diogenianus, in Euseb. *Praep*. *Evang*. 6. 8. (263c 7): τήν τε γὰρ πεπρωμένην πεπερασμένην τινά φησιν εἶναι καὶ συντετελεσμένην διοίκησιν, τήν τε εἱμαρμένην, εἰρομένην τινὰ εἴτε ἐκ θεοῦ βουλήσεως, εἴτε ἐξ ἧς δή ποτε αἰτίας.

[51] Stob. *Ecl*. 1. 79. 1W, *SVF* 2, 264, 14-19 (*frag*. 913): Χρύσιππος δύναμιν πνευματικὴν τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς εἱμαρμένης, τάξει τοῦ παντὸς διοικητικήν. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ Περὶ Κόσμου. Ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ Περὶ Ὅρων καὶ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ Τῆς Εἱμαρμένης καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις σποράδην πολυτρόπως ἀποφαίνεται λέγων: „Εἱμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ κόσμου λόγος" ἢ „λόγος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων." Cf. also Ps.-Plut. *De* *plac*. *phil*. 1. 28 (885B): Χρύσιππος δύναμιν πνευματικὴν τάξει τοῦ παντὸς διοικητικήν· καὶ πάλιν ἐν τοῖς Ὅροις· „εἱμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ κόσμου λόγος ἢ νόμος τῶν [ὄντων] ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων." That the same opinion was shared by Zeno is suggested by the remark at Epiph. *Adv*. *Haeres*. 1. 5, *SVF* 1, 24, 32ff. (*frag*. 87): φάσκει οὖν καὶ οὗτος (Ζήνων) ... εἱμαρμένην τε εἶναι καὶ γένεσιν ἐξ ἧς τὰ πάντα διοικεῖται .... "This man (Zeno) therefore also says that . . . fate is a beginning out of which all things are governed. . . ." Chrysippus is said to have written treatises both *On* *Fate* and *On* *Providence* (cf. Diog. Laert. 7. 189).

This emphasis on providence as a concomitant of the divine administration of the universe appears elsewhere, of course, in Stoic thought— indeed, it is characteristic of Stoicism— and sometimes it is providence which is credited with arranging things in the world. To quote Philo: "Providence, . . . as Chrysippus says and Cleanthes, omits nothing which pertains to more certain and more useful arrangement (dispensationem); whereas if it were better for the affairs of the world to be arranged (dispensari) in another way, it would have chosen its composition in that way, in so far as nothing happens towards hindering God."[52] Best of all possible worlds we have, so this philosophy suggests.

The Problem of Evil in the Divine Administration

Now this Stoic view, with its stress upon an all-powerful providence and divine rule and ordering in the universe, naturally faced a problem in explaining the existence of evil in such a world. Generally the Stoics held on, however, to their notion of providential action and divine government, in spite of evil, explaining it at times as a necessary contrary to the good, or a necessary accompaniment of the good which God may employ in order to arrive at the good— this latter position opening the way to the charge of what may be called "economical behavior" on the part of God.[53]

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[52] Philo, Provid. 2. 74 (ed. Aucher, p. 94), SVF 1, 124, 30-34 (frag. 548): . . . providentia, . . . ut dicit Chrysippus et Cleanthes, nihil praetermisit pertinentium ad certiorem utilioremque dispensationem. Quod si aliter melius esset dispensari res mundi, eo modo sumpsisset compositionem, qua tenus nihil occurreret ad impediendum deum.

The Stoic emphasis on divine rule and providential control in the affairs of the world could and did in some cases, of course, lead to fatalism. And there is plenty of evidence that fatalism, often coupled with worship of astral deities, was rife at times and in parts of the Roman Empire at the birth of Christianity. Properly, however, Stoicism did not result in fatalism but in the more positive attitude toward the world expressed above. As Bréhier puts it, Hist. Phil., 1, 2, 326, "Stoic resignation is not a makeshift, last resort, but a joyous and positive compliance in the world as it is." Sen. Ep. 97: non pareo deo, sed assentior.

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[53] Bréhier, Hist. Phil., 1, 2, 318: Chrysippus accounted for the presence of evil in the universe in two ways: (1) "Good is the contrary of bad, and contrary cannot exist without its contrary"; (2) God naturally wishes good, it is his nature; but, in order to arrive at it, he is disposed "to employ means which taken by themselves are not without inconvenience. The thinness of ~~the~~ bone of the skull, necessary for the human organism, does not go without danger for its health. Evil then is a necessary accompaniment (προσακολούθησις) of good." From this view it is but a step to the position that God employs what appears evil in order to achieve a good end— i.e., he is really doing something different and better than what appears on the surface.

Cf. also on Chrysippus' view of evil, R. Liechtenhan, Die göttliche Vorherbestimmung bei Paulus und in der Posidonianischen Philosophie (Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments, Neue Folge, 18; Göttingen, 1922) (cited hereafter as "Liechtenhan"), 74-78, where the same two points are noted: (1) it is logically unthinkable that the good can exist without the evil; (2) the gods let "evils" happen to the wicked as a good, to cure their "illness," so that, in the long run, evil in individual cases must serve the good of the whole. Liechtenhan also points out how Chrysippus distinguished a double causality: the direct

Chrysippus, for example, in attempting to hang on to both principles, that "god is in no way the cause of any dishonest thing," and that "not even the least little thing can happen otherwise than in accord with nature and its reason," laid himself open to attack at just this point, and Plutarch accused him of claiming that, since every condition or action of ours must be in accord with the divine administration, no habits or vices therefore which exist can really be contrary to reason, Zeus, or providence.[54]

(causae perfectae et principales), and a more indirect (causae adiuvantes et proximae or confatales), a primary divine predestination and secondary consequences attaching themselves thereto through natural necessity, a view carried over by Philo and Seneca.

[54] Plut. De Stoic. repugn. 34. 1049F ff., SVF 2, 269, 1ff. (frag. 937): πρῶτον γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ φύσεως τὸ ἀίδιον τῆς κινήσεως κυκεῶνι παρεικάσας, ἄλλα ἄλλως στρέφοντι καὶ ταράσσοντι, τῶν γινομένων, ταῦτ' εἴρηκεν· „Οὕτω δὲ τῆς τῶν ὅλων οἰκονομίας προαγούσης, ἀναγκαῖον κατὰ ταύτην, ὡς ἄν ποτ' ἔχωμεν, ἔχειν ἡμᾶς, εἴτε παρὰ φύσιν τὴν ἰδίαν νοσοῦντες, εἴτε πεπηρωμένοι, εἴτε γραμματικοὶ γεγονότες ἢ μουσικοί." καὶ πάλιν μετ' ὀλίγον· „κατὰ τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον τὰ παραπλήσια ἐροῦμεν καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡμῶν καὶ περὶ τῆς κακίας, καὶ τὸ ὅλον τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀτεχνιῶν, ὡς ἔφην." καὶ μετ' ὀλίγον ἅπασαν ἀναιρῶν ἀμφιβολίαν· „Οὐθὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλως τῶν κατὰ μέρος γενέσθαι οὐδὲ τοὐλάχιστον, ἢ κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνης λόγον." "For first, Chrysippus, having in the First Book On Nature compared the eternity of motion to a drink which is mixed together, turning and stirring up the things which exist, some this way, some that, says: 'Because the administration of the universe proceeds thus, it is a matter of necessity that we be in accord with this administration, in whatever condition we are, whether contrary to our proper nature we have become

Thus Plutarch writes:

> Chrysippus grants to vice an absolute liberty, alleging that an act of vice is done not only of necessity and according to fate, but also in accordance with the reason of God and in accordance with the best nature. And further it is seen that this is literally so, "for, since common nature extends to all things, it will be necessary that everything whatsoever is done in the whole universe and in any at all of the parts be in accordance with this common nature and the reason of that nature, proceeding on regularly, without any impediment. [All this is so] because of the fact that there is nothing without, which will oppose

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sick or maimed, or happen to be grammarians or musicians.' And again, a little later: 'In accordance with this reason [i.e., which controls the universe] we shall say similar things both about our virtue and vice, and generally of arts and lack of arts, as I said.' And, after a little, taking away all uncertainty: 'None of the parts [of the universe], not even the least, is able to be otherwise than in accord with the common nature and its reason.'"

The figure of the world as a mixed drink (κυκεών) is reflected in, and may go back to, a remark attributed to Heraclitus, Diels, Vorsokr. 1, 178, 16 (frag. 125, Theophr. de vertig. 9): καὶ ὁ κυκεὼν διίσταται ⟨μὴ⟩ κινούμενος. "The 'mixed drink' (kykeōn, wine with barley grains and grated cheese) also separates if not stirred." The eternity of motion, a process of "stirring," Chrysippus seems to imply, is a necessary factor in the administration of the universe, to hold it together.

The idea that "in whatever condition we are, it is necessary to stay in accord with the administration," is suggestive of Paul's thought at I Cor. 7: 20ff., "Everyone should remain in the state in which he was called."

the administration [τῇ οἰκονομίᾳ, i.e., the divine ordering of the universe], nor is there any of its parts which is able to be moved or habituated otherwise than in accordance with the common nature."[55] In other words, whatever happens in the world must be in accord with this divine administration of things, and according to such a line of thought, Plutarch charges, even sickness and evils of all sorts, cowardice, injustice, adultery, theft, and treachery must therefore not be contrary to nature, justice, providence, right reason, and Zeus, the Stoic deity! Stoicism with its rationalistic optimism was in genuine need of a theodicy.

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[55] *Ibid.*, 1050C, *SVF* 2, 269, 19ff. (*frag.* 937): ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος ἀναπεπταμένην παρρησίαν αὐτῇ (sc. τῇ κακίᾳ) δίδωσιν, ὡς οὐ μόνον ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐδὲ καθ' εἱμαρμένην, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ λόγον θεοῦ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν πεποιημένῃ τὴν ἀρίστην. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ὁρᾶται κατὰ λέξιν οὕτως ἔχοντα· „τῆς γὰρ κοινῆς φύσεως εἰς πάντα διατεινούσης, δεήσει πᾶν τὸ ὁπωσοῦν γινόμενον ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ τῶν μορίων ὁτῳοῦν κατ' ἐκείνην γενέσθαι καὶ τὸν ἐκείνης λόγον κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς ἀκωλύτως· διὰ τὸ μήτ' ἔξωθεν εἶναι τὸ ἐνστησόμενον τῇ οἰκονομίᾳ, μήτε τῶν μερῶν μηδὲν ἔχειν ὅπως κινηθήσεται ἢ σχήσει ἄλλως ⟨ἢ⟩ κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν."

The line of attack to be taken here by Plutarch against the Stoic claim of an all-powerful providence which regulates everything that happens is not dissimilar to the approach Marcion later used against the god of the Old Testament and the notion he had caused all the things attributed to him there: if he is really all-powerful, Marcion charged, then what an unjust, capricious deity he must be! Statements in the Old Testament, such as Amos 3: 6 ("Does evil befall a city unless the Lord has done it?"), played directly into Marcion's hands at this point.

That Chrysippus himself had squirmed over just this dilemma, Plutarch makes clear in what he goes on to say later. Apparently Chrysippus conjectured causes of a secondary nature, like neglect in management of some details within the cosmic household or even the existence of evil demons in the universe, to account for the evils that happen to good men, an argument which Plutarch picked up as really indicative of *bad* administration in providence's government of the world. Plutarch wrote, in a passage which significantly compares the divine administration of the world with the running of a great household and also with a king's governing of his provinces:

> Chrysippus, having often written that there is nothing reprehensible, nothing to be complained of in the world, all things being completed in accordance with a most excellent nature, again elsewhere leaves certain matters of negligence to be reprehended, and these not concerning small or base matters. Accordingly, in the Third Book of his treatise *On Substance*, because he has remembered that some things of such a nature do happen to gentlemen who are really noble and good, he says: "Is it because some things have been neglected, just as in great households some husks and a few wheat grains are scattered about, although things as a whole [in great households and in the universe] are well managed (τῶν ὅλων εὖ οἰκονομουμένων)? Or is it because evil demons stand over such things in which blameworthy examples of neglectfulness occur?" He also affirms that there is much necessity intermixed.
>
> I let pass how inconsiderate it is to compare such accidents befalling good and honest men, as . . . the condemnation of Socrates, . . . with letting some husks fall. But that there should be evil demons placed by providence over such charges — how can it be but a reproach to God, as it would be to a king to commit the administration of his provinces (διοικήσεις ἐπιτρέποντος) to evil and rash governors and captains and

to overlook the finer men being slighted and abused by them! And if, indeed, the element of necessity be interjected into the matters, God neither rules all things nor are all things administered (διοικεῖται) in accord with this reason.[56]

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[56] Ibid., 37. 1051B, SVF 2, 338, 24ff. (frag. 1178): ἔτι περὶ τοῦ μηδὲν ἐγκλητὸν εἶναι μηδὲ μεμπτὸν κόσμῳ, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην φύσιν ἁπάντων παραγενομένων, πολλάκις γεγραφὼς ἔστιν ὅπου πάλιν ἐγκλητάς τινας ἀμελείας οὐ περὶ μικρὰ καὶ φαῦλα ἀπολείπει. ἐν γοῦν τῷ τρίτῳ Περὶ Οὐσίας, μνησθεὶς ὅτι συμβαίνει τινὰ τοῖς καλοῖς καὶ ἀγαθοῖς τοιαῦτα, „Πότερον, φησίν, ἀμελουμένων τινῶν, καθάπερ ἐν οἰκίαις μείζοσι παραπίπτει τινὰ πίτυρα καὶ ποσοὶ πυροί τινες, τῶν ὅλων εὖ οἰκονομουμένων· ἢ διὰ τὸ καθίστασθαι ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων δαιμόνια φαῦλα, ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι γίνονται καὶ ἐγκλητέαι ἀμέλειαι;" φησὶ δὲ πολὺ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης μεμῖχθαι.

τὸ μὲν οὖν τὰ τοιαῦτα συμπτώματα τῶν καλῶν κ'ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν, οἷον ἡ Σωκράτους καταδίκη..., πιτύροις παραπίπτουσιν ἀπεικάζειν, ὅσης ἐστὶν εὐχερείας, ἐῶ· τὸ δὲ φαύλους δαίμονας ἐκ προνοίας ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπιστασίας καθίστασθαι, πῶς οὐκ ἔστιν ἔγκλημα τοῦ θεοῦ, καθάπερ βασιλέως κακοῖς καὶ ἐμπλήκτοις σατράπαις καὶ στρατηγοῖς διοικήσεις ἐπιτρέποντος καὶ περιορῶντος ὑπὸ τούτων ἀμελουμένους καὶ παροινουμένους τοὺς ἀρίστους; καὶ μὴν εἰ πολὺ τὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης μέμικται τοῖς πράγμασιν, οὔτε κρατεῖ πάντων ὁ θεὸς οὔτε πάντα κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνου λόγον διοικεῖται.

The gen. abs. τῶν ὅλων εὖ οἰκονομουμένων could have reference merely to the great households just mentioned; these neglected matters, of a few grains of wheat, are of minor importance, the household as a whole being well run. Since, however τὰ ὅλα is a regular Stoic term for the universe (and we have found it coupled with οἰκονομία, supra, 411, note 42) and

At times Chrysippus seems to have allowed that actions which stem from man himself are a cause, though a secondary one, for what happens, but even these, he insists, "are connected by fate with the general government of the universe (τῇ τῶν ὅλων διοικήσει)."[57] To put it another way, our destiny, including what we do, is part of a predetermined *dioikēsis* or arrangement in life.[58]

Sometimes Chrysippus seems to allow evil to exist and to be punished, but he explains misfortunes which happen to good men, not as a part of such punishment for evil, but rather as being in accord with another *oikonomia* or principle of divine government, a sort of element of inexplicable mystery which he allows to stand in the economy of Zeus. Plutarch alludes to this opinion:

> Chrysippus says that God punishes evil and does many things for the punishment of evil men; as in the Second Book *On the Gods* he says: "Sometimes misfortunes happen to the good, not as to the wicked for the

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because of the general drift of the passage, I take it also as a reference to the management of the larger "household," the world. Chrysippus' point is that such minor "slip-ups" are unavoidable, even in the best-run houses.

[57] Diogenianus, quoting Chrysippus' *On Fate*, in Euseb. *Praep*. *Evang*. 6. 8. (265d 10): φησὶν οὖν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ βιβλίῳ, τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἡμῶν πολλὰ γίνεσθαι δῆλον εἶναι, οὐδὲν δὲ ἧττον συγκαθειμάρθαι καὶ ταῦτα τῇ τῶν ὅλων διοικήσει. "In the Second Book, then, Chrysippus says it is evident that many things do originate with us, but nevertheless even these are connected by fate with the general government of the universe."

[58] Cf. the expressions attributed to Chrysippus by this same Diogenianus, *supra*, 418, note 50.

sake of punishment, but in accordance with another principle of government (κατ' ἄλλην οἰκονομίαν) just as in the city-states."

And again in these words: "evils . . . are distributed (ἀπονέμεται) in accordance with the reason of Zeus, either for punishment or according to some other principle of government, which has to do in some way with the universe (κατ' ἄλλην ἔχουσάν πως πρὸς τὰ ὅλα οἰκονομίαν)."[59]

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[59] Chrysippus, in Plut. De Stoic. repugn. 35. 1050E, SVF 2, 338, 1-9 (frag. 1176): ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸν θεὸν κολάζειν φησὶ τὴν κακίαν καὶ πολλὰ ποιεῖν ἐπὶ κολάσει τῶν πονηρῶν, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ Περὶ θεῶν, „ποτὲ μὲν τὰ δύσχρηστα συμβαίνειν φησὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς οὐχ ὥσπερ τοῖς φαύλοις κολάσεως χάριν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλην οἰκονομίαν, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι." καὶ πάλιν ἐν τούτοις· . . . ταῦτα (κακὰ) ἀπονέμεται κατὰ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς λόγον, ἤτοι ἐπὶ κολάσει ἢ κατ' ἄλλην ἔχουσάν πως πρὸς τὰ ὅλα οἰκονομίαν.

Liechtenhan, 76, reconstructs the drift of Chrysippus' fragmentary argument thus: "Much happens to men, not as punishment, but κατ' ἄλλην οἰκονομίαν; i.e., the proper guiding of the whole cannot avoid the result that what serves the whole somehow harms the individual. So it is necessary, e.g., that God here and there lets a diminution of men occur through a catastrophe, just as a city sends out colonists for the prevention of overpopulation [cf. Plut. De Stoic. repugn. 32. 1049A, SVF 2, 338, 13-16 (frag. 1177): ὡς δὲ αἱ πόλεις πλεονάσασαι εἰς ἀποικίας ἀπαίρουσι τὰ πλήθη καὶ πολέμους ἐνίστανται πρός τινας, οὕτως ὁ θεὸς φθορᾶς ἀρχὰς δίδωσι]. It is indeed unavoidable even in a good household that now and again good grains are thrown away along with the dirt [cf. supra, 425ff., note 56]. Or it is as in a play, where in individual passages much absurd material occurs, but this contributes to the charm of the whole

Chrysippus here seems to take the position that there can be such a thing as evil in the universe, and God punishes it; but misfortune in the life of the good man is not to be construed as a divine punishment, but rather as part and parcel of some other principle in the provident management of things, which somehow has a different meaning, a touch of mystery in the divine economy!

Chrysippus' answer to the mystery of evil, in spite of these apparent exceptions, seems generally to have upheld the idea that what happens is in accord with the natural, reasonable, providential management of things by Zeus, or whatever one calls god. Not all Stoics, however, took quite this extreme position; others must have been less logical but more realistic and must have admitted, as once even Chrysippus is quoted as saying, that "not all things are in accordance with fate, and the government of the universe (ἡ τοῦ κόσμου διοίκησις) is not unhindered and without interference."[60] Such a position allowed the admission also that, since

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[cf. Plut. *De comm. not.* 14. 1065D, *SVF* 2, 339, 31-36 (*frag.* 1181)]."

Once Chrysippus seems to suggest that evil will not always exist, but is destined to disappear [in Origen *c. Cels.* 4. 64, *SVF* 2, 337, 30-32 (*frag.* 1174)]; Liechtenhan, however, 78, calls this only a passing "flash of thought."

[60] Chrysippus, in Alexander of Aphrodisias *De fato* 37 (ed. I. Bruns, p. 210) *SVF* 2, 297, 8ff. (*frag.* 1005): οὐ πάντα μὲν ἔστι καθ' εἱμαρμένην, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἀκώλυτος καὶ ἀπαρεμπόδιστος ἡ τοῦ κόσμου διοίκησις.
In the passage, the author goes on to develop a system of more responsibility in ethics — actions may be praised or blamed, since "not all things are in accord with fate."

some things occur which are not in accord with fate, faults and shameful actions may happen in life which are not in accord with fate or right reason, and these defects and evil acts may then be condemned as culpable, rather than explained away as a part of the divine order of things. This procedure must have opened the way for an ethics that was less deterministic.

It may be concluded that the Stoic position on the existence of evils within an orderly universe dominated by reason and ruled over by a favorable providence is by no means clear or consistent, in any one writer, let alone the entire school— anymore, it may be added, than the position of the church fathers on this same vexing question was clear and consistent.[61]

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[61] Hatch, Greek Ideas, 217ff., offers an excellent summary on discussion of the question in Stoic and patristic literature. In Stoicism, he writes (p. 217), "over against the conception of a perfect Reason or Providence administering the world, was the fact of the existence of physical pain and social inequality and moral failure." Among the solutions attempted were these: (1) the denial of the universality of providence— God is the author only of good; evil comes from other causes (so Plato), or (as Chrysippus and Epictetus suggest) the universe as a whole is reasonably and well run, but individual details may be defective or seem inconvenient or unfair (supra, 425, note 56); (2) the denial of the reality of apparent evils— these "evils" are really forms of good or are incidental to the operation of the universe or are essential to its production and purpose (so Chrysippus; supra, 420, note 53). Such Stoic solutions, Hatch concludes (p. 220), may have been adequate explanations for physical pain and social inequality, but not for misery and moral evil. Hence there was a growing view that "men were the authors of their own misery," i.e., towards free will, although it was not always recognized that such a view was really

What must be noted, however, from this whole discussion on the relation of evil to the world government in the early Stoic thinkers is the fact

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incompatible with a universal divine economy. Commonly the two ideas were combined thus: the world is moving on towards its purpose; if man chooses rightly, in accord with nature, he is happy; if not, he is miserable; in either case he fulfills his destiny, and the world goes on.

In Christian thought the same problems, of course, arose. If one all-powerful God rules and administers the world, then how to explain evil, sin, pain, and so forth? In other words, how can God be all-sovereign and good and just at the same time? Christians solved the problems in different ways, their attitude toward creation always being reflected in the answer they gave. Marcion felt the difficulties sharply enough to posit two gods, one a just creator-god or Demiurge, the other a higher, good, and loving God; this dualism allowed him to hold fast to the absolute economy of the supreme God who suddenly and unexpectedly revealed himself in Jesus Christ, but also to explain the evil and imperfection in the world. Others, especially the Gnostics, tinged by Greek thought here, pictured creation as an evolution out of the lower forms of the divine pleroma, a sort of "fall" into matter that accounts for the material world, this world being bridged to the supreme deity by a series of aeons; the notion here usually is that matter in itself is evil, and this dualism again allows for an economy of the upper pleroma and divine administration of affairs, but at the same time offers a ready explanation for all the evils that exist. Catholic Christianity, under the influence of what Marcion and Gnosticism generally rejected, the Old Testament, came to say that the one supreme God had created the world which was "very good" in itself, and this one God rules and guides; evil is to be accounted for, however, by a "fall" that the philosophical premise here, about God's rule in the world, had implications for what one said about *man's life and doing* in the world. As a quotation from Chrysippus puts it: "It is not possible to enter upon

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of man and by the presence of lower spiritual beings whom this one God permits somehow to function for the time in his universe in spite of their evil activities.

Hatch concludes (pp. 231ff.) that this Christian concept, of the overall rule of the good God in all things, did not always explain misery and moral evil any more than the Stoic economy of providence did. Catholic Christianity was vulnerable at just that point, and according to Origen (*De prin*. 2. 9. 5) the followers of Marcion, Valentinus, and Basilides objected that "it is inconsistent with the justice of God, in making the world, to assign" different positions and glories to different men, or to assign some men a happier lot than others at birth. If free will has no place in such matters as birth, they argue, then *all* must be the result of accident and chance. "And if that conclusion be admitted, it will no longer be credible either that the world is made by God or that it is governed by his providence (nec a providentia ejus regi credetur) and consequently neither will the judgment of God upon every man's doings seem a thing to be looked for." Origen, of course, solves the problem only by recourse to free will, coupled with his notion that each soul has previously existed in other worlds and comes into this life strengthened or weakened by what it did before (3. 1. 20, 21).

The whole discussion here makes clear the breadth of topics influenced by the idea of a divine economy in both paganism and Christianity — creation, evil, providence, and, eventually redemption — and further justifies the statement (*supra*) that this concept is an important starting point for ethical considerations.

the question of goods and evils, or upon the virtues, or upon happiness, in any other more proper way, than from common nature and from the government of the universe (τῆς τοῦ κόσμου διοικήσεως)."[62] In other words, the Stoic principle of a divine government is a starting point for *ethics*, and is a possible source for the notion of "economical behavior" (κατ' οἰκονομίαν) we shall find in the later Stoics.

The Divine Administration in Later Philosophers

This concept of a divine government in the universe, ruled over by a deity called Zeus, providence, or something else, as these passages show, is amply vouched for in the fragments of the three early leaders of the Stoic school. The same theme continued among later Stoics, spilling over also into the thought of other schools and of eclectics of no school, on down through the first century A.D., as an examination of the evidence shows. Again and again this concept, of a divine and orderly world government, is attributed to the Stoics as a group, especially in contrast to the Epicureans,[63] and the question, whether the world is administered by providence, must have been debated back and forth by the various sects throughout the period. Indeed, Plutarch has a section summarizing philosophical opinion on this very issue, beginning with the statement that the Stoics and others hold the world "is administered by providence," and then going on to list the other views:

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[62] Chrysippus, in Plut. *De Stoic. repugn.* 9. 1035C, *SVF* 3, 17, 3-7 (*frag.* 68): οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλως οὐδ' οἰκειότερον ἐπελθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρετάς, οὐδ' ἐπὶ εὐδαιμονίαν, ἀλλ' ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου διοικήσεως.

[63] Thus, e.g., Epiph. *Adv. Haeres.* 1. 5, Diels, *Dox. Graec.*, p. 588, lines 3, 17-19, summarizes the contrast: the Stoic leader Zeno, equating God, matter, and fate, claims this to be the source by which "all things are administered (διοικεῖται) and are acted upon," but the Epicureans teach "that neither God nor providence administers affairs (καὶ μήτε θεὸν μήτε πρόνοιαν τὰ πράγματα διοικεῖν)."

> Democritus and Epicurus and as many as introduce the atoms and vacuum say that the world has neither a soul nor is it administered by providence (οὔτε προνοίᾳ διοικεῖσθαι), but by some irrational kind of nature. Aristotle says that as a whole and throughout, it has neither a soul, nor reason, nor intelligence, nor is it administered (διοικούμενον) by providence. For while the heavenly regions partake of all these properties, . . . the terrestial regions have none of them, but share in the orderly arrangement (εὐταξίας) by accident and not directly.[64]

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[64] [Plut.] *De plac. phil.* 886D, in Euseb. *Praep. Evang.* 15. 34 (842b 5-c8), Diels, *Dox. Graec.*, pp. 329f.: εἰ ἔμψυχος ὁ κόσμος καὶ προνοίᾳ διοικούμενος. οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι πάντες ἔμψυχον καὶ προνοίᾳ διοικούμενον. Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος, καὶ ὅσοι τὰ ἄτομα εἰσηγοῦνται καὶ τὸ κενόν, οὔτ' ἔμψυχον οὔτε προνοίᾳ διοικεῖσθαι, φύσει δέ τινι ἀλόγῳ. Ἀριστοτέλης οὔτ' ἔμψυχον ὅλον δι' ὅλων, οὔτε λογικόν, οὔτε νοερόν, οὔτε προνοίᾳ διοικούμενον. τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐράνια τούτων πάντων κοινωνεῖν, ... τὰ δὲ περίγεια μηδενὸς αὐτῶν, τῆς δ' εὐταξίας κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὐ προηγουμένως μετέχειν.

Cf. also Euseb. *Praep. Evang.* 15. 32 (840d 8) and Cyril *Adv. Iul.* 2. 46b. Stob. *Ecl.* 1. 21. 3, Diels, *Dox. Graec.*, p. 330b, lines 5-7, perserves the same passage quoted above and adds: Ἔκφαντος ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀτόμων συνεστάναι τὸν κόσμον, διοικεῖσθαι δὲ ὑπὸ προνοίας. "Ecphantos says the world is composed of atoms, but is governed by providence," a

There was plainly a variety of opinions on the matter. Often questions must have been raised like the one preserved in Aëtius, an eclectic of probably the late first century: "How is it, if indeed God does exist and the affairs of men are arranged (οἰκονομεῖται) by his providence, that the false prospers, but the polished suffers just the opposite?"[65] In answer to such questions came the continual Stoic response, "God is able to control (διοικητικός)"[66] and the emphasis upon his administration of affairs.

The same conclusion results, that Stoics preached a divine government in the universe, when one examines the *individual writers of the school* after Chrysippus. This may be done more briefly here, partly because they say much the same thing as the earlier teachers of the Stoa and we need not be overly concerned with the individual touches they introduce, and partly because the extant remains of these later Stoics are less numerous. One or two examples, however, will be noted in each century, concluding with a more elaborate discussion of how the concept spread in the period

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surprising eclectic view that mediates atomism and the idea of a provident government.

[65] Aët., in [Plut.] *De plac. phil* 1. 7 (*Mor.* 881), Diels, *Dox. Graec.*, p. 301, lines 7ff.: πῶς δὲ εἴπερ ὁ θεὸς ἔστι καὶ τῇ τούτου φροντίδι τὰ κατ' ἄνθρωπον οἰκονομεῖται, τὸ μὲν κίβδηλον εὐτυχεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἀστεῖον τ'ἀναντία πάσχει;

[66] Gal. *Historia philosophica* 16, Diels, *Dox. Graec.*, p. 609, line 6: προνοεῖν τε τῶν ἀρχομένων κατ' ἀρετὴν οἱ Στωϊκοὶ [διοικητικὸν] τὸν θεὸν εἰρήκασι. "The Stoics say that God [able to guide] provides for those governed in accordance with virtue." The MSS read διηγητικὸν "fond of telling stories," which makes no sense. Diels brackets the suggested διοικητικὸν, which makes excellent sense; Usener conjectures, . . . ἀρετὴν. οὗτοι καθηγητικὸν..., "T[illegible] (Stoics) say God is able to guide."

about which we are most concerned, in accounting for the great use of *oikonomia* and its related terms in the early Christian writers, namely, the end of the first century A.D. Here we shall find important evidence in the orator Dio Chrysostom and the philosopher Epictetus.

In the second century B.C., Boethus of Sidon, although he attempted to steer a middle course between the frequent pantheism of the Stoics and the theism of Aristotle, by assigning, on the one hand, the abode of the deity to the highest sphere and representing him as working from there on the universe (contrary to the usual Stoic notion of a world soul), but by also believing, on the other hand, that this God not only guides the universe from his point of direction but also stands beside every part of it ready to help (a notion contrary to Aristotle), nonetheless continued to speak of the administration of the universe in the usual terms, an administration (διοίκησις) which he calls "blameless and in accord with right reason."[67]

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[67] On Boethus' views generally, cf. E. Zeller, *A History of Eclecticism in Greek Philosophy* (London, 1883), 36f., and *RE* 3, 601. Fragments and testimonia, cf. *SVF* 3, 265-67, especially *frag*. 7, in Philo *De incorrupt. mundi*, 16 *SVF* 3, 266, 27-32: ἕκαστα ἐφορᾷ καὶ πάντων οἷα γνήσιος πατὴρ ἐπιτροπεύει καί, εἰ δεῖ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἡνιόχου καὶ κυβερνήτου τρόπον ἡνιοχεῖ καὶ πηδαλιουχεῖ τὰ σύμπαντα, ἡλίῳ τε καὶ σελήνῃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πλάνησι καὶ ἀπλανέσιν, ἔτι δ᾽ἀέρι καὶ τοῖς ⟨ἄλλοις⟩ μέρεσι τοῦ κόσμου παριστάμενος καὶ συνδρῶν ὅσα πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου διαμονὴν καὶ τὴν κατ᾽ ὀρθὸν λόγον ἀνυπαίτιον διοίκησιν. God "oversees everything and, like a true father, is in charge of all things and, to tell the truth, in the manner of a charioteer and a helmsman, he holds the reins and turns the rudder with regard to all things, being close at hand to both sun and moon and the other wandering planets and fixed stars,

The approach appears similar in the fragmentary remains of Posidonius of Apamea (c. 135-50 B.C.), who was perhaps the greatest figure in scientific and philosophical scholarship of his day, comparable for breadth of interests only with Aristotle. He introduced even more of a hierarchy into the Stoic picture of the government of the universe than Boethus had done, by separating Zeus, nature, and destiny and assigning to them separate spheres, each one subordinated to the preceding one, in a sort of triad of rulers.[68] This allowed him to make a distinction between a predestination by God and a purely mechanical consequence happening in life; it also allowed him to speak of the providence of the first gods, the providence of the second gods, and that of the daemons.[69]

In spite of such modifications in the traditional system, however, modifications which really were intended, one assumes, to meet the objections to the earlier Stoic answers about the problem of evil, Posidonius continues to speak of the divine dioikēsis. In the light of the hierarchical distinction now made, one could speak of God, dwelling in the upper air or ether, as governor (ἡγεμονικόν) of the macrocosm, and of the Logos,

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and furthermore to the lower atmosphere and the other parts of the world and assisting with regard to whatever things concern the distribution of the whole and its administration which is blameless and in accord with right reason."

[68] The three spheres of Zeus, physis, and heimarmenē are reported in Ps.-Plut. De plac. phil. 1. 28 (885B).

[69] Liechtenhan, 55f. On Posidonius' treatment of providence, see furthur Bréhier, Hist. Phil., 1, 2, 404f. The tendency towards astral deities, observed supra, 419, note 52, in some Stoicism, becomes more pronounced in Posidonius, and he earned for himself a place in astrology.

more intimately associated with the world, as governor of the microcosm; the dioikēsis thus means, among other things, "the establishment of the Logos in the world, the divine household management of the world," in Liechtenhan's phrase, taking place full of thought and plan.[70] To quote Diogenes Laertius: "the world is governed (διοικεῖσθαι) in accordance with nous and providence, . . . nous extending itself into every part, just as the soul does with us."[71] This comparison, between the human soul, the daemon or divine spark within us, and the world soul which rules the whole cosmos, is made elsewhere by Posidonius when he exhorts men ". . . to follow the daemon within themselves which is both kinsman to and possesses the same nature as the one who administers (διοικοῦντι) the whole world."[72] This point of contact opens the way for a moral interest in Posidonius which relates man's actions to the total divine economy.

Before noting that moral emphasis, however, it must be asserted that Posidonius, in spite of the fact that he separates Zeus, nature, and destiny and seems to allot each its own sphere of administration, also stressed, in typical Stoic fashion, a unity of nature and providence, indeed, even of deity. Liechtenhan calls him "the founder of Hellenistic monotheism," though he adds, "modified monotheism."[73] The old Stoic emphasis continues on the universal deity known by many names, Zeus, the Logos in whom the cosmos finds its ruler, Nous, or whatever name you will, as does also the emphasis on the order of the cosmos, its harmony, and unity, the regularity of the course of the stars, and so forth, as a basis for the belief in gods.[74] The world then was looked upon as an orderly politeia of gods and men, and an optimistic view taken of the divine care for the world and its affairs.[75] The general viewpoint of Posidonius plus many of his specific doctrines, including the theme of a divine administration, continued to find reflection in what might be called his school, as we shall see: Cicero, who was a pupil; Manilius; the orator Dio Chrysostom; the anonymous author of the De Mundo; and also Philo.[76]

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[70] Liechtenhan, 54.

[71] Diog. Laert. 7. 138: τὸν δὴ κόσμον διοικεῖσθαι κατὰ νοῦν καὶ πρόνοιαν ... εἰς ἅπαν αὐτοῦ μέρον διήκοντος τοῦ νοῦ, καθάπερ ἐφ' ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς.

[72] Gal. De plac. Hipp. et Plat. 5. 469, cf. 2. 448, as cited in Liechtenhan, 87: ...ἕπεσθαι τῷ ἐν αὑτοῖς δαίμονι συγγενεῖ τε ὄντι καὶ τὴν ὁμοίαν φύσιν ἔχοντι τῷ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον διοικοῦντι. Cf. also G. Rudberg, "Poseidonius und das Neue Testament," Theologische Studien und Kritiken 102 (1930), 316-323.

Something may now be said of Posidonius' moral interest, in the light of the divine administration of the world he sketches, traditionally Stoic but with individual modifications. Divine administration and human existence are related; the analogies already noted between the human soul and the world soul suggest that. Posidonius makes the relation clearer: man is to imitate the divine economy and thus, again in true Stoic fashion, live in accord with nature and nature's law. Clement of Alexandria quotes Posidonius' teaching that the goal for man is to live observing the truth and order (τάξιν) of the universe and to accommodate himself to it.[77] Observation of the divine order is imperative because "in the divine world-ordering, the divine will exists, the norm expressed for human actions."[78] So it is that the divine administration and ethics relate. As Liechtenhan sums up, "Cosmic and moralistic world-order are one — the Posidonian philosophy proclaimed this with enthusiasm."[79]

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[73] Liechtenhan, 59.

[74] Ibid., 59-61.

[75] Ibid., 66.

[76] Ibid., 60. Cicero studied under him during his trip to the east in 78 B.C. (Tusc. 2. 61; Plut. Cic. 4. 4 (Vit. 862 F); cf. Cic. Fin. 1. 6). For examples of Posidonius' teachings reflected in these later writers, see infra, 448ff.

One final phase of the work of this versatile philosopher of Rhodes needs mention here: his concept of history. Posidonius wrote some 52 books of history covering the rise of the Roman state from the point where Polybius' account came to an end, about 146 B.C., to the dictatorship of Sulla (81-79 B.C.), though only fragments are extand today.[80] It is his attitude toward history, however, which is important. Posidonius reflects much the same view of history that we have seen in Polybius, whose work, in a real sense, he sought to continue, and Diodorus Siculus. It was a unified view of history, developed in the light of his philosophical and theological outlook, "symbolized by the 'cosmopolis,' or city of God, in which, ruled ever as it is by His providence, all human beings have a share."[81]

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[77] *Strom*. 2. 21 (129, 4): ἐπὶ πασί τε ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὸ ζῆν θεωροῦντα τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἀλήθειαν καὶ τάξιν καὶ συγκατασκευάζοντα αὐτὸν κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, κατὰ μηδὲν ἀγόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς.

[78] Liechtenhan, 73f.

[79] *Ibid*., 74.

[80] Some fragments are translated in K. Reinhardt, *Poseidonius* (Munich, 1921). Texts printed in C. Müller, *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum* (Paris, 1841-70), 3, 245ff., and in F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* (Berlin and Leiden, 1923-), 2, No. 87.

[81] *OCD*, 722.

Like Polybius, Posidonius saw the Roman empire as playing a key part in that unfolding of the divine administration through the events of history with which the historian is concerned. Rome's empire, embracing so many peoples of the world in a human commonwealth, forms an earthly counterpart to the commonwealth of god, and the historian, as he draws out this pattern that the providence of the deity has left there for him to find, becomes in a sense an *oikonomos* of events, one might even say, depicting the *oikonomia* which exists in history.[82]

Though Posidonius' own historical writings are for the most part gone, the influence of his attitude toward history dare not be underestimated. Sallust, Caesar, Tacitus, and Plutarch were in some sense indebted to his conception of what history is; the universal historians, Timagenes, Trogus, and Diodorus among them, borrowed his doctrine of the "cosmopolis"; and, what is more significant, he inspired a revival of historical feeling that resulted in such works as Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *Antiquitates Romanae* and Flavius Josephus' *Antiquitates Judaicae*.[83] A style was set in the concept of history, and it was a style characterized by the notion of an economy or divine arrangement in historical events, the rise of Rome, for example, and rooted in the philosophico-theological belief in a divine government of the universe. The importance of the existence of such a conception at the time when Christians were beginning to philosophize and think in historical terms about the meaning of the new Way they had experienced scarcely requires comment.

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[82] Cf. Liechtenhan, 78-82, where the connection with Diodorus is especially suggested. Further cf. Diod. Sic. 1. 1. 1-3, where the function of historians is set forth: to bring together and record the common affairs of the inhabited world, so that men see themselves as part of one and the same orderly body (συντάξις), just as providence has brought about the orderly arrangement of the stars and the natures of men and continues to direct them; so it is that historians are "stewards of some sort of divine providence (τινὲς ὑπουργοὶ τῆς θείας προνοίας)."

[83] *OCD*, 722 and 433.

Later in the first century B.C., Arius Didymus is representative of Stoic views. An intimate of Augustus, who is said to have spared the city of Alexandria for his sake, he recites at one point the usual Stoic view of the world as a place where gods rule, men are subject, and there is a concord between them since both partake of reason, and then goes on to draw out from this a concept of the god who rules the universe, a Gottesbild which is marked by an especially beautiful portrayal of this god's benevolent, providential care for man and by the specific reference, in citing the many names of this god, that he arranges (οἰκονομεῖ) matters for good:

> From this it follows that we must suppose that the god who administers the whole universe (τὸν τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦντα θεόν) takes thought for mankind, being beneficent and kind and friendly to man and just and possessed of all virtue. For this cause the world is also called Zeus, since he is the cause of our life (τοῦ ζῆν); and inasmuch as from eternity he administers (διοικεῖ) all things unchangeably by connected reason (εἰρομένῳ λόγῳ), he is also called Fate (εἱμαρμένη); and Adrasteia, because nothing can escape him (ἀποδιδράσκειν); and Providence, because he arranges (οἰκονομεῖ) things severally for good.[84]

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[84] Arius Didymus has been called a Stoic, Academic, Pythagorean and so forth; more truly, he was eclectic (so OCD, 98), but with strong Stoic leanings, as this passage shows, from Euseb. Praep. Evang. 15. 15. 2

Elsewhere this same philosopher speaks of "the administration of the universe" (ἡ τῶν ὅλων διοίκησις) and "the administrator" (ὁ διοικῶν), and even of the "stars being governed by providence," suggesting that the words certainly were well-known technical terms in the Stoic vocabulary.[85]

(817 6ff.), Diels, Dox. Graec., p. 464f., or SVF 2, 169, 13ff. (frag. 528), where the passage is cited as especially illustrative of Chrysippus' views; the section translated supra reads: οἷς ἀκολούθως νομιστέον προνοεῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦντα θεόν, εὐεργετικὸν ὄντα καὶ χρηστὸν καὶ φιλάνθρωπον δίκαιόν τε καὶ πάσας ἔχοντα τὰς ἀρετάς. διὸ δὴ καὶ Ζεὺς λέγεται ὁ κόσμος, ἐπειδὴ τοῦ ζῆν αἴτιος ἡμῖν ἐστι. καθ' ὅσον δὲ εἰρομένῳ λόγῳ πάντα διοικεῖ ἀπαραβάτως ἐξ ἀϊδίου, προσονομάζεσθαι εἱμαρμένην· Ἀδράστειαν δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔστιν αὐτὸν ἀποδιδράσκειν· πρόνοιαν δ' ὅτι πρὸς τὸ χρήσιμον οἰκονομεῖ ἕκαστα. "The world," ὁ κόσμος, is used here in its frequent Stoic sense, as a title for deity, the "world soul," or anima mundi, as the passages in SVF 2, 168f. show (further, cf. LSJ, sub voce). On the quotation generally, cf. E. Zeller, The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics (London, 1870), 142, note 1, and 143, note 1.

[85] ἡ τῶν ὅλων διοίκησις— in Euseb. Praep. Evang. 15. 15. 7 (181b. 1), SVF 1, 112, 3 (frag. 499): ἡγεμονικὸν δὲ τοῦ κόσμου Κλεάνθει μὲν ἤρεσε τὸν ἥλιον εἶναι διὰ τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἄστρων ὑπάρχειν καὶ πλεῖστα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅλων διοίκησιν, ἡμέραν καὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ποιοῦντα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὥρας. "Cleanthes would have the sun to be the ruling power of the world, because it is the greatest of the heavenly bodies and contributes most to the administration of the universe, by making the day and the year and the other seasons."

ὁ διοικῶν— in Euseb. Praep. Evang. 15. 19 (821a 8) Diels, Dox.

In the first century A.D., Cornutus (*c.* A.D. 20-70), who wrote a *Summary of the Traditions concerning Greek Mythology*, treating these myths in the allegorical manner popular among Stoics since Chrysippus, continues the same idea of a universe governed by nature and Zeus; he writes, making the familiar comparison between the human soul and the world soul:

> Just as we are ordered by the soul (διοικούμεθα), so also the world has a soul which holds it together, and this soul is called Zeus, being

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Graec., p. 469, line 19, and 15. 15. 2ff., Diels, *Dox. Graec.*, p. 464, line 27, and p. 465, line 2; or *SVF* 2, 169, 30f. (*frag.* 528; *supra*, 441, note 84).

τὰ ἄστρα ... διοικούμενα κατὰ τὴν πρόνοιαν—Stob. *Ecl.* 1. 21. 5, Diels, *Dox. Graec.*, p. 466, line 5.

Euseb. *Praep. Evang.* 13. 13 (676d 5), quoting Clem. Al. *Strom.* 5. 14 (105, 1) relates the Stoics teach doctrines similar to Empedocles in their discussions "about a conflagration, and the world's ordering (περί τε ἐκπυρώσεως ... καὶ κόσμου διοικήσεως)." E.H. Gifford, in his edition of the *Evangelica Praeparatio*, takes it in the sense "*re*arrangement of the world's order," i.e., after the conflagration. Although he offers no evidence there for the rendering, and although the lexicons do not give *dioikēsis* in this sense of rearrangement, the word definitely was a Stoic *terminus technicus* in eschatology, designating the reordering of the universe after each destruction by fire. There was, thus, as Liechtenhan puts it (p. 82), no "end, . . . no goal, . . . only a purposeless endlessness, the alternation of διοίκησις and ἐκπύρωσις, the eternal return," in Stoicism's doctrine of the last things. This notion of a reordering of the world after destruction by fire, it must be observed, is related to the principle of a divine orderly administration; the world (κόσμος) is marked by order, not chaos.

> first and living through all and being the cause of life to all living creatures. For this reason Zeus is said to rule the universe, as the soul and our nature would be said to rule in us. Hence we call him Zeus (Δία), because on account of (διὰ) him all things exist and are preserved.[86]

Elsewhere Cornutus, who, it may be noted, according to Eusebius, was one of the authors from whom Origen learned the figurative method of interpreting the mysteries among the Greeks, which he in turn applied to the Jewish scriptures,[87] allegorizes the characteristics of Athena, to bring out the importance of the logos in the economy of the universe; she shares the aegis with Zeus, he explains, "and in it the face of the Gorgo is in the middle of the breast of the goddess, casting forth her tongue, the word, as it were, being most manifest in the arrangement of the universe (ἐν τῇ τῶν ὅλων οἰκονομίᾳ."[88]

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[86] Cornutus, Theol. Graec. 2 (ed. C. Lang; Leipzig, 1881, p. 3, lines 3ff.): ὥσπερ δὲ ἡμεῖς ὑπὸ ψυχῆς διοικούμεθα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ κόσμος ψυχὴν ἔχει τὴν συνέχουσαν αὐτόν, καὶ αὕτη καλεῖται Ζεύς, πρώτως καὶ διὰ παντὸς ζῶσα καὶ αἰτία οὖσα τοῖς ζῶσι τοῦ ζῆν· διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ βασιλεύειν ὁ Ζεὺς λέγεται τῶν ὅλων, ὡς ἂν καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡμῶν βασιλεύειν ῥηθείη. Δία δὲ αὐτὸν καλοῦμεν ὅτι δι' αὐτὸν γίνεται καὶ σώζεται πάντα.
Cf. ibid. 6 (p. 7, line 12), the typical Stoic phrase, ἡ διοικοῦσα αὐτὸν (= τὸν κόσμον) φύσις.

[87] Euseb. Hist. Eccl. 6. 19. 8, quoting Porphyry. On Cornutus' allegorical method and its relation to later Christian practices, cf. Hatch, Greek Ideas, 61ff., but also the comment in H. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1956), 1, 63.

[88] Theol. Graec. 20 (ed. C. Lang, p. 37, lines 4ff.): προτομὴ δ'

Another allegorizing writer, probably to be dated in the first century A.D., is known as Heraclitus, who left behind a treatise on *Homeric Questions*, but of whom we are otherwise ignorant.[89] Earlier Stoicism, especially Chrysippus, had espoused the allegorical method in order to extract illustration and corroboration for its teachings from the ancient writers like Homer. Cornutus had represented something of an attempt to revive this method in first-century A.D. Stoicism, and certain grammarians adopted the practice. Apparently from such a grammarian, or out of the labors of many of them, came this treatise attributed to the shadowy Heraclitus, an allegorical commentary usually Stoic in its outlook.

The method throughout is to seek for some deeper teaching about philosophy or nature hidden under Homer's tales. Thus, for example, in the section at O 190-193, where Hades, Zeus, and Poseidon draw lots for the various parts of the universe, the commentary allegorizes that account into a discussion of the four elements and their beginnings in the universe. Kronos is said to be Homer's fairly obvious code-name for "time" (*chronos*) and is, as such, the father of all things and the root of the four elements. Further, Homer "assigned Rhea to be their mother, since by some sort of flow (*rhusei*) and ever-flowing motion the universe is administered (τὸ πᾶν οἰκονομεῖται)."[90]

ἐν αὐτῇ Γοργόνος ἐστὶ κατὰ μέσον τῆς θεᾶς τὸ στῆθος ἔξω προβεβληκυῖα τὴν γλῶτταν ὡσὰν ἐκφανεστάτου ὄντος ἐν τῇ τῶν ὅλων οἰκονομίᾳ τοῦ λόγου. The last gen. abs., "the Logos being most manifest in the economy of the universe," would have obvious attractions to a Christian theologian.

[89] Cf. *RE* 8, 1, 508-10.

[90] *Heracliti Quaestiones Homericae* (ed. Societatis Philologae Bonnensis Sodales; Leipzig, 1910), sect. 41 (p. 62, lines 13f.): μητέρα δ' αὐτοῖς

Similar to this reference about an administration of the universe is another passage where the author talks of each of the four elements, earth, water, ether, and air, as managing their individual spheres in harmony. The plot against Zeus (A 399ff.), he writes, is really a recounting of the elements and teaches more physical theory; it is in summarizing the opinion of the "better philosophers" on the permanence of the universe that he remarks, "Until a harmony which is not fond of strife controls the four elements, no one exercising predominance especially, but each one in accordance with the harmony it received managing its position (τάξιν οἰκονομοῦντος), each of these will remain unmoved."[91] Details of these allegorical schemes often remain obscure for modern readers, but this much is clear in the case of Heraclitus: underlying the world concept which he is extracting from Homer is the idea of a divine administration or government (oikonomia) of the universe in typical Stoic fashion, and the allegorical method is here employed to bring this out.

This same divine administration is also found emphasized with reference to the regulation of the movement of the heavenly bodies and the ordering of the seasons by them into day and night, months and years, and so forth. Aratus' immensely popular Phaenomena in the third century B.C. had, of course, set forth something of the Stoic creed on such matters,[92] and

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ἔνειμεν Ῥέαν, ἐπειδὴ ῥύσει τινὶ καὶ ἀεννάῳ κινήσει τὸ πᾶν οἰκονομεῖται.

[91] Ibid., sect. 25 (p. 38, lines 7ff.): ἕως μὲν ἂν ἀφιλόνεικος ἁρμονία τὰ τέτταρα στοιχεῖα διακρατῇ, μηδενὸς ἐξαιρέτως ὑπερδυναστεύοντος, ἀλλ' ἑκάστου κατ' ἐμμέλειαν ἣν ἔλαχε τάξιν οἰκονομοῦντος, ἀκινήτως ἕκαστα μενεῖν.

[92] The Phaenomena was a versified form of the handbook on astronomy by

commentators kept referring to that theme of the order of the seasons and the celestial phenomena, as when one wrote, Aratus "says that that which precisely orders (τὸ διοικοῦν) the world is concerned with the years and months and days and hours, and risings and settings of the sun and of the moon and of the five stars."[93] Manilius' famous Latin poem, *Astronomica*, written in five books near the end of the reign of Augustus, likewise sets forth, in sharp contrast to the opinions of Lucretius, the idea of the Stoic divine mind governing in the world:

> A divine force of mind rules this work,
> Constructed of the immense body of the world,
> And the members of nature, formed with diverse form,
> Of air and fire and earth and encompassing sea,
> And God harmonizes it with sacred breath, and with a silent reason
> Governs and allots many bonds (*dispensat foedera*) in all the parts,
> So that one part makes and bears the strength of the other,
> And the sum remains connected through varied figures.[94]

Eudoxus of Cnidos; it influenced Virgil, was translated into Latin by Cicero, Germanicus, Avienus, and others, and is quoted by Paul in the Areopagus address at Acts 17: 28. Its popularity may reflect the interest in astral religion that sometimes connected itself with Stoicism.

[93] *Commentariorum in Aratum Reliquiae* (ed. E. Maass; Berlin, 1898), p. 324: εἶναι γάρ φησι τὸ διοικοῦν τὸν κόσμον ἀκριβῶς περί τε τοὺς ἐνιαυτοὺς καὶ μῆνας καὶ ἡμέρας καὶ ὥρας καὶ ἀνατολὰς καὶ δύσεις ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν πέντε ἄστρων. Cf. I Clem. 20 on the theme, and G. Bardy, "Expressions stoiciennes dans la I^{a} Clementis," *Recherches de Science Religieuse* 12 (1922), 75.

[94] *M. Manilii Astronomica* (ed. A.E. Housman; Cambridge, 1923), 1. 247-254 (p. 8, lines 245-252 in Housman's editio minor):

Again the figure of the elements of the world, harmonized together in a unity under the dispensation of the world soul.

Writers who do not belong entirely to the Stoic school also at times reflect the principle of a divine government; Cicero definitely,[95] perhaps even Philodemus in some questionable passages.[96] An especially

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hoc opus inmensi constructum corpore mundi
membraque naturae diversa condita forma
aeris atque ignis, terrae pelagique iacentis,
vis animae divina regit, sacroque meatu
conspirat deus et tacita ratione gubernat
mutuaque in cunctas dispensat foedera partes,
altera ut alterius vires faciatque feratque
summaque per varias maneat cognata figuras.

The same phrase occurs in Lucr. 5. 924 (omnes/foedere naturae . . . servant, "all serve . . . in a bond of nature"); cf. 5. 57 and 6. 906.

[95] On belief in a divine government of the world in Cicero, cf. E. Zeller, A History of Eclecticism in Greek Philosophy (London, 1883), 168, and Tusc. 1. 49. 118; Nat. D. 1. 2. 3; Leg. 1. 7; 3. 1, 3.

[96] Phld. Papyrus 157, Col. 7, lines 3ff., in Walter Scott, Fragmenta Herculanensia (Oxford, 1885), 154. Papyri 152 and 157 are grouped together by Scott under the title On the Mode of Life of the Gods; in 157, Philodemus' argument has been that the Stoic doctrine that God is at once omnipotent and beneficent is self-contradictory, as the existence of evil shows; here he answers, in regard to the question, "Are the gods omnipotent? No; but they have power over everything that concerns themselves." Then Col. 7, lines 3ff. go on: ὑφ' ἑαυτὸν ἔχῃ καὶ δύναται συμφερόντως ἑαυτῷ διοικεῖν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μέντοι τυγχάνῃ πάντων ὧν βούλεται. ". . . has under himself . . . and is able expediently to arrange (or care

interesting example is the treatise by an anonymous "Stoicizing Platonist," the De Mundo, traditionally attributed to Aristotle, but more likely from the latter half of the first century A.D. and perhaps addressed to Alexander, the nephew of Philo and an apostate from Judaism.[97] This treatise

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for) himself, and therefore attains all things which he wishes." The question is, however, whether the subject is "god" or "the wise man," and the fragmentary context does not help very much. Papyrus 157 has not been edited and published anywhere else as far as I can find (cf. the bibliography in P.H. and E.A. De Lacy, Philodemus: On Methods of Inference (Philadelphia, 1941), 179ff.). C.J. Vooys, Lexicon Philodemeum (Amsterdam, 1934), 1, 85 defines the term here as curo.

W. Scott, Fragmenta Herculanensia, p. 207, reports a reading at Papyrus 26, Col. 1, line 14: (δ?)οκεῖν δύναται π(ε?)ρι π(οε?)ῖσθαι. . . . This might be taken as διοικεῖν. However, H. Diels, in his edition, Περὶ Θεῶν Book I (Leipzig, 1906), p. 9, reads it as δ[ι]οκεῖν δύναται π[ε]ριπ[οε]ῖσθαι . . ., and C.J. Vooys in his Lexicon does not report any διοικεῖν here either.

[97] The text of the De Mundo was edited with apparatus criticus in the Budé series by W.L. Lorimer (Paris, 1933); translation by E.S. Forster in The Works of Aristotle (ed. W.A. Ross; Oxford, 1931), Vol. 3. Aristotelian authorship was questioned in antiquity (Procl. In Ti. 322E), the work also being attributed to Chrysippus, Posidonius, and Apuleius who made a Latin translation; authenticity was denied by Melanchthon (Physica, Opp. ed. Bretschneider, 13, 213ff.), a view followed unanimously by modern scholarship. W. Capelle, Neue Jahrbücher 15 (1905), 259-68, traces most of the doctrines in the work to Posidonius. W.L. Lorimer, Aristoteles Latinus (Rome, 1951), assigns it (p. 7) to an "unknown Stoicizing Platonist" of

takes up the elements of the universe, earth, sea, winds, other phenomena, and God's position in it all as administrator or governor. Accordingly there is stressed the orderliness of the universe, and its unity and harmony amid diversity, both typical Stoic qualities,[98] and the fact that the cause of this order is a god who is creator and preserver (σωτήρ).[99]

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the first century A.D. Others date it "perhaps first century before Christ" (E. Zeller, *A History of Eclecticism in Greek Philosophy* (London, 1883), 125, 144); "between 50 B.C. and A.D. 100" (*OCD*, 95); or the first half of the second century A.D. (Capelle, p. 267). In part the date depends on the "Alexander" to whom the *De Mundo* is addressed— perhaps Alexander the Great, if the author wanted to be taken as Aristotle; perhaps, in view of the epithet ἡγεμόνων ἄριστος at 391b 6, Tiberius Claudius Alexander, nephew of Philo, Procurator of Judaea and in A.D. 67 Praefect of Egypt (on this latter identification, cf. *RE* 2, 1, 1046).

[98] The orderliness and system of the universe are stressed at *De Mundo* 2 (391b 9ff.— σύστημα, τάξις τε καὶ διακόσμησις), a clear Stoic influence; cf. Stob. *Ecl*. 1. 144, where Chrysippus is quoted using many of the same terms. Harmony amid diversity, unity out of plurality (τὸ ἐκ πολλῶν μίαν), the emphasis that one single power has ordered the universe (διεκόσμησε μία . . . δύναμις), an ordered universe (τεταγμένον), and so forth, at *De Mundo* 5ff. (especially 396b 5ff., 397a 5ff.); cf. E. Zeller, *A History of Eclecticism in Greek Philosophy* (London, 1883), 135.

[99] *De Mundo* 397b 20ff.: σωτὴρ μὲν γὰρ ὄντως ἁπάντων ἐστὶ καὶ γενέτωρ τῶν ὁπωσδήποτε κατὰ τόνδε τὸν κόσμον συντελουμένων ὁ θεός. . . . "For God is in reality the preserver and creator of all things which are in any way brought to perfection in this world."

However — and here a Platonizing touch appears — this god does not personally toil and labor over the affairs on earth, travelling back and forth to places which need his attention, as some of the earlier Stoic concepts had implied about a divine providence which permeates all things; rather the supreme god in the De Mundo exerts a power that never grows weary, even over things at a distance from him, through a series of heavenly bodies extending from him down to earth in a sort of hierarchy of power.[100] Here is added to the old Stoic teaching about a divine oikonomia the notion of a hierarchy administering this power, from the upper sphere of the highest god down to the earthly levels, a notion that appears to grow in succeeding decades and which is not without its parallels in gnostic thought about the economy of God.

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[100] Ibid., 397b 22 - 398a 6: ... οὐ μὴν αὐτουργοῦ καὶ ἐπιπόνου ζῴου κάματον ὑπομένων, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει χρώμενος ἀτρύτῳ, δι᾽ ἧς καὶ τῶν πόρρω δοκούντων εἶναι περιγίνεται. ...κρεῖττον οὖν ὑπολαβεῖν, ὃ καὶ πρέπον ἐστὶ καὶ θεῷ μάλιστα ἁρμόζον, ὡς ἡ ἐν οὐρανῷ δύναμις ἱδρυμένη καὶ τοῖς πλεῖστον ἀφεστηκόσιν, ὡς ἔνι γε εἰπεῖν, καὶ σύμπασιν αἴτιος γίνεται σωτηρίας, μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς διήκουσα καὶ φοιτῶσα ἔνθα μὴ καλὸν μηδὲ εὔσχημον αὐτουργεῖ[ν] τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς. God is preserver and creator of all things in the world, "even though he does not endure the weariness of a being who administers and toils, since he rather employs an indefatigable power through which he prevails over even the things which seem to be afar off. . ... It is therefore better to suppose, a thing which is also fitting and especially suitable for a god, that the power which sits in heaven is the cause of preservation both for the things which are fartherest removed and, to put it in a word, for all things, rather than to say that it administers the affairs upon the earth by travelling and roaming where it is neither proper nor decent to go." Cf. supra, 435ff., however; Boethus, Posidonius, and others had already made such modifications in Stoic views. According to this theory, the petty details of administration are beneath the dignity of such a god, and his transcendence necessitates a hierarchy.

Perhaps the clearest example of this whole view in the De Mundo occurs in a series of short paragraphs where, to prove this point that the highest god cannot himself bother with administering petty matters on earth, the analogy is distinctly made between the management of the world and the management of a household, an army, and of a city-state or empire — precisely the influence under which, we have contended, the whole notion of an oikonomia by God over the world grew up.

> For this is not fitting even for the governors of men, to be set over every and any task which happens along — I mean, for example, the ruler of an army or of a city or of a household, if it were necessary to tie up the sack for bedclothes, and if it were necessary to perform a menial task of some sort, this type of thing the captive slave who happened to be there would do, just as is, moreover, narrated in the days of the Great King.[101]

Then follows a long paragraph describing the organization of the Persian Empire — Cambyses, Xerxes, or Darius, ruling his domains through a host of men that surround him, stewards of revenue (ταμίαι), leaders in war, couriers, watchmen, messengers, and so on down the line. Then the analogy:

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[101] Ibid., 398a 6-11: τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπων ἡγεμόσιν ἁρμόττει, παντὶ καὶ τῷ τυχόντι ἐφίστασθαι ἔργῳ, λέγω δὲ οἷον στρατιᾶς ἄρχοντι ἢ πόλεως ἢ οἴκου, [καὶ] εἰ χρεὼν στρωματόδεσμον εἴη δῆσαι καὶ εἴ τι φαυλότερον ἀποτελεῖν ἔργον, ὃ κἂν τὸ τυχὸν ἀνδράποδον ποιήσειεν, ἀλλ' οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως ἱστορεῖται.

> We must consider then that the prominence of the Great King falls as far short in comparison with that of the God who holds sway over the universe, as the prominence of the meanest and weakest creature falls short compared with that of the king of Persia, so that, if it was considered undignified for Xerxes himself to execute all things (αὐτουργεῖν) and to accomplish what he wished, and, having been set in charge, to administer things (διοικεῖν) everywhere, much more would such functions be unfitting for a god. Rather it is more dignified and fitting that he be seated in the highest realms, and that his power, extending through the entire universe, set in motion the sun and moon, and cause the whole heaven to revolve, and be the cause of preservation for all things which are on the earth.[102]

Thus, as further analogies make clear, there is envisioned an ordered universe, with the heavenly bodies arranged in such a way as to preserve a single harmony and purpose, with god ruling on high. To sum up the matter, and here the Stoic terms are clear:

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[102] Ibid., 398b 1-10: νομιστέον δὴ τὴν τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως ὑπεροχὴν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ τὸν κόσμον ἐπέχοντος θεοῦ τοσοῦτον καταδεεστέραν ὅσον τῆς ἐκείνου τὴν τοῦ φαυλοτάτου τε καὶ ἀσθενεστάτου ζῴου, ὥστε, εἴπερ ἄσεμνον ἦν αὐτὸν αὑτῷ δοκεῖν Ξέρξην αὐτοργεῖν ἅπαντα καὶ ἐπιτελεῖν ἃ βούλοιτο καὶ ἐφιστάμενον ⟨ἑκασταχοῦ⟩ διοικεῖν, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀπρεπὲς ἂν εἴη θεῷ. σεμνότερον δὲ καὶ πρεπωδέστερον αὐτὸν μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνωτάτω χώρας ἱδρῦσθαι, τὴν δὲ δύναμιν διὰ τοῦ σύμπαντος κόσμου διήκουσαν ἥλιόν τε κινεῖν καὶ σελήνην καὶ τὸν πάντα οὐρανὸν περιάγειν αἴτιόν τε γίνεσθαι τοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς σωτηρίας.

> In general, what a steersman is in a ship, a charioteer in a chariot, a leader in a chorus, a law(giver) in a city, a commander in an army camp, this God is in the universe. . . . Just as . . . the law of the state . . . regulates (οἰκονομεῖ) all the affairs throughout the state's administration, so we must suppose is also the case in the greater state, I mean the universe. . . . With God governing in an unshakable and harmonious fashion, the whole orderly arrangement of heaven and earth is administered (οἰκονομεῖται) [in this fashion].[103]

On this note the treatise closes, reciting the many titles for this god, including the term reflecting a notion of deity we have seen before, αἶσα, literally, "Dispensation," the deity who dispenses to each one his lot, though here the folk etymology is offered, "everlasting One" (ἀεὶ οὖσα).[104]

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[103] *Ibid.*, 400b 6-32: καθόλου δὲ ὅπερ ἐν νηὶ μὲν κυβερνήτης, ἐν ἅρματι δὲ ἡνίοχος, ἐν χορῷ δὲ κορυφαῖος, ἐν πόλει δὲ νομο(θέτη)ς, ἐν στρατοπέδῳ δὲ ἡγεμών, τοῦτο θεὸς ἐν κόσμῳ... ὥσπερ ... ὁ τῆς πόλεως νόμος ... πάντα οἰκονομεῖ τὰ κατὰ τὴν πολιτείαν· ... οὕτως ὑποληπτέον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς μείζονος πόλεως, λέγω δὲ τοῦ κόσμου.... ἡγουμένου δὲ ἀκινήτως αὐτοῦ [θεοῦ] καὶ ἐμμελῶς ὁ σύμπας οἰκονομεῖται διάκοσμος οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς....

[104] *Ibid.*, 401a 12-b 14: εἷς δὲ ὢν πολυώνυμός ἐστι, κατονομαζόμενος τοῖς πάθεσι πᾶσιν ἅπερ αὐτὸς νεοχμοῖ. καλοῦμεν γὰρ αὐτὸν καὶ Ζῆνα καὶ Δία, παραλλήλως χρώμενοι τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, ὡς κἂν εἰ λέγοιμεν δι' ὃν ζῶμεν. ... Νέμεσιν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἑκάστῳ διανεμήσεως, Ἀδράστειαν δὲ ἀναπόδραστον αἰτίαν οὖσαν κατὰ φύσιν, Αἶσαν δὲ ἀεὶ οὖσαν. "Although God is one, he has many names, being named in accordance with all the states which he himself renews. For we call him Zeus and Dios, using the names in parallel, as if we would say 'on account of

When the apparent popularity of the *De Mundo* in the ancient world is recalled,[105] coupled with what we have seen of its contents, we again attain an understanding how widespread the theme of a divine administration in the universe must have been at precisely the period the Christian movement was emerging.

Further evidence for the spread of this theme of god's rule and administration in the universe is suggested in certain examples where the concept takes on a syncretistic quality. Thus Osiris and Isis, identified with the sun and moon, some men believed, according to Diodorus Siculus in an account of Egyptian theology, "to regulate (διοικεῖν) the whole world."[106] The same emphasis is given by Plutarch in his essay *On Isis and Osiris*. He

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whom we live.' . . . [We call him] Nemesis from his distribution to each one, Adrasteia because he is an unescapable cause in nature, Aisa because he exists always." With the thought, on the various names for the one God, cf. *supra*, 441f., note 84; on the idea of God as dispenser or distributor, *supra*, 402 ff. On the etymology of αἶσα, cf. J.B. Hofmann, *Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Griechischen* (Munich, 1949), 8.

[105] The immense popularity of the *De Mundo* in antiquity is suggested by its attribution to such leading figures as Aristotle, Chrysippus, and Posidonius, and further by its many translations— into Latin, by Apuleius traditionally (cf. *Apulei Platonici Madaurensis de Philosophia Libri* (ed. P. Thomas; Leipzig, 1908), 3, 162ff.), into Syriac and Armenian, and the several later Latin translations which witness to the popularity of the work down into medieval and renaissance times, by Manfredi (d. 1266,?), Nicholaus Siculus, and Argyropoulos (?).

[106] Diod. Sic 1. 11, quoted in Euseb. *Praep. Evang*. 1. 9 (28a): τούτους δὲ τοὺς θεοὺς ὑφίστανται τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον διοικεῖν.

contends that these deities rule over water, sun, sky, and earth, Osiris contributing origins, Isis assigning (διανέμειν) them, gods being those who give and furnish things to us. But there are not *different* gods among different peoples, Plutarch goes on, but just different names which different peoples give to the sun, moon, heaven, earth, and sea, "there being one reason who orders these things, and one providence who administers them (ἐπιτροπευούσης), and subordinate powers which are ordained over all things."[107] Here is plainly a syncretistic notion of divine government, bringing together the diverse theologies of various cultures in what amounts to a hierarchically ordered administration of all things. The picture of the gods as dispensers of things in a world government is not confined merely to Greek usage either; Latin writers of the period, including Ovid and Seneca, use the verb *dispensare* of deities in this same way.[108]

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[107] Plut. *de Is. et Os.* 67: ἑνὸς λόγου τοῦ πάντα κοσμοῦντος καὶ μιᾶς προνοίας ἐπιτροπευούσης καὶ δυνάμεων ὑπουργῶν ἐπὶ πάντα τεταγμένων.

[108] Ov. *Her.* 12. 3, of the Fates, in a perfectly natural figure:

> Tunc, quae dispensant mortalia fila, sorores
> Debuerant fusos evoluisse meos.
> "Then the Sisters, who dispense the mortal threads,
> Ought to have unwound my spindle."

Sen. *Oedipus* 256, of Pluto, qui carentes luce disponis domos, "who dost allot homes devoid of light"; similarly, *Thyestes* 15, "thou who dost allot fresh punishments to the dead" (O quisquis nova supplicia functis durus umbrarum arbiter). Cf. *Hercules Oetaeus* 1096: "the gods are under law, even he who rules the seasons, who has arranged (deus anni disposuit vices) the four changes of the flying year."

Dio Chrysostom and the Divine Administration

Distinct confirmation that the late first-century A.D. world saw a clear connection between the divine administration of the universe by Zeus, of which we have been speaking, and the government of an earthly empire by a human king is found in the orations of Dio Chrysostom (*c.* A.D. 40-112). Speaking before Trajan in Rome just after the latter had become emperor about A.D. 98, this wandering philosopher, who reflects a popularized Stoicism, drew on precisely this point of comparison between the true king, who watches over his people, and the supreme god, Zeus, who watches over all mankind. After characterizing the ideal ruler, Dio goes on in his "First Oration on Kingship," desirous "to speak about the first and greatest King and Ruler, whom mortals and those who manage (διέποντας) the affairs of mortals must always imitate and keep in mind, directing and patterning their way after his, as far as it is possible."[109] Indeed, this imitation of Zeus on the part of rulers is, we are told, the reason why Homer called kings "Zeus-nurtured" (διοτρεφής) or "like Zeus in counsel" (Διὶ τὴν βουλὴν ὅμοιος). Dio then goes on to describe the world government of Zeus and how the wise man is to conform to it:

> It is therefore right to speak of the administration of the universe (τῶν ὅλων τῆς διοικήσεως), how, at any rate, the whole universe itself, both prosperous and wise, always advances through endless time, unceasingly, in endless cycles, with good Fortune and a similar divine

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[109] Dio Chrys. *Or.* 1. 37: ἐπεθύμουν διελθεῖν περὶ τοῦ μεγίστου καὶ πρώτου βασιλεως καὶ ἄρχοντος, ὃν χρὴ μιμουμένους ἀεὶ τοὺς θνητοὺς καὶ τὰ τῶν θνητῶν διέποντας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ὡς δυνατόν ἐστιν εὐθύνοντας καὶ ἀφομοιοῦντας τὸν αὑτῶν τρόπον.

power and providence and with a governing purpose which is both most righteous and best. And us it renders like itself, since, in accordance with a nature common to itself and us, we are arranged under one ordinance and law and share in the same commonwealth.

Now the man who honors and guards this commonwealth and does not do anything contrary to it is law-abiding, dear to the gods, and orderly; but, on the other hand, the man who disturbs it, in so far as he is able, and transgresses it and is ignorant of it, is lawless and disorderly, in like manner whether he is a private citizen or a ruler. But the offense on the part of the ruler is greater by far and more manifest to all.

Just as, therefore, in the case of as many men as are generals and rulers of armies, and cities, and provinces, whoever imitates your [i.e., Trajan's] manner especially and shows himself like your habits as much as possible, this man would be to you the dearest comrade and friend of them all; but if, on the other hand, someone should be contrary and unlike you, rightly would he incur blame and dishonor and, being swiftly removed from his office, he would give place to other men who are both better and better able to administer (διοικεῖν)— thus also in the case of kings, in view of the fact that, as I suppose, they have their power and stewardship (ἐπιτροπήν) from Zeus: whoever, on the one hand, looking towards Zeus, towards both his law and ordinances, orders and rules both justly and well, attains a good fate and a blessed end; but whoever, on the other hand, transgresses or dishonors him who entrusted (τὸν ἐπιτρέψαντα) or gave this gift, does not profit from his great authority and power than to this degree: that he has become evident to his contemporaries and posterity as being wicked and undisciplined.[110]

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[110] _Ibid._, 1. 42-46: καλὸν οὖν εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων τῆς

Thus the administration of the universe by Zeus provides the model for the wise king, and the young emperor is exhorted by Dio to an imitation of this orderly world government. The same note is struck elsewhere in

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διοικήσεως ὁποῖόν γε τὸ ξύμπαν αὐτό τε εὔδαιμων καὶ σοφὸν ἀεὶ διαπορεύεται τὸν ἄπειρον αἰῶνα συνεχῶς ἐν ἀπείροις περιόδοις μετὰ τύχης τε ἀγαθῆς καὶ δαίμονος ὁμοίου καὶ προνοίας καὶ ἀρχῆς της δικαιοτάτης τε καὶ ἀρίστης, ἡμᾶς τε ὁμοίους παρέχεται, κατὰ φύσιν κοινὴν τὴν αὑτοῦ καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ὑφ' ἑνὶ θεσμῷ καὶ νόμῳ κεκοσμημένους καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς μετέχοντας πολιτείας.

ἣν ὁ μὲν τιμῶν καὶ φυλάττων καὶ μηδὲν ἐναντίον πράττων, νόμιμος καὶ θεοφιλὴς καὶ κόσμιος, ὁ δὲ ταράττων ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ καὶ παραβαίνων καὶ ἀγνοῶν, ἄνομος καὶ ἄκοσμος, ὁμοίως μὲν ἰδιώτης, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄρχων ὀνομαζόμενος· πολὺ δὲ μείζων καὶ φανερωτέρα πᾶσι ἡ παρὰ τοῦ ἄρχοντος πλημμέλεια.

ὥσπερ οὖν ὅσοι στρατηγοί τε καὶ ἄρχοντες στρατοπέδων καὶ πόλεων καὶ ἐθνῶν, ὅστις ἂν τὸν σὸν μάλιστα μιμῆται τρόπον καὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἤθεσιν ὅμοιον αὑτὸν ὡς δυνατὸν φαίνηται παρέχων, οὗτος ἂν εἴη σοὶ πάντων ἑταιρότατος καὶ προσφιλέστατος· εἰ δέ τις ἐναντίος καὶ ἀνόμοιος γίγνοιτο, δικαίως ἂν τυγχάνοι μέμψεώς τε καὶ ἀτιμίας καὶ αὐτῆς γε τῆς ἀρχῆς ταχὺ παυθείς, παραχωρήσειεν ἑτέροις ἀμείνοσί τε καὶ ἄμεινον δυναμένοις διοικεῖν· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν βασιλέων, ἅτε οἶμαι παρὰ τοῦ Διὸς ἐχόντων τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ἐπιτροπήν, ὃς μὲν ἂν πρὸς ἐκεῖνον βλέπων πρὸς τὸν τοῦ Διὸς νόμον τε καὶ θεσμὸν κοσμῇ καὶ ἄρχῃ δικαίως τε καὶ καλῶς, ἀγαθῆς τυγχάνει μοίρας καὶ τέλους εὐτυχοῦς· ὃς δ' ἂν παραβῇ καὶ ἀτιμάσῃ τὸν ἐπιτρέψαντα ἢ δόντα τὴν δωρεὰν ταύτην, οὐδὲν ἀπώνατο τῆς πολλῆς ἐξουσίας καὶ δυνάμεως ἢ τοσοῦτον μόνον ὅσον φανερὸς πᾶσι γενέσθαι τοῖς καθ' αὑτὸν καὶ τοῖς ὕστερον πονηρὸς καὶ ἀκόλαστος ὤν.

the orations; the divine administration the Stoics find in the universe is held up as the example:

> The present orderly constitution of the universe . . . which is governed by one spirit and force— this they liken in one way or another to a city on account of the multitude of those who are constantly coming into existence in it or departing from existence, and further on account of the arrangement and orderliness of its administration (τὴν τάξιν καὶ τὴν εὐκοσμίαν τῆς διοικήσεως). . . . [This exemplary orderliness] the wisest and oldest Ruler and Lawgiver ordains for all, mortals and immortals, the Leader of the whole heaven and Master of all being, himself thus explaining the term and providing as an example of the happy and blessed condition his own administration (τὴν αὐτοῦ διοίκησιν).[111]

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[111] *Ibid.*, 36. 30-32: τὴν νῦν διακόσμησιν ... μιᾷ ψυχῇ καὶ δυνάμει διεπόμενον, ἁμηγέπῃ πόλει προσεικάζουσι [sc. the Stoics] διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ γιγνομένων τε καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων, ἔτι δὲ τὴν τάξιν καὶ τὴν εὐκοσμίαν τῆς διοικήσεως... ὅπερ δὴ ὁ σοφώτατος καὶ πρεσβύτατος ἄρχων καὶ νομοθέτης ἅπασι προστάττει θνητοῖς καὶ ἀθανάτοις, ὁ τοῦ ξύμπαντος ἡγεμὼν οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῆς ὅλης δεσπότης οὐσίας, αὐτὸς οὕτως ἐξηγούμενος καὶ παράδειγμα παρέχων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ διοίκησιν τῆς εὐδαίμονος καὶ μακαρίας καταστάσεως.

On the sense of πόλις implied in Dio's Stoic thought, cf. *Or*. 36. 20, *SVF* 3, 81, 15-17 (*frag*. 329): τὴν πόλιν φασὶν εἶναι πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων ἐν τ' αὐτῷ κατοικούντων ὑπὸ νόμου διοικούμενον. "They say that the city is a multitude of men who dwell in the same place and which is ordered by law." Further, *Or*. 3. 43, *SVF* 3, 81, 20f. (*frag*. 331): λέγεται γὰρ ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ „νόμιμος ἀνθρώ-

This divine administration of things provides the pattern for the "ruling and administration of men (ἀρχή τε καὶ διοίκησις ἀνθρώπων)."[112]

We have then here in these orations at the end of the first century vivid evidence for three important points: (1) the clear-cut idea of the rule of a supreme God who administers the universe and its affairs, the Stoic διοίκησις τῶν ὅλων, elsewhere, as we have seen, referred to sometimes as an *oikonomia*; (2) the concept that this supreme God grants power and authority to the rulers on earth as a stewardship, he himself being the Chief Steward or Ruler, these men to exercise their stewardship in imitation of him in a sort of hierarchy of power; and (3) definite proof that the rule of an earthly king was readily compared to the government of the heavenly God, right down to the use of the same term, *dioikēsis*. This latter point is interesting because Tertullian, in trying to explain the Trinity, will use much the same analogy, though in *reverse*, when he compares the relation of Father and Logos to Roman governmental practice.[113]

πων διοίκησις." "The government is called 'a lawful ordering of men.'" The idea is reflected in Clem. Al. *Strom.* 4. 26 (172, 2): πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων ὑπὸ νόμου διοικούμενον, καθάπερ ἡ ἐκκλησία ὑπὸ λόγου. "A city is . . . a multitude of men regulated by law *as the church by the word*" (italics mine).

[112] *Ibid.*, 3. 28.

[113] *Adv. Prax.* 2ff. Cf. Verhoeven, 108ff., and *supra*, 72ff. The idea here set forth, that the rule of God in heaven is paralleled by the rule of the emperor on earth, of course found lodgment in the Christian concept of the state later on, especially in the later Eastern Roman Empire. Cf. Otto G. von Simsom, *Sacred Fortress: Byzantine Art and Statecraft in Ravenna* (Chicago, 1948), 32: "The rule of Trajan symbolized, for the Stoic,

Epictetus and the Divine Administration

Unquestionably, however, the finest examples of references to the divine government of the world and what this administration of things means to man and his daily existence come in the discourses of Epictetus, the slave from Hieropolis in Phrygia, who became a free man and philosopher, setting up his school at Nicopolis in Epirus. His lectures were preserved by that army-officer-turned-writer, Arrian, the Roman Xenophon. Since Epictetus lived *c.* A.D. 55-135, he offers a splendid illustration of the ideas popular at the end of the first century and the start of the second, when Christian writers were especially beginning to talk about an economy of God.

Epictetus, as a Stoic, begins with the principle that the universe is the work of God and that the divine providence is manifested through the order and unity of this universe. Further, he believes that God oversees (ἐφορᾶται) all things in the universe and there is a divine government or administration— ἡ θεία διοίκησις, to use his own term.[114] All this is normal enough Stoicism, which we have seen present since the founding of the school.

Epictetus, however, unlike many other Stoics, makes particularly clear what all this means for the individual. Man, he holds, can see the order

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Dio Chrysostom, the divine rule of the universe. For the Christian, the great acts of government were images of that eternal economy from which they derived their sanction and to which they were ordered."

[114] ἡ θεία διοίκησις— Arr. *Epict. Diss.* 1. 12. 8 and 14. 7 (where the verb ἐφορᾶται is also used of God); 3. 11. 1 and 24. 42. ἡ διοίκησις τοῦ κόσμου— 1. 9. 4. ἡ τοῦ Διὸς διοίκησις— 2. 23. 42. ἡ διοίκησις (τοῦ θεοῦ)— 4. 1. 100 and 7. 7.

and unity of the universe, especially in nature,[115] and also has the power "to think about the divine government (τῆς θείας διοικήσεως)" he finds reflected there.[116] As he does this, a man will conclude that he is himself a part of this and a "citizen of the world," not merely of his own, petty, locality:

> The man who has studied the administration of the universe (ὁ τοίνυν τῇ διοικήσει τοῦ κόσμου παρηκολουθηκώς) and who has learned that "the greatest and most authoritative and most comprehensive of all governments is this one composed of men and God, and that from Him the seeds of being have descended, not to my father only, nor to my grandfather, but to all things that are begotten upon earth or grow, and especially to rational creatures, since it is natural for these alone to have fellowship in the society of God, being interwoven with Him in accordance with reason," why should he not call himself a citizen of the universe? Why not a son of God?[117]

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[115] *Ibid.*, 3. 24. 92 speaks of the "ordered arrangement and management (τεταγμένη τις οἰκονομία καὶ διοίκησις)" in nature, giving various examples (cf. *supra*, 397, note 14). Further, on man and his effort to understand the will of God revealed in nature, cf. 1. 14. 16; 1. 17. 15; and *Man*. 31. 1.

[116] *Ibid.*, 1. 14. 7: ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν περὶ τῆς θείας διοικήσεως καὶ περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν θείων, ὁμοῦ δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων ἐνθυμεῖσθαι δύνασαι. "Yet you, on the one hand, have the power to think about the divine government and about each of the divine things, but at the same time also about human affairs."

[117] *Ibid.*, 1. 9. 4-6: ὁ τοίνυν τῇ διοικήσει τοῦ κόσμου παρηκολουθηκὼς καὶ μεμαθηκώς, ὅτι 'τὸ μέγιστον καὶ κυριώτατον

Man will conclude from his observation of the divine administration, therefore, that he is himself included in this and has a relationship to God; as a "world citizen," no more will he yearn merely for the sights of Athens, its bits of rock and stone.[118] But more, he will also conclude from this observation that behind and in the divine administration is a god who administers the whole universe (ὁ διοικῶν τὰ ὅλα)[119] and that this god in his providence cares for men. As Epictetus puts it, he will believe that God "both exists and governs well (καλῶς διοικεῖ) the whole universe and does not neglect human affairs, and nothing evil befalls a good man either when he is alive or dead."[120]

καὶ περιεκτικώτατον πάντων τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ σύστημα τὸ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεοῦ, ἀπ' ἐκείνου δὲ τὰ σπέρματα καταπέπτωκεν οὐκ εἰς τὸν πατέρα τὸν ἔμον μόνον οὐδ' εἰς τὸν πάππον, ἀλλ' εἰς ἅπαντα μὲν τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς γεννώμενά τε, καὶ φυόμενα, προηγουμένως δ' εἰς τὰ λογικά, ὅτι κοινωνεῖν μόνον ταῦτα πέφυκεν τῷ θεῷ τῆς συναναστροφῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἐπι⟨πε⟩πλεγμένα', διὰ τί μὴ εἴπῃ [τις] αὐτὸν κόσμιον; διὰ τί μὴ υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ; The quoted material may be either from Posidonius (cf. Diog. Laert. 7. 138) or Chrysippus (Diels, Dox. Graec., p. 464, line 20, and 465, line 15).

[118] Ibid., 2. 16. 33: εἰ δὲ δὴ παρακολουθεῖς τῷ διοικοῦντι τὰ ὅλα κἀκεῖνον ἐν σαυτῷ περιφέρεις, ἔτι ποθεῖς λιθάρια καὶ πέτραν πομψήν; "If you really understand him who administers the whole universe and bear him about within yourself, do you still desire pieces of stone and a pretty rock?" (referring to the Acropolis and its buildings).

[119] ὁ διοικῶν τὰ ὅλα— ibid., 2. 16. 33 and 1. 12. 7. ὁ διοικῶν (bis)— 2. 14. 26.

[120] Ibid., 3. 26. 28: ... καὶ ἔστι καὶ καλῶς διοικεῖ τὰ ὅλα καὶ οὐκ ἀμελεῖ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων καὶ ὅτι ἀνδρὶ

To go on a bit further then, this man who has been observing the divine administration and has been thinking about what it shows, will also acquiese to this God and his government of the universe; note the parallel between God's world administration and the management of a human state which Epictetus works in, while making this point:

> The gentleman, therefore, having inquired into all these things [the existence of the gods, whether or not they care about men], subordinates his own will to him who administers the whole universe (τῷ διοικοῦντι τὰ ὅλα), just as good citizens subordinate theirs to the law of the state. And the man who is being instructed ought to come to the instruction with this aim, "How may I follow the gods in every way, and how may I be well pleasing to the divine administration (τῇ θείᾳ διοικήσει) and how may I become free?"[121]

ἀγαθῷ οὐδέν ἐστιν κακὸν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτ᾽ ἀποθανόντι. Cf. further 4. 7. 6. and 3. 24. 2ff. on the notion God orders all for the best.

[121] Ibid., 1. 12. 7, 8: πάντα οὖν ταῦτα ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἐπεσκεμμένος τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην ὑποτέταχεν τῷ διοικοῦντι τὰ ὅλα καθάπερ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται τῷ νόμῳ τῆς πόλεως. ὁ δὲ παιδευόμενος ταύτην ὀφείλει τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ἔχων ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ παιδεύεσθαι, „πῶς ἂν ἑποίμην ἐγὼ ἐν παντὶ τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ πῶς ἂν εὐαρεστοίην τῇ θείᾳ διοικήσει καὶ πῶς ἂν γενοίμην ἐλεύθερος;" Underlying the emphasis on instruction here is the Stoic view on how man comes to knowledge, for example, of God. Since man has reason, a part of the divine logos, man is able to acquire such knowledge, first of all, from within himself; such knowledge is inherent in man's nature, and there are certain conceptions about deity on which all men can

There is also present here, it may be observed, the concept of instruction in the divine administration and with this, the suggestion that one may progress in acquiescing in it, steps towards gaining contentment and freedom.

Now true freedom, Epictetus shows elsewhere, involves precisely this matter of acquiescing in the government of Zeus; it is at the heart of things when Epictetus recalls to man his purpose:

> to prepare yourself to use the external impressions which come to you in accordance with nature; in desire not to fail in what you would attain, and in avoidance not to fall into what you would avoid; never suffering misfortune, never being ill-fortuned; free, unhindered, unconstrained; conforming to the administration of Zeus (συναρμόζοντα τῇ τοῦ Διὸς διοικήσει), being obedient to this, well satisfied with this; finding fault with no one, blaming no one; being able to say these words with your whole heart,
>
> "Lead thou me on, O Zeus, and thou, too, O Destiny!"[122]

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agree innately. Secondly, ideas about God can be gained through education, from lecture, teaching, and contemplation of the cosmos. The two sources are referred to by Dio Chrys. Or. 12. 39 as τὴν ἔμφυτον ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις ἐπίνοιαν and as τὴν ἐπίκτητον καὶ δὴ οὐκ ἑτέρως ἐγγιγνομένην ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἢ λόγοις τε καὶ μύθοις καὶ ἔθεσι. Thus there is possible instruction in the divine administration and a man's part in it. Cf. Bertil Gärtner, The Areopagus Speech and Natural Revelation (Acta Seminarii Neotestamentici Upsaliensis, 21; Uppsala, 1955) (cited hereafter as "Gärtner, Areopagus Speech"), 105ff.

[122] Ibid., 2. 23. 42: ἄνθρωπε, τὸ προκείμενον ἦν σοι κατασκευάσαι σαυτὸν χρηστικὸν ταῖς προσπιπτούσαις φαντασίαις κατὰ φύσιν, ἐν ὀρέξει ἀναπότευκτον, ἐν δ' ἐκκλίσει ἀπερίπτωτον,

Freedom then means to conform to the government of Zeus, and the wise man will attach himself to God and thus pass through the world in safety. "How will he attach himself?" Epictetus was asked; by willing what God wills, he replied. "How, then, can this be done? Why, how else," he went on,

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μηδέποτ' ἀτυχοῦντα, μηδέποτε δυστυχοῦντα, ἐλεύθερον, ἀκώλυτον, ἀνανάγκαστον, συναρμόζοντα τῇ τοῦ Διὸς διοικήσει, ταύτῃ πειθόμενον, ταύτῃ εὐαρεστοῦντα, μηδένα μεμφόμενον, μηδέν' αἰτιώμενον, δυνάμενον εἰπεῖν τούτους τοὺς στίχους ἐξ ὅλης ψυχῆς·

ἄγου δέ μ', ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σύ γ' ἡ Πεπρωμένη.

The final line, an invocation by Cleanthes, is often quoted in ancient literature; Epict. Man. 53, SVF 1, 118, 21ff. (frag. 527); Arr. Epict. Diss. 3. 22. 95, 4. 1. 131, 4. 4. 34; Seneca Ep. 107. 10. Translation in F.C. Grant, Hellenistic Religions (New York, 1953), 152. The comparison with John Henry Newman's "Lead, Kindly Light," sometimes suggested, is forced; the background there comes from Ex. 13: 21-22 ("The Pillar of the Cloud," Newman's original title) and the author's childhood, and experiences in Sicily and Sardinia (cf. A.E. Bailey, The Gospel in Hymns (New York, 1952), 193ff., for a brief discussion). Liechtenhan, 13f., perhaps more fruitfully compares the thought with I Cor. 9: 16f., "Necessity is laid upon me. Woe to me if I do not preach the gospel! For if I do this of my own will, I have a reward; but if not of my own will, I am entrusted with a commission (οἰκονομίαν πεπίστευμαι)." Liechtenhan has in mind the latter part of Cleanthes' invocation:

...ἢν δέ γε μὴ θέλω
κακὸς γενόμενος, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕψομαι,

"If I do not wish (to follow without delay), being evil, nonetheless I follow." He admits, however, there is a great difference between the prophetic compulsion in Paul and the fatalistic submission in Cleanthes.

"than by observing the choices of God and his government (ἐπισκεψαμένῳ τὰς ὁρμὰς τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τὴν διοίκησιν)?"[123] Man should not strive against God but observe his administration of the world, conform to the revelation of his will there, and so he will pass through life, free from the vicissitudes of fortune.

The divine administration can, of course, include punishments, designed by law, "for those who are disobedient to the divine dispensation (τοῖς ἀπειθοῦσι τῇ θείᾳ διοικήσει)."[124] There is a law, "divine, mighty, and inescapable," which says: "let him who disobeys the divine administration (ὁ ἀπειθῶν τῇ θείᾳ διοικήσει) be mean in spirit, let him be a slave, let him suffer grief, let him suffer envy, let him be pitied [because of the passion which distrubs his serenity], most of all, let him be miserable, let him lament."[125] Even, however, in the case of those who are observant and wise and who accept this divine administration, there may still be suffering, pain, and, inevitably, death. Epictetus must struggle with the existence of such evils, but he refuses to admit that these things really are evil. They, too, occur through the divine providence, which is always good. In fact, Epictetus suggests, the wise man will accept and actually cooperate with these things as part of a total, over-all pattern which is for the good even though he may not grasp it at the moment:

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[123] Ibid., 4. 1. 100: πῶς οὖν τοῦτο γένηται; — πῶς γὰρ ἄλλως ἢ ἐπισκεψαμένῳ τὰς ὁρμὰς τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τὴν διοίκησιν; The passage goes on to explain that man should not strive against the universe but recognize he is a part of it because God "has made subject to the revolution of the universe my property, my furniture, my house, my children, my wife (ὑπέταξεν οὖν τῇ τῶν ὅλων περιόδῳ, τὴν κτῆσιν, τὰ σκεύη, τὴν οἰκίαν, τὰ τέκνα, τὴν γυναῖκα)." Ethics in Stoicism, it can be seen, is especially therefore a matter of conforming to the divine dioikēsis.

[124] Ibid., 3. 11. 1: εἰσί τινες ὡς ἐκ νόμου διατεταγμέναι κολάσεις τοῖς ἀπειθοῦσι τῇ θείᾳ διοικήσει.

[125] Ibid., 3. 24. 42f.: ὁ νόμος θεῖος καὶ ἰσχυρὸς καὶ ἀναπόδραστος ... ὁ ἀπειθῶν τῇ θείᾳ διοικήσει ἔστω ταπεινός, ἔστω δοῦλος, λυπείσθω, φθονείτω, ἐλεείτω, τὸ κεφάλαιον πάντων, δυστυχείτω, θρηνείτω.

> the philosophers well say that if the gentleman knew what was going to happen, he would aid the processes of disease and death and maiming, because he would perceive that this is allotted from the arrangement of the whole (ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ὅλων διατάξεως τοῦτο ἀπονέμεται), and the whole is supreme over the part, and the state supreme over the citizen.[126]

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[126] Ibid., 2. 10. 5: διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι ὅτι εἰ προῄδει ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τὰ ἐσόμενα συνήργει ἂν καὶ τῷ νοσεῖν καὶ τῷ ἀποθνῄσκειν καὶ τῷ πηροῦσθαι, αἰσθανόμενός γε, ὅτι ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ὅλων διατάξεως τοῦτο ἀπονέμεται, κυριώτερον δὲ τὸ ὅλον τοῦ μέρους καὶ ἡ πόλις καὶ τοῦ πολίτου. The view is based on a concept of the world as a whole; Hatch, Greek Ideas, 218f., sums up: "In its vast economy there are subordinations and individual inconveniences. Such subordinations and inconveniences are necessary parts of the plan. The pain of the individual is not an evil, but his contribution to the good of the whole. [E.g., Epictetus' own lameness; cf. 1. 12. 24.] The world, in other words, was regarded as an economy (οἰκονομία), like that of a city, in which there are apparent inequalities of condition, but in which such inequalities are necessary to the constitution of the whole." With this, cf. Chrysippus' more tersely expressed view, supra, 427, note 59.

Behind this stands the Stoic premise, of course, that the divine providence is good, and "nothing evil befalls a man, alive or dead"; thus the true Stoic will accept misfortune as part of the "arrangement of the universe," keeping his own self and will unblemished. Man acquiesces in God's administration, but, more positively, he also tries to understand the will of God in nature and then attempts to be a witness for God in word and deed.[127] God made us to be his witnesses and ministers, Epictetus states several times, and once at least speaks of his witnesses and servants, even in their sufferings, as "proofs (παραδείγμασι) for the uninstructed" of God's existence and providence.[128]

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[127] On the idea that God made us to interpret his administration of the universe, to be his witnesses and ministers, cf. ibid., 1. 9. 4 (supra, 463, note 117); 1. 17. 15 and 29. 46. 56; 2. 16. 33 (supra, 464, note 118); 4. 7. 6 (infra, 475, note 133); further, Hatch, Greek Ideas, 212. Man's task, in a word, Epictetus says, is to "sing the hymn that belongs to God" (1. 16).

[128] Ibid., 3. 26. 28: οὕτως ὁ θεὸς ἀμελεῖ τῶν αὐτοῦ ἐπιτευγμάτων, τῶν διακόνων, τῶν μαρτύρων, οἷς μόνοις χρῆται παραδείγμασιν πρὸς τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους, ὅτι καὶ ἔστι καὶ καλῶς διοικεῖ τὰ ὅλα καὶ οὐκ ἀμελεῖ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων καὶ ὅτι ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ οὐδέν ἐστι κακὸν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτ' ἀποθανόντι; "Does God thus neglect his own creatures, his servants, his witnesses, whom alone he uses as proofs for the uninstructed? They are 'proofs' that God is and governs well the universe and does not neglect human affairs and that no evil befalls a good man alive or dead" (supra, 464, note 120). Here again the idea appears that there can be instruction in the divine dispensation (cf. supra, 465f., note 121); is this a starting point for Clement's application of oikonomia in a pedagogical sense?

The real purpose of philosophy, Epictetus argues, is to awaken men to this understanding of God and his government of the universe and what it means for life, though few really pay attention to such things. This he makes clear in his beautiful comparison of life to a fair:

> Our position is like that of those who attend a fair. Cattle and oxen are brought there to be sold, and most men engage in buying and selling, while there are only a few who go merely to see the fair, how it is conducted, and why, and who are promoting it, and for what purpose. So it is also in this "fair" of the world in which we live; some persons, like cattle, are interested in nothing but their fodder; for to all of you that concern yourselves with property and lands and slaves and one office or another, all this is nothing but fodder! And few in number are the men who attend the fair because they are fond of the spectacle. "What, then, is the universe," they ask, "and who governs (διοικεῖ) it? No one? Yet how can it be that, while it is impossible for a city or a household [note the examples!] to remain even a very short time without someone to govern and care for it (δίχα τοῦ διοικοῦντος καὶ ἐπιμελομένου), nonetheless this great and beautiful structure should be kept in such orderly arrangement (εὐτάκτως οἰκονομεῖσθαι) by sheer accident and chance? There must be therefore someone who governs (ὁ διοικῶν) it. What kind of being is he, and how does he govern it (πῶς ὁ διοικῶν)? And what are we who have been created by him, and for what purpose were we created? Do we then really have some contact and relation with him or none at all?"
>
> That is the way these few are affected; and thence forward they have leisure for this one thing only— to study well the "fair" of life before they leave it. With what result, then? They are laughed to scorn by the crowd, quite as in the real fair the mere spectators are laughed

> at by the traffickers; yes, and if the cattle themselves had any comprehension like ours of what was going on, they too would laugh at those who had wonder and admiration for anything but their fodder.[129]

Obvious throughout the passage is the Stoic insistence that there is a divine administration of things, that God is the administrator who governs and cares for the universe, and coupled with it the feeling that the philosopher is to investigate this divine government and come into conformity with it.

The same ideas are evident in another paragraph, where Epictetus draws the conclusion that, in order to understand what one is and ought to be in life, in regard especially to the whole universe of which he is a part, one must take into account God and his management of affairs. The following analogy is offered:

> In a well-ordered household, no one comes along and says to himself, "I must be manager of the household (ἐμὲ δεῖ οἰκονόμον εἶναι)!" Or if he does, the lord of the estate (ὁ κύριος), when he turns around and sees the fellow giving commands in a high and mighty fashion, hauls him down and rebukes him.
>
> So it is also in this great city [the world]. For here also there is a lord of the household (οἰκοδεσπότης) who assigns (διατάσσων) each

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[129] Ibid., 2. 14. 25-27, translation from the Loeb Classical Library by W.A. Oldfather, 1, 313-15. The comparison of life to a fair is a common one, perhaps going back to Pythagoras; cf. Cic. Tusc. 5. 9; Diog. Laert. 8. 8; Iambl. Vita Pythagori 58; Men. frag. 481K. It may be recalled that the word oikonomia is vouched for in the sense of "fair, market, arrangement for sale of wares" (supra, 228f., note 48), so the analogy here is not altogether unexpected.

> and every thing its place: "You are the sun. . . . You are a calf. . . . You are a bull. . . . You are able to lead the army against Troy; be Agamemnon. You are able to fight a duel with Hector; be Achilles." But if Thersites came along and claimed command, either he would not have got it, or if he had, he would have disgraced himself in the presence of a multitude of witnesses.[130]

What we decide to do therefore in life requires thought— in the light of God and his administration of the universe. For man is not the *oikonomos*, who runs the household of the world; God is the manager — though notice that Epictetus, in line with what we observed of the Stoics earlier, does not call him *oikonomos* but *kyrios* and *oikodespotēs* — the lord of the household, managing things and stationing all men in their places.

The tone of many of these statements from Epictetus is reminiscent of early Christianity; the last analogy, about the obstreperous servant, has more than once been compared with Jesus' parable of the unmerciful servant.[131] Did Epictetus know of the Christians? Yes, for he refers to them, as the "Galileans,"[132] and significantly brings the Christians into connection with the divine administration and its implications, which is stressed so much in his own philosophy. While attempting to inculcate freedom from fear in his hearers, Epictetus refers to these "Galileans" as an example:

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[130] *Ibid*., 3. 22. 2: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν οἰκίᾳ καλῶς οἰκουμένῃ παρελθών τις αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ λέγει 'ἐμὲ δεῖ οἰκονόμον εἶναι·' εἰ δὲ μή, ἐπιστραφεὶς ὁ κύριος καὶ ἰδὼν αὐτὸν σοβαρῶς διατασσόμενον, ἑλκύσας ἔτεμεν. οὕτως γίνεται καὶ ἐν τῇ μεγάλῃ ταύτῃ πόλει. ἔστι γάρ τις καὶ ἐνθάδ' οἰκοδεσπότης ἕκαστα ὁ διατάσσων. 'σὺ ἥλιος εἶ· ...σὺ μοσχάριον εἶ· ...σὺ ταῦρος εἶ,... σὺ δύνασαι ἡγεῖσθαι τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐπὶ Ἴλιον· ἴσθι Ἀγαμέμνων. σὺ δύνασαι τῷ Ἕκτορι μονομαχῆσαι· ἴσθι Ἀχιλλεύς.' εἰ δὲ Θερσίτης παρελθὼν ἀντεποιεῖτο τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἔτυχεν ἢ τυχὼν ἂν ἠσχημόνησεν ἐν πλείοσι μάρτυσι.

[131] Matt. 18: 23-35; cf. Matt. 24: 45-51 and Luke 12: 41-46. J.B. Lightfoot, e.g., *Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians* (London, 1894), 315, note 6, concludes about the parallels between the Stoic philosophers like

> So then madness can produce this attitude of mind [fearlessness] toward the things which have just been mentioned [a tyrant's sword or misfortune], and also habit, as with the Galileans. But cannot reason and proof teach a man that God has made all things in the universe, and the whole universe itself to be free from hindrance, and to contain its end in itself, and the parts of it to serve the needs of the whole?
>
> Now all other animals have been excluded from the capacity to understand the governance of God (τοῦ δύνασθαι παρακολουθεῖν τῇ διοικήσει

Epictetus and the New Testament "I can hardly believe that so strange a coincidence is quite accidental," and that "it favours the supposition that our Lord's discourses in some form or other were early known to heathen writers."

[132] Arr. *Epict*. *Diss*. 4. 7. 6; cf. 2. 9. 19ff. The term "Galileans" as a designation for Christians continues down to the writings, e.g., of the Emperor Julian (A.D. 332-363). The reference to a Jew at 2. 9. 20 merely proves Epictetus' description of the Christians is superficial and that he regards them as a Jewish sect (so D.S. Sharp, *Epictetus and the New Testament* (London, 1914), 134f.). W.A. Oldfather, in his Loeb edition of Epictetus (London, 1933), Vol. 1, p. xxvi, agrees he knew of the existence of Christians. Epictetus lived in Rome from early life till A.D. 94, thereafter at Nicopolis, where there was also a Christian community from early times (cf. Rom. 15: 19, Titus 3: 12); contact could have come at either or both places.

> αὐτοῦ), but the rational animal [man] possesses faculties that enable him to consider all these things, both that he is part of them and what kind of part of them he is, and that it is well for the parts to yield to the whole.[133]

Man, in other words, will study God's dioikēsis, heed it, acquiesce, and in so doing arrive at fearlessness and serenity and happiness, by reason and proofs — just as Christians appeared to Epictetus, apparently, to do so by force of habit!

That Epictetus was himself a Christian seems impossible.[134] That he had even read the literature of the Christians is doubtful — the linguistic similarities are explained by the fact that both Epictetus and the New Testament used the same koiné Greek of the people of the day, not by any direct literary borrowings, and in doctrines there are striking differences as well as similarities.[135] But in regard to this one motif, the divine administration and providential rule of God in the world, there is remarkable rapport. The explanation, however, lies, not in any borrowing by Epictetus from Christian sources, nor even for that matter in any direct New Testament appropriation from Epictetus but rather in a common background which both developed: the concept of a divine world government and managing of the universe, which can be seen quite clearly in Greek thought through the centuries, especially in Stoicism. For Christianity there was also a strong influence toward the same motif from Judaism and the preaching of Jesus.[136] But the underlying theme of an oikonomia or dioikēsis of God was common property, "in the air," a part of the usual thought world for many Greeks and Romans just as Christian doctrine was beginning to take shape. Is it any wonder that these Christian writers seized upon the theme to help express what they believed in the light of their experience with Jesus?

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[133] Ibid., 4. 7. 6, translation after W.A. Oldfather in the Loeb series, 2, 363: εἶτα ὑπὸ μανίας μὲν δύναταί τις οὕτως διατεθῆναι πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ὑπὸ ἔθους οἱ Γαλιλαῖοι· ὑπὸ λόγου δὲ καὶ ἀποδείξεως οὐδεὶς δύναται μαθεῖν, ὅτι ὁ θεὸς πάντα πεποίηκεν τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν κόσμον ὅλον μὲν ἀκώλυτον καὶ αὐτοτελῆ, τὰ ἐν μέρει δ' αὐτοῦ πρὸς χρείαν τῶν ὅλων; τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα πάντα ἀπήλλακται τοῦ δύνασθαι παρακολουθεῖν τῇ διοικήσει αὐτοῦ· τὸ δὲ λογικὸν ζῷον ἀφορμὰς ἔχει πρὸς ἀναλογισμὸν τούτων ἁπάντων, ὅτι τε μέρος ἐστὶ καὶ ποῖόν τι μέρος, καὶ ὅτι τὰ μέρη τοῖς ὅλοις εἰκειν ἔχει καλῶς.

[134] D.S. Sharp, Epictetus and the New Testament (London, 1914), 134: "Epictetus was not a Christian."

[135] Ibid., 135: "It is doubtful whether Epictetus was acquainted with

The idea, then, of the divine economy or dioikēsis was common at this time. Just how common perhaps we can realize when it is pointed out,

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the New Testament." P. 137: "The language . . . resembles that of the New Testament because it was the language as spoken by the people of the time," a point amply shown by the papyrus investigations since J.B. Lightfoot's day. W.A. Oldfather, Loeb edition, Vol. I, p. xxvi, concludes similarly: Epictetus shared the vulgar prejudices of his day against the Christians and "would never have bothered to read their literature."

[136] A. Bonhöffer, Epiktet und das Neue Testament (Giessen, 1911), 122, suggests a similar conclusion: possible influence on Paul's use of oikonomia came from "the Stoic idea of the physical or cosmic economy," but also from the parables of Jesus in presenting "the essence and ordering of the Kingdom of God."

finally, that Lucian of Samosata, only a little later, midway in the second century, satirizes the gods and pokes fun at them because they are kept so busy at their duties of running the universe. They are burdened with administrative detail and red tape in this economy. Once, for instance, Lucian has Zeus lament the hard lot of the gods:

> A plague on those philosophers who say that the gods alone enjoy true felicity! If they knew what troubles we go through for mankind, they would not call us happy, merely because we have a little nectar and ambrosia. . . . I myself, the King and Father, what hardships do I go through, and what cares am I distracted with! First, I must oversee the works of the other gods. . . . And then I must do 10,000 other things . . . ; for not only these chief items of administration (τὰ κεφάλαια ταῦτα τῆς διοικήσεως) must I do, I myself having dispensed (οἰκονομησάμενος) hail and rain and winds and lightning flashes . . . , but it is also necessary for me to do these things too: [a long list follows, ending with the comment,] For if, perchance, we nod, right away, in truth, Epicurus appears correct, that we do not exercise providence over matters on earth![137]

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[137] Lucian, Bis accusatus seu Tribunalia 1-2 (ed. C. Jacobitz (Leipzig, 1896), Vol. 3, p. 65): Ἀλλ' ἐπιτριβεῖεν ὁσόσοι τῶν φιλοσόφων παρὰ μόνοις τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν φασὶν εἶναι τοῖς θεοῖς. εἰ γοῦν ᾔδεσαν ὁπόσα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἕνεκα πάσχομεν οὐκ ἂν ἡμᾶς τοῦ νέκταρος ἢ τῆς ἀμβροσίας ἐμακάριζον.... ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτὸς ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς καὶ πατὴρ ὅσας μὲν ἀηδίας ἀνέχομαι, ὅσα δὲ πράγματα ἔχω πρὸς τοσαύτας φροντίδας διῃρημένος· ᾧ πρῶτα μὲν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν ἔργα ἐπισκοπεῖν ἀναγκαῖον... ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ αὐτῷ μυρία ἄττα πράττειν...οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ κεφάλαια ταῦτα τῆς διοικήσεως, ὑετοὺς καὶ χαλάζας καὶ πνεύματα καὶ ἀστραπὰς αὐτὸς οἰκονομησάμενος καὶ

Elsewhere Lucian depicts all the responsibilities Zeus must administer (ἁπάντων . . . αὐτῷ διῳκημένων), including the hearing of prayers and vows, handling of divinations, and the regulation of natural phenomena.[138] No wonder, in view of all the administrative detail the Stoic notion about a divine, beneficent world government implied, Lucian has one of his characters make the cutting remark, after being told that the gods hear all and will be sure to punish at some time: "And when would the gods possibly have leisure for me, since, as you say, they have such great business and are administering (οἰκονομούμενοι) the affairs in the universe which are boundless in number?"[139] The economy of the gods was a common enough idea, thanks to all the Stoic emphasis upon it, to lend itself to just such ridicule by Lucian.

The Divine Administration, Summarized

To conclude this whole discussion on a more positive note, let us summarize what we have found in the Greek usage of oikonomia, dioikēsis, and related terms with regard to a divine rule and management in the universe.

διατάξας... ἀλλά με δεῖ καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ποιεῖν.... ἢν γάρ τί που καὶ μικρὸν ἐπινυστάξωμεν, ἀληθὴς εὐθὺς ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, ἀπρονοήτους ἡμᾶς ἀποφαίνων τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς πραγμάτων.

[138] Lucian, Icaro-menippus 27 (Jacobitz, 2, 783, line 59).

[139] Lucian, Iupp. Trag. 37 (Jacobitz, 2, 500): καὶ πότε ἂν ἐκεῖνοι σχολὴν ἀγάγοιεν ἐπ' ἐμὲ, τοσαῦτα, ὡς φής, πράγματα ἔχοντες καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος ὄντα οἰκονομούμενοι; On the general view, which must have been not uncommon, cf. Men. Epit. 649ff. (C. Jensen, Menandri Reliquiae in Papyris et Membranis Servatae (Berlin, 1929), pp. 44f.).

It appears undeniable that, in many parts of the ancient world, precisely at the time Christianity was appearing, there was a well-developed concept about God and his administration of things. Order and unity in the universe were stressed, by the Stoics especially, as over against the Epicureans,[140] and behind this order and unity was believed to be a Mind or Personality responsible for the arrangement of the world. This deity was called by many names — Reason, Fate, Destiny, Nature, Providence, and the traditional term Zeus — and he was readily identified with the gods of various religions, like Osiris; even Jewish writers did not distain employing this koiné Gottesbild in presenting their Yahweh to pagan readers.[141]

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[140] Stoics and Epicureans would seem to be the chief schools of thought to consider on such matters in the first century A.D. The Academics and Peripatetics occupied essentially compromise positions, and the Cynics busied themselves with practical, not theoretical, problems. The alternative, as Marcus Aurelius suggested, was "between the mechanical fatalism of the Atomists and the Stoic belief in a divine providence"; cf. M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa (Göttingen, 1948), 1, 354f. The above explanation is offered by Gärtner, Areopagus Speech, 47f., for the fact that only Stoics and Epicureans are mentioned at Acts 17: 18.

[141] Cf. Gärtner, Areopagus Speech, 67: "The quotation of often isolated phrases from older Greek literature enabled them [Jews of the Diaspora] to prove that, in their best moments, the Greeks also paid homage to the Jewish doctrine of the One God and the reality of the Creation. . . . Their propaganda for the One God found important points of contact in such monotheistic currents as were admitted by the Mediterranean world at the beginning of the era under review, as also in the monotheistic tendency in current philosophical education and religious syncretism." Further evidence in notes 1 and 2 there.

Amid the easy syncretism of the day there existed in religious and philosophical circles a type of henotheism or growing monotheism, the notion of one God who rules the universe.

Three aspects of this concept have been developed by Edwin Hatch as especially significant for their influence upon later Christian thought.[142] First, the notion of one Supreme Being as part of the Greek Gottesbild. Enough has been said to show that the qualities of unity in God, order, and personality, even the feeling that he is benevolent and loving toward man, were being proclaimed especially by the Stoics. Need we remind ourselves that Paul, nonsyncretist that he often was, took advantage of such a view as his startingpoint in the address at the Areopagus (Acts 17:22ff.)?[143] He seems there to share with the Stoics the belief that "from the rationality and order in nature, man deduces a Supreme Being governing all things."[144] The other two qualities the Greeks attributed to God as world ruler were even more significant for later Christian theology, however.

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[142] Hatch, Greek Ideas, 171ff.

[143] For the most recent summary on the subject, cf. Gärtner, Areopagus Speech. In contrast to E. Norden, Agnostos Theos (Leipzig, 1913), who concluded the speech was not by Luke, but modelled in Attic on a biography of Apollonius and inserted in Acts in the second century as a Stoicizing gesture, Gärtner stresses, properly, I think, the Jewish Diaspora theology as basic in understanding the contents of the address. That Philo provided significant influence on the church fathers in offering, among his "Scriptural Presuppositions" to philosophy and theology, an emphasis on these very points, the existence and unity of God, his creation of the world, and his divine providence, is argued by H. Wolfson, Philo (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1947), 1, 164ff.

[144] Gärtner, Areopagus Speech, 111.

The second was the conception of this one God who rules the world as creator of this world.[145] This was an important link in the train of thought that reasoned from an orderly universe which man observes back to a God of order whom he does not observe: this God must have created this world, this God of order brought an orderly universe out of chaos. Sometimes, characteristically, in Stoicism, God and the world were conceived of as one "stuff"— hence ὁ κόσμος can be used a term for deity — and the world is some sort of self-evolution of God. In other cases, particularly among the Platonists, a dualism between the divine Mind and the matter out of which the universe was made, is assumed and some sort of creation posited. The questions posed by Greek thought here had to be considered by the Christian thinkers, and solutions were not always easy, as the struggles about such issues in the second and third centuries show.[146] However, it is significant that the fathers of that period, in talking about God's "economy," which for them had a special meaning, with regard to redemption first of all, also had to include in connection with this topic of

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[145] Hatch, Greek Ideas, 174-208.

[146] The problem of creation was solved in different ways by different Christian groups: e.g., evolution (the Valentinians), or an act of creation by God, or an inferior Demiurge (Marcion). Related to this was the problem of evil: how could a good God make a morally imperfect world? Monists assumed a Fall story; dualists held evil was implicit in matter or posited creation by subordinate beings. The question of free will also had to be dealt with. The emphasis on the corporeality of God, especially strong in some Stoics, usually met with patristic rejection; cf. H. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1956), 1, 87.

"economy," not only the matter of God's providential rule in the affairs of the world, but also his creation of that world.[147] And this connection, between God's rule and his creation of the universe, is one that had already been made in Greek thought, upon which the fathers were to lean so heavily.

With the concept of God as Supreme Being who created the world was also connected a third element in the Greek Stoic Gottesbild, selected by Hatch as influential: namely, the idea of God as moral Governor.[148] The picture of God who administers the affairs of the universe in an orderly way— affairs of which man is inevitably a part— here came into contact, and at times into conflict, with the old Greek principles of goodness and justice. The Stoic picture of God as moral Governor of the universe proceeded simply to add these elements to its Gottesbild. The God who rules was regarded as both just and good; the divine administration punishes those who disobey and cares for those who are good; even apparent evils that happen to this latter group are to be reinterpreted as part of the whole providential administration of things. A divine forethought or purpose is posited for the universe, beneficent to the individual as well as to the whole, and providence, destiny, and reason are identified with a beneficent God ruling in a fixed order of nature.[149] Naturally, not all men accepted such ideas; Epicureans emphatically rejected them. And again Christianity inherited problems at this point: the relation of a divine administration of the world and belief in a just and good God, to the evils and misery of this present world.[150]

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[147] E.g., Irenaeus, in reporting the "Rule of Truth" at Adv. Haer. 1. 22 (cf. 4. 20) includes the concept of "one Almighty God . . . creating all things, disposing, and governing all things through his Word and Spirit (unus Deus omnipotens . . . per Verbum et Spiritum suum omnia faciens, et disponens, et gubernans)." Here a "Monarchy" is accepted as over against Marcion's two gods, but this very term for the "rule of One God" became a bone of contention in regard to the new meanings oikonomia took on in Christian usage.

[148] Hatch, Greek Ideas, 209-237.

But in spite of all these problems implicit in the concept of an economy or *dioikēsis* of God, it is obvious that here there existed a picture of God which lent itself readily to the New Testament outlook. It is not too great a step from Epictetus' portrait of God as the Master of the Great Household, opening the door and saying to us, "Come," to the picture Jesus gives of God as the Householder inviting, even compelling, men to come into the banquet in the Kingdom of God![151]

Greek philosophical and religious thought at the time Christianity was emerging thus provided the significant concept of a divine economy, the idea of order, system, and plan in the universe under one supreme God who had created the world and cares for it and its inhabitants. What the early Christian thinkers did was to bring this conception of a divine economy with its elements of order, system, and plan, into connection with what was central for them in their understanding of God, namely, their experience in Jesus Christ. There developed, though not without considerable problems, however, a theology which made much of this divine economy, a theology which related the economy of God to what may be called the "Christ-event."[152] This theology expressed the conviction that in Jesus of Nazareth and the series of activities which made up his brief life on earth the plan of God, for mankind and the universe, had been revealed. So it is that for the church fathers the economy of God, their frequent theme with its diverse ramifications, centers in this Jesus. But they also managed, as they struggled with the question of the historical and philosophical, as well as the existential, meaning of the Christ-event, to incorporate many of the traditional ideas which were associated with a divine administration in non-Christian, prepatristic thought (creation, providence, ethics, and the like) into the Christian economy which viewed Jesus as the mid-point of it all and the key to everything.

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[149] *Ibid.*, 215f. Usually, however, the Stoic idea of providence did not apply to the individual, another point of contrast to later patristic thought; cf. H. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1956), 1, 88.

[150] On these problems in Stoic and Christian thought, cf. *supra*, 429ff., note 61.

[151] Arr. *Epict. Diss.* 2. 13. 14, and Luke 14: 15-24 (especially verse 21; cf. Matt. 22: 7, ὁ βασιλεύς).

Precisely how this pattern unfolded in patristic thought, bringing together Christ-event and the older concept of a divine administration, will have to be the subject for future investigation. The whole development did not take place, of course, without influence from certain elements in Old Testament and Jewish thought and linguistic usage— the synagogue, Diaspora Judaism, and mediating thinkers like Philo providing an important bridge that brought together biblical concepts and Greek ideas and terminology and carried them on to the young church; this area of Jewish influence also requires fuller investigation than it has previously received. But above all, it is now clear that the background against which all this development must be viewed is that of earlier Greek usage; the entire complex of ideas about oikonomia in patristic thought must be seen in the light of previous, pagan contributions. Our investigation has shown that here, as in so many other areas, Greek philosophy and philosophical language, particularly in Stoicism — which Reitzenstein once said provided the "theological koiné for all the religious movements of late antiquity"[153] — contributed a part of the vocabulary and many of the definitive concepts that were to enter into the patristic economy of God.

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[152] I use the term, popularized by Oscar Cullmann among others, though aware of misunderstands inherent in it, as a brief reference to the Crucifixion, Resurrection, Incarnation, and other events in the life of Jesus, all of which, singly or collectively, are referred to by the term oikonomia in the fathers.

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[153] R. Reitzenstein, Die Hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen (3rd ed.; Leipzig, 1927), 7.

PART III

RESULTS:

SUMMARY ON THE USE OF OIKONOMIA AND RELATED TERMS IN GREEK SOURCES TO ABOUT A.D. 100, CONCLUSIONS AND TENTATIVE APPLICATION TO PATRISTIC USAGE, AND THE SIGNIFICANCE FOR FURTHER STUDY

1. Summary on the Use of oikonomia and Related Terms in Greek Sources to about A.D. 100

The examination of earlier literature on the subject in Part I indicated the importance of oikonomia and its related terms in early Christian usage and suggested further the significance of pre-Christian Greek application of the words as a basis for understanding many of the patristic nuances. At the same time the previous studies on the topic generally exhibited a dependence upon the samplings made in secondary sources for the pre-Christian usages or relied on much older collections of data, assembled in the prepapyrus days, with no attempt at completeness even for the classical authors. There was implied more than once in these previous studies the need for a more thorough examination of the history of the word oikonomia and its related terms, based on the facts of linguistic usage.

Part II of this dissertation has considered in detail the group of terms under study in their usage by non-Christian Greek authors for the period down to about A.D. 100, in order to show how widespread were the applications and nuances of oikonomia and its family of words in the pre-Christian world.

This examination has proceeded along semasiological lines, from the root meaning down to the later derived senses; along chronological lines, from the earliest examples cited in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. through to A.D. 100, and in a few cases on into the second century A. D. to tie together a point; and from the standpoint of logical development, from the original application of the root oikos in the word to a household, then its extension to a city or state, and finally to the world and universe. We have observed that the term was employed constantly in the home, in government circles, in business negotiations and legal procedures, in literature and oratory, for philosophical and religious discussion, and in everyday speech. The papyrus evidence makes very clear that the words were not confined merely to authors, thinkers, and men trained in the schools of rhetoric, but were part and parcel of the linguistic usage of the average man in a hundred different ways.

The results of this survey would seem to justify the very lengthy and detailed treatment of evidence involved in such an approach along historical and linguistic lines. Study of this non-Christian, pre-patristic material suggests certain direct lines of influence upon patristic application, which previous investigators could not have been expected to bring out because they were not working firsthand and in such detail with these background documents. The usage of oikonomia and its family of words prior to A.D. 100 have turned out to be even more "many-sided" than would have been first supposed, and the array of meanings before the Christian period even richer in explaining some of the patristic turns given to the word than previously imagined. In short, this accumulation of evidence offers fuller explanations for some early Christian phrases and ideas than was heretofore possible and provides a backlog of data from contemporary usage which must first be analyzed and considered before any other sources for Christian applications of these words can be conjectured.

Before, however, this evidence on pre-Christian, Greek uses of oikonomia and its related terms can be applied more directly to patristic passages, it will be helpful to sum up the findings of the detailed examination in Part II. Accordingly, the four chief meanings for the word which have been pointed out will now be summed up in outline form, along with the subsidiary ones as well. This scheme of classification will not only serve to bring together in more compact form these findings, but can also provide a handy frame of reference in future discussion of the patristic applications of the terms.

Following this summary, in order to demonstrate how common these meanings were in the writings of a man at the precise time the earliest Christian literature was being written down, examples illustrating each of the major sense will be cited from the works of Plutarch, who lived from c. A.D. 46 till sometime after A.D. 120. The fact that most of the meanings isolated in Part II of the dissertation can thus be found in a writer of about A.D. 100 will help to show just how current the terms in their variety of meanings were at the outset of Christian literary activity, and will also demonstrate the general reliability of the outline summary on findings as a convenient guide to the usage of these words in subsequent writers, pagan or Christian.

Then in the light of this summarization of the evidence on prepatristic, non-Christian usages of the terms, general conclusions will be offered, a word of warning added about future investigation, and some specific applications of the findings to patristic problems noted in Part I suggested. In conclusion, a word will be said concerning the significance of these findings for further study on the topic.

A. An Outline of the Uses of oikonomia and Related Terms in Greek Sources to about A.D. 100

The arrangement of this summary follows in general the order of the chapters in Part II of this dissertation. Thus each of the four chief meanings corresponds to one of the chapters there. The arrangement of submeanings under each heading also parallels on the whole the development sketched in Part II. The outline is thus almost a chart or lexicographical index for the body of the dissertation. The underlined words suggest the most important points in the skeleton of the outline.

Oikonomia and its related terms occur in Greek sources:

1. In the sense of household management— the ordering, administration, and care of domestic affairs within a household; husbandry which implies thrift, orderly arrangement, frugality, and is, in a word, "economical."

   Hence also, the duty of an οἰκονόμος: to achieve such a type of household management.

   Thus, "the art or science of household management" involves wide scope: care of a farm or a large estate, slaves, family, money, even matters of trade and commerce, as illustrated in the popular treatises and comments on the subject by Xenophon (Oeconomicus), Plato, Aristotle, Pseudo-Aristotle (Oeconomica), Philodemus (Peri oikonomias), and others.

2. Applied by extension to the management of a larger household— the ordering, administration, and care of:

   a. an army or military matters - "arranging an army" with regard to supplies or for battle; therefore also "conduct of operations" and "disposal, distribution of spoils";

b. *a city or political affairs*. A parallel between an estate (οἶκος) and a city-state (πόλις) is implicit here, though the political unit in question may range from a city to an empire. Especially, since the term often had commercial or business connotations, with reference to *financial affairs or administration*:

thus διοικεῖν often means "administer or disburse funds"; οἰκονομίαι, "state revenues"; οἰκονομία, "market, fair."

Applied to *specific titles in governmental administration*:

in Ptolemaic Egypt particularly— διοικητής, οἰκονόμος; ἡ οἰκονομία, "administration of grain, taxes, etc."; but also in the Seleucid empire, Greek city-states, elsewhere; in Roman times, in both public and private usage.

Also used for officers *in guilds, social organizations, religious groups, and the temple administration* of the Sarapis cult; out of this type of application comes the later ecclesiastical usage, the οἰκονόμος in a congregation or monastery, and "diocese" for an administrative division.

3. Applied by further extension, literally or metaphorically, to *arrangement in general*— management, ordering, direction, or regulation in various specific areas, including:

a. *legal arrangements* of many types— "commercial arrangement"; "legal step," concerning, e. g., tax collection; sale, purchase, renting, or hiring of property; registration of land or people; encumbrances on property; and for a *will* or final testament.

Then also, for *the record or document itself* involved in these transactions: "deeds," "document for land transfer."

b. *the arrangement of the body or of life* generally—
   in medicine— "arrangement" of medicines or of the body;
   "distribution" of nourishment, "digestion."
   to "arrange" the physical, external details of life.

c. *arrangement of materials in the arts*, e.g., in
   architecture— "arrangement," "wise management," "disposal of supplies" (*dispensatio*);
   music— "Dorian arrangement" (?);
   especially in literature— of a play, "production"; or the arrangement of a letter, or a book, or *of history*— thus, the over-all "arrangement" of events in history by Chance (Polybius and other historians);
   regularly in the scholiasts, for "plot," "dramatic arrangement," "device";
   and in rhetoric, sometimes with the added notion of purposeful and *deceitful arrangement*— "economic order," the arranging of material with an idea of expediency; "ordering" of material to cover weak arguments with stronger ones; thus in later rhetoricians, "expedient arrangement" (διοίκησις) and "artificial arrangement for a purpose" (οἰκονομία), in contrast with natural, chronological arrangement (τάξις).

d. and even the *arrangement of* one's *conduct*, again according to inner purposes and sometimes with a deceitful or shady connotation— "the execution of an inner intention"; thus, actual policy in accord with inner purposes, while external conduct may be covered by feigning. Such usage leads to the later sense of "accommodation" and "economical behavior."

4. Applied by ultimate extension to the management of the largest "household" imaginable, the universe—— therefore the arrangement, ordering, regulation, direction, or management of the cosmos (the world and its parts and the people in it) by nature or by God, especially with reference to providence. A parallel between the state (πόλις) and the world (κόσμος) is here assumed.

A scheme of arrangement, διοίκησις or οἰκονομία, is believed to be visible in nature, in the heavens, for example, leading to:

1) a concept of the management or administration of the universe (διοίκησις) found already in the Pre-Socratics; and

2) the concept of a supreme being, regarded as "the one who arranges" (ὁ διοικῶν or οἰκονομῶν, Xenophon); thus God is the "dispenser" (ταμίας).

Developed especially in Stoicism: οἰκονομία and διοίκησις were here employed for the "economy" or world administration or divine universal government.

In Zeno, Cleanthes, and especially Chrysippus, this διοίκησις implies one who administers (ὁ διοικῶν or ὁ διοικητής, but not ὁ οἰκονομῶν) who is equated with nature, reason, fate, destiny, Zeus, and providence, a combination which relates cosmic order to moral order and therefore has implications for ethics and moral behavior.

Also in the later Stoics, with syncretistic tendencies.

Particularly reflected in Dio Chrysostom, who parallels the διοίκησις of the universe with the διοίκησις of Trajan; *and in Epictetus*, who stresses "the divine administration" (ἡ θεία διοίκησις), with God as ὁ διοικῶν and as οἰκοδεσπότης (the term οἰκονόμος is implied but never used). Lucian even satirizes Zeus "administering" (οἰκονομῶν) things personally in his overburdened "administration" (διοίκησις).

B. The Uses of *oikonomia* and Related Terms About A.D. 100 Illustrated in Plutarch

Plutarch of Chaeronea, man of letters and priest of Apollo, provides an excellent source in which to test word occurrence and usage at the time of primitive Christianity, since he was born just before Paul reached Europe on his Second Missionary Journey, lived in the period when most of the New Testament was being written, and died a decade or so after the last of the subapostolic writers like Ignatius were passing out of the picture, just before the rise of the earliest Apologists.[1] Since Plutarch's contacts took him throughout Greece, as well as to Rome, Sardes in Asia Minor, and Alexandria, and since he writes in a literary koiné Greek, he is a fair test for linguistic matters in the *lingua franca* of the Empire at that time. It is significant then that Plutarch reflects most of these uses of *oikonomia* and related terms just outlined.

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[1] The evidence is conveniently assembled by Daniel Wyttenbach, *Lexicon Plutarcheum* (Leipzig, 1843).

Plutarch frequently employs the words in the first sense of household management. **οἰκονομία** means "running a household," [2] and **οἱ οἰκονομικοί** are the estate managers of whom Xenophon had spoken.[3] One essay on education, attributed to Plutarch, but more likely from another hand, though descriptive of conditions in his day, complains that "from among the best slaves, men appoint some as farm managers, others as shipmasters, others as tradesmen, others as household managers (**οἰκονόμους**)," but any old worthless rummy they set in charge of their sons as paidagogos![4]

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[2] Plut. Amat. 21C (Mor. 767C): **⟨ὧν⟩ οἱ μὲν ἄθλια γύναια προικιδίοις ἐφελκόμενοι μετὰ χρημάτων εἰς οἰκονομίαν καὶ λογισμοὺς ἐμβάλλοντες ἀνελευθέρους, ζυγομαχοῦντες ὁσημέραι διὰ χειρὸς ἔχουσιν.** In the case of men who are peevish and not inclined to falling in love, "of men who are of this nature, some, having dragged off sorry little lassies with dowries, thrusting them with their goods into running a household and into keeping niggardly accounts, are at it continually, quarrelling with their mate day after day"; other men of such a nature merely want to beget a child immediately and dispense with love.

[3] De recta ratione audiendi 6 (Mor. 40C): **ὡς γὰρ ὁ Ξενοφῶν φησι τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων ὀνίνασθαι καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, οὕτω τοὺς ἐγρηγορότας καὶ προσέχοντας οὐ μόνον κατορθοῦντες ἀλλὰ καὶ διαμαρτάνοντες ὠφελοῦσιν οἱ λέγοντες.** "For as Xenophon says that estate managers derive benefit both from friends and enemies, so also speakers, not only when they succeed, but also when they fall short, benefit those who are watchful and attentive." The reference is to Xen. Oec. 1.15, supra, 164 , note 26. Note the analogy between household management and rhetoric.

It is the assumption of all men, wrote Plutarch, that in a household "to store up, to preserve, and to arrange. . . [possessions in order] are useful and profitable qualities."[5] Elsewhere he speaks of "the necessary household arrangements (τὰς ἀναγκαίας οἰκονομίας)" for a family, meaning the transactions necessary to supply the wants of a household.[6] During the "Dinner of the Seven Wise Men," one of the topics discussed by Plutarch's characters is "how a household should be managed (περὶ οἴκου ᾗ χρηστέον)," a discussion which includes the supplying of wine as part of oikonomia, and which also takes up the topic earlier writers on the subject had concerned themselves with, namely, "the acquisition of some mearure of property which shall be sufficient in itself and adequate."[7]

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[4] De liberis educandis 4 (Mor. 4B): τῶν γὰρ δούλων τῶν σπουδαίων τοὺς μὲν γεωργοὺς ἀποδεικνύουσι, τοὺς δὲ ναυκλήρους, τοὺς δ᾽ἐμπόρους, τοὺς δ᾽οἰκονόμους, τοὺς δὲ δανειστάς· ὅ τι δ᾽ἂν εὕρωσιν ἀνδράποδον οἰνόληπτον καὶ λίχνον, πρὸς πᾶσαν πραγματείαν ἄχρηστον, τούτῳ φέροντες ὑποβάλλουσι τοὺς υἱούς.

[5] De comm. not. 22 (Mor. 1069A): καὶ μὴν πάντες ἄνθρωποι τὰς ἐκλογὰς καὶ τὰς τηρήσεις καὶ τὰς οἰκονομίας, ὅταν χρήσιμοι ὦσι καὶ ὠφέλιμοι, τότε χρησίμους καὶ ὠφελίμους ὑπολαμβάνουσι.... In a discussion of the Stoic idea of utility (**ὠφέλεια**): "Moreover all men, when they are useful and profitable, assume that storing up, keeping, and arrangements (i.e., arranging, bestowing of things) are then useful and profitable."

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[6] Lyc. 25 (Vit. 55A): διὰ τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ τῶν ἐραστῶν ἐποιοῦντο τὰς ἀναγκαίας οἰκονομίας. A discussion of life in Sparta, which deliberately kept many citizens out of business concerns: those under thirty years of age were not accustomed to go to the market place at all; "they provided for their necessary household arrangements through kinsmen and lovers." Stephanus, Thesaurus, col. 1790, refers the term to "necessary negotiations in the administration of family affairs"; the sense could be the acquiring of food supplies or, more broadly, business negotiations necessary for life.

[7] Conv. sept. sap. 14 (Mor. 157A): ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ πάλιν περὶ οἰκονομίας λόγος γέγονε, τίς ἂν φράσειεν ἡμῖν τὸ ἀπολειπόμενον; ἀπολείπεται δ' οἶμαι κτήσεώς τι λαβεῖν μέτρον αὐτάρκους καὶ ἱκανῆς ἐσομένης. "Since the conversation has again come to household management, who would tell us what has been omitted? There has been omitted, I think, the acquisition of some measure

Frequently Plutarch cites examples from history for what he considers good oikonomia or domestic economy. Pericles, who stayed in power for forty years under the Athenian democracy, set up his private affairs so that they would function efficiently, untainted by corruption, and not interfere with his public life. His wealth, Plutarch says, "he arranged into the sort of domestic economy (συνέταξεν εἰς οἰκονομίαν) which he supposed to be easiest and most exact": he bought and sold in quantity, not small lots, and had careful records kept by one servant Evangelus— "no one else being gifted by nature or prepared by Pericles for household management (πρὸς οἰκονομίαν)."[8] Crates the Theban (365–285 B.C.), on the other hand, is related to have abandoned his estate in favor of poverty and philosophy, "because he disliked the very details of administration (αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς οἰκονομίας) and the cares and

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of property which will be sufficient in itself and adequate." Cf.12 (154F ff.), where the sages define how a house should be managed.

[8] Per. 16 (Vit. 162 A-B): τὸν πατρῷον καὶ δίκαιον πλοῦτον... συνέταξεν εἰς οἰκονομίαν ἣν ᾤετο ῥᾴστην καὶ ἀκριβεστάτην εἶναι. τοὺς γὰρ ἐπετείους καρποὺς ἅπαντας ἀθρόους ἐπίπρασκεν, εἶτα τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἕκαστον ἐξ ἀγορᾶς ὠνούμενος διῴκει τὸν βίον καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν δίαιταν. ... ὁ δὲ πασαν αὐτοῦ τὴν τοιαύτην συνέχων ἀκρίβειαν εἷς ἦν οἰκέτης Εὐάγγελος, ὡς ἕτερος οὐδεὶς εὖ πεφυκὼς ἢ κατεσκευασμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ Περικλέους πρὸς οἰκονομίαν.

distractions of property."[9] Crassus (c. 112-53 B.C.) acquired slaves of many types and skills, including stewards (διοικητάς) to manage his financial interests, and trained them carefully himself to serve their master's interests, as "living tools of the science of household management (ὄργανα ἔμψυχα τῆς οἰκονομικῆς)," Plutarch adding the comment that for Crassus, like Aristotle, the oikonomikē science deals with men as well and finance.[10]

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[9] De vitando aere alieno 8 (Mor. 831F): αὐτὰς δὲ τὰς οἰκονομίας καὶ φροντίδας καὶ περισπασμοὺς δυσχεραίνων....

[10] Crass. 2. 7 (Vit. 544A): τοσούτους ἐκέκτητο καὶ τοιούτους, ἀναγνώστας ὑπογραφεῖς ἀργυρογνώμονας διοικητὰς τραπεζοκόμους, αὐτὸς ἐπιστατῶν μανθάνουσι καὶ προσέχων καὶ διδάσκων καὶ ὅλως νομίζων τῷ δεσπότῃ προσήκειν μάλιστα τὴν περὶ τοὺς οἰκέτας ἐπιμέλειαν ὡς ὄργανα ἔμψυχα τῆς οἰκονομικῆς. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ὀρθῶς ὁ Κράσσος, εἴπερ ὡς ἔλεγεν ἡγεῖτο τὰ μὲν ἄλλα διὰ τῶν οἰκετῶν χρῆναι, τοὺς δ' οἰκέτας δι' αὑτοῦ κυβερνᾶν. τὴν γὰρ οἰκονομικὴν ἐν ἀψύχοις χρηματικὴν οὖσαν, ἐν ἀνθρώποις πολιτικὴν καὶ βασιλικὴν γιγνομένην δρῶμεν. "He (Crassus) acquired so many slaves and of such abilities, readers, amanuenses, assayers of silver, financial administrators, table-stewards, he himself being in charge of those learning, himself paying attention and doing the teaching, and generally considering that it is especially

Mention has been made of Crassus' *dioikētai*; the same noun was used by Plutarch to designate the steward of Alexander the Great,[11] the steward of Philotas, a contemporary of Alexander,[12] a steward of Anthony in Corinth by the name of Theophilus,[13] and also in the plural for the managers of the household of Aratus whom Cleomenes appointed to watch over the former's property;[14] in another passage these stewards of Aratus are

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proper for the master to take care of his slave as living tools of the science of household management. And this Crassus did rightly, if indeed, as he was accustomed to say he thought that other matters were to be taken care of through the slaves, but the slaves were to be governed by himself; for we see that the science of household management concerns finance in the case of lifeless things, but becomes a matter of political and monarchial concern in the case of men." The allusion is to *Arist*. *Pol*. 1. 1253b 32 (*supra*, 175 , note 58), and the whole passage an excellent reflection of the teachings of Xenophon and Aristotle on the subject carried into practice.

[11] *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*, *Alexander* 7 (*Mor*. 179F).

[12] *Alex*. 48. 2 (*Vit*. 692B)

[13] *Ant*. 67. 9 (*Vit*. 947D). This man, **ὁ ἐν Κορίνθῳ διοικητής,** is a person of some authority and probably is more than a slave; cf. *infra*, 512 , note 45.

[14] *Arat*. 41. 4 (*Vit*. 1046E).

referred to as epitropoi, but they are instructed to manage (διοικεῖν) the property entrusted to them.[15] This verb is also once employed for "managing" flocks and herds.[16]

To go on a bit further, in regard to primary and derived meanings of the terms, Plutarch sees a relationship between household management and state management. He notes, on one hand, some difference between them and contends in his essay on "Old Men in Public Affairs," that it is wrong to urge someone who has served as a statesman to retire later on "to some sort of domestic management and keeping accounts (πρὸς οἰκονομίᾳ τινὶ καὶ λογισμοῖς διαθησόμενος)."[17] He employs the analogy that this is like stripping a freeborn woman of her gown, dressing her up in a cook's apron, and putting her to work in a tavern; "the worthiness and greatness of ability in public life is thus destroyed when it is turned to household affairs of some sort (πρός τινας οἰκονομίας) and money-making."[18] Here Plutarch reflects the common notion we have observed which connects oikonomia with mere money-making, and the custom that the details of household administration should be entrusted to a slave. But on the other hand, a more positive relationship between household and state is also brought out at times, as in this paragraph in the Lives:

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[15] Cleom. 40 (19). 7 (Vit. 813D).

[16] Pyrrh. 5. 5 (Vit. 385E).

[17] An seni 9 (Mor. 789C).

[18] An seni 4 (Mor. 785D): καὶ γὰρ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς οὕτως ἀπόλλυται τὸ ἀξίωμα καὶ τὸ μέγεθος πρός τινας οἰκονομίας καὶ χρηματισμοὺς ἀγομένης.

> It is commonly agreed that man does not possess any capacity which is higher than the capacity to rule a city or a state ("the political virtue," τῆς πολιτικῆς...ἀρετῆς); and the majority of men assume, I believe, that the ability to manage a household ("the virtue of household management," τὴν οἰκονομικήν) is no small part of this political capacity, for the city-state (or political unit) is in some sense a collection of households . . . . Now when Lycurgus banished silver and banished gold from Sparta and established for them a coinage of iron which had been ruined by fire, he did not release the citizens from household management (οἰκονομίας), although he did remove the enervating and festering and inflammatory qualities of wealth . . . . And Cato certainly was in no sense a more indifferent champion of the household than of the state, for he himself increased his own livelihood and was a teacher of household management (διδάσκαλος οἰκονομίας) and of agriculture for others. . . . Yet Hesiod says many things in exhorting us to righteousness together with household management (πρὸς οἰκονομίαν), and reproaches idleness as the beginning of injustice.[19]

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[19] Comparison of Aristides and Cato Major 30 (3) (Vit. 354 A-C): ὅτι μὲν δὴ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἄνθρωπος ἀρετῆς οὐ κτᾶται, τελειο-

Throughout the paragraph household and state are viewed as related. The closing section, following Hesiod, suggests that efficient management belongs together with just rule and that men who neglect their

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τέραν, ὁμολογούμενόν ἐστι· ταύτης δέ που μόριον οἱ πλεῖστοι τὴν οἰκονομικὴν οὐ σμικρὸν τίθενται· καὶ γὰρ ἡ πόλις οἴκων τι σύστημα .... ὅπου καὶ Λυκοῦργος ἐξοικίσας μὲν ἄργυρον ἐξοικίσας δὲ Χρυσὸν τῆς Σπάρτης, νόμισμα δὲ διεφθαρμένου πυρὶ σιδήρου θέμενος αὐτοῖς, οἰκονομίας οὐκ ἀπήλλαξε τοὺς πολίτας, ἀλλὰ τὰ τρυφῶντα καὶ ὕπουλα καὶ φλεγμαίνοντα τοῦ πλούτου περιελών.... φαίνεται τοίνυν ὁ μὲν Κάτων οὐδέν τι φαυλότερος οἴκου προστάτης ἢ πόλεως γενόμενος· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ηὔξησε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ βίον καὶ κατέστη διδάσκαλος οἰκονομίας καὶ γεωργίας ἑτέροις .... καίτοι πολλὰ μὲν Ἡσίοδος πρὸς δικαιοσύνην ἅμα καὶ πρὸς οἰκονομίαν παρακαλῶν ἡμᾶς εἴρηκε καὶ τὴν ἀργίαν ὡς ἀδικίας ἄρχην λελοιδόρηκεν.

The reference to Hesiod is to Op.306-09: "Let it be your care to order (κοσμεῖν) your work properly, that in the right season your barns may be full of food. Through work men grow rich in flocks and substance, and working they are much better loved by the immortals."

households are the same men who begin to provide for themselves in unjust ways— and this is just as true in the state as it is in an individual household, since there is a parallel and connection between the two.

The use of oikonomia for management in a larger household, the state, our second general usage, has already been seen in several of the examples quoted above. Sometimes Plutarch goes further and mixes the figures of the house manager and political administration; thus when Perseus, king of Macedon, fighting against the Romans in the second century B.C. had the chance to hire 20,000 professional soldiers for the war, he refused to pay the price required in gold, acting "as if he were a steward (ὥσπερ οἰκονομῶν), rather than a foe of the Romans."[20] Plutarch here seems to reflect the view that the average oikonomos was stingy and parsimonious.

Elsewhere Plutarch employs the words in regard to political arrangements, especially of financial administrations. Thus οἰκονομία is used for the "administration" of the public treasury in Rome in the sixth century B.C.[21] The term can refer to the management of a public office, like that of quaestor or praetor, in the time of the Gracchi.[22] Again the plural form may mean the financial accounts themselves kept by a quaestor; scrupulous Cato, it is said,

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[20] Aem. 12. 4 (Vit. 261A): ἀπείπατο καὶ προήκατο τὴν συμμαχίαν, ὥσπερ οἰκονομῶν, οὐ πολεμῶν Ῥωμαίοις, καὶ λογισμὸν ἀποδώσων ἀκριβῆ τῆς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον δαπάνης. Perseus out of parsimony "renounced and abandoned the alliance, as if he were serving as a house manager, not fighting the Romans, and was to give an exact account of the expenses for the war."

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[21] _Publ_. 12. 3 (_Vit_. 103C): ἐπῃνέθη δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸν ταμιευτικὸν νόμον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἔδει χρήματα πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον εἰσενεγκεῖν...τοὺς πολίτας, οὔτ' αὐτὸς ἅψασθαι τῆς οἰκονομίας οὔτε τοὺς φίλους ἐᾶσαι βουλόμενος, ...ταμιεῖον μὲν ἀπέδειξε τὸν τοῦ Κρόνου ναόν...ταμίας δὲ τῷ δήμῳ δύο τῶν νέων ἔδωκεν ἀποδεῖξαι. Publicola, traditionally one of the first Roman consuls, _c_. 509 B.C., was "praised also on account of the law concerning the public treasury. For when it was necessary for the citizens to bring contributions for the war, . . . because he himself did not wish to assume the administration and did not want to allow his friends to do it, . . . he made the temple of Cronus into a treasury, . . . and allowed the people to appoint two young men as quaestors."

[22] _Ti_. _Gracch_. 10. 6 (_Vit_. 829D): ...ὥστε πάντας ὑποδείσαντες ἀφεῖναι τὴν ἑκάστῳ προσήκουσαν οἰκονομίαν. Tiberius, in order to force a vote on his land law, forbade all magistrates in an edict to transact any public business and sealed the temple of Cronus so that the quaestors might make no deposits or withdrawals, "with the result that all officials, having grown fearful, withdrew from the administrative function which was proper for each."

> even after he had laid down the quaestorship, did not leave the treasury destitute of his watchful care, but his slaves were present day by day, copying the transactions (διοικήσεις), and he himself, having bought for five talents the books containing accounts of public transactions (βιβλία λόγους περιέχοντα δημοσίων οἰκονομιῶν) from the time of Sulla to his own quaestorship, always had these in hand.[23]

The participial form τὰ ᾠκονομημένα is also used to refer to the "acts of administration of a quaestor," in a similar story about the indefatigable honesty of Tiberius Gracchus.[24]

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[23] *Cat*. *Min*. 18. 7 (*Vit*. 767E): οὐ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἀπαλλαγεῖς τῆς ταμιείας ἀφῆκε τῆς φρουρᾶς ἔρημον τὸ ταμιεῖον, ἀλλ᾽ οἰκέται μὲν αὐτοῦ καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἀπογραφόμενοι τὰς διοικήσεις παρῆσαν, αὐτὸς δὲ βιβλία λόγους περιέχοντα δημοσίων οἰκονομιῶν ἀπὸ τῶν Σύλλα χρόνων εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ταμιείαν ὠνησάμενος πέντε ταλάντων, ἀεὶ διὰ χειρὸς εἶχεν.

[24] *Tib*. *Gracch*. 6. 2 (*Vit*. 826D): . . . οὐκ ἔχων ἀπολογίσασθαι περὶ τῶν ᾠκονομημένων . . . . While Tiberius was quaestor in Spain, the Roman army was forced to make a truce with the Numantines, leaving its trapped camp alive but abandoning all property there— including the ledger books and financial records

The noun οἰκονομία also turns up in Plutarch for the "administration and management of the grain trade" with Egypt, meant as an equivalent for the Latin title curatio annonae.[25] The plural of the same word is found for money affairs or "financial transactions" (τὰς φυγαδικὰς...οἰκονομίας) of refugees reaching back in a tangled web, sometimes for fifty years.[26] The verb oikonomein once means "serve as

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of the quaestor. Tiberius went back, however, with only a few attendants and asked for his records, so that he might not be maligned by enemies at home "because he was not able to give an account concerning his acts of administration." He got the records back!

[25] Pomp. 50 (Vit. 645F): . . . ἐπισταθεὶς δὲ τῇ περὶ τὸ σιτικὸν οἰκονομίᾳ καὶ πραγματείᾳ . . . . Pompey sent out agents, "having been placed over the administration and management of the grain trade." D. Magie, De Romanorum iuris publici sacrique vocabulis sollemnibus in Graecum sermonem conversis (Leipzig, 1905), 116, equates the title with curatio annonae; this Latin title is elsewhere expressed in Greek by the words ἐπιμέλεια τοῦ σίτου (Cass. Dio 39. 39), ἐπιμέλεια τῆς ἀγορᾶς (Mon. Anc. Gr. 3. 6), and ἡ τοῦ σίτου πρόνοια (Cass. Dio 39. 63).

[26] Arat. 14.2 (Vit. 1033B): . . . ἀποδειχθεὶς γὰρ αὐτοκράτωρ διαλλακτὴς καὶ κύριος ὅλως ἐπὶ τὰς φυγαδικὰς οἰκονομίας μόνος . . . . Aratus of Sicyon (271-213 B.C.), "when he was appointed independent arbiter and absolute authority

administrator" in the government,[27] and οἰκονομία, to give the term the broadest application in government it seems to have in Plutarch, once signifies the "arrangement of affairs by the Senate," in the famous parable of the Belly and the Limbs, put in the mouth of Menenius Agrippa, a figure of speech distantly reflected by Paul at I Cor. 12: 12.[28]

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[27] *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* 15 (*Mor*. 812E): ...λέγειν ἀπίθανος ὢν ἐπρέσβευες ἢ ῥάθυμος ὢν ᾠκονόμεις.... A man should do in a state what he has ability for, and nothing else, Plutarch advises; greedy men, when they go beyond their limits, fail and may be reproached: "Although you were unpersuasive in speaking, you went on an embassy; or although you were easy going, you tried to serve as an administrator."

[28] *Cor*. 6. 4 (*Vit*. 216C): τὰ γὰρ ἐκεῖ τυγχάνοντα τῆς προσηκούσης ἐπιμελείας καὶ οἰκονομίας βουλεύματα καὶ πράγματα πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἐπιφέρει καὶ διανέμει τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ ὠφέλιμον. When the plebians left Rome and established themselves a few miles away to the alarm of the Senate, Menenius Agrippa is said to have won them back with a fable: once all the other members of man's body rebelled against the belly because it sat idly by and made no contribution to the common welfare while the other members slaved away for its appetites; but the belly laughed at their simplicity for not knowing that it received into itself all the body's nourishment and duly distributed it to the other members. Thus with the Senate, Agrippa implied;

Words derived from the root dioikein are found in Plutarch with an even wider range of meanings related to state management. The verb, for example, occurs in connection with military affairs, with the meaning "maintain an army,"[29] and, on another occasion, with the sense "to manage a war."[30] Besides military usage dioikein was applied in political affairs.

"for the matters and deliberations there which receive the necessary care and disposition bring and distribute to you all what is useful and beneficial." Is there a reflection here of the medical usage of οἰκονομία for the disposition of the body and distribution of food we have noted (supra, 322f.)?

The same speech is reconstructed by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Ant. Rom. 6. 83-86), who uses the phrase ἡ διοικοῦσα τὰ κοινὰ καὶ τοῦ προσήκοντος ἑκάστῳ προνοουμένη βουλή, "the Senate which administers the affairs of the public and provides what is expedient for everyone." The story is also recounted in less detail in Livy 2. 22. 9-11, and the analogy reflected at Xen. Mem. 2. 3. 18, Cic. Off. 3. 5. 22, as well as in Paul (I Cor. 12: 12ff., Rom. 12: 4f.).

[29] Pomp. 55. 12 (Vit. 649C): ...χίλια τάλαντα λαμβάνειν καθ' ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτόν, ἀφ' ὧν θρέψει καὶ διοικήσει τὸ στρατιωτικόν. They voted that he "receive a thousand talents each year, from which he shall feed and maintain the army."

[30] Luc. 29. 10 (Vit. 512C): ...ἐξ αὑτοῦ διῴκει τὸν πόλεμον. Lucullus "managed the war against Mithradates of itself," without taking a penny from the public treasury.

At times this verb has to do with both military and political arrangements, as when it is employed to describe the steps of both sorts taken by Pompey in his eastern campaigns.[31] More commonly, though, dioikein refers to arrangements in civil government, as in the phrase "the things arranged (τῶν διῳκημένων) by Cato" while in charge in Spain,[32] or of the people in a state arranging (διοικοῦσι) their own affairs,[33] or for the directing of a younger colleague in political office.[34] More specifically, the verb, used in civil administration, can refer to "the acts of administration" (διῳκημένων) of a tribune,[35] or to the managing of great state embassies.[36] It can also be employed for the administering of a city, as in the instance of Demetrius of Phalerum managing Athens,[37] and the noun derived from it, *dioikesis*, is used in a similar sense in the *Life of Lysander*, for the administration of cities (διοικήσεις πόλεων).[38]

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[31] Pomp. 42. 7 (Vit. 641D): ... διοικήσας δὲ τἀκεῖ ..., "having arranged things there" in 63/62 B.C., Pompey went on.

[32] Cat. Mai. 11. 4 (Vit. 342D).

[33] Dion 10. 3 (Vit. 962B).

[34] Cic. 45. 6 (Vit. 884B): ... καὶ τὸ μειράκιον διοικεῖν ὀνόματος καὶ δόξης γλιχόμενον .... Octavian suggested to Cicero, prior to a proposed joint consulship, that the latter take upon himself the leadership "and direct the youngster striving after a name and glory."

[35] Cic. 34. 1 (Vit. 878B).

[36] Dion. 5. 8 (Vit. 960B): ... πρεσβείας τε τὰς μεγίστας διῴκει. Dion, the relative of Dionysius I and disciple of Plato, "managed the greatest embassies."

The connotation of financial management sometimes appears in Plutarch's use of the terms. *Dioikein* can mean specifically to administer financial affairs,[39] and *dioikesis* takes on the same emphasis in the phrase "oversight and management" of financial affairs,[40] or in an application to the administration of the office of overseer of public revenues in fifth century B.C. Athens (τῶν δημοσίων προσόδων ἐπιμελητής),[41] and in the reference we have already seen to the records of the quaestor in Roman times.[42]

Words from this same root, *dioikein*, likewise crop up in Plutarch as official titles of various sorts. Eros, described as ὁ τὰ ἐν

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[37] *Dem*. 8. 4 (*Vit*. 892B): τὸ μὲν ἄστυ Δημητρίου...διοικοῦντος.... "Demetrius was administering the city" of Athens.

[38] *Lys*. 23. 11 (*Vit*. 447A).

[39] *Cat*. *Min*. 38. 2 (*Vit*. 777F).

[40] *Brut*. 3. 3 (*Vit*. 985C): ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ διοίκησιν.

[41] *Aristides* 4. 4 (*Vit*. 320E): ...ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν διοίκησιν, cf. 4. 3 (320D) for the title.

[42] *Cat*. *Min*. 18. 9 (*Vit*. 767E), *supra*, 506, note 23.

Αἰγύπτῳ διοικῶν, is the Roman procurator in Egypt whom Caesar Augustus is said to have had nailed to the mast of a ship because he roasted and ate a champion fighting quail![43] The noun dioikētēs once describes the similar position of procurator which Areius held in Sicily.[44] This noun likewise finds use to describe the steward named Theophilus, whom Antony placed in Corinth,[45] and, in the plural, to denote the stewards whom Antony stationed in Athens to administer the grain supply.[46] Dioikētēs also is one of the words Plutarch choose to describe the office Gaius Gracchus obtained for himself, when he introduced bills for colonizing cities, building roads, erecting public granaries, and so forth, for these enterprises "establishing himself as director and manager" (αὑτὸν ἄρχοντα καὶ διοικητὴν ἐφιστάς).[47] Such a title was by no means limited to Roman offices, however; Plutarch also makes *dioikētēs* do service for the administrators appointed in Cappadocia by Eumenes of Cardia, the secretary to Alexander the Great and loyal supporter of his interests,[48] and for the administrators of the King of Egypt, both in pre-Hellenistic and in late Hellenistic times.[49]

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[43] Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata, Caesar Augustus 4 (Mor. 207B): ἀκούσας δὲ ὅτι Ἔρως ὁ τὰ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ διοικῶν ὄρτυγα τὸν κρατοῦντα πάντων ἐν τῷ μάχεσθαι καὶ ἀήττητον ὄντα πριάμενος ὀπτήσας κατέφαγε, μετεπέμψατο αὐτὸν καὶ ἀνέκρινεν· ὁμολογήσαντα δὲ ἐκέλευσεν ἱστῷ νηὸς προσηλωθῆναι. "When he [Caesar] heard that Eros, who was administering affairs in Egypt, had purchased a quail which was the champion of them all at fighting and was undefeated, had roasted the bird, and eaten it, he summoned him and examined him on the matter; and after Eros confessed, he ordered him to be nailed to a ship's mast."

[44] Ibid., 5 (Mor. 207B): ἐν δὲ Σικελίᾳ Ἄρειον ἀντὶ Θεοδώρου κατέστησε διοικητήν.

[45] Ant. 67. 9 (Vit. 947D), cf. supra, 500, note 13.

[46] Ibid., 68. 8 (Vit. 948B): εὐθὺς γὰρ τῶν Ἀντωνίου διοικητῶν καὶ στρατιωτῶν φυγόντων, διανείμασθαι τὸν σῖτον αὐτούς. "For immediately when the administrators and soldiers of Antony had fled, they distributed the grain."

Finally, with regard to application in governmental circles, it may be noted that the noun *dioikēsis* appears in Plutarch, along with *dioikein* and *dioikētēs*, not only for the administration of cities and of finances and revenues, as noted above,[50] but also for an administrative measure,[51] and for the governorship of provinces, as, for example, of Cicero's administration in Cyprus and Byzantium.[52] This latter usage for a governor's administration in a province under the emperor's supreme authority, it may be noted, is once compared to the rule of subordinates in the universe under the authority of a supreme manager, in the course of an argument against the views of Chrysippus.[53]

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[47] *C. Gracch*. 27 (6). 3 (*Vit*. 837D).

[48] *Eumenes* 3. 14 (*Vit*. 585A).

[49] *Ages*. 36. 7 (*Vit*. 616E), of the Egyptian king in 361 B.C.; *Cat*. *Min*. 38. 4 (*Vit*. 778A), of the Ptolemy's officials on Cyprus, in 56 B.C., cf. *supra*, 254, note 120. *Oikonomos*, as pointed out, *supra*, 263, note 143, also occurs in Plutarch to designate a steward in the Ptolemaic household on Cyprus in the first century B.C.

[50] *Supra*, 511, notes 37 and 39-41.

[51] *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* 19 (*Mor*. 814D).

Examples of the third general sense of "arrangement" for *oikonomia* can be found in Plutarch too. At one point he uses the word in a significant paragraph to describe nature's arrangements in the human body. Nature's careful and precise workmanship in making man, Plutarch says, can be seen especially in the "processes of procreation," though he begs off describing them; but one example is offered: in a mother's body, "the production and administering of milk (ἡ τοῦ γάλακτος ἐργασία καὶ οἰκονομία) suffices to make manifest nature's foresight and care," and he goes on to describe how the mother produces milk for the child via the breast, which "tapering off into flesh that is full of springs and able to filter the milk accurately through minute passageways, provides a storehouse for food which is comfortable for the infant's mouth and pleasant for it to touch and grasp. But there would be no benefit from such implements for procreation and such arrangements (τοιούτων οἰκονομιῶν) and such zeal and providence, if nature had not also planted in mothers love for offspring and care."[54] The passage is important because Galen, Philo, and Clement of Alexandria all cite the same figure, stressing the orderly, providential care of nature.[55] Plutarch's use of *dioikēsis* for the management or digestion of food has already been noted.[56]

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[52] *Ibid*., 18 (*Mor*. 814D): ἐπιτροπὰς καὶ διοικήσεις τῶν ἐπαρχιῶν, "procuratorships and governorships of provinces." *Cic*. 34. 2 (*Vit*. 878B): τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τῶν περὶ Κύπρον καὶ Βυζάντιον διοίκησιν, "his administration of affairs concerning Cyprus and Byzantium."

[53] *De Stoic*. *repugn*. 37 (*Mor*. 1051D), cf. *supra*, 425, note 56.

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[54] *De amore prolis* 3 (*Mor*. 495D-496A): ἀρκεῖ δ᾽ ἡ τοῦ γάλακτος ἐργασία καὶ οἰκονομία τὴν πρόνοιαν αὐτῆς ἐμφῆναι καὶ ἐπιμέλειαν. ... εἰς δὲ σάρκα πιδακώδη καὶ πόροις ἀτρέμα λεπτοῖς διηθοῦσαν ἀπολήγων, εὐμενὲς τῷ τοῦ νηπίου στόματι καὶ προσφιλὲς ψαῦσαι καὶ περιλαβεῖν ἐνδίδωσι ταμιεῖον. ἀλλὰ τούτων γε τῶν τοσούτων ἐπὶ τὴν γένεσιν ἐργαλείων καὶ τοιούτων οἰκονομιῶν καὶ φιλοτιμίας καὶ προνοίας οὐδὲν ἦν ὄφελος, εἰ μὴ τὸ φιλόστοργον ἡ φύσις καὶ κηδεμονικὸν ἐνειργάσατο ταῖς τεκούσαις.

[55] Gal. (C. G. Kühn, *Medicorum Graecorum Omnia*, *Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia* (20 vols.; Leipzig, 1821-33), Vol. 4, p. 176) discusses the theories and physical details here reflected; he does not use οἰκονομία, but does refer to τῶν ἔργων τῆς φύσεως τάξις (p. 178).

Philo *Spec*. 3. 199f. employs the same figure, adding the detail that nature has not given babies sharp, straight teeth, in order to protect the mother's breasts!

Clem. Alex. *Paed*. 1. 39ff.

[56] *Conv. sept. sap*. 16 (*Mor*. 160A): *supra*, 322, note 46.

The phrase "to arrange one's life" (διοικεῖν τὸν βίον) occurs once, but this has more the sense "arrange for one's livelihood and needs,"[57] and "to live economically" (οἰκονομικῶς βιοῦν) is meant as a contrast to living in political life[58]— both these figures therefore reflect use one.

Sometimes the verb *dioikein* has the meaning "to direct" or "govern" but is applied in a figurative way; thus, for instance, the statements that Galba was not well directed (διοικεῖσθαι);[59] that Antony in his flight from Actium was "governed (διοικούμενον) not of any officer or any man or even of himself," but by Cleopatra;[60] that at another point in Antony's career flute-players, dancing girls, and other rabble poured into his quarters and "ruled the roost there" (διῴκει τὴν αὐλήν);[61] or the statement that Geryon the monster "would have been an enviable [companion in an undertaking], since he had many legs and hands and eyes, if he had directed them all with one mind."[62] It will be noted, though, that most of these figurative uses of the verb are connected with political life and activity in one way or another, and thus reflect perhaps the second main use of the set of terms we observed.

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[57] *Per*. 16. 4 (*Vit*. 162A): διῴκει τὸν βίον καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν δίαιταν (*supra*, 498, note 8).

[58] *Adv*. *Coloten* 32 (*Mor*. 1126A): ἐμοὶ δὲ περὶ τούτων οἱ οἰκονομικῶς καὶ πολιτικῶς βεβιωκότες ἐγκαλείτωσαν. "Let those who have lived in private and political life reproach me concerning these things."

[59] *Galba* 13. 2 (*Vit*. 1058B).

[60] *Ant*. 66. 7 (*Vit*. 946F): ...οὔτ᾽ ἄρχοντος οὔτ᾽ ἀνδρὸς οὔθ᾽ ὅλως ἰδίοις λογισμοῖς διοικούμενον, ἀλλ᾽... ἑλκόμενος ὑπὸ τῆς γυναικός.

[61] *Ant*. 24. 2 (*Vit*. 925F).

To return to the third use, however, the literary and rhetorical applications of the words are definitely vouched for. Plutarch speaks of poets and orators stirring their audiences "by means of subject matter, their arrangements of it (ταῖς οἰκονομίαις) and their portrayal of character."[63] Again, he quotes Menander's reply, when asked whether he had composed a new comedy as yet: "By the gods, I have indeed composed the comedy; for the plot is arranged (ᾠκονόμηται), but it is necessary to fit the lines to it," indicating he regarded subject matter and arrangement as more important than the dialogue.[64]

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[62] Praecepta gerendae reipublicae 26 (Mor. 819D): οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἦν ὁ Γηρυόνης ζηλωτὸς ἔχων σκέλη πολλὰ καὶ χεῖρας καὶ ὀφθαλμούς, εἰ πάντα μιᾷ ψυχῇ διῴκει.

[63] Conjugalia praecepta 29 (Mor. 142A-B): ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ ποιητὰς καὶ ῥήτορας, ὅσοι φεύγουσι τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ὀχλικὸν καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ κακόζηλον, τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ ταῖς οἰκονομίαις καὶ τοῖς ἤθεσιν ἄγειν καὶ κινεῖν τὸν ἀκροατὴν φιλοτεχνοῦντας. "We also see poets and orators, as many as shun the type of diction which is vulgar and rude and in bad style, employing their art to move and stir the hearer by means of subject matter, their arrangements of it, and their portrayal of character"; wives should employ similar artistry on a husband.

Finally Plutarch uses our terms in the fourth general sense, with regard to the divine administration of the universe. The Plutarchian corpus of essays is an interesting and helpful source on philosophical views and religious thinking in the late first- and early second-century world, even though not all the items listed in the catalogue attributed to Plutarch's son, Lamprias, are genuine—— the summary *De placitis philosophorum*, for example, is certainly not from Plutarch's hand as we have it, but rather is indicative of varieties of philosophical opinion in his time or slightly later. The import of Plutarch lies not in his

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The plural οἰκονομίαι is to be accounted for by the plural forms ἤθεσιν and πράγμασι on either side of it, and to be understood as synonymous with τάξις and διάθεσις as one of the five parts of rhetoric; cf. R. Jeuckens, *Plutarch*...*und die Rhetorik*, 108 [446].

[64] *De glor*. *Ath*. 4 (*Mor*. 347E): νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς ἔγωγε πεποίηκα τὴν κωμῳδίαν· ᾠκονόμηται γὰρ ἡ διάθεσις· δεῖ δ᾽ αὐτῇ τὰ στιχίδια ἐπᾷσαι. The sense here is of literary arrangement and does not suggest any distinction between διάθεσις and οἰκονομία by Plutarch, since the words are a quotation; so R. Jeuckens, *Plutarch*... *und die Rhetorik*, 108 [446].

own brilliance as an original thinker or in his excellence of style, but rather in the fact that he conscientiously reflects the ideas of his period from a number of sources and offers a wealth of anecdote and insight. His viewpoint is eclectic and removed from the extreme partisanship of some of his contemporaries, yet never without interest in things philosophical and religious. A man who made something of a reputation for himself as a lecturer especially on philosophical topics, he also had a decided religious interest and served as a priest of Apollo at Delphi from A.D. 95 until his death, a position which he took seriously, perhaps even participating in the revival of the oracle that took place under Trajan. These very qualities, philosophical concern, religious interest, but without extreme partisanship, make him a valuable source on these matters and hence on the fourth general use of oikonomia.

With regard to religion, to touch briefly upon Plutarch's position and presuppositions, he may be described as a syncretistic monotheist. Apollo served as a symbol for this concept of one God but was often combined with Isis and Osiris or identified with the other deities of Greece and Rome and those of almost every people in the empire. There was also a tendency, in Plutarch's religious thinking, to lay stress upon Rome and the Pax Romana as part and parcel of this universal monotheism and divine guidance of the world. As Oakesmith, in his study The Religion of Plutarch, has put it, the universal deities Plutarch conceived of "had the world in their providential care, and Rome was the divinely chosen instrument of their beneficent purposes. The Emperor is the depository of the sacred governing power of the world,"[65] though for Plutarch this certainly did not preclude criticism of individual emperors. It is in this general connection that one must consider a tract De fortuna Romanorum by Plutarch, in connection with this conviction about the divine mission of Rome. In this essay "he discusses the question whether the greatness of Rome was due to Τύχη or Ἀρετή — to Chance or to Providence, we may translate, if we recognize that here Chance is the divine element, and Providence the human. In other words, is the grandeur of Rome the result of human virtue and forethought, or is it a direct gift of the Deity to mankind? He declares in the latter sense, though conceding much to the valour of individual Romans; and his incidental expressions of opinion bear as much evidence to the divinely inspired and divinely guided character of Roman administration as is borne by his definite conclusion."[66] In such opinions, stressing monotheistic syncretism, a divine, providential care of the universe, and a place for the empire and emperor in this divinely arranged administration of things, which Oakesmith finds to sum up the views of Plutarch, we meet positions which we have observed in other writers of Roman times, positions which lend themselves to the theme of a divine economy in the universe.

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[65] John Oakesmith, The Religion of Plutarch: A Pagan Creed of Apostolic Times (London, 1902) (cited hereafter as "Oakesmith"), 79. On Plutarch's syncretism, cf. Oakesmith, 78ff., and especially the essay De Iside et Osiride (Mor. 351C-384B). On his monotheism, cf. Oakesmith, 95ff. With the idea that empire and emperor had an important place in the divine scheme of things, compare the sentiments of Dio Chrysostom, supra, 457ff.

[66] Oakesmith, 83. De fortuna Romanorum (Mor. 316B-326C) does not use any of the terms under study, but the general stress on Tychē is comparable with the views of Polybius, supra, 330 ff.

With regard to philosophical views, Plutarch may be said to have taken a moderate, middle-of-the-road position between Epicureanism and Stoicism, between what in his time often amounted to "the headlong precipice of Atheism and the engulfing quagmire of Superstition."[67] While his religious views tended to favor the notion of a divine guiding or administration of things generally, as noted above, Plutarch did not go all the way with the Stoic position in applying this administration to the details of individual life; in fact, we have seen in earlier quotations that he wrote in no uncertain terms against some of the extreme conclusions of the Stoics about providence.[68] Oakesmith sums up:

> While, however, establishing the providence and goodness of God as against the practical Atheism of the Epicureans, it will be seen that he [Plutarch, especially in De Sera Numinis Vindicta] is especially temperate and equally consistent with himself, in avoiding the exaggerated zeal of the Stoics who, in their eager desire to do something for the honor of Providence, had subjected the

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[67] Oakesmith, 105, echoing Plut. De Is. et Os. (Mor. 378A).

[68] Supra, 424ff.

> minutest and commonest actions of life to the jealous watching of an arbitrary omniscience, so that, as Wyttenbach puts it, 'that most gracious name of Providence was exposed to ridicule and contempt, being alternately regarded as a fortune-telling old crone, and as a dreadful spectre to alarm and terrify mankind.'[69]

Plutarch may see a certain divine order in the Roman world, and at times may even view evil as a "dispensation of Providence,"[70] but he refuses to concede the consequences which Stoics like Chrysippus had drawn out of all this; his position is too balanced, too eclectic, but the very emphasis Plutarch puts on refuting such extreme Stoic positions suggests there must have been some who held them vehemently in his day.

A fair summary of the religious-philosophical position of Plutarch is given in this statement by Oakesmith, quoting a sentence from his essay on Isis and Osiris:

> Though there are many names for the gods, "Yet it is one Reason which admonishes, and one Providence which directs, while subordinate powers have been appointed over all things. Certain peoples make use of sacred symbols which, with greater or less clearness, direct the understanding to divine knowledge, and yet not without danger, since some in their desire to shun the swamp of Superstition have unconsciously slipped over the precipice of Atheism." Here we have combined

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[69] Oakesmith, 184f.

[70] *Ibid.*,109.

> in one sentence, Plutarch's belief in the Unity of God, his acceptance of the theory of Daemons, his recognition of the truth of foreign creeds, his desire...to follow the guidance of a reverent yet inquiring philosophy on a path which is equally distant from the two great moral evils which loom so large in his mental visiton.[71]

With this view in mind on how Plutarch's own positions reflect something of the notion of a divine administration in the world, while shunning Stoic overemphasis, we may now ask how he employs the specific terms from oikonomein and dioikein in the fourth general sense for management or arrangement in the world as a big household. We have seen how he himself spoke of the arrangement which nature has provided for delivering a mother's milk to an infant as an example of the foresight of nature, and how he had suggested there are many other such providential arrangements of details in the human body which he did not deign to mention.[72] A similar view is expressed when he speaks of the oikonomiai or domestic economies of animals like ants, which show a well-knit society, courage, and cunning, as illustrating the order in nature also.[73]

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[71] Ibid., 199f., Oakesmith's translation of De Is. et Os. 67 (Mor. 378A), where the Greek reads in the key phrases, ἑνὸς λόγου τοῦ ταῦτα κοσμοῦντος καὶ μιᾶς προνοίας ἐπιτροπευούσης καὶ δυνάμεων ὑπουργῶν ἐπὶ πάντα τεταγμένων.

[72] Supra, 514f., note 54.

[73] De sollertia animalium 4 (Mor. 962D): ἐπεὶ δείγματά γε πολλὰ κοινωνίας καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ τοῦ πανούργου περὶ τοὺς πορισμοὺς καὶ τὰς οἰκονομίας, ὥσπερ αὖ καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀδικίας δειλίας ἀβελτερίας, ἔνεστιν αὐτοῖς.

Usually, though, it is in discussing and refuting Stoic ideals that Plutarch employs these terms. Thus in the essay "On the Contradictions of the Stoics," he refers to the "administration of the universe" (ἡ τῶν ὅλων οἰκονομία),[74] "the administration" (ἡ οἰκονομία),[75] and "the government of the world" (ἡ τοῦ κόσμου διοίκησις),[76] all in quotations from Chrysippus. *Oikonomia* is also on one occasion given the meaning "principle of (world) government," again quoting Chrysippus,[77] and both *oikonomein* and *dioikein* are among the verbs used to describe

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Animals differ in wisdom; "since, at any rate, there are many examples among them of society and courage and of cunning in regard to their preparations and domestic arrangements, just so, in turn, there are also many examples of opposite qualities among them, injustice, cowardice, folly."

Cf. *Ibid*., 11 (967D): τὰς δὲ μυρμήκων οἰκονομίας καὶ παρασκευάς, "the domestic arrangements and preparations of ants."

[74] *Ibid*., *De* *Stoic*. *repugn*. 34 (*Mor*. 1050A), *SVF* 2, 269, 4 (*frag*. 937), *supra*, 421, note 54; cf. *ibid*., 35 (1050E), *SVF* 2, 338, 9 (*frag*. 1176).

[75] *Ibid*., 34 (1050C), *SVF* 2, 269, 26 (*frag*. 937), *supra*, 423, note 55, and 432, note 62.

[76] *Ibid*., 9 (1035C), *SVF* 3, 17, 7 (*frag*. 68): *supra*, 411, note 41.

[77] *Ibid*., 35 (1050E), *SVF* 2, 338, 5 (*frag*. 1176), *supra*, 427, note 59.

the management of affairs in this world government.[78] Once too the noun *dioikēsis* was used in such an argument over these Stoic notions to refer to provinces in an empire, but in a sense meant to parallel the spheres of rule by underlings in a divine administration of the universe.[79]

To this list may be added in summary one concluding example, not noted previously, but of the same general type. In the treatise *Concerning Common Opinions against the Stoics*, Plutarch employs both the noun *dioikēsis* and the verb *dioikein* in replying to the Stoic assumption that the wise and virtuous man is always happy like Zeus, no matter what happens. Plutarch answers that this "wise man" never existed, "but rather there are countless thousands of men who are wretched in the worst way, in the state and government of Zeus, even though this possesses the best administration (τὴν ἀρίστην ... διοίκησιν). Now what would be more contrary to common sense," he concludes, "than that, although Zeus administers (διοικοῦντος) the best way possible, we fare as badly as possible?"[80] Here Plutarch is employing the characteristic Stoic vocabulary in his own right as part of the counterargument. Comparable with it is the passage, already cited, from the spurious De placitis philosophorum, which voices a similar contention and sums up what was a frequent reaction to the Stoic claims, employing this time the verb oikonomein: "If God exists and human affairs are administered by his providence, how is it that baseness prospers and the refined suffers the opposite?" so that Agamemnon or Heracles, for example, suffer misfortunes?[81] Plutarch himself, to whom this question is attributed, certainly reflected just that point of view in other genuine writings, and the passage is true to his convictions. And so while not agreeing

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[78] οἰκονομεῖν— *ibid.*, 37 (1051B), *SVF* 2, 338, 31 (*frag.* 1178), *supra*, 425 , note 56.

διοικεῖν— *ibid.*, 34 (1050A), *SVF*, 2, 269, 18 (*frag.* 937); [*De fato*] 11 (574D), *SVF* 2, 264, 7 (*frag.* 912), *supra*, 409 , note 37; [*De plac. phil.*] 886D, *supra*, 433 , note 64.

[79] *De Stoic. repugn.* 37 (*Mor.* 1051D); *supra*, 514 , note 53, and 425, note 56.

[80] *De comm. not.* 33 (*Mor.* 1076B): ἄπλετοι δὲ μυριάδες ἀνθρώ-

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πων κακοδαιμονοῦντες ἐπ’ ἄκρον ἐν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς πολιτείᾳ καὶ ἀρχῇ τὴν ἀρίστην ἐχούσῃ διοίκησιν. καίτοι τί μᾶλλον ἂν γένοιτο παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἤ, τοῦ Διὸς ὡς ἔνι ἄριστα διοικοῦντος, ἡμᾶς ὡς ἔνι χείριστα πράσσειν; The tone given these stock Stoic phrases is almost sarcastic.

[81] [De plac. phil.] 1. 7 (Mor. 881D): πῶς δέ, εἴπερ ὁ θεὸς ἔστι καὶ τῇ τούτου φροντίδι τὰ κατ’ ἄνθρωπον οἰκονομεῖται, τὸ μὲν κίβδηλον εὐτυχεῖ τὸ δ’ ἀστεῖον τἀναντία πάσχει; The passage is specifically attributed to Aëtius, an eclectic of the first and second century A.D., by the editor, Pseudo-Plutarch; cf. supra, 434, note 65. Generally the editor of this collection of philosophical opinions reflects Epicurean views, but this particular idea certainly is in line with what Plutarch says in genuine essays. On the theme,

with the Stoic sentiments himself, Plutarch does preserve for us examples of how common the usage of these terms was in the philosophical and religious language of his day with reference to the divine administration of the world. And since, we have seen, from the more general conclusions of Oakesmith, Plutarch's personal convictions were not unsympathetic to the notion of a divine over-all management of things by *Tychē* which had

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cf. the words of Ennius (239-169 B.C.), preserved in Cic. *Div*. 2. 50. 104 and *Nat*. *D*. 3. 32. 79 (J. Vahlen, *Ennianae Poesis Reliquiae* (Leipzig, 1903), 178f.):

> Ego deum genus esse semper dixi et dicam coelitum,
> Sed eos non curare opinor quid agat humanum genus;
> Nam si curent, bene bonis sit, male malis, quod nunc abest.
> "I have always said and shall say that the race of heavenly gods exists,
> But I do not think that they care what the human race does;
> For if they cared, the good would fare well, the evil badly—which is now lacking."

The use of *dioikein* at [*De plac*. *phil*.] 1. 6 (*Mor*. 880A) is not especially significant: "Where did men obtain a concept of god? Hence those who have handed on a tradition of veneration for the gods [i.e., the Stoics] have claimed it has been directed (διοικεῖσθαι) to us through three forms," the physical, the mythical, and testimony from the laws.

so blessed the Roman empire— the view he took in opposition to the godless tenents of the Epicureans, though denying at the same time full application of this divine economy to the more minute details or happenings of individual life— perhaps we can speculate that Plutarch avoids these terms in expressing his own beliefs just because they were so frequently identified with Stoic thought as a semitechnical part of its vocabulary. Plutarch certainly is a witness to the current usage of the words, however, in the sense of a divine arrangement of things in the universe.

Thus oikonomia and its related terms seem amply demonstrated by these illustrations from Plutarch as common coin of the first and early second century vocabulary of the Greek-speaking world, and a surprising number of the shades of meaning found in our general survey are illustrated in this one author who stands contemporary with the beginnings of Christian literature.

2. Some Conclusions and Their Tentative Application to Patristic Usage

Having now summarized the chief uses of oikonomia and related terms in prepatristic Greek sources and having listed examples for most of these meanings from a single writer at the end of the first century A.D., we may now draw some obvious conclusions from this evidence.

1) Oikonomia and its family of related words were from the beginning capable of a very many-sided application.

2) In pre-Christian usage these words show even wider and more frequent applications in a host of areas than previous surveys had suggested, with particularly common employment in the documents of everyday life.

3) These terms were very definitely "in the air" during the late first century and early second century A.D. with a variety of established meanings which had accumulated over the years and which Christian writers often took over. The fact that the words were so common and so readily applicable to new situations made their usage by Christians all the more inevitable.

4) It is in the light of these already established uses, vouched for in pre-Christian Greek sources, that the Christian applications are primarily to be understood. Here is a reservoir of evidence which no future investigation should ignore.

5) The terms, true to their nature and past history in linguistic usage, can also be expected, however, to continue to be applied in new ways, but even here any further applications must be considered in the light of the earlier usages which still remain basic. Just as, in the prepatristic course of development, there was usually some logical or natural connection underlying each new sense of application and connecting it with the earlier meanings, so now, with regard to any new ways in which the church fathers

employ the terms, there may well be links to be sought relating these to the older senses. Past experience teaches us not to expect that new applications and connotations will arise ex nihilo from any Irenaeus, Origen, or Chrysostom, without the inheritance of some influences from the long and involved past history of these words.

In this combination of facts we have an explanation as to why the word oikonomia, so seldom found in the New Testament, becomes so comparatively common in later Christian writers. The obvious answer suggested by the evidence is that this word and its family of related terms with established meanings and connotations were already a commonplace in popular, legal, governmental, literary, rhetorical, military, philosophical, and religious types of speech in the contemporary Graeco-Roman world. As Christianity moved out into this Graeco-Roman world from its Palestinian birthplace and sought to express itself so that the peoples of this world could understand its message and claims, it found in these words a set of terms and ideas— one of many that the Christian movement took over— through which and in the light of which it could give voice to its concepts and develop them.[1]

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[1] To say this is not to ignore the very obvious fact that some of the New Testament passages using these terms have a Palestinian background— the dishonest oikonomos in Jesus' parable at Luke 16: 1ff. is perhaps the reflection of an actual case of a shrewd but corrupt steward in Jesus' day (so, e.g., J. Jeremias, The Parables of Jesus (London, 1954), 20, note 2); cf. supra, 141, note 2, and 246, note 102, on the existence of the title and position in Greek inscriptions in Palestine and as a Hebrew loan word. The remarks above are not meant to imply that such a parable could arise only among the Christian communities on gentile soil because of the use

Here then we have an answer to a basic problem with which our research began: how is it that this word *oikonomia*, limited in occurrence in biblical authors, is found in almost every church father in one sense and usually

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of this term. Rather the point is that since the word *oikonomia* and a number of fairly clearly defined concepts connected with it *already* existed in pagan Greek usage, it is only natural to look *first* for any background for these terms in the Graeco-Roman world where they are so amply vouched for than anywhere else, in Jewish apocalyptic, for instance, or in pre-Christian Gnosticism.

Is it accidental that the noun *oikonomia* occurs in the New Testament only in Luke, Paul, and Deutero-Paul (Ephesians, Colossians, I Timothy), all documents which reflect the outlook and environment of the Graeco-Roman world, rather than a more Jewish cast? Likewise, the noun *oikonomos* and the verb *oikonomein* crop up only in Luke, Paul, and I Peter within the New Testament, again suggesting a gentile outlook, rather than any perspective and vocabulary of Jewish apocalyptic (for exact occurrences in the New Testament, see *supra*, xxxiv, note 1). Dinkler, it will be recalled, felt the origin of the *oikonomia* theme (and vocabulary too apparently) was in Jewish apocalyptic. The evidence from Greek sources and the word occurrence in the New Testament suggest a different background, and perhaps his further suggestion of gnostic influence is more correct (*supra*, 118, notes 68, 69). But what all these guesses show to be plainly needed, in addition to the exploration of Greek sources here carried out, is a thorough study of Jewish materials for the terms and ideas and also an examination of the gnostic remains; hence the remarks *infra* on the necessity of these tasks as a note of caution against seeing everything in terms of Graeco-Roman data.

several?[2] It is because the word was so common in the world of these fathers; thus it was natural for them to adopt the term in their writings. Here too an explanation is furnished for the multitude of meanings which the term takes on in the fathers, a multitude of senses so perplexing to the reader, the very difficulty which touched off this entire investigation. The reason for this variety of patristic applications would seem to be the fact that the word always behaved like that; it was its nature to go on attracting new uses, as well as extensions and intensifications of its older ones. All these problems, then, of patristic usage and many more our examination of pre-Christian Greek sources helps deal with; but before noting some specific examples of how this background knowledge of earlier usage sheds light on the patristic data, a word of caution must be sounded here on the peril of trying to explain everything in the light of the pre-Christian Graeco-Roman senses. Jewish uses must be considered too.

The Significance of Jewish Usage of the Terms

These words were mediated to Christian writers not only by Graeco-Roman authors but also through Jewish sources employing the Greek language in the Diaspora. Thus oikonomia and its related terms occur in the Septuagint, in Philo and Josephus, and in other Jewish materials of the period, seemingly employed with many of the same meanings that have been noted above for pagan sources in Greek.[3] There is always the possibility, however, that at the pen of a Jewish writer the words could take on new meanings and associations — such at least always was the way of these words in time past, and a careful examination of the full evidence from Jewish documents in Greek might prove quite revealing.[4]

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[2] Supra, xxxiii f.

[3] On word occurrence in the Septuagint, cf. supra, xxxiv, note 1. Further, cf. Lillge, 10, on Philo and Josephus (briefly, with the comment that oikonomia occurs in these two authors "in the classical senses"), and 13

(on the two Septuagint uses); and, more thoroughly, but not exhaustively, Verhoeven, 118f., summarized *supra*, 75f. Verhoeven also finds that the examples in these Jewish authors have the same meanings in general as the secular Greek ones do. These treatments, it will be noted, do not take into consideration other Jewish evidence such as the *Letter of Aristeas* (e.g., "God governs (διοικεῖ) the whole universe," 254; "just as all things are fashioned by God, they are also administered (διοικεῖται) by his will," 234; and "all things . . . are administered (οἰκονομούμενα) by a single power," 143); other pseudepigraphical works (cf., for example, *The Testament of Abraham*, in *Texts and Studies: Contributions to Biblical and Patristic Literature* (Cambridge, 1892), Vol. 2, Number 2, p. 112, line 5, "Abraham, . . . you have heard completely your dispensation (τὴν οἰκονομίαν σου)," referring to a report by Michael on Abraham's death and resurrection); and fragments of other Jewish writers (e.g., Artapanus, quoted by Alexander Polyhistor in Euseb. *Praep. Evang.* 9. 23 (429d 2), Joseph "was made administrator (διοικητὴν)" of Egypt).

[4] Note especially the observation by Verhoeven, 118f., cited *supra*, 75f., that "not οἰκονομία but the synonym διοίκησις . . . is used in the LXX whenever the talk is of God who rules or orders his kingdom," and that "Philo also shows . . . the preference for διοίκησις, while οἰκονομία is used by him only in the profane sense." He adds in his summary that, while, in Philo, "God's reign over the world is called *monarchia* [rather than *oikonomia*], the practical extension of it is διοικεῖν, a single time

Regardless of what new connotations such an investigation might disclose, however, the noteworthy point is that through these Jewish usages of the words, *oikonomia*, *dioikēsis*, and the related terms, there was established a connection between all the ideas which they conveyed in the Greek world and the God of Israel witnessed to in the Hebrew scriptures. To put it into specific terms in one particular case, there was here the possibility of bringing together the "divine administration" motif of Greek Stoic philosophy with the Hebrew notion of the Reign or Rule of Yahweh in the world. One need not follow any theory about Jewish apocalypticism being responsible for the *oikonomia* theme in early Christian thought, but simply allow the fact that in the Diaspora, Jewish thinkers and missionaries were bringing

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οἰκονομεῖν," and for this the noun *dioikēsis* is also employed. The Logos, further, is assigned the mediating task of executing this *monarchia* or *dioikēsis*, but Philo avoids the name *oikonomos* for the Logos, just as he avoids *oikonomia* for his task.

Verhoeven derives these Philonic uses from his second and third classical Greek meanings, namely, political arrangement or management, and arrangement in general. His case is weakened because he did not present the extensive evidence for what we have called the fourth pre-Christian usage in Greek writers, namely, for a divine administration of the world. There is more connection here between Philo and the Stoic writers who emphasized this idea than has previously been pointed out. Verhoeven's presentation would also have been more significant if the passages in the *Quaest. in Gen.* and *Quaest. in Ex.* had been included. However the importance of his work is the establishment of the fact that in Philo's writings these terms of Stoic philosophy are now applied to the God of the Old Testament, and a careful pattern has been indicated for what terms Philo employs and avoids.

together the insights of their covenant faith and the terminology and ideas of their gentile environment.

Thus through this cultural, linguistic, and religious melting pot, conveniently referred to as Diaspora Judaism, especially in the work of Jewish missionary endeavor and writers like Philo,[5] there was a link from Graeco-Roman usage of our terms to the taking up of them by Christian authors. It was, though, a link which not only *transmitted* materials from its varied heritages; it also *transformed* them at times, colored the applications of the words, shaped them, and perhaps even changed them for patristic use. Accordingly, it must be allowed, Jewish uses of these words, in comparison with the Greek uses, may show *differences*, coming from the differing Jewish view of God, of man, of the universe, and of salvation; such differences may lead only to slightly different shades of meaning or they may result in totally new senses. At the same time there are also *likenesses* between conceptions in the two streams of thought, and the words of the *oikonomia* family at times expressed such likenesses. Thus, for instance, in its missionary preaching of one God, Judaism took over part of the "philosophic religiosity" of the Hellenistic world, and in this process Bultmann notes, "God's rule over the world through Wisdom [as presented in the Old Testament] is conceived in analogy to the Stoic view of the administration διοίκησις of the world by the spirit."[6] What is more significant, to follow this same example a bit further, Christian writers, like Paul, took over this same parallelism of Hebrew and Stoic ideas and terms and used them in combination as, for example, at Romans 1-2, Acts 17, and I Clement 20.[7] In these passages is found an emphasis on "natural theology" in the Stoic style, yet full of Old Testament insights, together with reiteration of the theme of law and order and a providence in the natural phenomena which make up the divine *dioikēsis*.[8] The point is made by Bultmann when he observes in connection with the development of Christian doctrine in the late first and early second century, "Thoughts taken from the natural theology of Stoicism are put to service . . . to describe the origin of the world out of God and his governance of the universe. Both motifs, the Hebrew and the Stoic, appear side by side"; but Bultmann also recognizes the transformation which comes in the Jewish-Christian use of such Stoic materials, when he adds that in such usage "natural theology is never treated by and for itself," but rather, for example, "the reference to the divine διοίκησις (governance) of the universe, I Clem. 20, is made in the service of an exhortation to peace and harmony."[9]

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[5] The especially important place of Philo will be suggested in several examples discussed *infra*.

[6] R. Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament* (translated by K. Grobel, 2 vols.; New York, 1951 and 1955) (cited hereafter as "Bultmann, *Theology*"), 1, 65.

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[7] *Ibid.*, 1, 66-72, 229; on I Clem. 20, cf. especially G. Bardy, "Expressions stoiciennes dans la I^{a} Clementis," *Recherches de Science Religieuse*, 12 (1922), 73-85, who notes that the author, while employing the models of the Stoic philosophers and using their vocabulary, was not a Stoic, but a Christian of Jewish background dealing with a familiar Old Testament theme. Cf. also W.C. van Unnik, "Is I Clement 20 purely Stoic?" *Vigiliae Christianae*, 4 (1950), 181-189, who likewise stresses Jewish sources and notes the oriental origins of Stoicism itself. The passage is a good example of how what has often been called "Stoic" in patristic writers also has another background in the Old Testament, or, more accurately, in the combination of the Old Testament and Greek philosophy and vocabulary already made in Jewish circles.

[8] Cf. Bultmann, *Theology*, 1, 71.

[9] *Ibid.*, 2, 145f.

Both likeness and differences therefore in Jewish usage of our terms, as compared with the classical Greek senses, are to be expected, and this Jewish usage is at the same time a bridge to, and a point of change and adaptation for, patristic usage. Certainly a thorough study is needed on this evidence in the light of the Graeco-Roman applications we have outlined. Attention must here be called to this Jewish "bridge," however, in order to give some indication of its potential significance and to prevent any notion that patristic applications are to be understood only in the light of Hellenistic backgrounds we have sketched.

Some Specific Applications of the Non-Christian, Prepatristic Background to Usages in the Church Fathers

In view of the findings of Part II of this dissertation, yet aware of some possible Jewish influences which call for further study, we may now offer some tentative suggestions about the application of this material to areas of patristic usage which have been noted in previous studies on the topic of oikonomia.

A. The "Rule of God" or "Administration of God" Theme

The concept of a divine rule in the world, an "economy" of God, existed in pagan thought, we have seen, and was expressed by the Greek philosophers, especially the Stoics, and in popular thought, by the terms ἡ διοίκησις and ἡ οἰκονομία for this administration of God and by the terms ὁ διοικῶν and ὁ διοικητής for the divine administrator. These pagan sources, however, almost never employed the title ὁ οἰκονομῶν for the ruling deity and deliberately avoided the noun ὁ οἰκονόμος for him because of the menial, servile connotations attached to the word.[10]

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[10] Supra, Part II, Chapter 4, especially 415f.; exception: οικονομῶν

Philo, it has been indicated, also spoke of the rule of God in the world, reflecting Old Testament conceptions but employing a Greek terminology which has much in common with the Stoic usage. Philo referred to a διοίκησις of God, sometimes also using the term *monarchia*, but avoiding the word οἰκονομία for it. As verb forms for the practical extension of this *dioikēsis*, usually through the Logos, he favored *dioikein*, using *oikonomein* only once, and significantly he never appears to refer to the Logos or to God as *oikonomos*, according to Verhoeven.[11]

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at Xen. *Mem.* 4. 3. 13.

[11] Verhoeven, 118f., cited *supra*, 75f. and 533, note 4. The verb *oikonomein* is once used by Philo with reference to God, according to Verhoeven, at 1, 3, 12 (*De Opificio Mundi* 2), "It is a worthless and unprofitable doctrine to maintain that there is anarchy in this world, as in a city, as though it had neither protector, arbitrator, or judge, whose task it is that all be administered (οἰκονομεῖσθαι) and directed." To this should be added 2, 247, 23 (*De Confusione Linguarum* 21), "God who is governor of the universe, arranging (οἰκονομῶν) and piloting all safely." Thomas Mangey in his edition of Philo (London, 1742) emended the MSS reading, οἰκονομῶν, to οἰακονομῶν, "steering," a change followed by Cohn-Wendland and subsequent translators, though Verhoeven, 81, note 27, argues, correctly, I think, for the MSS reading.

There are two possible exceptions to Verhoeven's statement that Philo nowhere calls the Logos an *oikonomos*, both occurring in the treatises of Philo preserved in Armenian, which his treatment did not consider: *Quaest. in Gen.* 4. 110 (on Gen. 24: 22), which R. Marcus, in his Loeb Library edition (London, 1953), 1, 393, renders, "The divine Logos is the governor and administrator of all things," remarking in a note that the Greek text

Christian writers too speak of an administration of God in the universe. They make use of the word οἰκονομία much more than either Greek or Jewish sources did to describe this divine rule[12] but seem to use the terms ἡ διοίκησις, ὁ διοικῶν, and ὁ διοικητής somewhat less frequently than the pagan philosophers did.[13] What is more, the church fathers also avoid the

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there read κυβερνήτης καὶ οἰκονόμος or something of the sort; and *Quaest. in Ex.* 2. 39 (on Ex. 24: 11b), where Marcus' translation (2, 82) refers to those who have made a migration to "a holy and divine place, which is called by another name, Logos, . . . through the steward," the latter term being expressed in Greek, according to his note, by διὰ τοῦ οἰκονόμου (or ἐπιτρόπου or διοικητοῦ). Marcus further refers to R. Reitzenstein, *Die Vorgeschichte der christlichen Taufe* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1929), who reports, 117, note 3, that the Armenian word here means "Hausverwalter," and further, 119, identifies the Logos as the διοικητής or *dispensator* in Philonic thought.

[12] On the occurrence of *oikonomia* in the fathers, cf. *supra*, xxxiv, note 1, and Lillge, *passim*.

[13] This observation upon the frequency of patristic examples involving these words from *dioikein* is admittedly a somewhat generalized impression based upon reading the fathers and the preliminary collection of evidence I have made. Since Lillge does not include the terms in his study at all and Verhoeven offers little data, a fuller investigation is necessary.

In such an investigation we may dismiss the many cases where *dioikēsis* occurs with the meaning "church administration," as, for instance, in the *Clementine Homilies*; cf. *Die Pseudoklementinen* I, *Homilien*, *GCS* 42 (edited by B. Rehm, Berlin, 1953), *Epistola Clementis* 3. 3 (page 7, line 14), 3. 5 (page 8, line 2), 4. 4 (page 9, line 2), 5. 1 (page 9, line 4), 16. 5

title ὁ οἰκονόμος either for God or for Christ almost completely—it

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(page 19, line 5).

The terms, of course, do occur in more significant senses with regard to the divine administration, and fairly early at that, in the Apostolic Fathers and the Apologists; e.g., the administration (διοίκησις) of God in the heavens, at I Clem. 20. 1, Diogn. 7. 2 (pl.), Just. *Dial*. 29. 3, and Athenagoras 24. 3 and 24. 5 (for the administration over matter assigned to angels) and 25. 2 (cf. 25. 1, where the verb *dioikein* is used of how "the ruler of matter . . . exercises a control and administration contrary to the good of God"). In all these instances, however, there may be influence from the terminology of Stoic philosophy (though compare 536, note 7, *supra*).

The words also appear in some later writers; for example, Dionysius of Alexandria (preserved in Euseb. *Praep*. *Evang*. 14. 27 (782d 6)) complains the Epicureans deny the divine administration (διοίκησις) of the world, and Eusebius himself uses the terms frequently: ἡ (τοῦ θεοῦ) διοίκησις (*Praep*. *Evang*.)6. 6 (249c 1), 15. 5 (798c 5); the verb *dioikein* for the rule of God or providence at *Praep*. *Evang*. 6. 6 (*bis*, 245d 2 and 251a 10), 8. 13 (385d 3), and 7. 11 (*ter*, 318b 6, 320a 2 and 4); and the noun *dioikētēs* applied to God (7. 11, 318b 8). Again, in some of these cases the passages deal with the views of pagan philosophers.

The following figures seem significant, however, in regard to patristic preference on the point. Clement of Alexandria, certainly familiar with the terminology of Greek philosophy, does not scorn using these words. *Dioikētēs* is found applied to Christ once (*Strom*. 7. 1 (9. 2), in *GCS* 17 (Clemens 3), 8, lines 10ff., τὸν πρῶτον διοικητὴν τῶν ὅλων). The verb *dioikein* appears 14 times, including applications to providence twice, the Logos three times, the world and its affairs four times, and once, occurs only once for Christ, according to Verhoeven.[14]

While a fuller investigation of the Philonic and the patristic evidence

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indirectly, to God (*Strom*. 2. 7 (32. 1), in *GCS* 15 (Clemens 2), 130, line 3). The noun *dioikēsis* crops up 22 times, including references to providence and the divine economy. But the noteworthy fact is that *oikonomia*, in comparison, appears 62 times; while *oikonomein* is found slightly less than *dioikein* (10 times to 14), and the noun *oikonomos* not once, this great difference in word occurrence seems to substantiate the impression given above. (On word occurrence in Clement, see the *index verborum* in *GCS* 39 (Clemens 4), 346f. and 591f.

The same observation is borne out even more strikingly in the figures for Origen: *oikonomia* appears in the extant writings which I have checked some 125 times, *dioikēsis* only 4 times; *oikonomein* 82 times, *dioikein* 19 times (plus *dioikonomein* once); *dioikētēs* is not to be found at all. (Figures based on the word lists in *GCS* 3 (Origenes 2), 470f. and 504; 6 (3), 328 and 338; 10 (4), 644; 22 (5), 382 and 387; 35 (9), 321; 41, 2 (12, 3), 180 and 250.

[14] Verhoeven, 121; *supra*, 77, note 58. The single exception he gives is Iren. *Adv*. *Haer*. 4. 20. 7. The reason Verhoeven suggests for this phenomenon may be noted (p. 121). He states in his discussion of New Testament passages like I Cor. 4: 1 and Eph. 3: 2 where *oikonomoi* of the mysteries of God and an *oikonomia* of the grace of God are mentioned:

> God places this administration and the preaching (οἰκονομία) of his mysteries (μυστηρίων) in the hands of the apostles and the bishops appointed through them, who in this function are called οἰκονόμοι. They take their task over against the men who are appointed as οἰκεῖοι τοῦ θεοῦ, and who together form the household of God (οἶκος τοῦ θεοῦ).

is needed in regard to linguistic usage for designating this administration of God, it would appear that there are certain points which the three

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In this connection Christ is mentioned moreover, but he has nothing to do with the "task" and is never named οἰκονόμος of God. He is rather the contents of the apostolic preaching. To preach the mystery means that God through his Son Jesus Christ wants to join himself to all heathen together with the Jews as children. The apostles are communicators, dispensers (οἰκονόμοι , dispensatores) of that secret. Jesus is together with the Father the giver of the commission. In this spirit the apostle Paul calls himself in one breath the slave of Christ and the administrator of the secrets of God (II Cor. 6: 4). The tradition in the later ecclesiastical writers remains true to this use of the word. Although men apply an abundance of epithets which qualify Jesus as servant and subordinate of the Father, the term οἰκονόμος is thereby avoided.

That there is another possible background, other than this New Testament theological insight, to be found in pre-Christian, pagan word usage is being suggested in the discussion above.

Moreover Verhoeven's statement that the term oikonomos is applied to Christ only in this one exceptional case in Irenaeus needs to be modified in the light of further evidence. I have noted the following passages, where the term is applied to Christ or even to God the Father, as additional exceptions. In the Acts of Thomas, a gnostic document of the third century, chapter 19, Thomas refers to the Lord as "the nourisher of orphans and steward of the widows" (ὁ τροφεὺς τῶν ὀρφανῶν καὶ οἰκονόμος τῶν χηρῶν). (Greek text in R.A. Lipsius and M. Bonnet, Acta Apostolorum Apocrypha (2 vols.; Leipzig, 1891-1903) (cited hereafter as "Lipsius-Bonnet"), 2, 2, 130, line 3; the title is undoubtedly under the influence of the verb oikonomein, which occurs three times in the preceeding lines; other MSS schools of thought share in common in regard to this motif, as well as a few on which they differ. Greek philosophers and Philo seem to prefer

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read προστάτης instead of οἰκονόμος here. An English translation is supplied in M.R. James, The Apocryphal New Testament (Oxford, 1953), (cited hereafter as "James") 372.)

Acts of Peter 39, where Peter, upside down on his cross, prays to Christ, "Thou art for me father, thou art for me mother, thou art for me brother, thou art my friend, thou art my servant, thou art my steward (σὺ [μοι] οἰκονόμος)." (Greek in Lipsius-Bonnet 1, 98, line 4; the Latin is tu procurans; the phrase may be drawn in under the influence of Luke 12: 42, Ficker suggests in E. Hennecke, Neutestamentliche Apokryphen (2nd ed.; Tübingen, 1924), 248. English translation in James, 335.)

Acts of Philip, a "catholic novel" of the fourth or fifth century, chapter 18, Philip prays, "O our good steward, Jesus, . . . do not overlook us (ἡ ἡμέτερος καλὸς οἰκονόμος, Ἰησοῦ, . . . οὐ παρεῖδες ἡμᾶς)." (Greek in Lipsius-Bonnet 2, 2, 10, lines 5f. English summary in James, 440.)

Origen De prin. 3. 1. 14 (GCS 22 (Origenes 5), 220, line 10), applied to God: "There is only one best administrator [of souls] (ὧν εἷς μόνος οἰκονόμος ἄριστος) . . . the God and Father of all things." The figure is used under the influence or Origen's previous allusions to Matt 13: 5-6, and God has just been called ὁ μέγας πάσης φύσεως γεωργός who sows seed in the rocky human heart.

Arius, Letter (containing his confession of faith) to Alexander, Bishop of Alexandria (313-38), dated about 321: "We know one God . . . judge of all, ordainer, dispenser (διοικητήν, οἰκονόμον)." (Greek text in Athanas. De synodis Armini 16, and Epiph. Adv. Haeres. 69. 7.)

A prayer of uncertain date but of Jewish-Christian origin, invoking the *dioikēsis* for the divine administration, the church fathers favor *oikonomia*; ὁ διοικῶν or ὁ διοικητής as a title for the divine administrator appears more commonly in Greek pagan documents than in Philo or in the fathers,[15] but all three types of religious-philosophical literature agree

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four winds: "O God, our God, the only absolute, the steward of the graces and of goodness (ὁ οἰκονόμος τῶν χαρίτων καὶ τῆς ἀγαθότητος), who makes his angels spirits, the God of the winds. . . ." (Greek text in *Catalogus Codicum Astrologorum Graecorum*, Vol. 9, Part 2, *Codices Britannicos* (edited by S. Weinstock, Brussels, 1953), p. 167, line 5, probably reflecting I Peter 4:10, οἰκονόμοι ποικίλης χάριτος θεοῦ.)

In a liturgical formula of prayer for the sick from an Egyptian liturgy, fourth century: "We beseech thee, the Overseer (τὸν ἔφορον) and Lord and Former of the body and Maker of the soul, the one who harmonizes man, the Steward (τὸν οἰκονόμον) and Governor and Savior of the whole race of men. . . ." (Greek text in G. Wobbermin, "Altchristliche Liturgische Stücke aus der Kirche Aegyptens nebst einem Dogmatischen Brief des Bischofs Serapion von Thmuis," *Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur*, 17 3 b (Leipzig, 1899), page 16, lines 9-12.)

Basil the Great (*c*. 330-379), *Ep*. 263 (405A), in a letter to the Westerners: "But if the good God and wise Manager of our life (ὁ ἀγαθὸς θεὸς καὶ σοφὸς τῆς ζωῆς ἡμῶν οἰκονόμος) stores up (ταμιεύεται) this favor for another time, nonetheless send us whatever things it is fitting should be written by you." The phrase may be under the influence of the verb ταμιεύεται, but elsewhere Basil is fond of calling God ὁ οἰκονομῶν (*Ep*. 2, 74E; cf. *Ep*. 92, 203, 204, 213, 269, 290, 300, 309, where the same participle is used of God) and ὁ διοικῶν (*Ep*. 92) and uses ταμιεύειν of God's actions (*Ep*. 2, 74E, cf. *Ep*. 1).

[15] Do the fathers shun as titles for God these colorless, rather

in shunning the terms ὁ οἰκονομῶν and οἰκονόμος for the deity.

If it is asked why all three bodies of literature avoid the titles ὁ οἰκονομῶν and ὁ οἰκονόμος for the deity, the answer must be given that it is in order to avoid applying to God the notion of a petty government official or niggardly house manager or of a slave performing menial tasks in a household or the public administration which the terms had in contemporary use. It must be added then that *patristic usage on this point follows pagan practice* quite exactly. The explanation for the fact to which Verhoeven calls attention, namely, that the church fathers so rarely call Christ or God an *oikonomos*, is that non-Christian, prepatristic writers had set this wise and natural precedent and they, in the footsteps of Philo, were simply following it.[16]

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impersonal phrases, "the Administrator," "the One who manages," because they had so many more vivid epithets for their more personal type of deity who was conceived of less abstractly than in some philosophies?

[16] Verhoeven, 119, has noted that in Philo it is the Logos who is assigned a mediating task in the execution of God's *monarchia*, though he observes that Philo nowhere calls this task, in so far as it refers to the Logos, an *oikonomia*, nor does he call the Logos an *oikonomos*. Then he goes on:

> In this respect the comparison with the eastern monarchy is not carried through by him. The task of the Logos in Philo almost falls together with that which Tertullian allots to the Logos . . . and which he designates with *dispositio* and *dispensatio*. Yet we may not without further consideration draw the conclusion that [Tertullian's use of these terms and of *monarchia*] should have developed out of the sense used by Philo. Precisely this lack of the application of οἰκονόμος to the Logos in this function —

If it be asked why the church fathers speak more often of an *oikonomia* of God than a *dioikēsis*, thus employing the term in the pair which pagan writers had used less frequently, we might conjecture that they do this precisely in order to make a distinction from pagan thought at this point.[17]

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this not only in Philo, but also in almost the whole Christian literature— leads us to this degree of caution.

Since, however, we have now seen that there is some evidence for this application of the word *oikonomos* to the Logos in Philo (*supra*, 538, note 11) and in Christian sources (*supra*, 541, note 14), and since we have now seen an obvious reason why both Philo and the fathers would desist from applying this term to the Logos— namely, earlier Greek practice— we may now say that this note of caution in Verhoeven is less necessary, and the problem of more direct connections between Philo and Tertullian at this point allows for deeper consideration.

[17] One must also allow for the possibility, to be examined in the light of the detailed evidence, that this patristic choice for *oikonomia* over *dioikēsis* could have been influenced by concepts and vocabulary implicit in the Christian message in its earliest proclamation and embodied in the New Testament documents. Was *oikonomia* perhaps the more natural term of the two to choose because of the use of the noun οἰκοδεσπότης in the gospels, as Alivisatos, 23, note 1, suggests. It would imply a "household of God" with God or Christ as the "householder," the disciples all having a task to perform in the general management of this house or its *oikonomia*. *Oikodespotēs* is applied to Christ at Matt. 10: 25, Luke 13: 25, and Matt. 13: 27 (cf. v. 37, where, in the allegorization of the early church, the householder who sows the good seed is identified as the Son of Man; some hold the reference was rather to God, cf. Bauer, 1012). *Oikodespotēs* is

Finally it may be suggested, in the light of the non-Christian, pre-patristic background we have examined, that the fathers in their writings could use or avoid the terms ἡ διοίκησις, ὁ διοικῶν, and ὁ διοικητής in referring to the divine administration depending on whether or not they wanted to suggest any parallel to the imperial administration of the day. If an author was vigorously opposed to the Roman government of his day, he would do well to leave out any possible reference in these words which suggested the imperial administration; if, on the other hand, he desired to suggest that this imperial administration was in some sense related to the divine administration of the universe, he had at hand a set of terms which had been previously employed to do that very thing in the orations of Dio Chrysostom. The use of these terms in Roman imperial administration may have been a factor in determining their usage by the fathers and, of course, accounts for the entry of one of them, διοίκησις, into ecclesiastical administration. This political connotation may also have

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applied to God (as in Arr. *Epict. Diss.* 3. 22. 4 and Philo *Somn.* 1. 149) at Matt. 20: 11 (where, even though the householder who owns the vineyard has been referred to in v. 1 as ἀνθρώπῳ οἰκοδεσπότῃ, the Old Testament source on which the parable draws, Isa. 5: 1-7, had made clear that Yahweh is the vineyard owned intended), Matt. 21: 33, and Luke 14: 21 (cf. the Matthean parallel, 22: 7, where the householder is characteristically called ὁ βασιλεύς); and to the disciples, indirectly, at Matt. 24: 43 and 13: 52. The title *oikodespotēs* for Christ occurs in the church fathers later on as well; I note one example in Peter of Alexandria, bishop 300-311, who speaks of Jesus as τοῦ οἰκοδεσπότου καὶ διδασκάλου ἡμῶν (Canon 9, *De Poenitentia*, text in M.J. Routh, *Reliquiae Sacrae* (5 vols., Oxford, 1846) 4, 32).

been a reason why *dioikēsis* was dropped in favor of *oikonomia* so often in describing the divine administration of the world.[18]

The preference, of course, could also be influenced by gnostic tendencies and ideas. A fuller examination of the whole complex of ideas is in order.

[18] Is there any connection between this Reign or Administration of God theme in the fathers and the Kingdom of God (ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ) in the gospels? The βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ which Jesus comes preaching means, of course, the reign or rule or kingship of God, rather than any sort of kingdom in the usual sense of the word. It is the Old Testament theme, "Yahweh reigns," now conceived of as breaking through in the last times, heralded and ushered in by the person of Jesus (cf. Mark 1: 14-15). It is well-known that this emphasis on the Kingdom of God (or Kingdom of *Heaven*, Matthew) is common in the Synoptics, but is much less frequently spoken of in Paul (where the stress is on the δικαιοσύνη τοῦ θεοῦ), is reinterpreted in John along lines of eternal life (ζωή), and crops up in the creeds of the early church in the formula "Jesus Christ is Lord" (Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς κύριος). The phrase Kingdom of God becomes certainly more peripheral in the patristic writers and less central than in the Synoptics, though it is a mistake to suppose the term and concept were lost; cf. on the topic, K.L. Schmidt, "βασιλεία (τοῦ θεοῦ) in den alten Kirche," in G. Kittel, *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament* (Stuttgart, 1933-), 1, 593-95; R. Frick, *Die Geschichte des Reich-Gottes-Gedankens in der alten Kirche bis zu Origenes und Augustin* (*Beiheft zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche*, 6; Giessen, 1928), who traces the history of the Kingdom of God idea in each patristic writer on the basis of the writer's God-concept, ethics, and comments on perfection,

B. Trinitarian Usage of the Terms in Tertullian

Various views have been propounded, we saw in the bibliographical survey, to explain how οἰκονομία became a trinitarian term in Tertullian and other

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eschatology, fellowship, and the church; and G.W.H. Lampe, "Some Notes on the Significance of ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙΑ ΤΟΥ ΘΕΟΥ, ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙΑ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ in the Greek Fathers," *The Journal of Theological Studies*, 48 (1948), 58-73. The comment of Schmidt, 1, 595, is suggestive, however, that the apologists and Clement of Alexandria understood the term on the basis of Stoic definitions. That *oikonomia* could have the meaning of *basileia* in the fathers is shown by Origen's *Homily on Luke* 30 (*GCS* 35 (Origenes 9), 184, 19) where τὴν Περσῶν οἰκονομίαν ἢ τῶν Ἰνδῶν is meant to refer to the βασιλείαι mentioned in the temptation narrative at Luke 4: 5.

A patent reason suggests itself why the Kingdom of God theme, so central in Jesus' teachings, might be reinterpreted along other lines in later writers, in addition to the matter of comprehensibility, which a shift from Palestine, with its Old Testament background of Yahweh's reign, to the gentile world with its different concepts, would entail; namely, the desire to avoid the political, subversive tag which street-preaching about a βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ in the Graeco-Roman world would have brought on the young church even more often than actually did occur. Certainly there is some similarity of emphasis between the βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ and οἰκονομία τοῦ θεοῦ motifs, and enough logical attractiveness about the possible reason for such a shift to warrant more investigation of the idea. It is also possible, even though the later Christian writers came to speak increasingly about an *oikonomia* of God, that the fathers kept on using the title *kyrios* for Jesus, among other reasons, because the cognate term *oikonomos* was so unsuitable and had been ruled out by pagan precedent.

writers. To review, these suggestions included the theories that this usage:

(1) evolved from the idea of an "economy," loosed from its framework in a general view of Heilsgeschichte, an evolution which took place under the influence of Logos Christology but under no pressure from secular or gnostic sources;

(2) derived from the sense of "interior organization" and so referred, Prestige argued, to the interior relationships within the godhead, again arising historically without any secular or gnostic influences;

(3) can be viewed as a parallel to the idea of the office of administrator in contemporary political organization, with a background in the position of the oikonomos in the despotic governments of the oriental and Hellenistic worlds, Verhoeven suggested.[19]

Verhoeven's own conclusions, we learned, after his examination of a number of avenues of evidence that lead to the significant passages in the Adversus Praxean, was that Tertullian's usage stems basically from the "Heilsplan type of thinking," with influence from the emerging Logos Christology and from the gnostic movement, all this to be seen against the background concept of a divine monarchia, in which Christ carries out an oikonomia in redemptive acts, though he himself is never called an oikonomos in the process; Prestige to the contrary, the term thus definitely does not indicate a trinity of being but deals with relationships in terms of redemptive activities and administrative arrangements.[20]

We can now see from our survey on non-Christian, prepatristic uses of the words involved some important bits of information which tend to strengthen the general answer Verhoeven has suggested. As early as Aristotle, the terms *monarchia* and *oikonomia* were joined together in philosophical thought, and it was insisted that a household is characterized by the rule of a single individual.[21] In Pseudo-Aristotle this theme and combination was reiterated, with talk of ἡ οἰκονομικὴ μοναρχία, "the rule by a single individual within a household," so that the notion became a traditional one.[22] Then we observed how the conception of a household broadened, and there appeared in political government, especially in eastern courts very often, a monarchial rule yet administered through the subordinate office of the *oikonomos* — one or several such officials to carry out the bidding of the one ruler in the larger political household of the state.[23]

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[19] Supra, 72f.

[20] Supra, 80f.

Next we saw that the frequently found analogy of the Stoics between *polis* and *cosmos* tended to help in carrying over such terms of civil and political administration to the government of the universe, and one might talk of a divine *oikonomia*, presuming one top ruler perhaps, with a host of subordinates or something like providence to help administer things.[24] Last of all, we learned that there was a tendency, especially in Dio Chrysostom, to parallel the imperial Roman administration and the divine government of the universe, so that Trajan's rule is a parallel in some sense to that of Zeus.[25]

Now Tertullian is heir to all this sort of thinking and all the connotations thus suggested by the terms involved. He is able, by the use of the words *monarchia* and *oikonomia*, to conjure up all the traditional associations of rule by an individual deity within the household of the world, yet still allow for the activity of an agent who in close relation carries out his bidding in certain significant areas of the divine administration.[26] It is striking, though, that Tertullian reverses the analogy we have in Dio, which saw the earthly emperor's administration as a copy and parallel of the heavenly pattern and related to it; Tertullian rather seems to use the earthly example of how in a *monarchia* there is often someone who carries into execution the plan of the one ruler to explain the relation of the Son to the Father. Drawing on current political practice, he is thus enabled to depict the Logos as administrator sharing in the Father's rule and bringing it into effect, yet at the same time he can hang on to the monotheistic notion of a sole Ruler he so dearly desires to keep as a defense against the charge of polytheism. The analogy, against this total background, becomes a very natural one to avoid the Scylla of duo- or tritheism and the Charybdis of shortchanging the increasing significance attached by Christians to the acts and position of the Logos-Son, Jesus Christ.

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[21] *Arist. Pol.* 1. 2. 21 (1255b 19); *supra*, 174, note 53.

[22] *[Oec.]* 1. 1. 1. (1343a 4); *supra*, 182, note 75.

[23] *Supra*, 213ff., especially, e.g., 224f.

[24] *Supra*, 391ff.

[25] *Supra*, 457 ff.

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[26] Possible influence from a number of New Testament passages and ideas must be allowed here. In connection with this notion that there is one universal household which God rules as sole lord and yet in which Christ (and later on also the apostles and disciples) carry out an *oikonomia*, the various New Testament passages which speak of God as a householder (cf. *supra*, 546, note 17), or imply a household of God (cf. ὁ κύριος τῆς οἰκίας, Mark 13: 35; οἰκεῖοι τοῦ θεοῦ, Eph. 2: 19) must be reckoned with. Such a view could have been encouraged by the type of thinking reflected at Heb. 3: 1-6, where Moses and Christ are viewed respectively as attendant and son within the οἶκος of God. Christ is superior to Moses, the writer argues, in the same way as the one who establishes a house is superior to the house itself (v. 3), the word οἶκος here referring not to Moses, as the analogy seems to suggest, or to a building but to the house*hold* or people of the Old Covenant (οἶκος, not οἰκία, following the usual Greek distinction; cf. *supra*, 147, note 12). He suggests that God within his world-household has established two households or peoples, those of the Old and the New Covenants (cf. v. 6, οὗ οἶκός ἐσμεν ἡμεῖς). The whole complex of thought here lends itself to the notion of God as the over-all ruler of this world-household and further to the sort of *heilsgeschichtlich* thinking which saw Moses and Christ as carrying out specific tasks for God within that household, making *oikonomiai* or covenantal arrangements.

Verhoeven also pointed out some similarities to Philo's concept of the Logos at this point, but hesitated to press them because he did not find *oikonomia* or *oikonomos* used with reference to the Logos in Philo.[27] Some evidence has now been presented to show that Philo (and the fathers) do employ these terms more often than Verhoeven assumed, and an explanation has been advanced to explain why both Philo and the fathers failed to call the Logos an *oikonomos* very frequently. These objections removed, it would seem that a fuller examination of Tertullian's trinitarian usage of the term οἰκονομία is now possible in the light of earlier uses of the word

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Even such a passage as John 14: 2 ("ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τοῦ πατρός μου are many rooms") may have bearing on the topic; οἰκία, in contrast to οἶκος which refers to the temple in John (cf. Moulton-Milligan, Part 5, 441), suggests the notion of the universe as God's household too (on heaven and earth as God's "dwelling" cf. Bauer, 1012). A fuller consideration of such possibilities is needed.

[27] *Supra*, 545, note 16.

and especially against the backdrop of the contemporary administration of political power and the traditional view of monarchia and oikonomia.

C. Graduated, Step-by-Step Arrangement within an Administrative Organization

From Persian times on, we have seen, there was strong emphasis upon a graduated type of political organization, extending downwards step by step from a supreme, central authority along a definite chain of command to subordinates and underlings, each charged with specific tasks and responsible to superiors on the ladder above. This sort of political administration with its host of officials carried over into the Hellenistic world and became a commonplace.[28] Thus in Egypt, for example, but also in other kingdoms and cities of the eastern Mediterranean, the oikonomos was a characteristic official in the dioikēsis or state administration, responsible for a specific oikonomia in the functioning of affairs for the realm.[29] In later times, under the Romans, this administrative office declined in importance but nonetheless continued on local and sometimes higher levels until at least the Arab conquest.[30] Over a period of some half dozen centuries therefore this type of administrative system existed, with its graduated series of officers reaching down to the lowest village and into almost every area of the life of the people, countless oikonomoi exercising an oikonomia as part of a larger administration of affairs.

The early Christians sometimes tended to regard themselves as men with an important part in God's ordering or administration of the world, as vital agents in carrying out the plan and program of God for men which was now revealed through Christ in the last days.[31] They, like Christ, were part of the divine economy. He, for instance, was spoken of as "*the* Apostle," sent forth by God on a mission to men, but the disciples also were *apostoloi*, agents commissioned in similar manner by God for related and likewise significant tasks.[32] Again, while the term *oikonomos* was avoided for Christ himself, his followers were nonetheless called *oikonomoi*, stewards entrusted with certain assignments to carry out in the larger *oikonomia* of salvation and God's will.[33]

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[28] Supra, Part II, Chapter 2, especially 213ff.

[29] Supra, 249ff.

[30] Supra, 232ff. and 269ff.

Behind such Christian expressions lay the conception of an over-all divine *oikonomia* or administration of things, brought to effect by Christ and his followers especially, an arrangement in which each disciple has his own particular place and significance in the economy of God for the world. Thus apostolic vocation, the office and mission of the *apostolos* or the steward, is bound up with this idea of an all-embracing divine plan and rule, and some would derive the very use of the term *oikonomos* by the early Christians to describe themselves from such an *oikonomia* concept.[34]

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[31] *Supra*, 104-108, 113.

[32] Christ is designated as ὁ ἀπόστολος at Heb. 3: 1, and as the one whom God has sent at John 17: 3 and 8. The link between this and the designation of his disciples as *apostoloi* is suggested by John 17: 18, "As thou didst send (ἀπέστειλας) me into the world, so I have sent (ἀπέστειλα) them into the world," and by John 20: 21, "As the Father has sent (ἀπέσταλκεν) me, even so I send (πέμπω) you."

[33] I Cor. 4: 1f., Titus 1: 7, I Pet. 4: 10, Ign. *Pol*. 6. 1.

[34] E.g., Cullmann, *supra*, 104-108; Dinkler, *supra*, 113; and Fridrichsen, *supra*, 113, note 47. Is there any relation of this concept to the fact that in Priene in Hellenistic times, perhaps in other cities, the office

Whether such a theory is wholly true or not, there would seem to be connections between this type of graduated, step-by-step organization, so frequent in political administration of the ancient world, and certain phases of Christian life and thinking in that same world. Quite obvious, of course, is the use of terms like *oikonomos* and *dioikēsis* in ecclesiastical administration.[35] But fuller application might be made, for instance, of all these notions as background for the emerging church organization of the early centuries. Do the various terms and procedures adopted for ecclesiastical administration borrow even more heavily than these mere terms from the type of arrangements in civil government which placed officials in an orderly chain of command and assigned each one, so often, a specific *oikonomia*? Do some types of church administration reflect a concept that within the church there were stations and orders and ranks of officials, each assigned a definite place and responsibility, in some sense, by God himself and each having a part in the divine administration of affairs? The term *oikonomos* is applied to bishops in particular, beginning in the New Testament period and extending down into the fourth century.[36] Is the

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of *oikonomos* was a *leitourgia* incumbent upon certain men in the community's scheme of things (*supra*, 247f.)?

[35] In the standard lexicons on patristic usage, cf. the following (all cited *supra*, 5, note 1) for *dioikēsis* and *oikonomos* in this sense: Sophocles, 384 and 796; Du Cange (Greek), 311, 1032f.; and Suicer, 1, 919-21 and 2, 463-65.

[36] So already at Titus 1: 7. Perhaps at Ign. *Pol*. 6. 1, where ὡς θεοῦ οἰκονόμοι καὶ πάρεδροι καὶ ὑπηρέται, "as God's stewards and assessors and servants," usually taken as a reference to *all* Christians, is supposed by Pearson to be a reference to a threefold order in the ministry, bishops,

bishop especially a manager for God who is assigned a particularly high and significant office in the hierarchy which stems from the management or *oikonomia* of God himself? How much do these administrative arrangements worked out over the centuries by the Christian movement owe to the idea that the church is the "household of God," implying God is the householder administering affairs and assigning to each man a calling, a place, a function in the smooth and orderly running of this divine household?[37]

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presbyters, and deacons, respectively (cited, without approval, by J.B. Lightfoot, *The Apostolic Fathers* (3 vols.; London, 1885), Vol. 2, Section 1, 352). In the *Acts of Philip* 143, *oikonomia* means the administration of the bishop's office; μὴ ἐμπιστεύσῃς οἰκονομίαν μηδενὶ νεωτέρῳ, "do not entrust the economy to any younger man," is phrased in other MSS, μὴ ἐμπιστεύσῃς δὲ τὸν τόπον τῆς ἐπισκοπῆς νεωτέρῳ (Lillge, 120, text in Lipsius-Bonnet, 2, 2, p. 83, lines 1-2 and 11-12, cf. line 22).

I note the use of the terms for the bishop especially in Basil, however. He speaks of himself in the bishop's office as an *oikonomos* (*Ep*. 290), of himself and his fellow bishops as "wise and trustworthy *oikonomoi*" (*Ep*. 26, 161, 206, 265); the administration of the bishop's office is several times referred to as an *oikonomia* (*Ep*. 145, 182, 190, 206, 213, 227, 228, 230, 244), while Basil also relates this episcopal office to the "administration of the good God concerning his churches" (τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ θεοῦ τὴν περὶ τὰς ἐκκλησίας αὐτοῦ οἰκονομίαν, *Ep*. 265), implying that what the bishops do is really part of God's *oikonomia* (cf. *Ep*. 227), and refers to the election and the consecration of Amphilochius as a bishop in 374 as "dispensations of the Lord" (ταῖς τοῦ κυρίου οἰκονομίαις, *Ep*. 161). The verb *oikonomein* is also used regularly to mean "govern the churches," as in *Ep*. 94, 98, 104, 143, 190, 191, 227, 230, 244, 265).

[37] *Supra*, 552, note 26.

And since the terms *oikonomoi* and *oikonomia* for the agents and task of administration within the divine household or church seem to appear particularly in gnostic and semignostic documents, often related to the themes of Christ's missionary command as an *oikonomia* and the apostle's office as a stewardship or administration of a task committed to him as part of what God has arranged in his all-embracing plan, it would appear important to reckon with the possibility of influence from heretical sources on the ecclesiastical organization of the orthodox,[38] this emerging out of belief in a divine economy and under the sway of a contemporary political administration that arranged officials in graduated ranks and orders.

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[38] Lillge, 119f., notes some examples of these terms in such documents referring to the missionary command or will of the Lord Christ, including sometimes martyrdom, in connection with the administration of a divinely appointed office. He cites, e.g., *Acts of Paul* (ed. C. Schmidt; Hamburg, 1936), 6, 26 and 29, where Paul says, "The grace of the Lord will walk with me until I have fulfilled all the redemptive commission (οἰκονομίαν πληρώσω) which has come upon me," Cleobius adding, "It is necessary that Paul fulfill every dispensation (πᾶσαν οἰκονομίαν)" (translation in James, 576); *Acts of Andrew and Matthias* 2 (text in Lipsius Bonnet, 2, 1, 67, line 1), where Matthias prays, on arriving at the city of the man-eaters, "If therefore thou hast determined for me that the lawless men in this city devour me, I will not flee thy arrangement (οὐ μὴ ἐκφεύξομαι τὴν οἰκονομίαν σου)" (summary only at James, 453ff.); and the late *Martyrdom of Matthew* 19 (Lipsius-Bonnet, 2, 1, 241, line 12) where the phrase τῇ οἰκονομίᾳ τοῦ Χριστοῦ refers to what Christ has arranged for his followers, including death by martyrdom (summary only at James, 460ff.). At *Acts of Philip* 54 (Lipsius-Bonnet 2, 2, 23, line 17) τὴν ἐμπιστευθεῖσάν μοι οἰκονομίαν means "the stewardship or office which God has entrusted to me." The presence of all these passages in the gnostic and

Another possible line of application for what we have referred to as this step-by-step administrative arrangement in the political governments of the Hellenistic-Roman world has to do, beyond the institutional organization of Christians, with their speculations on the ordering and arrangement of creatures within the heavenly realm. Do the notions about orders and ranks of aeons within a heavenly hierarchy, the troops of angels, archangels, cherubim, seraphim, and other celestial beings arranged into heavenly hierarchies, so common in gnostic theologizing but also in the writings of more orthodox fathers, owe anything to a background in the political chain of command for administration in that day? Within the framework of a divine economy which pagan philosophers were presenting prior to the Christian era we saw a tendency, as God was removed farther and farther away from the material world, to bridge the gap between the highest God and this world by a series of intermediaries, few or many in number, arranged in order, degree by degree, carrying the divine administration down to the earth itself, just as a host of contemporary officials implemented the decisions of the rulers at the top of the political peak and translated

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semignostic romances about the apostles suggests that the Pauline figure of the apostle as an oikonomos of God (I Cor. 4: 1) and the whole concept of a divine oikonomia in which men play a part must have been stronger and lingered longer in the popular Christian mind and especially in unorthodox quarters than has been suspected.

Note too Harnack's reference to the existence of Montanist oikonomoi, supra, 25, note 22, as another example of officials with such titles in heretical movements outside the "Great Church" itself.

them into action on the local level of the province, nome, or village.[39] Did a similar and parallel influence operate in cogitations of a Clement or an Origen, who talk about angels as divine oikonomoi and relate the economy of God not only to Christ but also to grades of angelic and ecclesiastical hierarchies?[40] Did such a background play a part in the gnostic usage of the word *oikonomia* for the pleroma of aeons and its organization that stood between the highest god and the lower world.[41]

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[39] Supra, Part II, Chapter 4, especially 435ff.

[40] Lillge notes something of the point in connection with the use of the word oikonomia in both of the Alexandrian fathers. Clement, for example, speaks of angelic and ecclesiastical hierarchies in the divine scheme of things. At Strom. 7. 2 (5, 6ff.) (GCS 17 (Clemens 3), 6, lines 3ff.) the host of angels and heavenly powers is said to be subject to the Word of God as he carries out his holy office or economy (τὴν ἁγίαν οἰκονομίαν); it is stated, interestingly enough, in this passage, that the Logos, who has acted in the course of Heilsgeschichte by the events of the Old and New Testaments to bring Jew and Christian to the perfection which is by faith, has also acted to bring Greek and barbarian to that same perfection by faith through a different process, giving to the Greeks their philosophy by his ministering angels, dispensing to some his precepts, to others his philosophy. Here is a further, but not unnatural, development of the "household of God" theme: God's management of his household must include all men and all cultures, and so here his oikonomia takes in pagan learning as well as Heilsgeschichte; to put it another way, one of Clement's contributions was to attempt to relate the insights of Greek learning with the Heilsgeschichte-Economy of God theme. At Strom. 6. 13 (107, 2) (GCS 15 (Clemens 2), 485, lines 22ff.) Clement further relates the economy to the grades of angelic and ecclesiastical hierarchies and suggests that this heavenly hierarchy is a model for the churchly one with

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its ordering of bishops, presbyters, and deacons (cf. Lillge, 82). In one passage attributed to Clement, in the *Excerpta ex Theodoto* 11. 4 (*GCS* 17 (Clemens 3), 110, lines 20f.) *oikonomia* refers to the sphere of administration which every spiritual being has assigned to him (so Lillge, 112).

Origen reflects a similar view when he writes that the angels are God's *oikonomoi* who administer affairs in nature (*c. Cels*. 8. 31, 5. 29). That these angels also play a part in *Heilsgeschichte* is suggested by his comment that the little children of Matt. 19: 13-15 did not come to Jesus without an *oikonomia* by the angels (*Mt. Tom*. 15. 6) (*GCS* 40 (Origenes 10), 364, line 14) (cf. Lillge, 94).

[41] Lillge, 106-115, in his discussion about the use of *oikonomia* in gnostic sources, shows that the word can mean a sphere in gnostic cosmology, either the psychic sphere from which the psychic body of the Soter comes (Iren. *Adv. Haer*. 1. 6. 1, 7. 2, and 9. 3), or the sphere over which the Demiurge rules (1. 7. 4); or it can denote the pleroma consisting of the thirty aeons and its arrangement (1. 16. 2) or, more particularly, the powers of the upper tetrad within this pleroma, from which the body of Jesus is formed (1. 15. 3). These meanings he finds also in the uses of the word *oikonomia* by the *Excerpta ex Theodoto* and in the fragments of Heracleon, preserved in Origen's *Commentary on John*, where there is also mention of οἱ τῆς οἰκονομίας ἄγγελοι (Lillge, 114; *frag*. 36 in A.E. Brooke, *Texts and Studies: Contributions to Biblical and Patristic Literature*, Vol. 1, No. 4, *The Fragments of Heracleon* (Cambridge, 1891), pp. 88f). For a similar conclusion by D'Alès, cf. *supra*, 61, and by Verhoeven, *supra*, 79.

To raise these questions at this point is simply to suggest the need for a fuller investigation of such possibilities. The non-Christian, pre-patristic usages of oikonomia and its related terms in connection with a

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Representative and perhaps the most significant are the passages at Iren. Adv. Haer. 1. 16. 2 and 15. 3 which speak of τῆς ἄνω οἰκονομίας as part of the gnostic speculation of Marcus, pupil of Valentinus, this "economy above" consisting of thirty aeons; these texts further speak of "the man who stems from the economy" (or pleroma, ὁ κατ' οἰκονομίαν διὰ τῆς Μαρίας γενεσιουργεῖται) being generated through Mary, and identify "the Savior from the pleroma" (ὁ ἐκ τῆς οἰκονομίας Σωτήρ), "the name of the man from the pleroma" (. . . ὄνομα μὲν τοῦ ἐκ τῆς οἰκονομίας ἀνθρώπου) as Jesus.

Such passages would seem to bring the word oikonomia into connection with the birth of Jesus in these gnostic sources and would suggest that the later, usual orthodox meaning of "incarnation" has a background in the gnostics of the second century, as Werner, supra, 54f., had suggested. More important, there would appear to be some possible relationship between this sort of oikonomia or arrangement of the aeons in the world above, posited by the gnostics, and the notion of an economic Trinity or arrangement of powers and functions in the celestial hierarchy found in more orthodox thinkers. Prestige^2, 101, notes the passage at Iren. Adv. Haer. 1. 16. 2 concerning "the economy on high" but dismisses the possibility of gnostic influence on Tertullian because "the word does not appear to be of common occurrence, and the reference . . . seems to be made quite casually and incidentally" by Irenaeus. However, is this only because our gnostic sources are so fragmentary and because we have not looked at the broader background of a divine economy found in pagan thought and also graduated, step-by-step organization within the political world and also the application of these words by pagan philosophers to the grades of

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cropping up in gnostic and orthodox theologians?

Harnack, it is to be recalled, *supra*, 26f., saw a resemblance at this point between gnostic and orthodox views on such an economy, believing the difference to be that, while Tertullian and Hippolytus limited the *oikonomia* of God to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the gnostics exceeded this number and extended their economy to include the host of aeons who share in the administration of the divine sovereignty. Koehler, we also noted, *supra*, 41, felt gnostic influence in the economic monarchy which Tertullian presents. Finally, Werner, *supra*, 52ff., laid stress upon the relationships between the graduated, step-by-step system of administration found in Neoplatonism and in the gnostic doctrines about the aeons, on the one hand, and the similar approach, on the other, to organization of the godhead into an economic Trinity, observed in orthodox thinkers like Tertullian and, especially, he felt, Eusebius of Caesarea; indeed, in Werner's reconstruction of the theology of Eusebius there is emphasis on a heavenly kingdom of divine powers, angels, and spirits, with the Logos-Christ as chief administrator but a host of angels handling administrative details under him, what Werner calls "angel Christology."

The dominant influence on Christian speculation here about an economic Trinity may or may not be gnostic; but what is clear is that in the pre-Christian concept in the pagan philosophers of a graduated, step-by-step administration of the world by God and one or more intermediaries, a conception which certainly seems to have been influenced by the usage of *oikonomia* and its related terms in political organization, we have a background upon which both gnostics and orthodox drew, to describe either the organization of the pleroma or the relationships within the godhead.

intermediaries within a divine economy of the universe may have significance for administrative organization in the early church and for Christian ideas about the arrangement of beings of the world above in God's economy. And, since the church on earth with its grades and ranks and orders was sometimes held to parallel the conditions of arrangement within the heavenly hierarchy, there may well be a connection between the two.[42]

D. Religious Connotations to the Office of oikonomos

The use of the term oikonomos in the New Testament and in patristic writers to designate the apostles, bishops of the church, and later on, in a more conventional sense, the steward or administrator of a congregation or monastery, roots, we have seen, in the pre-Christian Greek concept of the office of oikonomos as it existed in the secular world. In the one case, the steward for a Christian congregation or monastic center had his counterpart for centuries in the ubiquitous oikonomos of Greek households and societies; in the case of the application to apostles and bishops, the term seems to have had some connection with the graduated, step-by-step arrangement of political officials into an organization for administering a city or state, officials playing a role in its total oikonomia. All this pre-Christian background, it will be noted, however, lies in the political or economic spheres. Hence it may be asked whether there is any more specific background involving religious connotations or associations for the Christian applications of oikonomos and its related terms.

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[42] E.g., Clem. Al. Strom. 6. 13 (107, 2), supra, 560, note 40. The gnostic and patristic references here are meant to be only suggestive and not exhaustive, and other similar, even better, passages exist bearing on all these points.

No commentary, it has been pointed out, apparently connects the title, *oikonomoi* of God or of his mysteries, as used by Paul and other writers, with previous pagan cult or the mystery religions, though on the surface such a relationship seems quite attractive.[43] The reason is, of course, that nowhere, thus far, has the phrase οἰκονόμοι μυστηρίων θεοῦ been cited for any pagan religious movement, and even writers like Richard Reitzenstein and Hans Windisch, who make much of Christianity as a mystery religion and Paul as a mystagogue, can give no such evidence.[44]

In the face of this situation, other scholars have conjectured that the phrase, as applied to the apostles, was not a borrowing of some such pagan title, but rather represents a new and specifically Christian application of the word. This view holds that the title "stewards of the mysteries of God" arose, not, of course, without some influence from the whole secular background in household and political application, primarily from the oikonomia concept which dominated the thinking of some early Christians; the oikonomos was therefore not a Christian reflection of some official in pagan cult, but rather conceived of himself as a vital cog in proclaiming and bringing to pass God's oikonomia in the world.[45]

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[43] *Supra*, 288, note 211; for the passages involved in the New Testament and Apostolic Fathers, see 285f., note 207.

[44] R. Reitzenstein, *Die Hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen nach ihren Grundgedanken und Wirkungen* (3rd ed.; Leipzig and Berlin, 1927) does not list the phrase in his index or discuss any of the passages involved. Hans Windisch, *Paulus und Christus: ein Biblisch-religionsgeschichtlicher Vergleich* (Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament, 24; Leipzig, 1934), 215-226, presents Christianity as a mystery religion and Jesus and Paul in its mystery-fellowship as the two leading mystagogues and οἰκονόμοι μυστηρίων θεοῦ; he sees Paul as an arch-mystagogue and arch-hierophant, preaching a mystery religion (cf., e.g., Phil. 4: 12, μεμύημαι), and views Jesus "like Paul, in the tradition as an οἰκονόμος μυστηρίων θεοῦ" (p.221), but he nowhere gives any evidence for the use of οἰκονόμος by the mystery cults, a point which would have strengthened his argument immensely, had it been available.

The question therefore is, did Christians, by and large, invent this application of oikonomos to the apostles in the light of an oikonomia theology, or is there some religious association that the title already had in pre-Christian usage? Our collection of evidence indicates that there is more of a background relating the term to religious life than was suspected or assembled previously.

The evidence is this. The related noun ἡ διοίκησις was long used for the financial administration of a temple in the pagan world.[46] The verb οἰκονομεῖν is, once at least, employed for "administering a fund for the people and the gods," a combination of state and temple fiscal administration, or, possibly, a recognition that there is a stewardship to the gods involved in all state financial transactions, though the phrase may have been merely a convention without meaning.[47]

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[45] So Verhoeven, supra, 76; Cullmann, supra, 104ff., especially 106, point (3), and note 25; and Dinkler, supra, 113. Even in this situation, however, it might be argued there was influence from pagan thought: the idea expressed by Dio Chrysostom in his orations, supra, 457ff., that the emperor and his administration (dioikēsis) are a parallel to, and in some sense a part of, the divine administration by Zeus of the universe could be put forth as an analogue to the Christian idea that the apostles play a role as oikonomoi in the total oikonomia of God.

[46] Supra, 276, note 178; cf. 285.

The title oikonomos, we saw, came to designate not only political officials, but also officers of societies and guilds, such as the treasurer of a synodos of Dionysiac players.[48] On Lesbos in pre-Christian times the title may have been applied to an official at a cult-house, whose duties apparently included financial oversight.[49]

But even the political oikonomos too had religious duties at times, it was found. In Ptolemaic Egypt the oikonomos sitikōn had as part of his oikonomia the task of making an annual gift of grain to the local temple of the crocodile god.[50] At Magnesia and Ephesus in particular, from at least the fourth to the second centuries B.C., oikonomoi existed as officials of the city, whose tasks included such specifically religious obligations as the purchase of animals for sacrifice and the personal participation in cultic rites— at times even the oversight of temple property.[51] That such duties continued on into later centuries is suggested by the third-century A.D. inscription where a town oikonomos offers prayer to inquire on behalf of his city whether the barbarians will strike at it again or not.[52] It must be added, however, that all these examples do not show the oikonomos to be fundamentally a cult official but only a civic officer with a few incidental religious duties. He takes part in religious observances, but either as a private citizen or in much the same way as any other city official in the ancient world would be expected to. Such duties do not make him a cultic official any more than the archōn became a religious leader by such occasional chores as part of his office.[53]

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[47] Supra, 226, note 44; cf. 285.

[48] Supra, 281f., notes 191, 192. For the use of dioikētēs in similar societies, see supra, 282ff.

[49] Supra, 245f., notes 98, 99; cf. 284.

[50] Supra, 258f., notes 131, 132; cf. 285.

[51] Supra, 236ff., notes 72ff.; cf. 285.

[52] Supra, 288, note 213.

More significant evidence comes, however, in apparent reference to an oikonomos for a religious society which supervises festivals in honor of some deity.[54] The fairly early use of oikonomein in the sense of "administer a sacred office" also fits in here.[55] The very best insight into the background, we saw, though, comes in texts which mention oikonomoi for the Sarapis cult at Memphis, Egypt, and imply the existence of such cult officials elsewhere.[56] There was reason for believing also, we concluded, that oikonomoi appeared in the Hermes Trismegistus movement.[57] In these passages we have ground for assuming that the oikonomos, who appeared in households, local and national government, societies, and guilds of the pre-Christian world, also found a place in religious organization of some cult groups.

It has been suggested that the Sarapis cult provided a forerunner to the Christian monastic movement,[58] and both groups had oikonomoi among their officials. But more significantly, this evidence from pagan cult background also posits a more immediate and certain background for the primitive Christian designation of apostles and other leaders as stewards of God and his mysteries. Whether or not further investigation will prove direct influence on the phrase either from the references to oikonomoi in the teachings of Jesus or from an oikonomia theology, as some claim, here is a more direct background from contemporary Graeco-Roman life which must be reckoned with.

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[53] Supra, 288f.

[54] Supra, 284, note 200.

[55] Supra, 286f., note 208.

[56] Supra, 290ff.

[57] Supra, 298-303.

[58] Supra, 290, note 217.

E. The Use of oikonomia in a Legal Sense for a Will or Testament as a Link to Patristic Application in "Covenant Theology"

Reference has been made to an "oikonomia type of thinking" or theology in the early church, the notion of the divine rule or administration breaking into the world in the person of Jesus, proclaimed and carried out by him and his disciples, as part of God's over-all plan and program for the ages, now especially coming to dramatic climax in the last times.[59] More than one writer has equated oikonomia with a heilsgeschichtlich kind of thought and with what modern theologians refer to as "redemptive history."[60] It has thus been brought into connection with what is often referred to as a "covenant theology," a theological view of history which occurs in certain fathers, centered around a series of covenants made by God with man at various times.

In this connection, G.L. Prestige has reported that, in patristic usage of the term, oikonomia means "above all . . . the covenanted dispensation of grace";[61] he cites several examples for this meaning, and these can be further augmented from Lillge's study. Thus, as early as Ignatius, there is reference to the economy relating to the new man Jesus Christ, the new covenantal relationship of grace he has initiated.[62] Origen uses the same noun to refer to the covenant made through the law in the Old Testament;[63] but he recognizes a qualitative difference between old and new covenants[64] and maintains that the covenant privilege which the Jews once enjoyed, of special regard beyond other men, the oikonomia and grace which was theirs, has now been transferred to the Christians.[65]

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[59] So, especially, Dinkler, supra, 108ff., but also Cullmann, supra, 97ff.; cf. the views of Harnack, supra, 24f., and of Seeberg, supra, 35ff.

[60] In particular, Cullmann, supra, 103 and 106f.; cf. also the views, supra, of Harnack, 24ff.; Loofs, 31ff.; Seeberg, 35ff.; Koehler, 38ff.; and Werner, 50f.

[61] Prestige^2, 64; cf. supra, 66f.

Irenaeus especially spoke of human history in terms of covenant.[66] Usually he refers to duo testamenta,[67] a dispositio legis, or Old Covenant,[68] and a *novam libertatis dispositionem* given through Christ,[69] yet both from one God, the especial emphasis he must make against Marcionite and gnostic notions that the Old Testament stems from a secondary, inferior deity. At times he seems to think of four covenants[70] and recognizes a decided superiority which the New Covenant of Christ has over the old, Mosaic one,[71] but the theme of continuity in God's redemptive work is also at bottom there.

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[62] Ign. Eph. 20. 1: οἰκονομία εἰς τὸν καινὸν ἄνθρωπον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, noted in Prestige², 64, and Lillge, 17.

[63] Origen Comm. in Ioan. 6. 44 (GCS 10 (Origenes 4), 153, 18): τὴν διὰ τοῦ νόμου οἰκονομίαν; Lillge, 99.

[64] Lillge, 99; cf. Origen c. Cels. 4. 8 and 9 (GCS 2 (Origenes 1), 280, 12 and 15): "Christ did not, as it happened in the earlier ordering of salvation (κατὰ τὴν προτέραν οἰκονομίαν), bring scourges and fetters and implements of torture to be applied against men; for the teaching sufficed."

[65] Origen c. Cels. 5. 50 (GCS 3 (Origenes 2), 54, 28): ταύτην δὲ τὴν οἰκονομίαν μεταβεβηκέναι καὶ τὴν χάριν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς; cf. Prestige², 64; Lillge, 95.

[66] Cf. Robert V. Moss, The Covenant Conception in Early Christian Thought (microfilmed dissertation; Chicago: the University of Chicago, March, 1954) (cited hereafter as "Moss"), 162: "In Irenaeus for the first time we have a clear summing up of human history in covenant terms."

[67] Lillge, 43; e.g., Adv. Haer. 4. 9. 1.

[68] Adv. Haer. 3. 12. 15, which D'Alès, "Irénée," 5, calls orthodox, not gnostic, is a passage where Irenaeus argues, somewhat naïvely, in connection

Tertullian follows Irenaeus, in opposition to Marcion, by referring to the two covenants (*dispositiones*) from the one God,[72] though he too sees the uniqueness of the redemptive arrangement which has been made through Christ: "I confess that in the Old Covenant under the creator-god one procedure has developed, but a different one in the New Covenant under Christ."[73]

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with Gal. 2: 11ff., that there is a unity to the two testaments because the early apostles and Paul observed the Old Testament law: Sic apostoli, quos universi actus et universae doctrinae dominus testes fecit, religiose agebant circa dispositionem legis, quae est secundum Moyseum, ab uno et eodem significantes esse deo.

[69] *Adv. Haer.* 3. 10. 5, also orthodox: unus deus . . . novam libertatis dispositionem per novam adventum filii sui hominibus aperiens.

[70] E.g., *Adv. Haer.* 3. 11. 8 (Adam, Noah, Moses, Christ, according to the Latin text; Greek omits Adam, inserts Abraham); cf. Moss, 162.

[71] Lillge, 47; cf. *Adv. Haer.* 4. 20. 10.

[72] Lillge, 72; for the two *diathēkai* mentioned at Gal. 4: 24 Tertullian (*Adv. Marc.* 5. 4) uses the word dispositio, a Latin equivalent for *oikonomia*, as we have seen in the Latin translation of Irenaeus.

[73] *Adv. Marc.* 4. 1: confiteor alium ordinem decucurrisse in veteri dispositione apud creatorem, alium in nova apud Christum.

The same thought emerges in later fathers. Gregory of Nyssa talks about the economy relating to the covenants,[74] and Cyril of Alexandria refers, for example, to the superiority of the second oikonomia to the ancient one.[75] Clement of Alexandria, to take a final illustration of this patristic usage, likewise speaks of the two testaments given by the one God[76] and, in characteristic fashion, mentions "the oikonomia ordained through the church for us" which especially has to do with Christ's coming in the flesh.[77] We have also seen, moreover, how Clement likes to extend the concept of Heilsgeschichte and covenant to include Greek philosophy as a paidagōgos to Christ;[78] in this line of thinking, Greek philosophy also becomes a covenant or diathēkē of the Lord, and it has been pointed out, regarding diathēkē, "the term used in this way is hardly distinguishable from οἰκονομία."[79] To reverse the figure, quoting Prestige, "economy in such contexts [as those above] means simply dispensation or covenant,"[80] and here are roots for the covenant theologies of the post-Reformation period and for the more recent dispensational theories.[81]

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[74] Cant. proem., cited in Prestige^2, 64.

[75] Hab. 563D, cited in Prestige^2, 64.

[76] Moss, 166, with examples cited from Strom. 2. 6, 1. 39, and 5. 6. Lillge, 88, notes that this thought is expressed also at Strom. 2. 29. 2 (GCS 15 (Clemens 2), 128, 24), where the two covenants are said to have been given οἰκονομικῶς, i.e., on the basis of the plan of salvation or "covenantally," (cf. Strom. 6. 106. 3 (GCS 15 (Clemens 2), 485, 17), where he speaks in terms of a single covenant).

[77] Strom. 3. 103. 3 (GCS 15 (Clemens 2), 243, 33): ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν καθ' ἡμᾶς οἰκονομία; cf. Lillge, 88, and Prestige^2, 64.

[78] Supra, 560, note 40.

[79] R.B. Tollinton, Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Liberalism (London, 1914), 2, 205, as cited in Moss, 169.

[80] Prestige^2, 65.

Oikonomia, it can be seen from these examples and the observations on it by a number of scholars, can mean about the same thing as diathēkē in patristic authors and has a very close connection with the heilsgeschichtlich, covenantal type of theology. Apparently, however, any exact reason for equating oikonomia and diathēkē in the fathers and interchanging them so readily has eluded previous investigators. Now, however, a more direct and significant background can be provided for this use of oikonomia out of its earlier non-Christian, prepatristic senses.

We have observed that oikonomia was used from Hellenistic times on, especially in the papyri, for legal arrangements of all sorts.[82] Usually these legal arrangements were of an economic or commercial, financial nature and often involved supervision by a governmental administrative agency. The translation "any legal step or arrangement" or "every measure with legally binding effect" has been given for oikonomia in papyrological dictionaries,[83] while specific applications to such legal arrangements as tax collection, the sale of ground, purchase, hire, or rental of property, registration of land or people, as in a census, and encumbrances on property have been quoted.[84] It has also been seen that the term oikonomia could refer not merely to the legal arrangements but also to the document itself recording the arrangement involved in these legal transactions.[85]

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[81] On post-Reformation "covenantal theology," cf. supra, 9, note 1; on "dispensationalism," supra, 123ff.

[82] Supra, 306ff.

[83] Supra, 308, especially note 8, quoting Preisigke, Fachwörter, 132.

[84] Supra, 308-312.

[85] Supra, 318f.

It was not surprising therefore that the verb *oikonomein* should turn up in wills of the Hellenistic period with the meaning "to administer one's affairs" or "make legal arrangements,"[86] and it was quite in harmony with this whole series of meanings that we discovered a Roman legal papyrus of the late second century A.D. where the noun *oikonomia* specifically meant a last will and testament, the document setting forth the legal arrangements whereby a man bequeathed his goods to the heirs he chose.[87] In this will, where the phrase "the notary who wrote this legal instrument (οἰκονομίαν)" is found, the term *oikonomia* very definitely refers to the noun *diathēkē*, which appears half a dozen times.[88]

What has not been pointed out, of course, is that the word *oikonomia* is here equated with *diathēkē*, and the latter is the regular word in the Septuagint, the New Testament, and in many of the fathers for covenant, an arrangement, sometimes viewed as having a legal character, between God and men for the salvation of the Old or New Israel.[89] The fathers, as has been observed, employ *oikonomia* at times in just this sense of covenant and from roughly the same time on as in this papyrus example.[90] Here, then, we have a very possible explanation for the patristic meaning that is thus given to this many-sided word: the fathers are using *oikonomia* in exactly the same sense it already had acquired in secular, even legal, Greek of the day, for a last will and testament, a covenant, or *diathēkē*. It may even be suggested that perhaps the fathers preferred the work *oikonomia* at times over *diathēkē* just because it was a more general term and may have avoided the specifically legal connotation which *diathēkē* had.

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[86] *Supra*, 312, note 26.

[87] *Supra*, 312ff.

[88] *Supra*, 312, note 27; the phrase occurs at Col. III, line 2, and the word *diathēkē* is found in Col. II at lines 19 and 30, and in Col. III at lines [4], 7, 12, 16, and 20.

[89] Cf. Bauer, *sub voce*.

[90] The papyrus text in *BGU* is dated May 26, A.D. 184; Irenaeus was active in the last quarter of this century, Tertullian and Clement of Alexandria in its last decade and the opening years of the third century.

One further observation suggests itself. In the papyrus passage, the *oikonomia* or *diathēkē* under discussion was a will fastened with seven seals, in accord with current legal custom which required seven seals to authenticate a Roman will and which maintained that no will could be carried into effect until all seven seals were broken.[91] The detail of seven seals suggests immediately the scroll of the seven seals mentioned at Revelation 5.[92] The scroll there has to do with God's will for the last times. It can be put into effect only by Jesus Christ, the true witness, who alone is worthy to break its seals. In the Apocalypse, as he opens each seal, some portentous event takes place, having to do with the denouement of God's scheme for the world and men.

Now a number of the older commentators have seen an obvious parallel here between Revelation 5 and Roman legal custom, and R.H. Charles wrote that the scroll with the seven seals "represents a Will or Testament relating to the Old and New Testament Covenant."[93] It is thus a device to dramatize the will or disposition of God concerning the last times, which Christ puts into effect in view of the fact that it is he alone of whom it can be said, "Worthy art thou to take the scroll and to open its seals, for thou wast slain and didst ransom men for God."[94] There is, to put it another way, here in these chapters a combination of Heilsgeschichte — what the Lamb of God has done for the redemption of men — and eschatology — what he therefore effects for God at the end of the present age.

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[91] *Supra*, 316. Reference to the seven seals in the text, *supra*, 312, note 27, at Col. II, lines 24f., Col. III, lines 13 and 14.

[92] Rev. 5: 1: βιβλίον γεγραμμένον ἔσωθεν καὶ ὄπισθεν, κατεσφραγισμένον σφραγῖσιν ἑπτά.

[93] R.H. Charles, *The Revelation of St. John* (2 vols.; New York, 1920),

No one, apparently, has previously been able to take cognizance of the fact that in later secular Greek usage oikonomia was used for just such a testament or covenant with seven seals. John the seer does not, of course, apply this word oikonomia to the scroll or legal document he describes with details that normally apply to a Roman will or testament. But later writers among the fathers would have known this secular Greek usage, and could the more readily use the word oikonomia to stand for a diathēkē or covenant from God in Heilsgeschichte, implying at the same time from this general background that God's oikonomia also includes his

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1, 137f. Charles recites some of the evidence on the Roman legal custom involved. A similar position, calling attention to the book with the seven seals as a parallel to a Roman will of the period, is taken in James Moffatt in The Expositor's Greek Testament (ed. W. Robertson Nicoll, reprinted Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1951), 5, 383; Moffatt names Zahn, Selwyn, and J. Weiss, among others, as supporting the application. W. Bousset, Die Offenbarung Johannis (Göttingen, 1906), 255, note 1, and E. Lohmeyer, Die Offenbarung des Johannes (Tübingen, 1926), 50, note but do not stress such a parallel.

[94] Rev. 5: 9.

plan for the last times, eschatology, this too seen within the covenant framework. Is it, in the light of these somewhat involved but entirely possible interconnections, any accident, then, that Irenaeus, who emphasizes especially a covenantal theology and a heilsgeschichtlich view of history, also stresses eschatology and preserves some of the same primitive eschatological views, on the millennium, for instance, which are also found in Revelation — where Heilsgeschichte and eschatology likewise go together?[95] Heilsgeschichte, covenant theology, and eschatology seem to fit in a pattern that frequently combines them in characteristic ways.

The secular application of oikonomia to a testament or covenant with seven seals is thus a suggestive background for much patristic usage of the term: it suggests that a fruitful approach to many of the passages where the church fathers employ the word with the meaning of covenant or covenanted dispensation of grace will involve keeping an eye on any legalistic or eschatological connotations, as well as the familiar references to redemptive history, which the term may take in covenant theology.[96]

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[95] It is to be recalled that Dinkler, supra, 113ff., finds an affinity between the oikonomia philosophy and apocalyptic, as does Cullmann also, supra, 99f.

[96] Moss, 59, makes the interesting reminder that the P source in the Old Testament uses the word b^{e}rith for a covenant to divide history into covenantal periods and thus "is our first clear evidence of the 'dispensational' interpretation of history which comes to play an important part in early Christian thought." Yet P, who at times has such a universal interest (the covenant with Noah), is also a supreme legalist. Is there a significant relationship thus established for covenant theology and

F. History as a "Divine Economy"

Covenant theology and Heilsgeschichte imply a periodization of history—an understanding of history in terms of covenant periods, the division of human history into segments of time marked off by the significant events or special redemptive arrangements which God, who guides all history, has prompted or inserted in human affairs.[97] Such an approach to history assumes God is the lord of the happenings of history, entering into its course more personally at times, controlling its destiny and details always. There is, above all, in history, according to this concept, a pattern, a divine pattern to the course of worldly events, and for this the informed observer is able to find the key, which, applied, will unlock some of the secrets of meaning for history.

A view of history much like this, we have found, some scholars label as the basic attitude of the primitive and patristic church toward the problem of the significance of history. Cullmann claimed that the New

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legalism? Moss also observes, 137, that Tertullian apparently is the first to apply the covenant idea to the canon of Christian scripture itself, so that the books become the covenant in legal terms and the resulting view of these sacred writings is legalistic; the statement here by Moss must, however, be qualified by the usage attributed to Melito by Euseb. Hist. Eccl. 4. 26. 13 and by the passage in Iren. Adv. Haer. 4. 15. 2; cf. also M.S. Enslin, Christian Beginnings (New York, 1938), 465. All this is instructive for any legalistic connotations oikonomia may take on, especially since we have seen the word already meant a legal step or instrument in secular Greek.

[97] Cf. Moss, 140ff., for a pertinent summary of the ideas in New Testament and patristic sources.

Testament view and the primitive Christian philosophy of history was of just this sort, stressing oikonomia or the continuous redemptive line, God's plan of salvation reaching consistently through past, present, and future, which arrives at its climax in the Christ-event ephapax.[98] Dinkler held that while this delineation of the meaning of history is not the biblical view or even the primary one in the New Testament, it is found in many early Christian writers, underlying certain of Paul's ideas, for example, and he further agreed that this oikonomia philosophy, which sees history as divine economy, emphasizing a plan of salvation, did become dominant in ensuing centuries and, except for Augustine, reigned as the Christian view down through the Middle Ages.[99]

We may now say, however, that such a notion about history is not wholly new with Christian writers, for our examination of the non-Christian, prepatristic usages of the word oikonomia has revealed that something of the same idea concerning history is, at least in part, to be found in earlier thinkers and historians. The whole Stoic position, emphasizing a divine administration which manages affairs in nature but also, to some extent, under the aegis of providence, in history and human affairs, has relevance here, of course.[100] But more specifically we discovered that the idea of a pattern, a program, a divine guidance in history, even down to broad eras which the observer feels he can discern in human progress, occurs in some of the Hellenistic historians. Their concept of history partakes of the divine economy theme and actually employs on occasion the word *oikonomia* to indicate what they mean.

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[98] Supra, 97-108.

[99] Supra, 108-121.

[100] Supra, 404ff., especially the examples from Chrysippus, 419ff., where not merely divine order in nature but also in events and personal actions, i.e., history, is under discussion.

Such a concept of history was most stressed in Polybius.[101] He directs the reader's attention to an over-all *oikonomia* or arrangement of historical events by *Tychē*, Chance or Fortune, a divine force which rules with its own ends, direction, and purpose in history and which creates a pattern or scheme for historical events that Polybius claimed was discernible to him, for example, in the rise of Rome to power.[102] Such a belief in the ordering of history by a force outside of it implies, one may add, a divine government of sorts, gods or at least something divine beyond men that reaches into human history.[103] Such an over-all *oikonomia* by the divine *Tychē* must, of course, be comprehended by the historian at the outset of his work, but once this is done, Polybius believed, the arrangement or pattern of events will be seen to extend even to the lesser happenings which he is going to describe in his narrative.[104] The historian's task then is to find the general *oikonomia* of history — as this is done, history thus becomes a teacher — and to recount this clearly to his readers. In this fashion there is introduced into his work an especial concern for orderly arrangement in the narrative — the order of history itself demands this.[105] There is also introduced, in the case of Polybius, at times an additional sense for which this notion of *Tychē's* rule in human life is responsible: namely, what has been called the meaning for *tychē* of "a divine interposition in the affairs of the world."[106] For Polybius this meaning, a popular sense of the term *tychē*, was a handy one when he, as a scientific historian, could not put his finger on any logical cause for an event or condition. But it is to be stressed that for Polybius the general rule by *Tychē* over history with the pattern it imposes on the world also thus relates to certain inexplicable, somewhat miraculous details which cannot be or are not explained logically; they, too, at least in popular speech, become elements in *Tychē's* arrangement of life.

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[101] *Supra*, 329-335.

[102] *Supra*, 330f.

[103] Cf., especially, the remarks from *RE* 21, 2, 1536, quoted *supra*, 331, note 66.

[104] *Supra*. 334f.

[105] *Supra*, 329f.

Something of the same theme we also observed in other historians a bit later in the first century B.C., Posidonius and Diodorus Siculus.[107] Diodorus, for instance, likewise seems to approach history on the basis of these presuppositions about a definite order or divine arrangement behind it. Thus for him the historian is a "minister of divine providence"[108] and there is just as much a concern over proper arrangement which will bring out the underlying *oikonomia* as Polybius exhibited.

Now in the approach to history of both the Hellenistic historians and the early Christians there is this in common: they view history as a divine economy, a plan-pattern, which the writer ferrets out and presents. The key which the two groups employ differs, naturally, as do the ways each one sees the divine economy entering into history and the intensity with which each would prefer to stress this divine administration of historical event. But put God or the Logos in the place that these Hellenistic writers assign to *Tychē*, as the arranger of history, and you get the beginnings of a philosophy with which many a Christian — and Jew — would have felt at home.[109]

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[106] W.W. Fowler, "Polybius' Conception of Τύχη," *The Classical Review* 17 (1903), 448, quoted *supra*, 331, note 66.

[107] *Supra*, 439f. and 335-37 respectively.

[108] Diod. Sic. 1. 1. 3, cited *supra*, 336, note 69, and 440, note 82.

Such Stoic, Hellenistic roots for the conception of history as a divine economy have potential significance in other ways too. Dinkler, it will be recalled, felt that the oikonomia approach to history stemmed from Jewish apocalyptic.[110] In part, such a philosophy, it may now be asserted, stressing a divine management of affairs in nature and in history, is Greek, and the Hellenistic historians reflect this tendency.

One may further observe that the writer in the New Testament who especially seems to present history as a divine economy is Luke in his two-volume work. Dinkler himself makes this point well when he shows how Luke stresses the advance of the Christian message (from Jerusalem to Rome in Acts, and beyond to the untouched ends of the earth over a long sweep of time, he implies) before the Parousia can take place.[111] This Lucan approach, Dinkler felt, reflected an economy-plan idea of world history and a notion of Heilsgeschichte which had become more universal and had expanded to take in all history, the details of secular history, too, along with the program of redemptive history. This way of looking at history that Dinkler finds in Luke can scarcely be called the method of Jewish apocalyptic exclusively, but now must be acknowledged to be in harmony with the method of those writers whom Luke seeks to imitate on certain other points, the Hellenistic historians. Just as he follows their habits on the construction of speeches for which there are no full transcripts and their use of prefaces and summaries at the beginning of each book,[112] so also he follows their lead in emphasizing an underlying divine economy or arrangement into a pattern of history. Luke sees, not Tychē, but the God whom Jesus Christ reveals as the lord of history, who provides it with a definitive and divine pattern. This pattern Luke thinks he has found. Hence, in reporting his material to his readers, there is concern for a clear outline; hence also the noting of logical or scientific causation at times, but at other times the allowance for special divine interpositions or miracles as part of the divine management of human affairs.[113] In all this he is again following his Hellenistic models in historiography.

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[109] I add the words "and Jew" with Josephus particularly in mind. Cf. the study by A. Schlatter, Wie Sprach Josephus von Gott? (Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie; Gütersloh, 1910), especially Chapter 7 on "Gottes Regierung." Schlatter points out that Josephus applies God's leading of human history not only to Israel but at times to all men, using such terms as pronoia, heimarmenē, and tychē, often in a Greek sense (pp. 49-55). The theme also, of course, roots in the Old Testament, though the mode of expression has become Greek.

[110] Supra, 118, though he also allows for gnostic influence.

[111] Supra, 114.

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[112] With Luke's method of reporting speeches and sermons by Peter and Paul, cf. Thuc. 1. 22. The preface to Luke's Gospel, 1: 1-4, and the preface and summary at the beginning of Acts, 1: 1-11, may be compared with the similar devices of the Hellenistic historians, the proekthesis, for example, at Polyb. 4. 1.

[113] Luke's workmanlike outline in Acts (though the same thing holds true of his gospel) is instanced in the threefold division of the book following 1: 8 ("Jerusalem, all Judea and Samaria, and the end of the earth") and in the summary phrase appearing six times on "the increase of the word of God" (6: 7, 9: 31, 12: 24, 16: 5, 19: 20, and 28: 30-31). Natural cause and effect is stressed, for example, in the shipwreck story (27: 1ff.), divine interposition in the many healing miracles and in the same shipwreck story.

One other comment on the matter of an over-all economy of God in history, which Christians claim to be able to see, especially in the light of Christ's coming, and the pin-pointing of this divine administration theme in certain specific events. In the later fathers this notion grows, and the term oikonomia is applied to an amazing variety of events outside what was originally Heilsgeschichte, strictly speaking, in the Christ-event. Starting from the premise that God or the Logos is at the controls of world events, and following Luke's cue that details of the divine economy can be seen in contemporary happenings in life too, subsequent writers claim all sorts of things as reflections of this inclusive economy, as Prestige's survey illustrates.[114] God arranges, not only the seasons, but also economizes whole cycles of ages, Origen holds.[115] It was therefore easy for him and other fathers to conceive of God managing the events of Old Testament history— thus there was a divine overruling or economy of Pharoah by God in the events of the exodus;[116] so too, Athanasius says, God caused a famine economically in order that the children of Israel should go down to sojourn in Egypt;[117] and the Israelites in the fiery furnace, according to Chrysostom, were prevented by an economy of God from knowing that the fire would not hurt them, since such knowledge would have destroyed the merit of their firmness![118] Clement went further and applied the divine economy of history to the world of the Greeks — aspects of true philosophy came to them not be accident but by divine economy.[119] Eusebius in his histories and essays enthusiastically applied the theme of a divine economy to events both past and present: the Septuagint version, centuries before, had been economized from God, but in his own age God has just as truly arranged it that the eldest son of Constantine should be present at his deathbed![120] Cyril of Alexandria, to take an example of another application to more contemporary history, piously and patriotically concluded the Romans had obtained universal domination because this was part of God's plan economically.[121]

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[114] Prestige^2, 59-66, noted supra, 65ff.

[115] Origen c. Cels. 4. 69.

[116] Origen de prin. 3. 1. 14.

[117] In Ps. 104. 16, cited in Prestige^2, 62.

[118] On I Cor. 18. 4, cited ibid.

Almost from the beginning, though, the notion of a divine arrangement as a cause for happenings was applied also to minor events in life, especially in the accounts of martyrdoms — vivid evidence of how seriously the economy of God theme as applied to history was taken by many an average Christian. So, for instance, some of the incidents which took place during the persecution of the Christians at Vienne and Lyons were described as "a great economy of God."[122] Dionysius of Alexandria in his trial claimed to experience an economy of God.[123] In another document, even a chance meeting with a donkey-driver is described as happening "by an economy of God."[124] Cyril of Jerusalem, in much the same spirit, relates how it was the grace of God that arranged for certain lessons to be read on a certain day in the course of the lectionary,[125] and Prestige, obviously enjoying his summation of the evidence, concludes: "The monks in the desert had as strong a sense of the detailed guidance and overruling of events as had the Fathers in their studies. 'God did us this economy,' says one of them in the apophthegmata patrum (Abb. Mac. 2), 'that neither we freeze in winter nor does the heat do us injury in summer.' 'By economy it became dusk,' says another (ib., Eul. presb.). 'By economy of God the old man went to those parts,' remarks John Moschus (prat. spir. 83). God's hand was recognized in the smallest things as in the things as in the greatest."[126]

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[119] *Strom*. 1. 19 (94, 1). Cf. *supra*, 560, note 40.

[120] *Praep*. *Evang*. 8. 1. 349c and *Vit*. *Const*. 1. 18. 2. I note the use of these terms especially in Eusebius; an examination of his writings in the light of this theory that sees history as a divine economy, and also of the writings of other Christian historians, would appear to be most rewarding.

[121] On *Hosea* 51A, cited in Prestige^2, 62.

[122] Euseb. *Hist*. *Eccl*. 5. 1. 32: μεγάλη τις οἰκονομία θεοῦ.

[123] *Ibid*., 7. 11. 2.

"Particular instances of a dispensation of mercy or special divine interposition" is Prestige's definition for such uses of oikonomia.[127] The sense and the background, rooted in the notion of a divine economy, seen in great events and lesser ones, is paralleled in the Greek historians by the popular meaning *tychē* had taken on in Polybius: "a divine interposition in the ordinary affairs in the world." In conception, then, of history on the whole as a divine economy and, on the more popular level, of specific events as rather miraculous, inexplicable manifestations of this divine arrangement of things the examples in the Hellenistic historians seem to provide some light on Christian applications of the word *oikonomia*.

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[124] Acts of Xanthippe and Polyxena 31, a document from the middle of the third century, printed by J.A. Robinson in Cambridge Texts and Studies 2, 3 (Cambridge, 1893), 80, line 12; cited by Prestige^2, 65.

[125] Cat. 14. 24.

[126] Prestige^2, 66. Again it may be emphasized that such expressions and thinking have sound foundations in the Old Testament with its concept of Yahweh's lordship and supervision over the affairs of men — "as the Lord wills" could apply to all sorts of details of life. Here the background lies within the central area of Old Testament thought, and not merely in Jewish apocalyptic. But the vocabulary to express these notions is decidedly Greek.

[127] Ibid., 65.

G. Pre-Christian Background for the "Shady" Use of *oikonomia* as an "Accommodation" in Ethical Matters

It has long been recognized that the word *oikonomia* has the meaning "accommodation" in patristic application to moral conduct, especially often in connection with the exegesis of biblical passages where the actions of a patriarch or saint seem on the surface subethical; *oikonomia* here signifies an "arrangement" which is of doubtful propriety on the surface but which is justified by ultimate purposes or factors, sometimes revealed only later on by God himself or the subsequent, inspired interpreter.[128]

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[128] For examples of such a use of *oikonomia* in the fathers, cf. *supra*, 2f., notes 1-3. The definition given for *oikonomia* in Athanasius' *Epistle to Amoun* (*PG* 26. 1173) is suggestive: "with regard to the same action, it is not lawful to do it under one circumstance and at one time, but under another circumstance it is both conveniently forgiven and acquiesced to" (τὸ αὐτὸ κατά τι μὲν καὶ κατὰ καιρὸν οὐκ ἔξεστιν, κατά τι δὲ καὶ εὐκαίρως ἀφίεται καὶ συγκεχώρηται). The sense of "accommodation" for the word is recognized by a number of scholars in the summaries *supra*; Newman, 16ff.; Harnack, 27ff.; Prestige, 66, 70; Alivisatos, 83; and Lillge, 88.

This sense of "economy" has been the despair of translators, and they have adopted a variety of English terms to get at the exact sense, including "discretion," "concession," "reserve," "act of policy," "connivance in sharp practice," "economical behavior," and "maneuver."[129]

Now in the light of our examination of the non-Christian, prepatristic usages of oikonomia, this well-established sense of "accommodation" for the term later on would seem to have definite roots in certain earlier associations of the family of words.

In the first place, oikonomia in its primary meaning of household management had, almost from the outset, acquired a connotation of shrewdness and business acumen, somewhat akin to the tone of connivance and discretion implied by the word later on. Already in Xenophon's pioneer treatise on the subject, oikonomia smacks of keen estate management, signifying "the science by which men can increase estates" through clever, though not illegal, practices.[130] It was the kind of knowledge and virtue that a practical-minded Greek appreciated, and its broad subject matter at that early date included the policy that a man skilled in oikonomia could use even his enemies to make a profit.[131] Thus the science was treasured by Athenians as an orderly and scientific method for improving one's estate in order to live "well" (eu), an adverb which was increasingly interpreted in the popular mind to mean "lavishly."[132]

By Aristotle's day, oikonomia, we saw, was commonly equated with mere money-making and it apparently suggested a program of devices and techniques for securing a rich and wealthy mode of living; against such views Aristotle himself urged a more humanitarian concept of the science and sought to purify it of the crass connotations it had begun to take on.[133] His philosophical approach to household management did not stem the materialistic tide, however, and the old trend of associations continued. Pseudo-Aristotle's Oeconomica represented, in part, at least, a handbook on more dubious, but effective, ways for expanding a state's revenue.[134] Many a teacher must have given sophistic instruction on methods for bigger and better household management in the Hellenistic age, and in Roman times Philodemus suggests this popular impression about oikonomia was still dominant when he argues vigorously at the outset of his essay on the topic that to live "well" is not to live lavishly, as the majority hold, but rather to live in accord with a mean of expediency.[135]

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[129] Most of these translations are employed by Prestige^2, 61ff.

[130] Supra, 162ff., especially Oec. 6. 4, quoted on 165, note 31.

[131] Oec. 1. 15; supra, 164, note 26.

[132] Supra, 165, cf. 167f.

Thus, from Xenophon on down to Roman times, this word, in its basic sense of household management, continually suggested shrewd, sharp practice in the popular mind, and even among the philosophers, who identified it as one of the virtues of the wise man, it had the notion of expediency.[136]

A second factor in pre-Christian usage to help shed light upon this "shady" meaning which oikonomia acquired is the kind of associations which the family of words took on in literary and rhetorical use. Here as an arrangement in a play or a speech, oikonomia could suggest a device which emphasizes expediency, or which makes the worse case appear the better, or which artfully conceals real intents, or which skillfully arranges dramatic details in a plot.[137] Thus in rhetoric the word comes in the course of time to take on the meaning of expedient arrangement of material for stating and winning a case. Dionysius of Halicarnassus in the late first century B.C. called oikonomia, or the arrangement of subject matter, the most artful part of rhetoric, because it conceals and implies and generally makes one's case as strong as the facts allow— stronger, sometimes, if the practitioner is capable enough! — and he himself allowed all sorts of tricks as part of the process.[138]

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[133] Supra, 170-179, especially 175-178 and note 61.

[134] Supra, 180-187, especially Book II, supra, 185-187.

[135] Supra, 188-200; the meaning of eu is discussed in Peri oik. Col. I. 3-21, cited supra, 194ff., note 105; Philodemus' concept of expediency is discussed, supra, 197-200.

[136] Cf. supra, 200ff. Note particularly that this same characteristic appears in Philo as typical of the wise man, supra, 207ff., notes 4-7.

Pseudo-Dionysius, writing in the same tradition a bit later on, took the term dioikēsis and applied it to this sort of rhetorical legerdemain; it meant the art of expedient and strategic arrangement of data, often saying one thing but actually meaning something else.[139] Later rhetoricians, generally Stoics, and presumably dating from the same general period when the New Testament documents and earliest patristic writings stem, we saw, used the word oikonomia to convey these same sorts of pragmatic tricks in arrangement.[140] Thus oikonomia came to mean in these schools of rhetorical science, specifically, an artificial order which is adopted for the sake of expediency to present and win a case, in distinction from taxis which stands for the original chronological order of events.[141] Here oikonomia

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[137] On oikonomia in literary arrangement in general, supra, 328ff.; on use by the scholiasts, 341ff.; on the use in rhetoric, 348ff.

[138] Supra, 359ff., especially 361-363 and 364f.

[139] Supra, 365-372.

[140] Supra, 372-383. It is to be observed that writers of Jewish background like Caecilius (supra, 363f.) and Philo (supra, 374, note 155) used these same rhetorical terms. Indeed, any distinction between oikonomia and

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taxis in the list of the parts of rhetoric which Philo gives at Somn. 1. 35 is difficult, as the note by F.H. Colson in his Loeb edition shows (Philo (London, 1949), 5, 604, "it is perhaps unusual to find both **τάξις** and **οἰκονομία**, the latter, which covers the management and organization of the material, either superseding the former, or including it as a subdivision"), unless some such differentiation as proposed above is borne in mind.

[141] Does this distinction in the rhetoricians between oikonomia and taxis shed any light on the use of the latter word in the famous phrase of Papias for describing the composition of the Second Gospel? The text, preserved in Euseb. Hist. Eccl. 3. 39. 15, reads: **Καὶ τοῦτο ὁ πρεσβύτερος ἔλεγεν· Μάρκος μὲν ἑρμηνευτὴς Πέτρου γενόμενος, ὅσα ἐμνημόνευσεν, ἀκριβῶς ἔγραψεν, οὐ μέντοι τάξει, τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἢ λεχθέντα ἢ πραχθέντα. οὔτε γὰρ ἤκουσε τοῦ κυρίου, οὔτε παρηκολούθησεν αὐτῷ, ὕστερον δέ, ὡς ἔφην, Πέτρῳ, ὃς πρὸς τὰς χρείας ἐποιεῖτο τὰς διδασκαλίας, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὥσπερ σύνταξιν τῶν κυριακῶν ποιούμενος λογίων, ὥστε οὐδὲν ἥμαρτε Μάρκος, οὕτως ἔνια γράψας ὡς ἀπεμνημόνευσεν. ἑνὸς γὰρ ἐποιήσατο πρόνοιαν, τοῦ μηδὲν ὧν ἤκουσε παραλιπεῖν ἢ ψεύσασθαί τι ἐν αὐτοῖς.** It may be rendered: "And this the Presbyter said: Mark, having become Peter's interpreter, as much as he remembered, wrote down precisely, not however in order, the things said or done by Christ. For he was not a hearer of the Lord, nor did he accompany him, but later on, as I said, accompanied Peter, who for the needs [of his hearers or of the situation] adapted his teachings, but not as if he were making a connected order of the Lord's discourses, so that Mark did not err in thus writing some of

meant "economic order," a deviation from, or rearrangement of, the facts as they had occurred, in order to place them in a more persuasive arrangement. It too must have contributed to the shady reputation which the word acquired.

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them as he recalled them. For he had one thing as his deliberate intent: to omit nothing of the things which he heard or to falsify nothing in them."

The key phrases in the passage, for our interests, οὐ μέντοι τάξει, and, following the reference to Peter's arrangement of his material to needs, ὥσπερ σύνταξιν τῶν κυριακῶν ποιούμενος λογίων are rendered by Kirsopp Lake (*Eusebius, The Ecclesiastical History* (Loeb Classical Library, 2 vols.; London, 1953) 1, 297), "not, indeed, in order . . . as necessity demanded, not making, as it were, an arrangement of the Lord's oracles." J.M.-F. Marique, *The Apostolic Fathers* (New York, 1947), 379, expresses it, "not in chronological order . . . adapted his instructions to the needs [of the hearers], but not with the object of making a connected series of the discourses of our Lord." The most thorough discussion to date of the passage, it is true, takes a slightly different line; J.A. Kleist, *Rereading the Papias Fragment on Mark* (St. Louis University Studies, Series A. Humanities, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1-17; St. Louis, 1945), more briefly reflected in his book *The Memoirs of Peter* (Milwaukee, 1932), 17-22, and quoted by Marique, 379, note 6, paraphrases it: "though by no means with full detail (though not without gaps in his narrative) . . . Peter did not intend to give a complete exposition of the Lord's ministry, but delivered his instructions to suit the varying needs of the people." This rendering for *taxei*, in the sense of "list," is supported by the papyri (cf. Moulton-Milligan, 7, 625), and is favored by M.S. Enslin, A final source in pre-Christian usage for the patristic sense of "accommodation" for the word oikonomia is the application which it already

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Christian Beginnings (New York, 1938), 384, who points out Papias is definitely defending Mark's gospel against accusations of some sort, feels "not in chronological order" is "not impossible" as a translation for οὐ μέντοι τάξει, but concludes the sense "not with the completeness of a list" is better, seen in the light of the comparative fulness of Matthew's account.

However, even in the face of such conclusions, the interpretation here suggested has some obvious points to recommend it. The criticism against which Papias is defending Mark could just as well be the charge of deliberate rearrangement of his materials, arrangement of pericopes and blocks of oral or written material in the light of dogmatic presuppositions about Jesus, what later generations have called the Marcan theory of the Messianic secret, which dominates the outline. It is to be noted too that the element of expediency which so often clusters about oikonomia in this sense is implied in the procedure of Peter's teaching: he adapted it to the needs of his hearers or situations. This seems akin to the notion of economical order which shifts the arrangement to meet the need; perhaps the implication is that Peter's preaching already practiced a selective arrangement of material, rather than a set, chronological outline, and this Mark inherited from him. Finally notice how such an interpretation of the meaning of the passage, that Mark wrote "not in chronological order" but (it is hinted) with economic or expedient order, fits in with modern rediscovery of the purpose and structure of Mark: that the Second Gospel is in no sense strict biography or history, nor does it provide an infallible skeleton to outline the career of Jesus, as Form Criticism shows; instead, it had in pagan sources to ethical matters, as when it is employed to stand for expedient actions which are in accord with inner purposes, the significance of which may not appear on the surface.[142] Thus, for instance, the word could convey the idea of one's actual policy in distinction to an apparent or intended one.[143] So too in Epictetus the phrase κατ' οἰκονομίαν appears with a meaning along these lines, suggesting an action done out of clever calculation or the direction of acts in accordance with an inner purpose.[144] In later Stoics such applications became more obvious, in Marcus Aurelius, for instance,[145] but already in writers prior to the second century A.D. significant examples had occurred.

In connection with this usage of the word *oikonomia* for moral matters of either a good or bad sort, it must also be noted that the general concept of a divine economy in the universe, as developed by the Stoics, sometimes allowed ethical implications which writers extracted from it.[146] This divine administration was regarded at times as the starting point for ethical discussion.[147] What is more, the idea that the order and arrangement

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is witness literature to Jesus as Lord, with certain underlying theological presuppositions. It is always dangerous to argue, of course, that ancient comments affirm modern critical views, and the entire matter requires deeper study. At the least, such a re-examination of the passage would seem worthwhile.

[142] *Supra*, 383ff.

[143] Polyb. 2. 47. 10; *supra*, 384, note 169.

[144] Arr. *Epict*. *Diss*. 3. 14. 7; *supra*, 385f., notes 171-172.

[145] *Med*. 11. 18. 5; *supra*, 387f., note 173.

[146] *Supra*, 430ff.

[147] Plut. *De* *Stoic*. *repugn*. 9 (*Mor*. 1035C), *SVF* 3, 17, 3-7 (*frag*. 68), cited *supra*, 432, note 62.

of this divine rule in the world could be discerned in nature led to the notion that there must be a divine pedagogy — man can learn from what he sees in God's administration of the universe — and human conduct in some sense should be instructed by and parallel the divine economy.[148] This meant, of course, that man's actions should imitate God's, and the emphasis of such conformity to the divine economy would usually inculcate such virtues as dependability, order, and unity; where, however, the deity is depicted as winking at shady practices or playing a part in them himself, the way is opened for his devotees to act in a similar fashion, still imitating the god. Thus when the church fathers expound on certain happenings in the Old Testament, for example, as "divine economies," as we shall note in a moment, the possibility was available for them also to allow such actions to themselves and the Christians of their day, in line with this pagan precedent that the divine economy has implications for human conduct.

Here, then, are possible roots in pre-Christian, pagan usage of the word oikonomia to account for the shady sense of "accommodation" it took on in the fathers. In popular speech, as applied to household management, it suggested shrewd, sharp actions; in rhetoric, it came to mean a type of arrangement that reshuffled the facts so as to gloss over difficulties and persuade hearers the more readily by a host of tricks and devices; and in ethical application it suggested at times clever, calculated ordering of one's acts to achieve an interior, often unexpressed purpose, even by pretending or feigning externally to effect that policy. In most of these uses, oikonomia conveyed a notion of expediency, which in an age of what has been called "decadent philosophizing" in the second century came to be regarded as "a legitimate philosophical argument"[149] and the basis, popularly, for much of life, so that what was expedient sometimes stood in the common mind in contrast to the idea of what was right or just. Oikonomia, with its connotations of expedient arrangement to attain a goal by one shrewd means or another, suited just such a temper of the times.

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[148] Cf., e.g., the views of Dio Chrysostom and Epictetus, supra, 457ff.

It would appear, from my own preliminary examination of the evidence, that Philo was a significant link between these shrewd and shady connotations oikonomia had begun to acquire in pre-Christian Greek usage, particularly in connection with ethical matters, and the patristic application to the moral conduct of individuals, either in biblical passages or contemporary situations, as an "accommodation." Philo seems to have employed this very word in explaining the deeper, economic meaning of certain unsavory details in Old Testament narratives, thus connecting the word and concept with scripture for the first time apparently. What is more impressive, he does this with some of the very same passages that later fathers also explain as "economies"! In conclusion, then, two examples will be cited to demonstrate this point and to suggest the import of Philo in grasping how this pagan background for oikonomia that implied a shady arrangement of affairs with a deeper meaning came into association with biblical exegesis and the meaning of moral actions in the scriptures.

The first case has to do with Genesis 27, where Jacob tricks his brother Essau out of his birthright and the blessing of their father Isaac. In verse 16 Rebekah puts goatskins on the hands and neck of Jacob to disguise him as his more hairy, older brother Esau. Philo in his comment first observes the obvious, literal meaning and then goes on to point out the deeper one, and this has to do with economic conduct, for which he gives an interesting series of analogies from the theater and medical ethics:

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[149] E.R. Goodenough, The Theology of Justin Martyr (Jena, 1923), 67f.

> The literal meaning is clear and apparent, (namely) that it was for the sake of being unknown and that (his father) might not understand and that when he [Jacob] was in his presence he might not seem to be who he (really) was but might seem to be the brother who was absent. And she threw the skins of goats over his arms and naked neck because the latter (Esau) was hairy. But as for the deeper meaning, the arms and the back of the neck are stronger than all of man's (other) limbs, and they are smooth. And the wise man is gleaming and naked to truth; and just as in the case of the other virtues, so also does he in pure fashion exhibit and practise and pursue courage. And if it sometimes happens that he conceals this and makes it hairy because of the necessity of the occasion, and uses economy,[d] he still remains in the same state and does not retreat from his original purpose, but because of involuntary occurrences he changes to another kind of form, as in a theatre, for the benefit of the spectators. For this is just what physicians are accustomed to do, for they change the foods of ill persons, and their places (of residence) and the ways (of living) which they had before their illness. And the physician who is skilled in worldly matters does foolish things for a time (but) wisely, and unlasciviously and moderately does lecherous things, and bravely does cowardly things, and righteously does unrighteous things. And sometimes he will speak falsehoods, not being a liar, and he will deceive, not being a deceiver, and he will insult, not being an insulter.[150]

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[150] Quaest. in Gen. 4. 204 (Gen. 27: 16), translation from the Armenian by R. Marcus, Philo, Supplement I, Questions and Answers on Genesis (Loeb Classical Library, London, 1953), 498-500. At 499, note d, Marcus gives

So then Philo here explains away the deceit by Rebekah and Jacob as an arrangement or economy (oikonomia) characteristic of the wise man. Such a man, in order to achieve his ultimate purpose, has the right to use all sorts of questionable means, employing foolish-looking, lecherous, or unrighteous actions, which in reality are to be considered as wise and proper; he can lie and play-act as part of his economy, all to achieve the desired end.

Other details in the same chapter are similarly interpreted. Thus, in commenting on 27: 18-19, Philo poses the question, "Why, when his father asks, 'Who art thou, son?' does Jacob reply, 'I am Esau, thy first-born. I have done as thou hast told me'?" Then he answers in regard to the literal meaning of the passage:

> Again he [Jacob] will seem to be a deceiver, although he is not to be thought (to be connected) with any evil.[b] For calumniators[c] call the dispensation of virtue[d] deceit and fraud.[e] And what dispensation is better than when one does not ascribe good things and virtues to those who wish to live shamefully and disgracefully?[f] But let the spy say when he is caught, "I am not an enemy but a friend"; and if this be not praised, and his words have no place, let him say these words, "I hastened to you of my own accord, condemning my own (side)." Let the

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the underlying Greek for the passage we are concerned with, which he also cites in volume 2 of his Loeb edition, Supplement II, Questions and Answers on Exodus (London, 1953), Appendix A, Greek Fragments, page 230, from Vatican MS 1553, headed Φίλωνος· ἐκ τοῦ δ' τῶν ἐν Γενέσει ζητημάτων. It reads: Ὥσπερ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς ὁ ἀστεῖος, οὕτως καὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν καθαρῶς ἐπιτετηδευκῶς, ἐάν που ταύτην ἐπισκιάζῃ χάριν, καιρῶν οἰκονομίᾳ χρῆται. Χάριν he suggests is a corruption perhaps for καὶ τραχύνῃ.

general speak of making war when he is doing the work of peace, or in the time of peace when he is thinking of drawing up his line of battle.[a] Let the king also put on the guise of a commoner if he is not able in any other way to obtain benefit for his realm and his subjects. And let the master (put on the guise) of a slave in order not to be ignorant of anything that is done in the house.[151]

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[151] Ibid., 4. 206 (Gen. 27: 18-19), in Marcus' translation, 1, 501f. Marcus' notes read as follows:

[b] The Arm. text is not altogether clear. Aucher renders, "rursum fallax esse putetur nullo cum malo reputandus": OL "item fallax esse videtur a bonis emotis pravitate negotationum." Procopius' paraphrase reads πάλιν ἀπατεὼν εἶναι δόξει τοῖς μὴ τὴν κατ' ἀρετὴν σκοποῦσιν οἰκονομίαν.

[c] οἱ συκοφάνται: OL "calumniatores."

[d] τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς οἰκονομίαν (cf. the end of the preceding sentence in the Greek frag. from Procopius): OL "pro virtutate acquisita."

[e] The Procopius fragment lacks this sentence.

[f] OL reads unintelligibly "quid autem dispensabilius utilitati quam optime studiosa turpissimi quoque et scrupulosae vitae homines et optimi viri exquirunt?" Procopius is briefer and clearer, ἡ δὲ οἰκονομία πρὸς τὸ μὴ τοῖς ἀναξίοις δίδοσθαι τὰ καλά. The original probably meant that Esau did not merit the status of first-born. . . .

[a] The Arm. is apparently defective. One expects the latter part of the sentence to read "or in time of peace let him think of drawing up his line of battle."

The Greek passages from Procopius, out of which phrases are here cited, are printed in their entirety by Marcus, 2, 231. It is to be noted that

Here Philo applies the term oikonomia to that type of conduct, involving feigning and pretense that is so familiar in the later Stoics and the fathers. Some people may call this type of conduct fraud and deceit, but Philo speaks of it with approval and uses it to explain Jacob's lie. It is not a lie, but an economic action, an ethical arrangement of the truth which, while it may appear of dubious merit on the surface, actually has a deeper and more allowable meaning underneath. The wise man speaks falsehoods, but is not actually in an economy to be reckoned as a liar![152] God seemingly approves, and the wise man may imitate this conduct.

Even Isaac's blindness, which helped Jacob's trickery succeed, is called an economy by Philo in his explanation of this chapter. Thus, in dealing

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the phrase translated above "to obtain benefit for his realm" in connection with a king disguising himself as a commoner, is represented in both Greek traditions, in Vatican MS 1553 and in Procopius, by the words τὸ συμφέρον... λαβεῖν. Dispensational conduct is thus again brought into relation with "what is expedient." Is there any possibility, we may also ask, that the figures about the king or the master in the passage above ever served as any sort of analogy to the incarnation? or to the idea that the incarnate Christ economically tricked the devil, his flesh serving as bait over the fishhook of his divinity in the Christus Victor theme?

[152] With this idea, cf. ibid., 4. 67 (Gen. 20: 10-11), Marcus 1, 346, and 2, 219, where it is stated concerning the fact that Abraham lied to Abimelech over Sarah: "Not all the truth is to be told to all men; hence also now the wise man manages the whole affair with an alteration and change of names [i.e., from wife to sister]." οὐ πάντα ἀληθῆ λεκτέον ἅπασιν· ὅθεν καὶ νῦν ὁ ἀστεῖος ὅλον οἰκονομεῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα μεταθέσει καὶ ἀπαλλαγῇ τῶν ὀνομάτων.

with the question about verse 1, "What is the meaning of the words, 'After Isaac became old, his eyes became weak in seeing'?" Philo explains:

> Those who give a literal explanation say that because of a dispensation[j] the prophet failed in sight, and afterwards was again established and became keen of sight. But the dispensation was a blessing, not that a wicked man but one deserving of blessings might obtain it. To me they seem to give a plausible explanation.[153]

The implication is that providence too took a hand in this economic arrangement of events, so that by a divine economy Isaac's sight failed for the time and he blessed Jacob rather than Esau!

Now it is to be recalled that a passage in another essay by Philo, *De Virtutibus*, also includes the word *oikonomia* with reference to the Jacob and Esau story. He wrote there: "Again, of the one who was approved as heir [Isaac], two twins were begotten, although they bore no resemblance to each other, either in body or in disposition" and then the phrase is added, "except in the hands and in these on account of some sort of economy (ἕνεκά τινος οἰκονομίας)."[154] Cohn, it is true, has bracketed the words in his critical edition of Philo, but, in the face of these existing Philonic interpretations elsewhere, the genuineness of the phrase seems more probable. Colson in his note on the passage points out that both Clement and Chrysostom refer to this very action in the Old Testament as an economy, something that is typological and prophetic, but not really an act of deceit.[155] Thus there seems ground for supposing that in Philo this passage was already explained as economic behavior, and the fathers were merely following his precedent; and Philo, we have argued, was in accord with older Greek usage when he used the word oikonomia in this shady sense.

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[153] *Ibid*. 4. 196 (Gen. 27: 1), in Marcus' translation, 1, 484f. Note j reads: "διὰ χορηγίαν or οἰκονομίαν; Aucher "propter dispensationem aliquam": OL "pro quadam utilitate."

[154] *De Virtutibus* 38 (208), in the edition by L. Cohn and P. Wendland, *Philonis Alexandrini Opera Quae Supersunt* (Berlin, 1896-1930), 5, 330, 13ff.: πάλιν ἐκ τοῦ δοκιμασθέντος κληρονόμου δύο δίδυμοι γεννῶνται μηδὲν [ὅτι μὴ χεῖρας καὶ ταύτας ἕνεκά τινος οἰκονομίας] ὅμοιον ἐπιφερόμενοι, μήτε τοῖς σώμασι μήτε ταῖς γνώμαις.

The other case deals with the story in Genesis 19 of how Lot's two daughters, after the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, believing that no other people were left on the face of the earth, got their father drunk with wine and then lay with him, so that they might preserve the human race by offspring through their father. Of this incestuous union, according to the biblical account, were born Moab and Ben-ammi, ancestors of the traditional enemies of Israel, the Moabites and the Ammonites. Philo, in the Armenian version of his Questions and Answers on Genesis, explains regarding the daughters of Lot, "In the belief that (they were showing) foresight (and) that (the earth) might not be devastated and remain desolate and that the human race might not be destroyed, they rushed into an audacious act to overcome their helplessness in this matter and their difficulties."[156] In a Greek fragment, however, preserved in Procopius of Gaza in the early sixth century and attributed to Philo by several scholars, the word oikonomia is employed to describe this conduct and turn of events.[157] On the verse (Gen. 19: 33) "And they made their father drink wine at night," the fragment comments, "Through the fact that they say, 'There is no man on the earth who will enter in to us,' they show that not incontinent passion drove them to this but preservation of the race, whence they are very pardonable. . . . Thus there was some sort of arrangement (οἰκονομία τις) also in the case of the daughters of Lot, since what happened did not occur because of licentiousness and mere fleshly lust for children."[158] Here then the case of Lot's incest is explained to have a far deeper and more

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[155] F.H. Colson, Philo (Loeb Classical Library, London, 1939), 8, 290, note b, with a much longer discussion in the Appendix, 449f. He quotes the phrase that Clement Strom. 2. 19, (99, 3) adds after summarizing Philo's remarks about Jacob and Esau, ἡ δὲ οἰκονομία αὕτη καὶ προφητικὴ καὶ τυπική, and he also calls attention to the statement in Chrysostom, "Jacob has deceived his father, but it was not an ἀπατή but an οἰκονομία." Colson himself feels the phrase may be spurious but is unwilling to reject it so completely as Cohn does. This sort of explanation in the fathers, of course, justifying such dubious actions as divine, gives them more latitude for economic conduct as they imitate God.

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[156] Quaest. in Gen. 4. 55 (Gen. 19: 30), translation by Marcus (cited supra, 597, note 150), 1, 336.

[157] The Procopius passage, in Cod. Aug. f. 104v, is assigned to Philo by Marcus, ibid., 2, 219, and earlier also by P. Wendland, Neu entdeckte Fragmente Philos (Berlin, 1891), 77.

[158] The text, as reprinted by Marcus, ibid., reads: ἐπότισαν δὲ τον πατέρα αὐτῶν οἶνον ἐν νυκτί. ... δι' ὧν δέ φασι, "καὶ οὐδείς ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ὃς εἰσελεύσεται πρὸς ἡμᾶς," δεικνύουσιν ὡς οὐ πάθος ἀκολασίας ἤλασεν αὐτὰς ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ φειδῷ τοῦ γένους, ὅθεν εὐσύγγνωστοι. ... οὕτως οἰκονομία τις ἦν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν θυγατέρων τοῦ Λώτ, ἐπειδὴ μὴ δι' ἀκολασίαν καὶ παίδων ἐπιθυμίαν τὸ γεγονός.

Other passages in Procopius also refer to the events of Gen. 19 as an economy. Commentarii in Genesin 139 (PG 87. 1, 377B): "And the two daughters of Lot conceived from their father. Thus there was an economy of God, just as also in the case of Tamar." καὶ συνέλαβον αἱ δύω θυγατέρες Λὼτ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτῶν. οὕτως ἦν οἰκονομία θεοῦ, noble meaning, as an economy, according to the Armenian text and, using the term oikonomia, according to the Greek cited for Philo on the passage.

Now the point of further significance to observe is that Irenaeus also, a century or more later, refers to this same incident in Genesis 19 as an economy or divine dispensation, which contains a greater meaning than any mere surface appraisal of the facts would indicate. Irenaeus brings up this example to illustrate his point that nothing is ever meaningless in scripture. "Lot, not out of his own will," wrote Irenaeus, "nor out of his lust for the flesh, . . . carried out a type. As the scripture says, 'And the older daughter went in and slept with her father that night, and Lot did not know when she slept and when she got up.' And with the younger, likewise. 'And he did not know,' it says, 'when she slept with him and when she got up.'" Then the passage goes on, in both Greek and Latin, "Although Lot did not know about it and he was not enslaved to lust, there was accomplished an 'arrangement' (Greek, οἰκονομία; Latin, dispensatio), through which the two daughters, i.e., the two synagogues," the Greek

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ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς Θάμαρ. And ibid., 190 (474A): (referring to Tamar's becoming pregnant in Gen. 38 by her father-in-law, Judah) "And she conceived in her womb from him. Thus there was an economy of some sort also in the case of the daughters of Lot." καὶ ἐν γαστρὶ ἔλαβον ἐξ αὐτου. οὕτως οἰκονομία τις ἦν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν θυγατέρων τοῦ Λώτ. Philo's Quaest. in Gen. does not treat any material beyond 28: 9, and it is not certain that he intended to comment on the whole book (cf. Marcus, 1, xi); however, the association of the stories about Lot's daughters and Tamar in Procopius suggests that Philo's explanation of Gen. 38 would again have been along the lines of an economy.

concludes, "were signified being made pregnant from one and the same father without lust of the flesh. For there was no one else there who could give them seed of life and fruit of children, as the scripture says."[159] Certainly the explanation of the happening as an *oikonomia* is similar in tone to the explanation attributed to Philo, and the word involved combines the nuances of a divine arrangement in history, of a typological proceeding in the Old Testament with deeper meaning for Christians, and of an economical sort of action that has a more honorable meaning than appears on first glance.[160]

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[159] *Adv. Haer.* 4. 31. 1: Etenim Lot non ex sua voluntate, neque ex sua concupiscentia carnali, . . . consummavit typum. Quemadmodum Scriptura dicit: "Et intravit major nata, et dormivit cum patre suo nocte illa: et non scivit Lot cum dormiret illa, et cum surgeret." Et in minore hoc idem: "Et non scivit," inquit, "cum dormisset secum, nec cum surrexisset." Nesciente igitur homine, neque libidini serviente, dispensatio perficiebatur, per quam duae filiae, id est, duae synagogae, ab uno et eodem patre in sobolem adoptatae significantur sine carnis libidine. Nec enim alter erat aliquis, qui semen vitale et filorum fructum posset dare eis, quemadmodum scriptum est. The extant Greek reads: μὴ εἰδότος τοῦ Λώτ, μηδὲ ἡδονῇ δουλεύσαντος, οἰκονομία ἐπετελεῖτο, δι' ἧς αἱ δύο συναγωγαὶ ἀπὸ ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πατρὸς τεκνοποιησάμεναι ἐμηνύοντο ἄνευ σαρκὸς ἡδονῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἄλλος οὐδεὶς σπέρμα ζωτικὸν καὶ τέκνων ἐπικαρπίαν δυνάμενος δοῦναι αὐταῖς, καθὼς γέγραπται.

The Latin, of course, reads a bit differently in the latter part of the section: ". . . two synagogues are signified adopted in lineage by one and the same father. . . ."

This particular section in Irenaeus where the discussion about Genesis 19 occurs has been referred to as "a single theological document" running over several chapters "in connection with the utilization of the pious of the Old Testament" as illustration, and has been assigned more specifically to what Harnack called the "Presbyter-preacher source" for Irenaeus: Harnack terms it a presbyter's homily, dated perhaps A.D. 165/70, which is directed against Marcionite criticism of the Old Testament.[161] It is worth speculating whether perhaps this Presbyter-preacher of Asia Minor, in defending the Old Testament, may not have fallen back upon some of the arguments and devices which Philo had employed in championing the Old Testament to the philosophers and critics of the Greek world in his day. Thus, if there is anything to this line of thought, we have the possibility that Philo, following trends and associations which the word oikonomia already had in its pagan Greek background, explained certain unsavory moral happenings in the Old Testament as economies or "arrangements" and that the church fathers like Irenaeus, perhaps with such men as the Presbyter-preacher of Asia Minor as a connecting link, took up this same word, to speak of these embarrassing elements in scripture as "accommodations." Scholars have long ago pointed out similarities between the idea of accommodation as a doctrine in Philo and in patristic writers like Justin, Clement, and Origen.[162] Origen, in fact, even explained that it was the Word of God who arranged for certain things to be placed throughout the midst of the law and history in the Old Testament as sources of offense, as it were, and impossibilities, to be cleared up by the gifted exegete, so that also the difficulties of scripture become part of the over-all economy of God![163] Thus the idea of accommodation, especially in ethical matters, and particularly in Old Testament interpretation, is no novel invention of the fathers but seems to extend in terms of influence from Philo to the Christian writers.

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[160] Prestige^2, 67, gives the word here the sense of a divine merciful dispensation in revelation and prophecy, and Lillge, 43, calls it a typological proceeding in the Old Testament.

[161] A. Harnack, "Der Presbyter Prediger des Irenäus (IV, 27, 1 - 32, 1). Bruchstücke und Nachklänge der altesten exegetischen-polemischen Homilieen," Philotesia: Paul Kleinert zum LXX. Geburtstag (Berlin: Trowitzsch and Son, 1907), 5-36. The opinion that it is a single theological document had previously been expressed by T. Zahn and is cited by Harnack, even though he himself feels there are several sources which need to be separated in the chapters. Cf. Lillge, 52f., who feels that in the Presbyter we see an already traditional foundation for Irenaeus' heilsgeschichtlich theology.

It is possible that the broad lines of development being sketched here are all too tenuous, as speculative as some of the theories of Philo himself. However, the tentative suggestion is offered that the notion of "accommodation" attaching to patristic usage of oikonomia has roots in earlier, pagan associations of the word, and that Philo, taking these over, provides a significant link for explaining the patristic senses. These are steps of development, put forth as a theory warranting further investigation, to explain the meaning of "maneuver" or "accommodation" or "God-pleasing pliancy"[164] given to oikonomia in some passages of the church fathers.

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[162] Cf. Carl Siegfried, Philo von Alexandria als Ausleger des Alten Testaments (Jena, 1875), 199ff. On the influence upon Justin, cf. 333; on Clement, 344; and on Origen, 351ff.

[163] De prin. 4. 15: ᾠκονόμησέ τινα οἱονεὶ σκάνδαλα καὶ προσκόμματα καὶ ἀδύνατα διὰ μέσου ἐγκαταταχθῆναι τῷ νόμῳ καὶ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος.

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[164] The phrase is coined by H.A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers (Cambridge, 1956), 1, 474.

3. Significance of the Findings for Future Work

The aim of this dissertation has been to present a fairly full collection of evidence on the non-Christian, prepatristic usages of *oikonomia* and its related terms in Greek sources of all sorts and to attempt from this evidence to sketch the background against which all applications of these words in the New Testament and the church fathers must be assessed. It thus provides a base for a more precise determination by future investigation of the history of the concepts and motifs associated with these terms in the early Christian centuries.

Our own survey of the previous literature on the topic, plus the collection of the evidence itself, and the summation of this evidence and suggestive application of it to recognized problems in Christian thought has indicated quite clearly what steps are now needed in any such future investigation.

First, there must be a thorough examination of all these words in Jewish sources: viz., the Septuagint; Philo, including the *Questions and Answers on Genesis* and *on Exodus*, and taking cognizance of the problems of text involved and the witness of the translations of Philo into other languages; then Josephus, especially in connection with his concept of God's reign and his views on history; and all other Jewish literature available, such as the *Letter of Aristeas*, noncanonical works like the *Testament of Abraham*, and fragments of minor writers, like Artapanus. It would be well to check the use of loan words from the stem *oikonomein* in rabbinical literature, and also it is essential to think, not merely in terms of word occurrence, but also in terms of ideas, so as to be aware, for example, of the whole Old Testament emphasis upon the reign of God as a background for

Christian use of these terms, or of the dispensational view of history found in the P writer as a source later reflected in covenant theology.

As a second step, in the light of the Greek and Jewish background there can be a more adequate reappraisal of the usage of the terms in the earliest Christian literature, both canonical and extracanonical, like the Apostolic Fathers. Is it possible, for example, that one of the most determinative contributions made by any figure in the early church was that of the author of Ephesians, when he brought the kerygmatic emphasis of the apostolic preaching, that God's reign is breaking into the world with the coming of Jesus Christ and the new age, into association with the existing pagan philosophical concept of a divine administration of the world? The result of such a combination, whoever originated it, was an _oikonomia_ type of theology in which the Christ-event was central and all else seen in relation to it: Christ became _the_ expression of the divine plan or scheme of things. But in this sort of _heilsgeschichtlich_ or covenantal thought, the word _oikonomia_ could be applied not only to the over-all plan, but also to different parts of it — thus, out of this method of thinking, the word might refer in the fathers to various aspects of the Christ-event such as the passion or death or resurrection of Jesus or, as so commonly later on, the incarnation. But it might also be applied to other elements which were viewed then as part and parcel of the divine scheme of things to which Christ offered the clue — the happenings of Old Testament history, for instance, the events of contemporary history, the workings of providence in men's lives, even the intellectual development of the Greek world prior to Christ's coming, all these things could be and were brought into connection with the economy of God. Over against such possibilities a sober examination of the evidence in primitive Christian literature is called for.

Thirdly, there will then be needed a thorough historical analysis of the continuing development of the terms and concepts in the second and third centuries A.D. in non-Christian sources, and in heretical and semi-heretical materials. The parade of new meanings for oikonomia and its family of words did not necessarily come to a halt with the writing of the New Testament, and one must expect new shades of meaning, not only in Christian, but also in non-Christian writers. If the pagan examples we have collected for the period prior to A.D. 100 are significant, those in non-Christian sources from the ensuing centuries would most likely prove so also. Specific authors and bodies of literature to be tackled here include philosophers like Marcus Aurelius, popular texts like the magical papyri, religious documents like the Hermetic corpus, and the confused, unmapped, but immensely rewarding landscape of gnostic and semignostic materials, including all sorts of apocryphal New Testament writings, especially the hoard of documents found in 1946 at Chenoboskion, Egypt.[1] The import of these gnostic applications for understanding orthodox terminology has repeatedly been emphasized, and this is a task of research that appears particularly necessary.

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[1] On these finds, perhaps more significant than the highly publicized Dead Sea Scrolls, cf. the preliminary reports in Vigiliae Christianae, especially the articles by T. Mina, "Le papyrus gnostique du Musée Copte," Vol. II, No. 3 (July, 1948), 129-136; J. Doresse, "Trois livres gnostiques inédits," ibid., 137-160; and J. Doresse and T. Mina, "Nouveaux textes gnostiques coptes découverts en Haute-Egypte," Vol. III, No. 3 (July, 1949), 129-141. A briefer account is given by V.R. Gold, "The Gnostic Library of Chenoboskion," The Biblical Archeologist, Vol. XV, No. 4 (December, 1952), 70-88.

In the fourth place, one may venture to suggest a further examination of developments beyond Origen. If the course of development for meanings for oikonomia did not stop with the end of the first century A.D., it is not likely that it stopped with the middle of the third either. After Origen the words take on yet new senses, such as "alms" or "the administration [of the Eucharist]," and the turns of meaning given to these words especially in Eusebius and Marcellus of Ancyra, to mention two outstanding examples, clamor for a more painstaking investigation than has been made thus far.

Finally it can be suggested that even the ground covered in some detail by Lillge in his dissertation may profitably be examined again in the light of the fuller evidence from pre-Christian materials which is here amassed and in the face of what future investigations here proposed might turn up.[2] Indeed, while Lillge's general conclusion, that oikonomia has three main applications in the church fathers, may prove quite correct and there may be no need to supplement it extensively, nonetheless a more specific and detailed background for each of these three uses may now already be suggested from our present study.

The primary emphasis on Heilsgeschichte, which he found embodied above all in Irenaeus, the concept of a divine economy or administration of things, affecting nature and history, in which God acts to redeem men, may now be seen foreshadowed in some sense in Stoic thought and in certain historians. The possibility of gnostic influence seems especially pertinent.

The trinitarian usage of the terms which he saw especially in the writings of Tertullian, we may now say, seems to have distinct parallel in the current concepts of government and the comparison of them with the divine administration of the world by God, of which many a writer spoke.

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[2] For Lillge's views, cf. supra, 88f.

And even the pedagogical application, which Lillge discovered particularly in Clement, may have its background in Stoic thought. The notion of some Greek philosophers, that there is a divine administration of the universe and that one must learn of this through observation of nature, acquiesce to it, and even imitate it, opened the door to a divine pedagogy, and Clement, like these Stoics, associates the pedagogical sense of the term with an administration of God in the universe. Such a pedagogical sense, also, we saw, opened the way to bad, as well as good, ethical applications and to the whole principle of economic conduct, patterned at times after God's.[3]

Lillge was unquestionably more right even than he knew: oikonomia is "in itself capable of a many-sided application."[4] Our investigation of pre-Christian usage confirms this and provides meaningful insight into the patristic senses, in some cases the only explanation for turns of meaning that can really be offered. But such insights are to be demonstrated only by careful and thoroughgoing searching out of the evidence, and this dissertation has attempted to provide the essential foundations toward future work in what has been urged as "a still more exact presentation of the history of the term οἰκονομία."[5]

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[3] Supra, f., especially, and the line of application suggested in note 155.

[4] Lillge, 1.

[5] Hugo Rahner, S.J., Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, 61 (1937), 299.